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Abstract 
This thesis explores the repercussions of the establishment of Soviet hegemony in 
Eastern Europe in the USSR itself, especially Ukraine. In order to trace the changing 
character and claims of national and supra-national identities in the different regions 
of Ukraine, I identify various „official‟ contexts in which Soviet citizens discussed 
and observed developments in the satellite states. I argue that Soviet portrayals of 
Eastern Europe were inconsistent and even contradictory, shaped as they were by 
complex interactions between party officials in Moscow, Kyiv, and the provinces. 
From the Hungarian uprising in 1956 to the Solidarity crisis in the early 1980s, 
CPSU leaders perceived ethnic diversity as a threat to Soviet stability. They 
sponsored various images of the people‟s democracies to promote Soviet patriotism, 
which they mobilised to bridge or even obliterate ethnic divisions in the USSR. Yet 
they never agreed upon a common definition of the Soviet „patriot‟, outlining various 
roles which workers, non-Russian intellectuals, and west Ukrainians would play in 
the unified „Soviet‟ community. Influenced by events in the people‟s democracies, 
they variously framed „Soviet‟ identity in ethnically exclusive East Slavic terms or in 
the rhetoric of „working class solidarity‟. My thesis demonstrates that the „diffusion‟ 
of ideas across borders, alongside modernisation and social mobilisation, was a 
crucial factor which contributed towards the rise of Soviet patriotism in Ukraine. 
Through contrasting a homogeneous „Soviet nation‟ to other peoples of Eastern 
Europe, party leaders inadvertently encouraged Soviet Jews, Poles, Hungarians, and 
Ukrainians to protect their linguistic and cultural interests more vigorously. 
However, with „official Ukrainianness‟ increasingly confined to the sphere of low-
culture, most residents of the republic downplayed their ethnic identities and 
identified themselves as „Soviet‟. Thus, they sought to ease access to information 
and obtain material benefits from the state.  
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Note on Spelling and Transliteration 
I use the Library of Congress transliteration system for Russian and Ukrainian. 
Czech, Hungarian, Polish and Slovak terms have been anglicised to exclude 
diacritics. 
For the sake of consistency, all place names in Ukraine are given in the Ukrainian 
version. They therefore differ from some well-established forms which the English 
reader may be accustomed to: I have, for example, chosen to write Kyiv, L‟viv and 
Odesa rather than Kiev, L‟vov and Odessa. 
Wherever the sources allow me to ascertain that a particular individual lived in 
Soviet Ukraine, I cite names, patronymics and surnames in the Ukrainian form. I 
thus refer to Volodymyr Shcherbyts‟kyi rather than Vladimir Shcherbitskii. In 
ambiguous cases, such as the member of the CPU Central Committee in Kyiv 
Mykola Pidhornyi who then became better known as Nikolai Podgornyi after 
moving to the CPSU Central Committee in Moscow, I provide both versions. 
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Introduction 
The establishment of Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe had far-reaching and 
unexpected consequences in the USSR itself, especially the western borderlands. 
Between the mid-1950s and the mid-1980s, as the people‟s democracies diverged 
from the Soviet model and yet remained close „socialist‟ allies of the USSR, they 
provided a testing ground for Soviet policies and ideas, as well as an example of 
socio-political innovation which, as Roman Szporluk puts it, „subverted the position 
of the Soviet Union as the one prototype of the socialist future of mankind‟.1 In this 
way, the „outer empire‟ inspired diverse attitudes towards the Soviet regime among 
the population of the USSR and, more broadly, gave rise to different notions of what 
it meant to be Soviet. 
Eastern Europe helped to imbue the concept of Sovietness with undertones of 
power and international prestige. As early as the 1940s, the Soviet media began to 
claim that the people‟s democracies were grateful to their Soviet „liberators‟, with 
foreign workers admiring the Soviet social system and Stalin.
2
 After the mid-1950s, 
the rising mass media coverage of the socialist camp, the emerging ideology and 
practices of international travel and the celebration of particular historical 
anniversaries fostered a widespread sense of Soviet superiority. Official narratives 
stressed the importance of the „Soviet people‟ in guiding Eastern Europe on the path 
of progress, protecting the satellite states from „west German revanchism‟ and 
„American imperialism‟, as well as rebuking „anti-Soviet‟ opinions and attitudes 
which arose in the outer empire. They thus depicted the countries of the Warsaw 
Pact as reliant on the USSR for ideological guidance, economic help and military 
security. The authorities implied that the USSR was more powerful, stable and 
advanced than its junior partners from the socialist camp.  
At the same time, however, events and developments in the outer empire 
undermined the image of a united, Soviet-led Eastern Europe. Periods of unrest in 
Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia raised doubts about attitudes towards the 
                                                          
1
 R. Szporluk, „Introduction‟ in Roman Szporluk (ed.), The Influence of Eastern Europe and the 
Soviet West on the USSR (New York, 1976), 2. This was especially because, as Hodnett and Potichnyj 
point out, communist ideology was assumed to have international validity. G. Hodnett and P. 
Potichnyj, The Ukraine and the Czechoslovak crisis (Canberra, 1970), 116. 
2
 J. Brooks, Thank You, Comrade Stalin!: Soviet Public Culture from Revolution to Cold War 
(Princeton, 1999), 192-196. 
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USSR in the socialist „near abroad‟, prompting some Soviet citizens to ponder the 
nature of the „empire‟ and the opposition to Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe, 
particularly in the aftermath of the military interventions in Hungary and 
Czechoslovakia. Furthermore, the rise of reformist movements within the communist 
parties of Eastern Europe in 1956 and 1968, as well as the appearance of a „workers‟ 
opposition‟ in Poland during the 1970s and the early 1980s, exposed residents of the 
USSR to new ideas for change and innovation. 
The politics of empire and the crises of 1956, 1968 and 1980-81 should not just 
be seen as political events but also as a window into popular opinion in the USSR. 
Official propaganda and other sources of information about the satellite states 
compelled many people to look at and ultimately to take a stand on issues of Soviet 
foreign policy, socio-economic problems in the socialist bloc, political reform, and 
the role of nations under socialism. While party activists encouraged citizens to 
speak in public about both the benefits of international socialist cooperation and the 
„foreign‟ threat to Soviet integrity and stability, the growth of international tourism 
and the availability of East European mass media in the Soviet Union facilitated the 
spread of ideas across borders. As a result, numerous residents of the USSR 
expressed opinions about the satellite states in such different contexts as public 
agitation meetings, written reports compiled upon returning from foreign trips, 
private letters, and informal conversations with friends, colleagues, and foreign 
tourists.  
Because of geographical and linguistic proximity, family ties, and memories of a 
common history, debates about the outer empire acquired a particularly large scope 
in Soviet Ukraine.
3
 They fit into complex social, regional and national dynamics in 
the republic, exposing overlapping fault lines between Russian and Ukrainian 
speakers, ethnic minorities, as well as various generational and occupational groups. 
Closely intertwined with evolving popular ideas about the role of nations under 
socialism, perceptions of the „near abroad‟ also underpinned notions of Soviet 
                                                          
3
 B. Lewytzkyj, „Political and Cultural Cooperation Between the People‟s Republic of Poland and The 
Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic‟ in P. Potichnyj (ed.), Poland and Ukraine: Past and Present 
(Edmonton, 1980), 209; E. Teague, Solidarity and the Soviet Worker: The Impact of the Polish Events 
of 1980 on Soviet Internal Politics (London, 1988), 140; A. Bromke, „Ukraine and Poland in an 
Interdependent Europe‟ in Potichnyj, Poland and Ukraine; Z. Gitelman, „The Diffusion of Political 
Innovation: From East Europe to the Soviet Union‟ in Szporluk, Influence, 38; R. Solchanyk, „Polska 
a sowiecki zachod‟, Suchasnist: Zeszyt w jezyku polskim 1-2 (1985), 93. 
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patriotism among the population of Ukraine.
4
 The republic thus provides an 
interesting case study illuminating how the monitoring of events and developments 
in the outer empire shaped a wide range of attitudes towards Soviet foreign and 
domestic policy. 
This thesis explores the evolution of national identities and Soviet patriotism in 
Ukraine through the lens of residents‟ perceptions of three satellite states: 
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland.
5
 Focusing on the changing role of agitation 
meetings, mass media, international travel, and historical commemoration, I trace the 
development of popular opinion about Eastern Europe between the Hungarian 
uprising of 1956, the Prague Spring of 1968, and the rise and fall of the Solidarity 
trade union in Poland in the early 1980s.  
 
I. Popular Opinion 
Scholars have employed various concepts to refer to views held by people in 
modern societies. These notions have different implications for the understanding of 
the relationship between „opinion‟, „civil society‟ and the „public sphere‟. While the 
idea of „public opinion‟ is normally used in reference to open and democratic 
societies, it presents particular challenges when applied to the Soviet Union and the 
attitudes adopted or publically expressed by its citizens. 
For Jürgen Habermas, public opinion emerged gradually with the growth of the 
bourgeoisie in Western Europe, particularly after the French Revolution.
6
  Fusing the 
physiocrats‟ idea of rational public discussion with the notion of an irrational bon 
sens of the people, which Rousseau believed to challenge the power of enlightened 
                                                          
4
 John Breuilly suggests that individuals are encouraged to define and pursue their collective aims and 
values as nations when they observe other communities that advance their interests as nations too. J. 
Breuilly, Nationalism and the State (Manchester, 1993), 380; Likewise, Bloom points out that „the 
appropriation and manipulation of images of the international environment can be used for nation-
building‟. W. Bloom, National Identity and Foreign Policy: Nationalism and Leadership in Poland, 
Russia, and Ukraine (Cambridge, 1998), 149. 
5
 I focus on these three countries in part due to their geographical proximity to Ukraine and in part 
due to their historical and political significance. Unlike Yugoslavia and, to some extent, Romania, 
these countries remained close allies of the USSR throughout most of the post-war period, and yet 
experienced major crises and turning points which undermined official Soviet visions of Eastern 
Europe and socialism. 
6
 J. Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of 
Bourgeois Society (Cambridge, 1989), 89-102. 
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bureaucrats, private citizens, possessing the capacity to overcome their own 
ignorance and alienation, used public spaces to engage in critical debate. According 
to Habermas, this gave rise to public opinion, as subjects used the force of the better 
argument „to test validity claims to truth and normative rightness in discourses‟ and 
thus to shape legislation.
7
 While his critics accuse him of idealising the nineteenth-
century public sphere, pointing out that it excluded large sections of European 
societies,
8
 Habermas himself suggests that „a communicative network of a public 
made up of rationally debating private citizens has [now] collapsed‟.9 For 
contemporary societies, he distinguishes between „informal, personal, non-public 
opinion‟ and „formal, institutionally authorised opinion‟.10 The former is not „“tested 
out” in the argumentative crossfire‟, for it expresses the private interests of people 
who relate to the state not through political participation but by adopting an 
individualised attitude of demand.
11
 As such, „non-public opinion‟ may well adopt 
the form of the Hegelian „common sense‟, „dispersed among people in the form of 
prejudices [and] not true knowledge‟.12 Meanwhile, the concept of „authorised 
opinion‟ reflects Habermas‟ belief that, as Luke Goode puts it, „politics is now 
something you see and read about, rather than something you debate‟.13 It brings to 
mind C.W. Mills‟ notion of „mass opinion‟, which arises when „“far fewer people 
express opinions than receive them …, [t]he communications that prevail are so 
organised that it is difficult or impossible for the individual to answer back 
immediately or with any effect …, [t]he realisation of opinion in action is controlled 
by authorities who organise and control the channels of such action … [and] [t]he 
mass has no autonomy from institutions”‟.14 While public opinion – understood as a 
product of rational-critical debate – remains an ideal for Habermas, it is unclear 
                                                          
7
 L. Thomassen, Habermas: A Guide for the Perplexed (London, 2010), 31; Habermas, Structural 
Transformation, 99; L. Goode, Jürgen Habermas: Democracy and the Public Sphere (London, 2005), 
12 Calhoun, 17. In this way, Habermas holds, individuals seek to maximise technical control over 
objective nature, mutual understanding, and individual „autonomy in the sense of being in control of 
the conditions under which one lives‟. Thomassen, Habermas, 29. 
8
 Thomassen, Habermas, 48-50. 
9
 Habermas, Structural Transformation, 247. For Habermas, as Luke Goode puts it, politics is now 
something you see and read about, rather than something you debate. Goode, Jürgen Habermas, 24. 
10
 Habermas, Structural Transformation, 245. 
11
 Goode, Jürgen Habermas, 24. 
12
 C. Calhoun, „Introduction: Habermas and the Public Sphere‟ in Craig Calhoun (ed.), Habermas and 
the Public Sphere: Conference Papers (Cambridge, Mass., 1992), 19-20; J. Habermas, „Further 
Reflections on the Public Sphere‟ in Calhoun, Habermas and the Public Sphere, 440-441. 
13
 Goode, Jürgen Habermas, 24. 
14
 Quote after Habermas, Structural Transformation, 249. 
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whether it is in fact possible to formulate, express and measure such public opinion, 
even in the context of liberal democracies.   
Needless to say, the Soviet system did not allow for the rise of public opinion 
understood in Habermas‟ framework. Reflecting in part Marx‟s disdain of public 
debate as a mask for „bourgeois class interests‟,15 the regime left few spaces for the 
open exchange of ideas. Instead, it sought to shape opinion and to eliminate 
dissenting views.
 In some ways, it is useful to distinguish between „non-public 
opinion‟ and „mass opinion‟ in the USSR. Unable to participate in free public debate, 
citizens still articulated „non-public opinions‟ when they commented on their 
personal life experiences in such different forums as informal conversations with 
friends and colleagues, letters, and agitation meetings.
16
 In this vein, for example, 
individuals spoke about their family‟s living standards and complained about 
problems at work. Meanwhile, the notion of obshchestvennoe mnenie (public 
opinion), which resurfaced in official rhetoric under Khrushchev, was akin to Mills‟ 
„mass opinion‟, for it referred to those views that the regime recognised as 
„correct‟.17 However, in contrast to „mass opinion or „authorised opinion‟, Soviet 
obshchestvennoe mnenie had an added dimension: inhabitants of the USSR had to 
manifest publicly their adherence to official slogans. The authorities adopted a range 
of unconventional methods to test not only the extent to which citizens toed the line, 
but also, particularly before 1968, the degree to which they „understood‟ the 
regime‟s pronouncements. Top Party apparatchiks displayed great concern to 
organise „explanatory‟ discussion meetings for citizens and to outline official views 
in the mass media in a consistent and convincing way. In this sense, the Soviet 
obshchestvennoe mnenie resembled Jacque Necker‟s and Jacque Pechet‟s eighteenth-
century notion of public opinion, which Keith Michael Baker describes as a „political 
invention‟ „endowed with the rational characteristics of absolute power‟: it „implied 
acceptance of open public discussion on the one hand, but … was seen as an 
                                                          
15
 Calhoun, „Introduction‟, 19. 
16
 As Peter Kenez argues for the 1920s, the regime destroyed genuine debate and prevented „the 
formation and articulation of alternative points of view‟. Consequently, „[t]he success of propaganda 
was the ever-increasing atomisation of society‟. P. Kenez, The Birth of the Propaganda State: Soviet 
Methods of Mass Mobilisation, 1917-1929 (Cambridge, 1985), 252, 254. 
17
 J. Plamper, „Beyond Binaries: Popular Opinion in Stalinism‟ in Paul Corner (ed.), Popular Opinion 
in Totalitarian Regimes: Fascism, Nazism, Communism (Oxford, 2009), 72. As Marcin Kula 
demonstrates for the People‟s Republic of Poland, the first centre for investigating public opinion was 
originally supposed to monitor only official radio broadcasts. M. Kula, „Poland: The Silence of Those 
Deprived of Voice‟ in Corner, Popular Opinion, 149-150. 
13 
 
 
alternative to a politics of contestation and compromise on the other‟.18 
Paradoxically, citizens were expected to engage in rational, public debate, whilst also 
being compelled to arrive at the „correct‟ conclusions.  
Yet the division of Soviet views and attitudes into „non-public opinion‟ and „mass 
opinion‟ is in fact of limited usefulness. For one, many dissidents explicitly rejected 
official ideas of obshchestvennoe mnenie, but claimed that their views should 
become the new „public‟ norm. Moreover, the individual‟s reflections upon his or 
her personal relationship to the regime acquired a public significance, to the extent 
that everyone was expected to display an understanding of the „correct‟ views about 
life in the USSR. Indeed, the authorities endeavoured to monitor all forms of 
communication, praising citizens who articulated „correct‟ views and expressing 
alarm about „incorrect‟ opinions voiced in both formal and informal contexts. All 
citizens‟ attitudes – whether expressed in public or in private – were, therefore, a 
matter of public concern. Most evidently, arguments and opinions surrounding the 
notion of Soviet patriotism and national identities automatically assumed a public 
dimension in the USSR, for the regime pressured its citizens to develop a common 
view of their collective identities.
19
  
In this thesis, I use the term „popular opinion‟ to refer to a process of 
communication involving Soviet citizens and the government which does not easily 
fit into the categories of „authorised‟ or „mass‟ opinion on the one hand, or atomised, 
individualised „non-public opinion‟ on the other. Although no official Soviet 
category corresponds to this notion of popular opinion, the term encompasses what 
official surveillance reports normally described as „moods‟ (nastroeniia and nastroi), 
„reactions‟ (reagirovaniia, reahuvannia, otkliki, and vidhuky), „views‟ (vzgliady and 
pohliady), and „voiced opinions‟ (vyskazyvaniia and vyslovlennia). On one level, 
popular opinion thus refers to the attitudes of citizens who explicitly expressed their 
alienation from the Soviet system and official obshchestvennoe mnenie. However, 
following Jacques Derrida‟s idea that language is too opaque to allow any two 
parties to arrive at a mutual understanding, as well as Jonathan Culler‟s criticism of 
                                                          
18
 K.M. Baker, „Defining the Public Sphere in Eighteenth-Century France: Variations on a Theme by 
Habermas‟ in Calhoun, Habermas and the Public Sphere, 192, 197-198. 
19
 As Luke Goode argues in reference to Western societies, discourses of nationalism have 
encouraged subjects to attempt to „find a “natural” coincidence between private and universal 
interests, rather than public interest simply reflecting compromise and negotiation between private 
antagonistic interests‟. Goode, Jürgen Habermas, 17. 
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Habermas‟ distinction between communication aimed at achieving a purpose and 
communication aimed at mutual understanding,
20
 I also argue that popular opinion 
often consisted of the same terms and slogans as obshchestvennoe mnenie, all the 
while encompassing differing ideas about life in the USSR. For example, individuals 
who participated in reproducing official slogans expected perks and privileges in 
return for their conformity. From this perspective, my notion of popular opinion 
includes the claims that people made on the basis of the fact that they embraced the 
„correct‟ point of view. Furthermore, Soviet subjects invested official slogans with a 
range of meanings, seeking thereby to obtain power (in Michel Foucault‟s sense): 
they sought „access to knowledge and language, which confer the ability to classify 
ideas, behaviours, and experiences and impose that classification, as norms, on 
others‟.21  
In sum, popular opinion existed in a dynamic exchange with the norms embodied 
in obshchestvennoe mnenie, with individuals‟ opinions ranging from expressions of 
consent for the system, through mild criticism and even to outright dissent. My 
analysis thus includes views that can be classified into three broad groups: those 
Soviet officials labelled as „negative‟ (otritsatel’nye and nehatyvni), „hostile‟ 
(vrazhdebnye and vorozhi), and „anti-Soviet‟ (antisovetskie and antyradians’ki); 
those attitudes that Party apparatchiks considered problematic but classified in less 
radical terms, referring to „incorrect‟ (nepravil’nye and nepravyl’ni) opinions and 
cases of panic (panika) among citizens; and finally, those views which surveillance 
reports categorised as „correct‟ (praviln’ye and pravyl’ni), or as expressions of 
„support‟ (podderzhka and piddtrymka) for the Soviet state and its policy. (In some 
cases, popular opinion can be defined in negative terms, as in those instances when 
local officials assured their superiors that they had registered no undesirable views 
among the population.) Far from signifying simple consent, expressions of „correct‟ 
and „supportive‟ views offer an insight into more complex social dynamics in Soviet 
Ukraine. 
 
                                                          
20
 Thomassen, Habermas, 65. 
21
 In this sense, they were similar to the Tsar‟s subjects who engaged in debates about the meaning of 
„hooliganism‟. See J. Neuberger, Hooliganism: Crime, Culture and Power in St. Petersburg, 1900-
1914 (Berkeley, 1993), 13. 
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a) Beyond Support and Resistance 
Though most studies of Soviet popular opinion to date focus on the 1930s, they 
provide an important conceptual framework for the understanding of post-war Soviet 
society. Historians suggest that Soviet citizens held diverse, perhaps even self-
contradictory attitudes towards the regime and its ideology, occasionally questioning 
the legitimacy of the Soviet system, developing different ideas about how the Soviet 
state and society should function, and articulating a range of personal goals and 
values.  
With possibilities to conduct research in the USSR severely limited before 1991, 
and Western academia largely divided along the totalitarian-revisionist lines, 
scholars hardly explored the nature of Soviet popular opinion. On the one hand, 
advocates of the totalitarian school took it for granted that residents of the USSR 
were either brainwashed or else secretly longing for Western-style democracy. On 
the other hand, the „revisionists‟, whilst demonstrating that the state sought to satisfy 
citizens‟ needs and expectations, implied that the pursuit of material and status 
benefits was the main source of stability in the Soviet Union.
22
 As Linda Cook points 
out, this approach was „based on the belief that what the Soviet state delivered was 
precisely what its society most valued‟, leaving little room to explore how people 
defined their goals.
23
  
Only after the opening of post-Soviet archives in the 1990s did scholars truly 
move beyond the totalitarian-revisionist dichotomy. Adopting various 
methodological approaches to the study of newly accessible sources, historians 
began to explore Soviet popular opinion. On one level, they argue that citizens 
questioned the officially propagated aims and values, invoking various „unofficial‟, 
non-Soviet ideas to evaluate the performance of the regime. In this vein, Sarah 
Davies examines secret police surveillance reports and documents of the Party and 
Komsomol information departments. Davies holds that the reports reveal „an 
independent current of popular opinion‟ in the USSR: people selected those aspects 
of official rhetoric which „corresponded with their beliefs and rejected others‟, all the 
                                                          
22
 For a discussion of the totalitarian-revisionist dichotomy, see S. Fitzpatrick, Tear Off the Masks!: 
Identity and Imposture in Twentieth Century Russia (Princeton, 2005), 9; J. Hellbeck, „Fashioning the 
Stalinist Soul‟ in Sheila Fitzpatrick (ed.), Stalinism: New Directions (London, 2000), 78. 
23
 L. Cook, The Soviet Social Contract and Why It Failed: Welfare Policy and Workers' Politics from 
Brezhnev to Yeltsin (Cambridge, Mass., 1993), 4. 
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while drawing on a range of rival discourses such as nationalism, anti-Semitism, and 
populism.
24
 Lynne Viola likewise suggests that „we glimpse the persistence of 
autonomous or semi-autonomous cultures, subcultures, and identities surviving 
within the hegemonic political culture of Stalinism‟.25 In this way, she points to the 
importance of examining active and passive resistance in the USSR. 
In contrast, other scholars suggest that people rarely questioned the legitimacy of 
Stalin‟s rule, because they did not retain an „outside frame of reference‟ in assessing 
Soviet policies and ideas.
26
 According to Igal Halfin, the „official discourse had the 
power to determine not only what a Soviet citizen said but also (at least in part) what 
he desired‟.27 Similarly, examining personal diaries from the 1930s, Jochen Hellbeck 
argues that people felt powerless to overturn the „revolutionary current‟ which 
„claimed nothing short of a monopoly on the future‟.28 Pointing out that individuals 
did at times invoke ideas that they regarded as „non-Soviet‟, Hellbeck claims that 
they sought to purge themselves of those „private‟ thoughts and attitudes which did 
not correspond with their „public‟ Soviet personae.29 Hellbeck implies thereby that 
popular attitudes towards the regime were paradoxical: people believed that they 
should believe in official Soviet ideology, drawing on Bolshevik ideas of self-
improvement and seeking to develop a revolutionary consciousness, but they 
sometimes also felt that they had not fully rid themselves of non-Soviet or pre-Soviet 
ways of thinking. This raises important questions about how citizens fit their 
personal life stories into the revolutionary master narrative. Not only did individuals 
hide certain facts about themselves from public view, Hellbeck suggests, but they 
also identified various possible interpretations of official rhetoric, hoping to find 
                                                          
24
 S. Davies, Popular Opinion in Stalin's Russia: Terror, Propaganda, and Dissent, 1934-1941 
(Cambridge, 1997), 7, 13, 183-186. 
25
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ways to present themselves as reliable Soviet citizens. At times, people even 
challenged the regime‟s pronouncements on who was properly „Soviet‟.30  
From this perspective, it appears that people conjured up their own role in the 
wider Soviet community by invoking official slogans and ideas. Indeed, the 
conviction that the Soviet system and ideology were forward-looking seems to have 
encouraged some citizens to outline their views on how the regime should operate. 
As Sheila Fitzpatrick puts it, inhabitants of the USSR tried to „decode the regime‟s 
pronouncements‟.31 Firm in the belief that real social advance was only possible in 
the USSR, she claims, people discussed how the Soviet state could best fulfill its 
promise to improve their lives: they acted as loyal Soviet citizens concerned about 
the future of their homeland, employing the language of rights written into the Soviet 
constitution, taking an active interest in foreign affairs, and even sending letters to 
Soviet leaders offering opinion and advice on policy.
32
 In order to understand the 
mechanics governing popular opinion in the USSR, Fitzpatrick implies, it is 
necessary to explore how citizens grew to understand the meaning of socialism and 
Sovietness.  
At the same time, however, without denying that official rhetoric structured the 
way in which most citizens spoke in public and even in private, some historians 
question the extent to which the population „believed‟ in Soviet socialist ideology. 
These scholars do not see popular opinion as shaped by individuals weighing up 
„Soviet‟ and „non-Soviet‟ ideas, or as a function of citizens‟ understandings of 
Sovietness and socialism; instead, they explore how people employed official 
language instrumentally with the aim of strengthening their social position in the 
USSR. Stephen Kotkin claims that formulaic surveillance reports do not permit the 
historian to establish the extent to which people „accepted‟ or „rejected‟ the regime. 
As a result, he remains ambiguous about the extent to which inhabitants internalised 
Marxist-Leninist ideals during the Stalin era. On the one hand, he writes that Stalin‟s 
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subjects eagerly „spoke Bolshevik‟ and suggests that some people attached real 
meaning to official rhetoric, using „certain of the officially promoted ideals to 
challenge regime policy‟.33 On the other hand, Kotkin maintains that a „private‟ 
sphere survived whilst people behaved „as if they believed‟ in public.34 In this way, 
he implies that some citizens at least thought of themselves as self-interested 
individuals, repeating official slogans to manipulate the system to their „minimum 
disadvantage‟.35 
In a similar vein, Jeffrey Brooks develops the concept of „performance‟: citizens 
found it difficult to maintain „separate personal and public understandings of “the 
facts of life”‟,36 he holds, but also paid little attention to the referential meanings of 
what they said. Instead, individuals focused on the performative role of speaking 
„correctly‟. Fixed and repetitive, official language did not lend itself to multiple 
interpretations but offered a means through which citizens manifested their 
dedication to the state: well aware that they had to repeat certain slogans to survive 
and to achieve their goals and ambitions under Soviet-style socialism, people learnt 
to articulate their interests within a „stylised, ritualistic, internally consistent public 
culture‟.37 Staging consent without necessarily attaching real meaning to socialist 
slogans, people responded perhaps to the material incentives which the regime 
offered in return for obedience, operating in what Kevin McDermott tentatively 
describes as a „neo-populist dictatorship‟.38 In order to gauge citizens‟ ambitions and 
views on how Soviet society should work, it would seem, the historian must focus on 
what they hoped to achieve through speaking „correctly‟ rather than investigating 
what they meant by the words they used: in this sense, the context in which people 
spoke is potentially more important for understanding popular opinion than what was 
actually said.  
Although victory in the Great Patriotic War and Stalin‟s death marked crucial 
historical breaks in the development of Soviet popular opinion, the modes of self-
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expression that scholars identify for the 1930s can still be distinguished in the post-
war period: citizens articulated explicitly „non-Soviet‟ ideas, argued about the 
meaning of Sovietness and socialism, and expressed public support for the regime. 
Nationalism and populism framed what might be called „anti-Soviet‟ views after 
1945. On the one hand, many historians have argued that the incorporation of the 
western borderlands at the end of the war created a breeding ground for nationalist 
dissent in the USSR. In western Ukraine, separatist nationalism seems to have been 
especially widespread among the creative intelligentsia, members of ethnic 
minorities, and the faithful of the illegal Greek Catholic Church, which survived in 
the underground despite the official ban in 1945.
39
 Some residents of the borderlands 
retained a regional identity which made them reluctant to identify themselves as 
„Soviet‟, scholars claim, ascribing these alternative loyalties to Habsburg legacies, 
memories of exclusion from Russian and Soviet rule, and the impact of the civil war 
that had waged in the region until the early 1950s.
40
 On the other hand, such 
expressions of „resistance‟ in the western borderlands (and in other parts of the 
USSR) do not necessarily establish other citizens‟ dissatisfaction with the Soviet 
system or the appeal of anti-Soviet nationalisms. Rather, as Vladimir Kozlov claims, 
they often exposed popular frustration with local bureaucrats and economic 
shortages, but also a deep-seated attachment to the Soviet state and its professed 
goals and values. According to Kozlov, during the late 1950s and the 1960s, threats 
to „hang communists‟ or to „stage a second Hungarian uprising in Ukraine‟ were 
underpinned by passionate „anti-statist‟ attitudes amongst volatile sections of 
society, as well as a wider belief in the need to rectify what some citizens saw as 
political mistakes or abuses of power that prevented the Soviet state from delivering 
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a decent standard of living for its citizens.
41
 In this way, as Lynne Viola puts it, 
people fixed „a dichotomy of state and society‟ from below, articulating „a subaltern 
view of domination‟.42 
Moreover, whereas Jochen Hellbeck claims that bottom-up attempts to „redefine 
the objective revolutionary narrative‟ were ultimately unsuccessful under Stalin,43 it 
seems that the war and de-Stalinisation allowed citizens more latitude both to 
reconcile diverse personal life stories with notions of Sovietness and to invest 
official slogans and ideas with new meanings. Amir Weiner argues that the war 
paved the way for people to advance conflicting visions of who was properly 
„Soviet‟. With ordinary citizens invoking the myth of war as an „autobiographical 
point of reference‟, social origin became considerably less important for classifying 
reliable citizens and enemies than it had been before 1941.
44
 In this way, Weiner 
suggests, the myth of war facilitated the articulation of „particularistic identities‟: 
Red Army veterans, former partisans, and members of various ethnic communities 
struggled to prove that their groups had made the most important contribution to the 
war effort.
45
  
More importantly, perhaps, sweeping changes in policy following the death of 
Stalin encouraged people to articulate diverse ideas about the shape that Soviet 
society should take. As Polly Jones and Cynthia Hooper show, people argued about 
the Stalinist past and their post-Stalinist futures, probing thereby the nature and 
limits of reform. These debates acquired a particularly large scope and public 
dimension in 1956, when Khrushchev‟s Secret Speech was read out during primary 
party meetings.
46
 Gradually, however, the authorities established a clearer vision of 
how Soviet citizens should speak in public, providing for more short-lived and 
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superficial discussion, especially after the Twenty-Second Party Congress in 1961.
47
 
Although some members of the „liberal intelligentsia‟ continued to use official 
channels to publicise diverse ideas about how Soviet society should operate, 
invoking principles of socialism to justify the need for social and cultural reform, 
such debates now involved fewer people and, especially after Brezhnev‟s crackdown 
on „permitted dissent‟ in 1966,48 were confined to informal conversations and 
samizdat.
49
  
In clamping down on public debate, the authorities also outlined a set of „correct‟ 
views which citizens should invoke to show loyalty to the regime. With Stalin gone, 
according to Alexei Yurchak, there was no „external voice‟ to distinguish between 
„correct‟ and „incorrect‟ interpretations of Sovietness and socialism. As a result, 
residents of the USSR engaged in increasingly „fixed, predictable, citational, and 
cumbersome‟ ideological rituals and routine practices of everyday life, but also, for 
the most part, paid little attention to the „literal‟ meanings of the slogans and ideas 
which they articulated in public: they were the svoi, as distinct from dissidents and 
some party activists who interpreted ideology as either true or false.
50
 In contrast to 
Jeffrey Brooks, who argues that people could not escape certain frames of thinking 
promoted by Soviet propaganda,
51
 Yurchak claims that members of „the last Soviet 
generation‟ (that of the Brezhnev era) wrote, spoke and behaved in the „correct‟ 
manner precisely because this „enabled creative productions of “normal life” that 
went beyond, though did not necessarily in opposition to, those that these rituals and 
texts described‟.52 Assuming that the Soviet system would last forever, people did 
not question its legitimacy or the need to participate in the „performance‟; still, they 
remained „outside‟ (vnye), neither simply supporting or opposing the system, but 
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rather developing diverse personal ambitions, social networks, subcultures and ideas 
about what life should be like under the Soviet regime.
53
 Inspired by Alexei 
Yurchak‟s idea that citizens „[used] words to achieve actions in the world‟, I call 
these „correct‟ ways of speaking and behaving „staging consent‟. The term refers to 
what Yurchak describes as „mass participation in the reproduction of the system‟s 
authoritative forms and representations, enabling the emergence of various forms of 
meaningful, creative life that were relatively uncontrolled, indeterminate, and 
“normal”‟.54 
  
b) Popular Opinion and Eastern Europe 
Eastern Europe had a crucial impact on the claims and nature of Soviet popular 
opinion in the post-Stalin period. Citizens‟ perceptions of the outer empire helped to 
fuel different concepts of „resistance‟, inspired debates about the meaning of 
Sovietness and socialism, and facilitated the practices of „staging consent‟ for the 
Soviet regime and its policies. 
During the 1950s and the 1960s, official depictions of the satellite states in the 
USSR were varied and even contradictory, shaped as they were by complex 
interactions between party apparatchiks in Moscow, republican capitals and the 
provinces. Internal party correspondence, instructions issued to agitators who 
delivered speeches about international affairs in the regions of Ukraine, and plans for 
mass media coverage of the satellite states reveal that CPSU officials did not outline 
clear boundaries between dissent and „counterrevolution‟ on the one hand, and 
legitimate reform that did not threaten the foundations of Soviet-style socialism on 
the other. Although many scholars have demonstrated that the authorities were 
concerned about the potential spill-over of dissent and opposition from the outer 
empire into Ukraine, strengthening censorship and sponsoring large-scale 
propaganda campaigns to condemn East European unrest,
55
 top CPSU apparatchiks 
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also retained ambiguous attitudes towards reform and innovation instigated by 
communist leaders in the outer empire. They even suggested that some East 
European innovations, particularly in the economic sphere, were progressive and 
could be copied in the USSR.
56
 Official reports further reveal inefficiencies of the 
censorship machine, as well as the apparent incompetence of local party activists 
responsible for organising agitation meetings, which also helped to mould the 
parameters of Soviet debates about Eastern Europe. 
Moreover, international travel within the socialist bloc and East European media, 
which often reached Soviet Ukraine, facilitated the spread of competing, non-Soviet 
voices in the republic between the 1950s and the 1980s. Upon encountering Soviet 
citizens, residents of the people‟s democracies sometimes informed them about East 
European ideological and institutional innovations, as well as expressing a range of 
opinions about the USSR.
57
 Particularly in the western oblasts, travel thus helped to 
expose residents to outright criticism of the „socialist‟ system, but, more often, face-
to-face encounters between Soviet citizens and their „socialist brothers‟ simply raised 
questions about alternative ways of resolving socio-economic, political and 
ideological questions in Soviet-style regimes. Likewise, mass media from the 
people‟s democracies helped to spread different ideas about socialism among the 
population of Ukraine. Apart from tuning in to Western radio stations broadcasting 
into the USSR,
58
 residents of the republic eagerly read the comparatively less 
censored socialist publications from Eastern Europe and, especially in the western 
borderlands, followed the news from Polish, Romanian, and Czechoslovak radio and 
television.
59
 Not only did many people understand broadcasts in other Slavic 
languages, but the population could also access Ukrainian-language press and radio 
created for the Ukrainian minorities in Poland and Czechoslovakia. As Roman 
Szporluk puts it, East European media provided „a window to the world which 
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neither the Kyiv nor the Moscow press could offer‟.60 Though diverging from Soviet 
sources of information, news from the satellite states could not easily be labelled 
„anti-Soviet‟: indeed, internal Party reports suggest that Soviet officials were 
reluctant to block East European media from reaching Ukraine, afraid as they were 
of discrediting the idea of international „socialist unity‟.61 At the same time, mass 
media from the satellite states certainly did expose the Soviet population to different 
models of socialist development, with the authorities struggling to answer citizens‟ 
questions and define an official point of view on such „unorthodox‟ ideas as calls for 
cultural and national „liberalisation‟ and intra-Party democracy. Consequently, 
events and developments in Eastern Europe acted as „the bearers of otherwise 
unacceptable … ideas and mechanisms‟ in the USSR.62  
At the same time, however, the authorities gradually created fixed ways of 
describing socialism and the USSR‟s relationship with the outer empire. For one, 
agitation meetings devoted to Eastern Europe became increasingly ritualised after 
1956. Although the mass media allowed citizens to learn about foreign affairs in the 
privacy of their homes,
63
 debates about the outer empire retained a crucial communal 
aspect: citizens were encouraged to speak in public and behave in a manner which 
proved that they both trusted the Soviet media and rejected alternative sources of 
news, including press, television and radio from the people‟s democracies. Unlike 
during the Stalin period, when the authorities disdained silence as inherently 
suspicious and counterrevolutionary,
64
 „going through the motions‟ and simply 
participating in agitation gatherings was now also a means of manifesting one‟s 
„correct‟ attitudes.  
The emerging ideology and practices of international travel further helped to 
ground formulaic ways of speaking and writing about the „near abroad‟. The status 
and demands placed on Soviet travellers who visited the people‟s democracies 
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required increasingly ritualised forms of speech, writing, and behaviour. When 
compiling official reports, addressing other citizens at public gatherings, and 
publishing articles in the press, many residents of Ukraine described their 
experiences of travel in fixed, repetitive ways. Reliable citizens were not to question 
what they saw, or to invent new ways of improving Soviet relations with the 
people‟s democracies, but rather to participate in rituals that reaffirmed the 
superiority of the USSR in the socialist camp, as well as the Soviet people‟s 
commitment to „helping‟ their „socialist brothers‟. This allowed Soviet leaders to 
weave official narratives about the people‟s democracies, which presented the USSR 
and Soviet people as more experienced and sophisticated than those in the satellite 
states.  
As political propaganda focused increasingly on the past, rather than promises of 
a better future,
65
 history provided another increasingly important prism through 
which citizens described the satellite states. Participating in numerous anniversary 
commemoration ceremonies, many people invoked in public a mythological version 
of World War II and the „Soviet liberation‟ of Eastern Europe, but also memories of 
„Polish exploitation in western Ukraine‟ and Russian and Ukrainian conflicts with 
other states and nations in the region. In this context, a large number of Ukraine‟s 
residents spoke about how the USSR guided other states towards socialism and 
sometimes highlighted national divisions in the Soviet bloc. History was thus a 
crucial means to discredit East European departures from the Soviet model as a 
relevant „external commentary‟ on Soviet values and practices, for it implied that 
unrest and reforms in the people‟s democracies were underpinned by backward, 
„non-Soviet‟ and „non-socialist‟ traditions.  
The polyphony within the portrayals of the satellite states in Ukraine evoked a 
wide range of responses among the population. Because Soviet propaganda as well 
as some foreign radio stations informed citizens about the rise of „anti-Soviet‟ forces 
in the outer empire, the ideas of „dissent‟ and „rebellion‟ became more tangible and 
propitious than they had been in the 1930s.
66
 Admittedly, the svodki or summaries 
compiled by the KGB both projected and concealed certain forms of resistance to 
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Soviet authority: encumbered by the questions asked and standardised forms of 
classifying „dissent‟, they do not reflect accurately the motivations and beliefs which 
underpinned non-conformist views about the outer empire. The term „bourgeois 
nationalists‟ was particularly problematic. While it probably did reflect the 
continuing popularity of „anti-Soviet‟ nationalism among some citizens, it also 
appears to have become a catchall phrase to classify any „incorrect‟ views and 
attitudes adopted by individuals who had been convicted for „nationalist‟ crimes in 
the past.  Equally, the widespread use of the label „bourgeois nationalists‟ may well 
signify the officials‟ own prejudice against certain groups of citizens, including 
members of ethnic minorities, former activists of Ukrainian nationalist movements, 
and the faithful of the illegal Greek Catholic church. Still, numerous KGB reports 
about popular reactions to disturbances in the outer empire strongly suggest that 
some Soviet citizens expressed support for East European „uprisings‟, articulating 
ideas which they conceived of as „national resistance‟ in such various contexts as 
conversations with friends and colleagues, private and anonymous letters, encounters 
with foreign tourists, and illegal pamphlets. 
Similarly, „hooliganism‟ was an ambiguous category originating in the early 
twentieth century and frequently used to classify crime in the 1920s and the 1930s, 
and it became increasingly popular after 1956.
67
 A formal crime, hooliganism 
covered behaviours ranging from using foul language to knife fighting. As Brian 
LaPierre demonstrates, it also became „a flexible catchall category that could be 
ratcheted up or watered down to fit any occasion or action no matter how small or 
non-serious‟.68 As a result, „[p]etty hooliganism was not only used to make debatable 
and borderline behaviours deviant …, [but] could also be used to transform major 
crimes into minor offenses‟.69 It is therefore conceivable that the term „hooliganism‟, 
though sometimes used in reference to unacceptable behaviours allegedly evoked by 
political crises in Eastern Europe, denoted anti-social behaviour which militia 
officers and law-makers sought to categorise as a crime but which was not 
necessarily ideological in nature. It is also possible, however, that some references to 
„hooliganism‟ masked cases of a more principled opposition to Soviet policy. More 
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broadly, it seems that hooliganism was employed to describe individuals who 
disrupted social harmony and thus threatened to undermine the official vision of a 
„united Soviet community‟.70 Whereas it was used in the 1920s „to define the 
“respectable” proletarian worker and to stigmatise disruptive and non-productive 
behaviours‟,71 the term was often linked in the Khrushchev and Brezhnev era to 
alcoholism and domestic violence, turning the story of hooliganism into a „story of 
negotiating the boundary between the public and the private‟.72 Indeed, my sources 
do not refer to the kind of „hooligan uprisings‟ and „mass hooliganism‟ described by 
Vladimir Kozlov,
73
 but rather to examples of individual misdemeanour which were 
deemed to be a matter of „public‟ concern to the extent that they disrupted the 
harmony of Soviet society. Cases of hooliganism described in my sources included 
drunken outbursts in which individuals criticised Soviet policy, fist-fights, as well as 
the destruction of state insignia and other instances of vandalism.  
Apart from fuelling some „anti-Soviet‟ views and hooligan behaviour, perceptions 
of Eastern Europe inspired many residents of the USSR to articulate opinions about 
the benefits and dangers of reform in Soviet-style regimes. In 1956 and, to a lesser 
extent, in 1968, the „near abroad‟ provided a kind of „external commentary‟ on 
Soviet discourse, precisely that which Yurchak argues disappeared with the death of 
Stalin. Periods of unrest in the satellite states exposed residents of Ukraine to 
conflicting ideas about how Soviet-style regimes should operate, compelling people 
to take a stance on divergent interpretations of socialist ideology. Despite Yurchak‟s 
assertion that people did not really care about the meaning of ideological slogans,
74
 
many citizens who spoke in public rallied behind varying visions of „socialism‟ and 
criticised the authorities for their failure to define a clear „Soviet‟ stance on 
important events in the socialist bloc. Meanwhile, senior Party apparatchiks were 
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obsessed about the need to establish a clear and coherent narrative to explain why 
crises took place in Soviet-style regimes.  
Eventually, however, the ritualisation of public rhetoric undermined the position 
of the people‟s democracies as a laboratory of ideas and policies. Between the mid-
1950s and the mid-1980s, and particularly after the Prague Spring of 1968, Ukraine‟s 
inhabitants increasingly repeated officially approved slogans about the outer empire 
in various public forums. Indeed, by the early 1980s, party activists involved 
numerous inhabitants in ceremonial affirmations of Soviet superiority in Eastern 
Europe, which, at least in public, discouraged residents from discussing the example 
of foreign developments as an „external commentary‟ on socialism. During the rise 
and fall of Solidarity, most inhabitants of Ukraine whose views were registered 
described foreign „deviations‟ from the Soviet model as a sign of anti-Soviet 
nationalism.  
As Soviet narratives about the inherent superiority of the USSR and its citizens 
gained ground at the height of the Czechoslovak crisis of 1968, a rising number of 
citizens went to great lengths to manifest their support for this vision of the world, 
but also paid little attention to the literal meaning of the words and slogans they 
used. Permitting individuals to establish their credentials as reliable Soviet citizens, 
the ability to stage consent enabled them to claim privileges in return, and sometimes 
even emboldened people to criticise Soviet authorities. In this sense, it was the rising 
importance of the „national‟ in Soviet portrayals of the outer empire which allowed 
many inhabitants of Ukraine to act as, in Yurchak‟s term, svoi.  
Although citizens did not openly question the superiority of Soviet practices over 
the unstable states and nations of Eastern Europe, or indeed deny that excessive 
„liberalisation‟ weakened the Soviet camp, they nonetheless made diverse and even 
contradictory statements in public. The imaginary Eastern Europe functioned much 
like Yurchak‟s „imaginary West‟, providing a Soviet „internal elsewhere‟: just as it 
was possible – depending on one‟s perspective and purpose – to represent the 
wearing of jeans as „bad cosmopolitanism‟ or „good internationalism‟,75 inhabitants 
of the USSR could also speak about economic complaints as legitimate demands 
voiced by people who worked hard for the benefit of their „socialist brothers‟ abroad 
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or panic-mongering which exposed the population to harmful influences from 
Eastern Europe. Similarly, residents could portray Ukrainian cultural autonomy as 
vital protection against Polish expansionism or as a nationalist deviation which 
played into the hands of backward forces in the outer empire. As a result, the act of 
speaking or behaving in a particular way mattered more than what was actually said, 
as citizens who staged consent could give a different spin to the same formulaic 
slogans about the outer empire.  
Popular notions of „legitimate‟ and „hostile‟ views, as well as the imagined 
boundaries of permitted debate emerged from complex interactions between top state 
and Party apparatchiks who defined the „official‟ line on the outer empire, 
journalists, censors, and agitators who interpreted instructions from the top, and 
individual citizens who drew on various sources of news about the satellite states. 
Overarching notions of conformity and dissent are therefore of limited usefulness in 
defining the range of views which citizens articulated in various public and private 
contexts. In order to understand the mechanics governing Soviet popular opinion 
about the outer empire, the historian should rather explore how citizens construed 
both the meaning of and their relationship to official rhetoric. 
 
c)  Popular Opinion and Sources 
My sources reveal attempts by the state to shape opinion, as well as popular 
responses to events and developments in Eastern Europe. In order to analyse the 
evolution of official portrayals of the outer empire, I have examined not only 
newspaper reports, but also correspondence between party officials in Moscow, 
Kyiv, and oblast centres, journalists and agitators, and local activists of the Party and 
Soviet friendship societies with foreign countries. This archival paper trail allows me 
to trace the complex dynamics which shaped the nature of agitation meetings 
devoted to foreign affairs, mass media depictions of Eastern Europe, and 
international travel within the socialist camp. Furthermore, reports compiled by 
Glavlit officials and local Party apparatchiks offer an insight into the mechanics of 
information control in the USSR, exposing inefficiencies of the censorship machine, 
concerns about the popularity of foreign mass media, and the spread of samizdat 
publications in Ukraine. 
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To explore the range of popular opinion, this thesis has had to rely largely on 
reported opinion. With the exception of a few samizdat documents, which reflected 
the first-person views of Soviet dissidents and, at times, their assessment of what the 
broader public thought, I have relied on official Party and KGB sources to gauge 
how broader segments of the population reacted to events in Eastern Europe. The 
most important documents are informational reports (often labelled informatsiia, 
spravka, dovidka, zapiska or zapyska) compiled for obkom officials and senior Party 
bureaucrats at the CPSU and CPU Central Committees. Their authors ranged from 
heads of primary party organisations, through raikom and gorkom bureaucrats, to 
obkom leaders and first secretaries of the CPU. The stated aim of such reports was to 
assess popular reactions to major events and developments in the Soviet bloc in the 
regions of Ukraine and, while this was not always made explicitly clear, to judge the 
effectiveness of agitation work and propaganda. Documents compiled at different 
levels of the Party hierarchy naturally varied in the amount of detail they provided, 
but sources signed by senior apparatchiks did not seem to alter the general tone and 
conclusions of lower-level reports. As a rule, Party documents defined the scope and 
nature of „correct‟, „incorrect‟ and „hostile‟ views voiced during primary party 
meetings and official agitation gatherings, citing a few participants word-for-word as 
well as providing a list of questions asked. Moreover, I have examined dozens of 
KGB surveillance reports, most of which were produced by senior officers for the 
use of obkom secretaries and apparatchiks at the CPSU and CPU Central 
Committees. Based on the small number of published KGB sources concerning 
popular reactions to the Prague Spring in Ukraine, it appears that these documents 
did not differ in content and format from the summaries produced for internal KGB 
use.
76
 Surveillance reports normally described the results of KGB work in a 
particular geographical region, citing a handful of individuals verbatim in order to 
illustrate the nature of „hostile‟ and „incorrect‟ attitudes. Other important sources for 
my analysis are compilations (svodki) of readers‟ letters that newspaper editors sent 
to top CPSU officials, in which they summarised the content of both signed and 
anonymous letters received from readers. They normally included extracts of letters 
which the officials deemed most significant or interesting.  
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Because I rely on official sources to gauge popular opinion, the picture of what 
people said about Eastern Europe may be distorted by the Soviet apparatchiks‟ own 
prejudices and vested institutional interests. This is especially problematic because 
my sources do not explain who commissioned surveillance reports or clarify what 
use was made of them. As Terry Martin argues, the KGB often focused on 
monitoring those people who had already been considered suspicious.
77
 
Consequently, their reports may well construct certain groups and individuals as 
„hostile‟. This problem is partly alleviated by the fact that the KGB also made 
attempts to assess the spread of „hostile‟ and „incorrect‟ opinions, and consequently 
outlined a whole range of attitudes expressed by seemingly random individuals in 
various public sites. Still, as Sarah Davies suggests, it is conceivable that secret 
police reports devoted disproportionate attention to opinions that the regime 
considered problematic, while Party reports may have hidden problems that the 
bureaucrats encountered in their areas of jurisdiction.
78
 Moreover, Soviet 
apparatchiks may have assigned official categories to an otherwise broader range of 
views, creating a false impression of uniformity and conformity. 
Furthermore, though some official sources never make this clear, it appears that 
most reported statements were expressed in such public forums as official agitation 
meetings, letters, informal discussions between friends and colleagues at work, as 
well as conversations and brawls at railway stations and market places. In this sense, 
the popular opinion analysed in this thesis was „public‟, and people quite possibly 
spoke in different ways in the privacy of their homes, where they were unlikely to be 
overheard by Soviet officials.
79
 Vladimir Kozlov‟s study of mass disturbances in the 
USSR shows that there was a growing rift between Soviet citizens‟ public, 
„conformist‟ personae and their private selves after the early 1960s, which he links to 
a progressive loss of faith in the Soviet project. Nevertheless, people still recognised 
that „friendship with the state‟ could be an „extraordinarily profitable occupation‟, 
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even if they no longer found it meaningful to express their grievances and concerns 
in public by invoking socialist slogans as they had before.
80
  
Despite these limitations, official reports reveal particular patterns of response to 
events in Eastern Europe. Opinions voiced in public at times of East European crises 
in 1956 and 1968 reflected a continuing struggle to make sense of socialist ideas and 
to understand what it meant to be Soviet (as opposed to Czech, Hungarian, Polish or 
Slovak). Reports from public gatherings compiled by regional party leaders, as well 
as information about citizens‟ attitudes towards reform and innovation in the outer 
empire provided by KGB officials, imposed official categories of „correct‟, 
„mistaken‟ and „hostile‟ opinions on what was probably a more diverse range of 
views. Nevertheless, combined with samizdat materials, they suggest that citizens 
adopted diverse attitudes towards ideas of reform and innovation. Official sources 
for subsequent years become formulaic and often frustratingly boring, as they mostly 
described how citizens manifested their support for the „correct‟ vision of Eastern 
Europe. While these reports do not allow the historian to assess levels of genuine 
belief, they nevertheless expose complex social dynamics in Soviet Ukraine. They 
outline the ways in which citizens described the role of various social, regional and 
national groups in strengthening Soviet influences in Eastern Europe, as well as 
specifying who got to speak about and travel to Eastern Europe. In this way, they 
show which categories of citizens were most successful at manifesting the „correct‟ 
point of view, improving thereby their social standing in the USSR and claiming 
material benefits and other perks from the Soviet state.  
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II. Soviet Patriotisms 
The few existing studies of Soviet interactions with Eastern Europe concentrate 
on non-conformist views about East European unrest, which fuelled radical demands 
for „liberalisation‟ in the USSR. Historians mostly focus on dissident reactions to the 
Prague Spring in 1968, showing that some brave Soviet citizens articulated 
unadulterated support for Dubcek‟s vision of „reform socialism‟, despite the 
increasingly repressive policy of the Soviet state. Mark Kramer points out that 
„leading proponents of democratic change such as Andrei Sakharov publicly hailed 
the Prague Spring and called on the Soviet leadership to halt its pressure against 
Czechoslovakia‟; Kramer also underlines that some Soviet university students 
contemplated the possibility of replicating Czechoslovak experiences in the USSR.
81
 
Likewise, Volodymyr Dmytruk demonstrates that a surprisingly large contingent of 
the Soviet Ukrainian population criticised the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, 
which leads him to the rather sweeping conclusion that „Ukraine was not silent‟.82 
While these scholars show that popular opinion about Eastern Europe was 
diverse, providing a plethora of fascinating examples, they also perpetuate a false 
dichotomy between conformity and dissent. They do not analyse why citizens 
expressed support for foreign reforms or which aspects of change they hoped to 
imitate in the USSR. Although Dmytruk states that the authorities distinguished 
between „hostile‟ views and „misunderstandings‟ about the Prague Spring in 1968, 
he does not explore the claims inherent in these different non-conformist views.
83
 
This approach also prevents historians from examining the spread of „unorthodox‟ 
opinions, which may even create the misleading impression that criticism of Soviet 
policies in Eastern Europe and sympathy towards dissidents and reformists in the 
satellite states were the dominant views in Soviet Ukraine. Indeed, some recent 
studies rely very heavily on KGB reports about popular reactions to foreign crises, 
thus inevitably highlighting the views which the authorities considered 
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problematic.
84
  
In fact, however, discussions surrounding East European unrest fuelled the 
development of more complex attitudes towards the Soviet state and the prospects of 
reform. Opinions about events and developments in the satellite states cannot be 
classified as simply „pro-„ or „anti-Soviet‟. Rather, they reflected and shaped notions 
of how Soviet-style regimes should work. Following Khrushchev‟s denunciation of 
Stalin at the Twentieth Party Congress, Soviet citizens were particularly keen to 
assess the claims of reformist forces in the outer empire in late 1956. Excited and 
apprehensive about the prospect of change in the socialist camp, residents of Ukraine 
voiced radically different opinions about Gomulka‟s policies in Poland, as well as 
reflecting upon the underlying problems which had led to the outbreak of violence in 
Hungary. Commenting on the dramatic events abroad as a consequence of 
Khrushchev‟s „liberalisation‟, they sought not only to gauge the nature and limits of 
„permissible‟ reform, but also to assess Moscow‟s new policies. Apart from illegal 
pamphlets and informal conversations with friends and colleagues, citizens discussed 
the need for and the dangers of reform in Soviet-style regimes during primary party 
cell meetings and agitation gatherings for non-party members. 
Subsequently, during the late 1950s and the 1960s, the authorities promoted more 
rigid ways of describing reform and innovation in the outer empire. CPSU 
apparatchiks exerted pressure on party activists, artists, writers, academics, educated 
professionals and leading workers to compile official reports and write newspaper 
articles about their travels in the socialist camp. As a result, members of these groups 
scrutinised minor technical innovations in industry and farming, analysed how East 
European regimes promoted culture and organised party work, and described the 
functioning of the mass media and universities in the Soviet bloc. Kenneth Farmer 
claims that Ukrainian intellectuals who traveled to Eastern Europe in the 1950s and 
the 1960s „were undoubtedly influenced by the more open and experimental 
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atmosphere that prevailed there, and brought these influences back with them‟.85 
However, while citizens did at times suggest that some foreign ideas could be 
incorporated in the USSR itself, it seems that most inhabitants of Ukraine who 
described Eastern Europe in public were more critical of innovative, non-Soviet 
practices embraced by foreign journalists, artists, engineers, academics and party 
leaders. They tended to stress that well-established Soviet ways were superior to new 
ideas emerging from the satellite states, criticising in particular the „cultural 
experimentation‟ and „unorthodox‟ views propagated in East European mass media. 
Whether such views represented people‟s „genuine beliefs‟ cannot be established, 
their function was to promote in public a general suspicion of reform and innovation.  
In 1968, the Prague Spring compelled a larger number of Soviet citizens to define 
clearly the difference between „legitimate‟ and „illegal‟ attitudes towards reform. In 
this sense, the Czechoslovak crisis constituted a crucial breaking point in the 
development of popular notions of Sovietness. To be sure, in commenting on the 
reforms pursued by Czechoslovak communist leaders, some residents of Ukraine 
engaged in debates with friends and colleagues, wrote anonymous letters to party 
bureaucrats, corresponded with Czechoslovak citizens, and produced samizdat 
publications. However, the authorities cracked down on dissent and vigorously 
engaged a large number of Ukraine‟s residents in very formulaic agitation 
gatherings, during which speakers condemned Dubcek‟s policies, corrected 
„mistaken‟ views about the unfolding developments, and rejected alternative visions 
of socialism as propagated by East European mass media and Soviet dissidents. 
CPSU leaders thus sought to define and promulgate a properly „Soviet‟ outlook on 
political, social, and economic questions, which they contrasted with „foreign‟ 
ideological diversions. As Jeremi Suri shows, this was especially important because 
the authorities, while wary of allowing the reformist impulses from Czechoslovakia 
to fuel resistance to Soviet authority, wanted to avoid jeopardising the „modernising 
and reforming claims of “developed socialism”‟.86 Condemning the excesses of 
Dubcek‟s reformism, including the relaxation of censorship and intra-party 
democracy, Brezhnev still wanted citizens to believe that gradual economic reform 
and limited intellectual and cultural openings could reinvigorate decaying socialist 
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institutions without undermining strong state control over society.
87
 Therefore, the 
authorities wanted inhabitants of Ukraine to distinguish between Soviet „gradualism‟ 
and Czechoslovak ideological diversions. 
Citizens were expected to express pride in the USSR‟s achievements all the while 
distancing themselves from „unreliable‟ foreigners in Eastern Europe. In this way, 
popular reactions to events in Eastern Europe were supposed to be imbued with a 
sense of Soviet patriotism. Notions of Soviet patriotism can be traced back to the 
1930s. As Terry Martin argues, the concept was then „most frequently used in 
discussions of the need to resist potential foreign aggression‟.88 The regime 
demanded that citizens manifest loyalty to their „socialist motherland‟ in word and in 
deed, both through hard work and bravery in battle.
89
 After the war, in Benjamin 
Tromly‟s words, patriotism „served functions that nationalism has performed at other 
places and times‟, providing a point for self-identification and shaping political and 
social conflicts.
90
 Partly because of Cold War tensions and partly because inhabitants 
of the USSR contrasted their country with other nominally „socialist‟ states, 
„socialism‟ was no longer a sufficient marker of loyalty to the system but merely one 
aspect of being Soviet. This made „Sovietness‟ and „Soviet patriotism‟ into central 
categories for identity formation, as many people sought to define what made Soviet 
citizens distinct from inhabitants of other countries. Playing on Stephen Kotkin‟s 
notion of „speaking Bolshevik‟, I suggest here that citizens also learnt to „speak 
Soviet‟: whereas before the war it had been important to behave „as if one believed‟ 
in socialist slogans, people who sought to prove their loyalty to the system after 1945 
found it even more important to voice support for the Soviet state and its foreign 
policy.
91
 Indeed, it seems plausible that, like the East German intellectuals described 
by Thomas Lindenberger, many Soviet citizens believed that their social and 
material status, professional careers and personal happiness were intimately linked to 
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the vicissitudes and survival of their country.
92
 
Yet official and popular views of patriotism were not necessarily the same. While 
Tromly argues that official notions of Soviet patriotism stressed the need for people 
to rally behind the state to protect Soviet achievements from external enemies,
93
 
popular understandings of what it meant to be a Soviet patriot in the post-war period 
were more diverse. Some people thus appropriated the idea of patriotism and 
Sovietness to portray themselves as autonomous citizens who deserved respect and 
recognition for their contribution to the „motherland‟ and who consequently had the 
right to judge the authorities as representatives of an imagined „Soviet people‟. As 
Ethan Pollock suggests, war veterans in particular spoke of their dedication to the 
Soviet homeland as distinct from loyalty to „communism‟, Stalin or the Party.94 
Moreover, as Soviet identities were often defined in relation (and sometimes in 
opposition) to the satellite states, important aspects of patriotism became much less 
Russocentric than before the war.
95
 Official narratives stressed, for example, the 
contribution that the western republics had made to protecting the Soviet community 
from East European nationalisms and strengthening Soviet power throughout the 
region. 
Commenting on events and developments in Eastern Europe, many citizens 
argued about the future of the USSR and the meaning of Soviet patriotism.
96
 During 
the 1950s and the 1960s, residents of Ukraine often debated the dangers and benefits 
of reform in Soviet-style regimes. While some citizens argued that the countries of 
the socialist camp needed to change, many more condemned reformist ideas and 
suggested that the Soviet state suppress deviations from well-established political, 
economic and social practices, both at home and abroad. I have broadly categorised 
these views as „reformist patriotism‟ and „conservative patriotism‟. Far from 
denoting coherent sets of attitudes, these terms provide useful ideal types for 
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classifying a very diverse set of opinions expressed in different contexts and settings. 
They do not refer to any clear social divisions in Soviet Ukraine, as it is conceivable 
that individuals voiced multiple, perhaps even contradictory views, both over time 
and in different contexts. In other words, in writing about conservative and reformist 
patriotism, I do not mean to imply that there were easily identifiable conservative 
and reformist patriots, though some individuals likely did conform more closely to 
the one or the other ideal type. 
Central to both conservative and reformist patriotisms were various 
understandings of the USSR‟s role as the centre of the socialist camp. In expressing 
ideas of conservative patriotism, citizens generally contrasted the peaceful and 
„cultured‟ Soviet people to more unreliable and backward foreigners in other 
socialist states. They articulated a sense of „imperial‟ pride by insisting that Moscow 
should at all costs preserve its hegemony in Eastern Europe, cracking down on 
deviations from the well-established Soviet model. Conversely, reformist patriotism 
generally held that excessive interference in the domestic affairs of other countries 
prevented CPSU leaders from implementing far-reaching reform at home, albeit 
within the framework of Soviet socialism. Reformist patriotism reflected a sense of 
„imperial‟ responsibility: its proponents first highlighted that the USSR should guide 
the satellite states towards „democratisation‟, and then increasingly maintained that 
the Kremlin must prove more tolerant of and responsive to progressive ideas 
emanating from the satellite states.  
Reformist patriotism was at its peak in 1956, when some university students and 
members of the creative intelligentsia articulated support for Wladyslaw Gomulka‟s 
reforms in Poland and, to a lesser extent, condemned Soviet intervention in Hungary. 
Many seemed to believe that Khrushchev‟s „liberalisation‟ should be taken further, 
both in the USSR and in the outer empire. Yet proponents of reformist patriotism did 
not develop a common outlook on reform in 1956. Their claims ranged from 
relatively mild demands for more cultural freedom, through more systemic 
complaints against censorship, to very radical statements condemning the system of 
collective farming (the last were largely in response to the reversal of the 
collectivization of agriculture in Poland). In subsequent years, as the space for the 
articulation of critical views grew narrower, expressions of reformist opinions 
became increasingly rare, but also more coherent and concentrated in samizdat. In 
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effect, much of reformist patriotism was excluded into the political wilderness of 
outright dissidence. Commenting on Dubcek‟s policies in 1968, a small number of 
citizens thus complained about repressive policies of the Soviet state at home and 
abroad, calling for open debate and freedom of information. These demands were 
underpinned by concerns about the lack of intra-party democracy, censorship, and 
national tensions in Soviet Ukraine. Even as such proponents of reformist patriotism 
gradually developed a „dissident‟ consciousness, therefore, and were well aware that 
the authorities would persecute their ideas and actions, some still remained 
committed to preserving the Soviet state and its institutions. For this reason, I 
include these views within the category of reformist patriotism. By contrast, after 
1968, a larger proportion of dissidents concluded that the system as a whole was 
unreformable and articulations of reformist patriotism all but disappeared after 
Brezhnev‟s crackdown on dissent in the late 1960s and the early 1970s. 
The relative scarcity of reports concerning reformist views may partly be 
attributed to the fact that citizens had every reason to fear accusations of „treason‟ 
and reprisals should they call for a more tolerant policy towards the „forces of 
change‟. However, positive perceptions of reform were clearly overshadowed by 
conservative concerns. A growing number of Ukraine‟s inhabitants, party activists 
and war veterans prominent among them, voiced support for the Kremlin‟s 
repressive measures in the outer empire. As advocates of conservative patriotism, 
they wanted Moscow to maintain control over the satellite states, condemning 
foreign deviations from the Soviet model of socialism. Dmitry Epstein suggests that 
these attitudes were particularly widespread among the nomenklatura, who saw 
Soviet patriotism as a „willingness to act in defence of the country‟, the definition of 
which they extended to the entire Warsaw Pact with the exception of Romania.
97
  
Seweryn Bialer goes even further as he argues that „the primary dimension of the 
Soviet relationship with Eastern Europe [was] the legitimisation of Soviet internal 
rule‟, and claims that the USSR‟s domination of the socialist camp was popular 
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among the population.
98
 Indeed, while articulations of support for Soviet foreign 
policy no doubt reflected top-down pressures, many Soviet citizens also seemed to 
harbour an emotional attachment to the idea of Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe. 
Somewhat unexpectedly from the authorities‟ point of view, however, conservative 
concerns about preserving Soviet influences abroad sometimes even fuelled criticism 
of Moscow‟s foreign policy. As war veterans underlined that they had personally 
contributed towards the liberation of the people‟s democracies from Nazi 
occupation, and other citizens often claimed that East Europeans should be grateful 
to the USSR for economic subsidies and continued protection from „west German 
revanchism‟, for example, they criticised the authorities for what they perceived as 
excessive „leniency‟ vis-à-vis „anti-Soviet‟, „nationalist‟ and „counterrevolutionary‟ 
forces abroad. These opinions exposed a sense of superiority that many inhabitants 
of Ukraine felt towards foreigners from the satellite states, but also popular fear of 
war and instability: residents often stressed that the USSR must exert strong 
influences in Eastern Europe in order to maintain peace in the region. 
The spectre of instability underpinned conservative distrust of reform in the 
USSR, too. Many citizens feared the outbreak of war and the spill-over of unrest 
from the outer empire into the USSR, which inspired criticism of „liberalisation‟ in 
general, particularly in late 1956. Most inhabitants of the republic whose views about 
Eastern Europe were recorded suggested that Soviet authorities should reject the 
Polish and Hungarian trajectory of reform, instead maintaining strong hierarchical 
control within the CPSU and in society as a whole in order to assure economic 
stability and security. They also defended the system of censorship and, at times, 
articulated a sense of nostalgia for Stalin‟s strong rule. The Prague Spring caused 
less alarm and controversy, but, as Amir Weiner demonstrates for the western 
borderlands, prominent members of Ukrainian society (and KGB officers in 
particular) still feared that „de-Stalinisation‟ would encourage „slanderous and 
hooligan‟ elements to turn against the Soviet elite, which was what they believed to 
have happened in Czechoslovakia.
99
 This encouraged some very impassioned 
denunciations of Dubcek‟s reforms from among the population of Ukraine. 
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Moreover, the military intervention in Czechoslovakia made inhabitants of 
Ukraine very reluctant to speak about the possibility of reforming socialist regimes. 
This was because, as Jeremi Suri suggests, few Soviet citizens took seriously the 
promise of internal reforms in the socialist camp, with the Prague Spring 
undermining „the claims of “developed socialism”‟.100 Because numerous citizens 
were afraid of being branded „hostile‟ or „wrong‟ in their assessment of Dubcek‟s 
policies, they condemned „reform socialism‟ in its entirety. They spoke of 
„democratisation‟, relaxation of censorship, and the opening of borders as inherently 
„non-Soviet‟, rallying thereby behind a conservative vision of Sovietness. It is 
difficult to assess the extent to which residents of Ukraine believed what they said 
during the highly formulaic agitation meetings, or indeed what they thought whilst 
„going through the motions‟ and listening silently to aggressive speeches about 
Czechoslovak deviations from the Soviet model. However, it appears that the bulk of 
Ukraine‟s inhabitants chose to manifest their loyalty to the CPSU and the Soviet 
state, all the while accepting that the USSR was unreformable.  
As proponents of conservative and reformist patriotism argued about the 
directions in which the USSR should steer the socialist camp, they also reflected 
more broadly upon Soviet values and practices. Comparing the USSR to other states 
and nations in Eastern Europe, they defined Sovietness itself in a national framework 
and consequently retained a significant degree of loyalty towards the Soviet state. 
They sought to pursue their goals within existing state structures and in the name of 
a „Soviet people‟. For this reason, the notion of patriotism is itself central to this 
thesis: citizens cared about the future of their homeland and, for this very reason, 
sometimes asserted their right and their duty to criticise the authorities. 
 
III. The New ‘Big Deal’ 
As the authorities stifled public debates about the need to reform Soviet-style 
regimes, residents learned that Soviet leaders expected them to condemn foreign 
reforms and voice support for continuing Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe, 
particularly during the Czechoslovak crisis of 1968. With citizens increasingly 
engaged in practices of staging consent to display these „correct‟ opinions, 
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conservative patriotism became the primary „legitimate‟ standpoint that people 
invoked to manifest their loyalty to the CPSU and the Soviet state. Articulations of 
conservative patriotism acquired thereby a strong performative role but at a 
noteworthy cost: even as they allowed citizens to demonstrate their patriotic 
credentials, they also emboldened them to demand perks and privileges from the 
authorities in return. Consequently, staging consent had a major impact on the 
making of social identities in Ukraine, helping to give rise to a new „big deal‟ 
between the regime and what I call the Soviet „middle class‟, but also encouraging 
some citizens to demand that the big deal be extended to Soviet society as a whole. 
During the late Stalin period, Vera Dunham argues, the authorities struck a „big 
deal‟ with the educated strata of Soviet society: the regime effectively created a 
„middle class‟ by bestowing material incentives on certain groups of specialists in 
return for their political conformism, „loyalty to the leader, unequivocal nationalism, 
reliable hard work, and professionalism‟.101 While Dunham suggests that it was the 
devastation of the Great Patriotic War that pushed the authorities to pamper 
productive and skilful individuals,
102
 effectively building on the system established 
in the 1930s of awarding privileges to the „new elite‟,103 citizens‟ increasing 
exposure to developments in Eastern Europe after the death of Stalin changed the 
mechanics governing the big deal. There was now a large and growing group of 
citizens who claimed that they made a special contribution to strengthening Soviet 
influences in the outer empire. They thus portrayed themselves as superior both to 
foreigners in the satellite states and to „average‟ inhabitants of the USSR. As more 
citizens participated in reproducing canonical depictions of the socialist camp, 
membership in this middle class was progressively extended. In this way, the post-
Stalin regime forged a new „big deal‟ with a large number of citizens, who, by 
staging consent for the USSR‟s domination over Eastern Europe, claimed material 
rewards and other perks in return. 
To be sure, using the term „middle class‟ is inherently problematic in reference to 
the USSR. The post-Stalin middle class was not a class in the Marxist sense, for it 
had little to do with a relation to the means of production. Moreover, it was not an 
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imagined community, as its members did not use any collective name to describe 
themselves and it is doubtful whether they developed any coherent group identity. 
The notion of middle class likewise does not correspond to the official Soviet 
tripartite division of society into workers, agricultural workers, and the intelligentsia. 
While many members of the middle class were indeed the Soviet intelligentsia, the 
post-Stalin elite was more heterogeneous than Sheila Fitzpatrick‟s generation of 
vydvizhentsy and considerably larger than Dunham‟s middle class of High 
Stalinism.
104
 Apart from Party activists,
105
 engineers, writers, and artists, the Soviet 
empire in Eastern Europe provided a new means to reward war veterans, workers 
with some managerial responsibilities (such as brigadiry), as well as citizens who 
received various official titles and state awards,
 such as „shock workers‟ (udarniki or 
udarnyky).  
Following Vera Dunham, therefore, I use the term middle class to refer to the 
„embouregoisement of Soviet manners, values, and attitudes‟ which „partly crosscuts 
differences of position, of occupation and of income and which is, therefore, 
somewhat amorphous and difficult to anchor in any one sharply defined social 
group‟.106 Dunham was primarily interested in fiction and representations, however, 
and it is clearly more difficult to define middle class in relation to real people and 
popular opinion. Nevertheless, there was an important social dimension to the 
growth of middle class in the post-war period. As Moshe Lewin points out, the 
expansion of Soviet bureaucracy, rising party membership, urbanisation, and the 
increasing number of Soviet citizens with secondary and higher education put 
pressure on the Soviet leaders to bridge the gap between citizens‟ growing 
aspirations and the still relatively primitive working conditions and quality of life.
107
 
The new big deal provided a means to mark and reward ambitious citizens, helping 
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to shape a middle class elite in a society where party membership in itself was no 
longer a sufficient indicator of status.
108
 
At the same time, citizens aspiring to a „special‟ status in Soviet society had to 
actively seek public recognition, and one key mechanism was staging consent. They 
thus participated in official delegations that visited the people‟s democracies and 
compiled official reports which highlighted their special contribution to 
strengthening Soviet influences in Eastern Europe. They also displayed their 
„correct‟ opinions and attitudes and more general „reliability‟ by speaking at public 
meetings, especially during the Prague Spring. Surprisingly, perhaps, the middle 
class was very prominent in the western borderlands, because local residents had 
more opportunities to manifest their contribution to „helping‟ the satellite states than 
other citizens. In this sense, there was a significant performative dimension to the 
Soviet middle class. 
Most importantly, perhaps, my notion of middle class refers to an „activist‟ norm 
of socio-political identity: citizens aspiring to middle class status claimed to guide 
the rest of Soviet population and the outer empire on the path of progress. The term 
which comes closest to encapsulating the aspirational and elitist attributes of the 
middle class is obshchestvennost',
109
 which the 1958 Academy of Sciences 
dictionary defined as „the advanced portion of society‟. As Jeffrey Brooks argues for 
the 1930s, the Soviet obshchestvennost’ „did not in any sense approximate “a new 
class” or an actual social grouping‟, but was rather „a fanciful construction that 
served … to express a wishful image of the body politic‟, with a range of figures 
from „stakhanovites and minor officials to government leaders, who were united in 
the creative imagining of the politically active community itself, mediated by 
newspaper staffs‟.110 The post-war middle class was likewise an idealised 
propaganda image of the „active public‟: the mass media and official reports 
described certain groups of citizens as key actors who strengthened Soviet influences 
in the socialist bloc, aiming thereby to provide a model of how all citizens should 
speak and behave. However, the protagonists of these propaganda campaigns came 
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to resemble a class, not only because they boldly invoked their supposedly high level 
of „advancement‟ to claim perks and privileges from Soviet state, but also because 
other citizens began to resent and challenge their elite status.  
Whereas Dunham shows that the model middle class citizen of the late 1940s was 
encouraged to take pride in professional success, wealth and personal happiness, 
with neither the regime nor its citizens interested in ideology,
111
 staging consent 
about Soviet policies in Eastern Europe projected in official rhetoric a different kind 
of elite. Residents claiming this privileged status still stressed their commitment to 
hard work, but they now suggested that they not only strove for personal prosperity, 
but also helped to maintain Soviet supremacy in Eastern Europe. As notions of status 
became intimately linked with a sense of pride in Soviet achievements abroad, 
people who wanted to be recognised as more reliable and privileged than „ordinary‟ 
citizens – in other words, the aspirational middle class – also presented themselves as 
more ideologically committed, modest, and cultured than the „frivolous‟ and 
„unstable‟ East Europeans.  
These norms and narratives shaped the nature of the claims asserted by the 
aspirational middle class through staging consent. On the socio-economic level, by 
manifesting their commitment to spreading Soviet influences abroad, many citizens 
sought improved access to consumer goods and perks associated with international 
travel. Moreover, professing to foster the „correct‟ opinions and attitudes towards 
Eastern Europe among „ordinary‟ citizens, members of the middle class often 
criticised Soviet mass media. They not only demanded better access to news and 
information for themselves, but they also pointed to gaps and inconsistencies in 
official coverage of international affairs, arguing that they could lead to the rise of 
malicious rumours and misunderstandings among „ordinary‟ residents of Soviet 
Ukraine. These claims, therefore, had strong paternalistic undercurrents, all the while 
reflecting growing concerns about the potentially unstable „masses‟. Indeed, alarmed 
about the potential spill-over of unrest from Eastern Europe into the USSR, members 
of the aspirational middle class became increasingly aware of the need to control 
popular moods and attitudes.  
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In order to integrate the „masses‟ into the wider Soviet community, the authorities 
also created opportunities for more residents to stage consent and thereby to distance 
themselves from the people‟s democracies. The practices of staging consent evolved 
between 1968 and the early 1980s. Most inhabitants of Ukraine who participated in 
ritualised agitation meetings about the Prague Spring in 1968 and 1969 remained 
silent, manifesting thereby their loyalty to the state but also helping to perpetuate the 
impression that party activists and educated individuals who actually spoke during 
the gatherings constituted an „elite‟. This was largely because the speakers still 
needed to manifest a significant level of political skill as they rejected the claims of 
„reform socialism‟. In contrast, during the early 1980s, the authorities encouraged a 
larger number of Ukraine‟s inhabitants to speak about the Polish events. 
Commenting on the rise and fall of Solidarity during public gatherings, but also in 
informal conversations at workplaces, outside shops, and on public transport, many 
„ordinary‟ citizens highlighted their distrust of „anti-Soviet Poles‟. Making 
references to national divisions in Eastern Europe, they presented themselves as full-
fledged members of the Soviet community. In other words, by reproducing simplistic 
portrayals of national conflicts in Eastern Europe which had grown increasingly 
widespread under Brezhnev, a rising number of Ukraine‟s inhabitants sought to 
strengthen their social standing in the USSR. This reflected the growing ambitions of 
post-war Soviet society as described by Katerina Clark, who argues that most of the 
working population „endeavoured to comport themselves as was deemed fit for a 
person of their standing‟ precisely because they „sought to rise in the hierarchy of 
status and enjoy a higher standard of living‟.112 Creating opportunities for a large 
number of citizens to manifest the „correct‟ point of view about the outer empire, the 
authorities inadvertently emboldened some blue-collar workers and collective 
farmers to challenge the elitist claims of the aspirational middle class and to demand 
that the new big deal be extended to Soviet society as a whole. 
The egalitarian claims inherent in the mechanisms of staging consent further 
stimulated the rise of economic populism in Soviet Ukraine. After 1956, class 
returned as an „operational category‟, legal changes „reinforced long-standing 
patterns of shop-floor bargaining between workers and managers‟ and, as Christine 
Varga-Harris shows, people pursued „individualistic aims‟ and demanded that 
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„officials enter into dialogue with them and assist them, sometimes vividly 
illuminating the failings of the Soviet system‟.113 As these developments encouraged 
Soviet citizens to demand that the authorities assure a decent standard of living for 
the population, perceptions of events and developments in Eastern Europe helped to 
shape the scope and nature of such economic claims. In 1956, when numerous 
citizens feared the spill-over of unrest from the outer empire into the USSR itself, 
their material expectations of the state remained relatively modest. Inhabitants of 
Ukraine were primarily concerned about the need to maintain basic stability in the 
face of what seemed like an impending threat of war. Consequently, local officials 
managed to satisfy material demands of the population by improving the supply of 
basic food products and fuel: they thus proved the state‟s ability to maintain stability 
in the republic, restoring popular faith in conservative patriotism. Furthermore, in 
1968, public debates about the Prague Spring actually made it easier for party 
activists to keep economic populism under control. The elite articulators of 
conservative patriotism who spoke during public agitation meetings claimed that 
Soviet people remained united during such a tumultuous period and underlined that 
the USSR was more economically advanced than Czechoslovakia. Consequently, 
staging consent did not permit inhabitants of Ukraine to articulate material 
expectations of the Soviet state: in fact, citizens who spoke in public about the 
Prague Spring condemned economic complaints among the population of Ukraine as 
a sign of „anti-Soviet‟ attitudes.  
Conversely, as many more people were able to claim the status of reliable citizens 
by staging consent during the Solidarity crisis in Poland, they articulated more 
systemic complaints about poor living standards. Highlighting their alienation from 
the foreigners in Poland, many residents of Ukraine condemned Soviet economic 
subsidies to the „ungrateful Poles‟ and demanded that the authorities pay more 
attention to the economic needs of „patriots‟ at home. Articulating the idea of Soviet 
supremacy in Eastern Europe, citizens conceded that they should work more 
efficiently to give a good example to their „socialist brothers‟ abroad, but they also 
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drove home the idea that they had earned the right to live well themselves. In that 
sense, by highlighting their commitment to conservative patriotism during the height 
of the Solidarity crisis, people located themselves within well-established social 
practices, which led the „elites‟ and the „masses‟ to renew the „social contract‟.114 
Afraid that labour unrest might spread from Poland into Ukraine, top CPSU leaders 
and party activists in the regions of Ukraine decreased work norms and made a more 
concerted effort to respond to the economic needs and demands of the population.
115
 
Despite the ritualisation of public rhetoric and a major crackdown on dissent, 
Soviet patriotism remained a potent force during the Brezhnev era. By condemning 
East European diversions from the Soviet model of socialism and thus voicing ideas 
of conservative patriotism, citizens implicitly demanded that the authorities live up 
to their promises that the „Soviet political and economic order was uniquely suited to 
create modern civilisation, replete with industry, a welfare state and a disciplined, 
educated, hygienic and otherwise “cultured” populace‟.116 
 
IV. National and Regional Identities 
The evolution of conservative and reformist patriotism had further implications 
for national and regional identities in Ukraine. By constructing narratives about the 
USSR‟s relations with Eastern Europe, CPSU apparatchiks fuelled various ideas 
about the role that Ukraine would play in the USSR and the socialist camp as a 
whole. They thereby helped to facilitate differing expressions of Ukrainian national 
identity in the republic, to change popular perceptions of the western borderlands, 
and to alienate the republic‟s Hungarians, Jews and Poles. 
The fact that Moscow allowed the satellite states to pursue their own „roads to 
socialism‟ acquired a particular significance in Ukraine, for it encouraged republican 
leaders to raise in public the issue of Ukrainian rights.
117
 When the „attempt to 
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reconcile the agendas of the CPU and the national intelligentsia reached its zenith 
during the tenure of Petro Shelest‟ in the 1960s, Party officials created various 
contexts in which residents of the republic could articulate Ukrainian identities.
118
 
Official narratives about Eastern Europe helped to reinforce these Ukrainisation 
policies: Kyiv presented Ukrainians as a separate nation by encouraging Soviet 
visitors to Eastern Europe to speak about both Soviet and Ukrainian cultural 
cooperation with the people‟s democracies and by sponsoring articles about 
Ukrainian relations with the satellite states in the republican press. More 
surprisingly, perhaps, even after the pace of Russification picked up in the early 
1970s,
119
 CPU apparatchiks continued to outline a special role for Ukraine and 
Ukrainians in Eastern Europe. In particular, they instructed historians to write about 
common Russo-Ukrainian resistance to Polish exploitation, suggesting thereby that 
Ukrainian people could best defend their national interests within the USSR and in 
close alliance with Russia. While urbanisation and the decrease in native language 
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education promoted linguistic assimilation in the Soviet Union,
120
 formulaic 
portrayals of East European history helped the bureaucrats in Kyiv to develop a 
discrete and progressive role for „Ukrainians‟ in official rhetoric.121  
These official notions of Ukrainianness implicitly excluded significant parts of 
the republic‟s population, perpetuating long-standing ethno-national stereotypes. By 
placing a strong emphasis on the need to maintain Soviet unity despite „instability‟ in 
Eastern Europe, the authorities made ethnicity into a key category for defining 
internal enemies in Soviet Ukraine. As Kate Brown argues, nation-building projects 
in the republic were used to create a uniform, homogenous space intended to 
overshadow the multi-faceted identities of the borderlands.
122
 Indeed, because Party 
officials became concerned about the potential impact of East European crises on 
Hungarians, Jews and Poles in Ukraine, particularly in the western oblasts, they 
encouraged the practice of naming and shaming members of ethnic minorities as 
„outsiders‟. As Soviet media both condemned „Zionists‟ and „revanchist western 
German forces‟ for problems that arose in the satellites and associated reformist and 
opposition movements abroad with anti-Soviet, anti-Russian and anti-Ukrainian 
nationalism, they fuelled the notion that reliable Soviet citizens were Eastern 
Slavs.
123
 The rising stress on Soviet unity vis-à-vis foreign threats also helped to 
reinforce negative depictions of Ukrainian „bourgeois nationalism‟ in official 
rhetoric, which the authorities presented as a tool in the hands of Polish and German 
nationalists seeking to break up the USSR and Russo-Ukrainian friendship.  
At the same time, however, the ritualisation of public rhetoric helped to change 
official narratives about the western borderlands. Though sharing top officials‟ 
                                                          
120
 D. Gorenburg, „Soviet Nationalities Policy and Assimilation‟ in Dominique Arel and Blair A. 
Ruble (eds.), Rebounding Identities: The Politics of Identity in Russia and Ukraine (Washington, 
D.C., 2006), 280-281. 
121
 This process had already been evident under Stalin. As Serhii Yekelchyk‟s study of historical 
memory demonstrates, Ukrainian bureaucrats and intellectuals deciphered ideological currents to 
rehabilitate Ukrainian national heroes and redefine „Ukrainian history‟. S. Yekelchyk, Stalin's Empire 
of Memory: Russian-Ukrainian Relations in the Soviet Historical Imagination (Toronto, 2004), 5, 6-9, 
19. 
122
 K. Brown, A Biography of No Place: From Ethnic Borderland to Soviet Heartland (Cambridge, 
Mass., 2004), 230; Kuromiya likewise demonstrates that nation-building projects aimed to undermine 
regional and class identities in the Donbas. Kuromiya, Freedom and Terror, 297. 
123
 T. Garton-Ash, The Polish Revolution: Solidarity (New Haven, 2002), 102; Solchanyk, „Polska‟, 
89; Hosking, Rulers and Victims, 271. This tendency was especially strong due to anti-Semitic 
prejudice among CPSU leaders, which gained a new momentum after the Six Days War of 1967. E.R. 
Drachman, Challenging the Kremlin: The Soviet Jewish Movement for Freedom, 1967-1990 (New 
York, 1991), 32. 
51 
 
 
concerns that the west was most exposed to „harmful‟ influences from across the 
border,
124
 local Party activists also attempted to challenge the idea that the 
borderlands were somehow less „Soviet‟ than other parts of Ukraine. With this aim, 
they invoked formulaic portrayals of national conflict in Eastern Europe to suggest 
that local inhabitants had made a unique contribution to the wider east Slavic 
community. They organised special anniversary commemorations and worked with 
local artists, historians and museum directors in order to show that residents of 
western Ukraine had always resisted Polonisation, cultivated a Ukrainian identity, 
and strove for reunification with Russia. In comparison with other regions of 
Ukraine, they also created more opportunities for local residents to express their 
alienation from the „foreigners‟ in Eastern Europe, including numerous agitation 
meetings, where citizens manifested their conservative opinions about the satellite 
states, as well as ritualised practices of foreign travel, where citizens enacted and 
described imperial hierarchies.  
The increasingly formulaic ways of describing Ukraine‟s relationship with 
Eastern Europe fuelled a wide range of responses among the population. In line with 
the broader emphasis on national dissent in the western borderlands, analyses of 
Ukrainian perceptions of the socialist camp have mostly focused on exploring the 
rise of „anti-Soviet‟ Ukrainian nationalism. Like Roman Szporluk, who pioneered 
the study of transnational interactions between Ukraine and the Soviet satellite states, 
many historians stress that ideas from Eastern Europe propelled national dissent and 
opposition in Soviet Ukraine.
125
 They argue that interactions between Soviet and 
East European dissidents increasingly inspired Ukrainian demands for outright 
independence, especially because, as Timothy Snyder demonstrates, Polish 
dissidents assured their Ukrainian counterparts that Poland would not seek to redraw 
its borders with independent Lithuania, Belarus, and Ukraine.
126
  
                                                          
124
 T. Kuzio and A. Wilson, Ukraine: Perestroika to Independence (London, 1999), 57. 
125
 R. Szporluk, „The Making of Modern Ukraine: The Western Dimension‟, Harvard Ukrainian 
Studies 25:1-2 (2001). 
126
 T. Snyder, The Reconstruction of Nations: Poland, Ukraine, Lithuania, Belarus, 1569-1999 (New 
Haven, 2003), 218; Prizel, National Identity, 353; G. Grabovych, „Model Kultury‟, Krytyka 10:1-2 
(2006), 3; Bromke, „Ukraine and Poland‟,  334-335; I. Zaitsev, „Pol‟s‟ka opozytsiia 1970-80-kh rokiv 
pro zasady ukrains‟ko-pol‟s‟koho porozuminnia‟ in Iurii Slyvka (ed.), Deportatsii ukraintsiv ta 
poliakiv: kinets 1939- pochatok 50-kh rokiv (L‟viv, 1998), 57. 
52 
 
 
Indeed, perceptions of Eastern Europe did help to propel „anti-Soviet‟ nationalism 
in western Ukraine, especially in the 1950s and the 1960s. Commenting on 
Ukraine‟s relationship with the satellite states, some former activists of Ukrainian 
nationalist organisations and activists of the illegal Greek Catholic Church 
questioned the legitimacy of Soviet rule in the republic and spoke of East European 
„national‟ resistance to Soviet rule. Discussing in particular violent unrest in 
Hungary, they claimed that both the people‟s democracies and Ukraine would 
eventually overthrow Soviet or Russian power. Furthermore, although official 
reports may well exaggerate the spread of „anti-Soviet‟ views among ethnic 
minorities and former activists of Ukrainian nationalist organisations, reflecting 
thereby the officials‟ own prejudices and expectations, it seems that many 
Hungarians, Jews and Poles felt alienated from the rest of the Soviet community and 
articulated „anti-Soviet‟ views when they commented on events and developments 
across the border.
127
  
Nevertheless, interactions with and perceptions of Eastern Europe also facilitated 
the rise of other notions of Ukrainianness, which were more compatible with Soviet 
patriotism. During the 1960s, the example of „national roads to socialism‟ in Eastern 
Europe helped to inspire some party activists and members of the creative 
intelligentsia to call for increasing Ukrainian cultural autonomy in the USSR. 
Quoting the example of independent satellite states, they suggested that Ukraine 
could also enjoy more autonomy without betraying socialist ideals, arguing in 
particular that the authorities should improve Ukraine‟s cultural contacts with the 
satellite states. To use Kenneth Farmer‟s expression, they thereby posed a „reformist 
challenge‟ to Soviet leaders.128 Their demands were echoed by some members of 
ethnic minorities, particularly among Jews, who also called for a more „liberal‟ 
nationalities policy in the USSR. While some used Eastern Europe as an example of 
a more tolerant approach towards Jewish culture, urging Soviet leaders to follow the 
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people‟s democracies in this respect, others spoke about anti-Semitic practices in the 
outer empire to prove that Soviet-style regimes oppressed the Jewish minority. These 
ideas fit into the wider framework of reformist patriotism, for their proponents 
sought change in the Soviet Union, calling for the restoration of the principles of 
„Leninist nationalities policy‟.129 While these appeals were sometimes voiced in 
public, particularly in 1956, they were then increasingly confined to the samizdat 
like other forms of reformist patriotism.
130
  Numerous advocates of reformist 
patriotism were convinced that the Soviet state was not responsive to their national 
demands. 
Meanwhile, many citizens increasingly projected visions of Ukraine within the 
framework of conservative patriotism: during agitation meetings as well as private 
conversations registered by the KGB, they described East European „nations‟ as a 
threat to the (imagined) Ukrainian and Soviet communities alike. They suggested 
thereby that most residents of the republic remained loyal to the CPSU and the 
Soviet state, all the while contrasting Ukrainian people with residents of the satellite 
states and turning expressions of Ukrainian identity into a means of staging consent. 
Articulating support for Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe as a form of protection 
against „anti-Soviet‟ and „anti-Ukrainian‟ forces, these citizens also implied a 
broader distrust of „liberalisation‟ which, they claimed, could destabilise the socialist 
camp.  
Popular reactions to events and developments in Eastern Europe do not fit the 
stereotypical divide into an „anti-Soviet‟ west and „pro-Soviet‟ east, for it was 
especially in the western borderlands that many residents drew an explicit link 
between Ukrainian national identity and conservative Soviet patriotism. On one 
level, because of geographical proximity to the satellite states, inhabitants of the 
borderlands feared the outbreak of war and discussed the possibility of a foreign 
take-over of western Ukraine more often than other citizens. As Amir Weiner 
demonstrates, this was especially evident in 1956, when many locals remained 
extremely suspicious of Khrushchev‟s new policies, which they blamed for the 
escalation of violence abroad, the rising threat to Soviet territorial integrity, and the 
                                                          
129
 They referred to the 1920s as a period when official policies of korenizatsiia helped to protect the 
rights of nationalities in the Soviet Union. See Martin, The Affirmative Action Empire, 3. 
130
 Farmer, Ukrainian Nationalism, 8; B. Lewytzkyj, Politics and Society, 100. 
54 
 
 
„chaos‟ brought about by returning „nationalist‟ Gulag prisoners.131 Furthermore, it 
was also in the west that many Soviet citizens took advantage of the opportunities to 
participate in staged political events probably in order to defend themselves against 
accusations of disloyalty levelled against them. In both 1956 and 1968, they often 
denounced in public ethnic minorities and „bourgeois nationalists‟ as potential 
troublemakers who exposed Ukrainian people to the „Polish menace‟. Rather than 
seeing western Ukraine as the least Soviet part of the republic, therefore, it is more 
accurate to describe it as the most conflicted region where residents expressed 
radically different visions of Sovietness and Ukrainianness. 
West Ukrainian articulations of conservative patriotism then took on a new 
dimension in the early 1980s. Drawing on the official historical narratives about East 
Slavic conflict with Poland, many local residents asserted that they had made a 
special contribution to protecting Russians and Ukrainians from foreign nationalism 
in the past, as well as forming a bulwark against the threat of Solidarity in the 
present. In particular, they emphasised that they rejected harmful, anti-Soviet views 
voiced by Polish tourists who visited the region en masse. In this way they not only 
undermined the image of western Ukraine as „unreliable‟, but actually turned their 
regional identity into a positive marker of Sovietness. 
Commenting on Soviet relations with the outside world, inhabitants of Ukraine 
developed different understandings of their ethno-national identities. Apart from the 
relatively rare demands for Ukrainian independence and the rejection of Soviet 
identities among some members of ethnic minorities, notions of nationhood 
reinforced a sense of Soviet patriotism in the republic. Stressing that the USSR was 
superior to other nations in Eastern Europe, the authorities pointed to the importance 
of nations under socialism. This fuelled reformist demands for increasing Ukrainian 
cultural autonomy in the USSR, especially before the early 1970s. Meanwhile, 
portrayals of Eastern Europe also encouraged some conservative-minded citizens to 
speak in public about the importance of Russo-Ukrainian unity vis-à-vis foreign 
threats, thus propagating in official rhetoric the idea that Ukrainians were a separate 
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nation that contributed to the growth of the USSR. This emboldened some citizens to 
challenge the widely held notion that Ukrainians, and particularly residents of the 
western borderlands, were somehow less „Soviet‟ or more „unreliable‟ than other 
citizens.  
 
V. Overview 
The thesis combines a chronological and thematic structure. Chapters one, three 
and five provide its backbone, examining the evolution of popular opinion and 
Soviet patriotism in Ukraine. They analyse the range of popular reactions to the 
dramatic events in the Soviet camp, which unfolded in 1956, 1968, and 1980-1981. 
Chapter one shows that Wladyslaw Gomulka‟s reforms in Poland and the Hungarian 
uprising inspired very heated debates about „liberalisation‟ and „democratisation‟, as 
well as fuelling anti-Soviet nationalism, particularly among former Gulag prisoners. 
Unsure about the nature of Khrushchev‟s „de-Stalinisation‟, citizens who commented 
on the unfolding events expressed a wide range of views about foreign and domestic 
policy which could not easily be classfied as either „correct‟ or „dissenting‟. Twelve 
years later, with the state establishing a clearer script about the limits of reform both 
at home and in the satellite states, opinions about the Prague Spring were more 
clearly polarised along the axis of reformist patriotism, now considered „illegal‟, and 
conservative patriotism, which formed the „correct‟ point of view. Chapter three thus 
analyses the impact of the Czechoslovak crisis among the population of Ukraine, 
exposing debates about reform, tracing the evolution of anti-Soviet nationalism, as 
well as analysing the implicit claims on the state that citizens made through staging 
consent. Finally, chapter five examines how the increasing ritualisation of public 
rhetoric under Brezhev conditioned Ukrainian responses to the Solidarity crisis 
during the early 1980s. It shows that while some citizens staged consent to claim a 
special status in Soviet society, others invoked formulaic portrayals of Ukrainian 
people‟s resistance to Polish oppression to challenge these elitist claims and demand 
material benefits from the state. 
In order to understand the different claims that citizens made through speaking 
about unrest in the outer empire, chapters two and four trace the development of 
official narratives between 1956 and 1991. Chapter two explores the role of the 
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ideology and practices of travel in establishing ritualised ways of describing Eastern 
Europe in Ukraine. In particular, it focuses on the impact of international travel on 
the concept of a Soviet middle class, which proved pivotal in the formation of 
popular attitudes towards the Prague Spring. Chapter four turns to historical 
memory: as it became an increasingly important element in official narratives about 
the socialist camp, it fashioned Poland as Ukraine‟s national nemesis and raised the 
importance of national themes in official Soviet rhetoric. Ukrainian party leaders 
employed official images of East European past to outline a special role which 
Ukraine, Ukrainians and residents of the western oblasts would play in the Soviet 
community, as well as highlighting the role of the „masses‟ in Soviet history. This 
facilitated the rise of egalitarian claims during the Solidarity crisis in the early 1980s.  
In this way, the thesis analyses the claims and nature of Soviet patriotism and 
national identities in Ukraine. The conclusion then briefly considers how Soviet and 
Ukrainian identities evolved during the 1980s and beyond. 
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Chapter One 
De-Stalinisation and Soviet Patriotism: Ukrainian Reactions to East European 
Unrest in 1956 
The Polish and Hungarian unrest of 1956 could not have caught Moscow at a 
more fragile time. Khrushchev‟s not-so-Secret Speech at the Twentieth Party 
Congress in February had raised troubling questions about the „cult of personality‟ 
and the excesses of Stalinism. With the country unsettled by waves of returning 
Gulag prisoners and the dramatic shifts in state policy in the years following Stalin‟s 
death, the future seemed uncertain.
1
 As party members in particular argued about the 
need to engage society at large in the process of reform, some advocated extending 
debate about the Stalinist past and Soviet future beyond the Party, whereas „others 
wanted to keep the wider society ignorant‟. Indeed, as Cynthia Hooper argues, a 
„small group of party members questioned the very mechanics of truth and deception 
in the Soviet dictatorship‟, though senior apparatchiks often labelled the latter view 
as „mistaken‟ or even „hostile‟.2  For their part, non-party citizens were also pushing 
the boundaries of freedom of expression. They complained about shortages of 
information in Soviet mass media, openly admitted to listening to foreign radio 
stations, and publicly criticised Khrushchev‟s policies at home and abroad.  
The dramatic events in the Soviet satellite states of October and November 1956 
had been propelled by Khrushchev‟s reforms. In Poland, the Secret Speech was 
distributed very widely and it triggered popular complaints about the economy, the 
suppression of national culture, and Polish-Soviet relations. Rejecting Khrushchev‟s 
rhetoric about the „cult of personality‟, many Poles condemned the entire CPSU and 
Stalinist-era Polish communist leaders.
3
 Top Warsaw apparatchiks sought out new 
sources of legitimacy, especially after the bloody workers riots in Poznań in June 
1956. Elected to serve as the first secretary of the Polish United Workers‟ Party on 
19 October 1956, Władysław Gomulka announced a new Polish „way to socialism‟, 
halting collectivization of agriculture and allowing (at least temporarily) a greater 
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degree of freedom of expression. The Soviet army came close to invading, and the 
Soviet press raised alarm about the rise of anti-Soviet moods in Poland, but 
Khrushchev eventually accepted the new leadership in Warsaw.
4
 The Secret Speech 
also triggered heated debates about the need to reform the regime in Hungary. In 
contrast to Edward Ochab in Poland, who assisted the reformer Gomulka, the 
Hungarian leader Matyas Rakosi was succeeded by a fellow hard-liner, Erno Gero. 
Historians have suggested that a more liberal leader might have been able to prevent 
the escalation of violence, thereby preventing the Hungarian Revolution.
5
 As it was, 
however, fighting broke out on the streets of Budapest on 23 October and, after a 
brief Soviet military intervention, Imre Nagy took over the reins of the Hungarian 
Party. As he made chaotic attempts to end the violence and to restore the authority of 
the Hungarian Party, Moscow grew concerned that his reforms went too far; new 
political parties appeared and Hungary announced that it was going to withdraw 
from the Warsaw Pact.
6
 On 4 November, Soviet armies moved in to Budapest again 
to crush the popular uprising, resulting in bloodshed on both sides. Hungarian 
resistance was crushed by 10 November, and the new Soviet puppet government 
destroyed all forms of public opposition within the next two months.
7
  
In the Soviet Union itself, these events were seen and judged as a direct 
consequence of Khrushchev‟s „liberalisation‟. Many scholars who explore Soviet 
citizens‟ attitudes towards reform and „de-Stalinization‟ in 1956 focus on reactions 
to the Secret Speech and changes in the USSR itself. However, this story of 1956 is 
incomplete, for the crises in the „outer empire‟ also shaped popular perceptions of 
Khrushchev and his reforms. On one level, inhabitants of Ukraine judged 
Khrushchev as an international leader, widely discussing his policies vis-à-vis the 
socialist satellites. More importantly, Poland and Hungary were regarded as a testing 
ground for reform, and observation of the dramatic events inspired Soviet citizens to 
argue about the extent to which it was possible to liberalize Soviet-style regimes 
without inducing violence and instability. To be sure, top CPSU leaders in Kyiv and 
Moscow were well aware that the foreign crises reverberated in the USSR, 
particularly in the borderlands. After the cataclysm of the Secret Speech, when 
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public debates slipped out of control,
8
 they were determined to constrain discussion 
surrounding the Polish and Hungarian events more effectively. In order to 
communicate the party line and keep people under control, they sought to outline 
clear rules about how to conduct special agitation meetings for workers, collective 
farmers, as well as rank-and-file party members.  
In this chapter, I examine dozens of reports about these public explanatory 
gatherings to gauge attitudes towards Eastern Europe in 1956. Most date from 
October and November 1956, with some carrying on well into 1957.
9
 They were 
produced by raikom, gorkom, and obkom officials across Ukraine and summaries 
were compiled by top apparatchiks in Kyiv. The reports cannot provide unmediated 
access into popular opinion, of course. Not only did residents of Ukraine control 
what they said in public, but low-level officials were liable to hide some problems 
which arose in their areas of jurisdiction when they wrote to their superiors. An 
additional source for my analysis is the information which party officials obtained 
about „private‟ conversations, anonymous letters, and illegal pamphlets which 
cropped up in different regions of Ukraine. Such accounts of „informal‟ opinions 
were often embedded in longer reports about the public meetings, and it is difficult 
to determine how representative these views were of wider trends in Soviet Ukraine 
in 1956. Many „unofficial‟ conversations may have gone unnoticed, but equally 
importantly, by their very nature, reports about opinions expressed outside the 
context of explanatory meetings devote disproportionate attention to „hostile‟ 
attitudes. Indeed, most were provided by the KGB. Though both kinds of sources are 
defined by the context of their production, they provide a rich and exciting prism 
through which to analyse people‟s attitudes to the crisis. The categories used in 
describing the developments and posing questions about Poland and Hungary reveal 
deep-seated divisions in Ukrainian society, as well as different patterns of response 
to the example of reform in the outer empire. 
People‟s responses to the crisis in Eastern Europe do not fit into the simple 
dichotomy of support and opposition to Khrushchev‟s „liberalisation‟, but range 
between conservative patriotism, which was most common, and reformist patriotism. 
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On the one hand, conservative patriotism included support for Moscow‟s repressive 
policies in Hungary and a belief in a strong state, perhaps even a Stalin-nostalgia. Its 
proponents criticised Khrushchev for taking de-Stalinization too far and losing 
control over the outer empire. At the same time, however, conservative patriotism 
was underpinned by a notion of economic entitlement. In line with the „broader 
populist commitments‟ of de-Stalinisation, which meant „renewed attention to citizen 
welfare‟,10 many residents of Ukraine complained about economic shortages, 
pointing out that the Soviet state should assure peace and stability at home and in the 
socialist camp as a whole. It is in this context that we should understand the frantic 
attempts of Soviet officials to improve the supply of certain basic products to keep 
the population quiet in the aftermath of the East European unrest. On the other hand, 
advocates of reformist patriotism sought to pursue further „democratisation‟ through 
engaging in public discussion about Eastern Europe. Nevertheless, they also looked 
towards a strong and stable Soviet state to provide information and an organisational 
framework for such debates, as well as economic stability. Hence, they were 
disturbed by the apparent rise of violence and Moscow‟s seemingly declining 
authority in the aftermath of Khrushchev‟s Secret Speech. They were distinct, 
therefore, from many former members of Ukrainian nationalist organisations and the 
illegal Uniate church who saw the Polish and Hungarian events as „the writing on the 
wall for the Soviet Union itself‟, a feeling made more poignant by the belief that, in 
Amir Weiner‟s words, „the simultaneous initiatives to accelerate the indigenisation 
of local cadres and the administrative reorganisation [were] inseparable and decisive 
steps in the dissolution of the union‟.11 Proponents of conservative and reformist 
patriotism also differed from some members of ethnic minorities, including Jews, 
Poles, and Hungarians, who typically commented on the unfolding crises to 
underline their status as „outsiders‟ in the USSR. 
Discussions about Eastern Europe exposed overlapping fault lines in Ukrainian 
society: social, economic, generational, geographical, and ethnic identities 
conditioned popular responses towards the crises. This may go some way towards 
explaining why citizens harboured complex, even self-contradictory attitudes 
towards the Soviet state and its policies, drawing on the various discourses of 
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„imperial‟ pride and responsibility, economic populism, „liberalism‟, and 
nationalism. The aspirational Soviet middle class, encompassing such „privileged‟ 
members of Ukrainian society as party activists, engineers, agricultural specialists, 
and university lecturers, appeared to be the most prominent supporters of the 
USSR‟s repressive policies in Eastern Europe. In contrast, some young people, 
especially university students, hoped that Polish reforms would be emulated in the 
USSR itself. On another level, as the authorities used economic incentives to ensure 
peace and stability in Ukraine, they encouraged many residents of the republic to 
identify themselves as „claimants‟, distinct from the local bureaucrats and party 
apparatchiks who they expected to satisfy their material needs. Not surprisingly, the 
borderlands proved to be the most conflicted region in the republic. Nevertheless, the 
stereotypical division into an anti-Soviet west and a „pro-Soviet‟ east is misleading 
and simplistic; rather, conservative patriotism, „economic populism‟, reformist 
patriotism, and ethnic nationalism found their most stark representation in the 
western oblasts, exposing divisions in the region and, perhaps, the logically 
incoherent attitudes of its individual inhabitants. 
The chapter begins by analysing how official Soviet portrayals of Poland and 
Hungary evolved between June 1956 and January 1957, exposing the tensions 
between officials at different levels of the party bureaucracy. It then examines the 
meaning of conservative patriotism and „economic populism‟ in the context of late 
1956, contrasting them with Soviet reformist patriotism. The chapter concludes by 
exploring the claims and the appeal of ethnic nationalisms in the republic, with a 
particular focus on the western oblasts.   
  
I. Getting the Story Straight 
Between October 1956 and January 1957, obkom and gorkom apparatchiks in 
Ukraine urged low-level party officials to conduct mass „explanatory work‟ for 
Soviet citizens. Ever since Khrushchev‟s Secret Speech, primary party cell meetings 
were an important means of examining and influencing the public mood.
12
 As Polly 
Jones demonstrates, discussion was often chaotic and unpredictable, but by the latter 
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half of 1956 the centre grew more confident in „defining, and then anathematising 
and excluding anti-Soviet conduct‟ during the gatherings, coming up with clearer 
statements „if not on the increasingly vexed question of the Stalinist past, then at 
least on the regulations governing public opinion in the present‟.13 The Bolsheviks 
were now „exhorted from above to keep subsequent disagreements within the Party 
and to present a united front to the rest of society‟.14 Indeed, with the outbreak of 
unrest in Eastern Europe in late October, top Party officials were ever more 
determined to outline a clear distinction between „acceptable reform‟ and 
„counterrevolution‟, relying on party activists as guides of popular opinion. They 
sent special letters and telegrams to raikom and obkom officials throughout the 
USSR, on the basis of which they were expected to prepare a coherent explanation of 
the recent developments for rank-and-file party members, as well as non-party 
students, workers, collective farmers, and members of the intelligentsia. They also 
instructed agitators to refer to the Soviet press when addressing their audiences, and 
even to read out newspaper articles during the actual meetings. However, before the 
end of December, the Party failed to outline a clear point of view about the limits of 
„liberalisation‟ in Eastern Europe, which reflected Moscow‟s own ambiguous 
attitudes towards reform and „de-Stalinisation‟. This created tensions between the 
top party bureaucrats and activists in the regions, whilst leaving most residents of 
Ukraine confused about Moscow‟s attitudes towards Poland and, to a lesser extent, 
Hungary. 
The Soviet press published the first news of unrest in Poland on 30 June. 
Coverage of the Poznan riots in Pravda and Izvestiia was to set the tone for debates 
surrounding the Polish and Hungarian crises in the autumn. It echoed Moscow‟s 
concerns about the unity of the socialist camp, as well as a renewed commitment to 
improving living standards in the USSR and the Soviet empire as a whole. The press 
blamed „international reactionary forces‟ for the outbreak of violence, underlining 
that „workers‟ supported the pro-Soviet political leaders in Warsaw, but it also 
pointed to „bureaucratic distortions‟ which aggravated economic shortages in 
Poland.
15
 More broadly, official reports from Poland reflected a tension between the 
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perceived need to find new sources of bottom-up support for the Soviet satellite 
regimes, and the desire to preserve Moscow‟s top-down control in Eastern Europe. 
When Literaturnaia gazeta bemoaned the fact that Polish writers confused the 
„distortions and dogmas caused by the cult of the individual for the genuine ideas 
and principles of socialist realism‟,16 it reflected the concerns of the Soviet leaders 
who hoped both to extend discussion about „de-Stalinization‟ and to control its 
outcomes.  
This apparent paradox goes some way towards explaining why Moscow did not 
articulate a clear Soviet point of view about the changes taking place in Poland 
during September and October 1956. As the Polish debates about reform gained 
momentum during the autumn, the CPSU Central Committee Presidium received 
reports about the publication of anti-Soviet materials in the Polish press,
17
 but there 
seemed to be no consensus about how the Soviet media should react to this.
18
 Pravda 
printed the news of Gomulka‟s take-over on 20 October 1956, and informed its 
readers that Polish enemies of socialism who had previously „disguised themselves 
by claiming that they were exposing the consequences of the “cult of the individual”‟ 
were now explicitly „renouncing Lenin and Marx‟.19 However, Khrushchev 
remained reluctant to define the Kremlin‟s attitude towards the new leadership in 
Warsaw. On 21 October, he informed the Presidium that no statement about the 
Polish situation should yet be sent out to party organisations.
20
 It was not until 23 
October that the CPSU Central Committee began to draft a letter about the situation 
in Poland, which was supposed to be read out alongside Gomulka‟s speech outlining 
his new policies in the obkoms and raikoms throughout the USSR three days later. 
Even then, the authorities sought to limit the flow of information from Poland, 
instructing obkom officials to read the letter to raikom bureaucrats but not to leave 
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any copies with them. Khrushchev also made it clear that Gomulka‟s speech was not 
to be printed in the press.
21
 Meanwhile, Pravda continued to produce contradictory 
images of Gomulka‟s Poland over the next two weeks or so, informing its readers 
about the influence of „nationalistic‟ and „reactionary‟ forces in the country, but also 
writing about „working class unity‟ and successful Soviet-Polish cultural 
cooperation.
22
 Senior bureaucrats were likewise vague when they outlined the 
„correct‟ response to the Polish crisis which agitators should promote during 
informational meetings: while some of Gomulka‟s ideas were „undoubtedly correct‟, 
others were „questionable‟, and others still were „outright incorrect‟, they wrote in a 
special report about shortcomings in propaganda work.
23
 With Gomulka attacked by 
the Soviet press and yet ultimately accepted as the new leader of Poland, Moscow‟s 
attitudes towards the new „Polish way to socialism‟ remained unclear.  
By contrast, news reports from Hungary were much less ambiguous, as the 
official mass media left no doubt that the crisis amounted to a full-blown 
counterrevolution. On 25 October 1956, Pravda and Izvestiia wrote about a 
„counterrevolutionary rebellion‟ in Budapest, organised by „reactionary underground 
organizations‟.24 After some initial approval of Imre Nagy and reports to the effect 
that Budapest was returning to „normal life‟,25 Soviet readers were informed on 31 
October that the events had turned much more violent and complicated.
26
 Pravda 
also wrote about Austrian and German aircraft delivering soldiers to Hungary,
27
 
pointing to the supposed links between the „fascist‟ rebellion in Hungary and 
German revanchism. Finally, on 3 November, the CPSU Central Committee sent out 
a telegram to republican leaders and local officials at the obkoms, which stated that 
Nagy‟s government had prepared the way for „reactionary forces‟ which sought to 
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re-establish the capitalist system in Hungary. At the same time, despite Molotov‟s 
opposition,
28
 the telegram included a condemnation of the „Rakosi-Gero clique‟ and 
thus criticised Hungarian leaders for their reluctance to introduce reform after 
1953.
29
 In line with this, on 5 November, the editorial in Pravda stated that „the 
Hungarian Revolutionary and Peasants Government … requested the Soviet troops 
to help the people smash the dire forces of reaction and counterrevolution‟. 
Meanwhile, it also emphasised that the new Hungarian government established 
under Soviet protection would pursue a programme of reform, „ensuring the 
country‟s national independence‟, „raising the standard of living of the working 
people‟ and „establishing indestructible fraternal ties with the socialist states‟.30 
Popular acquiescence would be achieved through granting economic concessions to 
the Hungarian workers, and preserving a degree of Hungarian autonomy within the 
socialist camp.   
Through thus shaping their portrayals of Poland and Hungary, the official media 
suggested that Soviet-style regimes had firstly to strengthen top-down control to 
prevent the rise of „counter-revolutionary forces‟, and secondly to concentrate on 
economic reform to gain mass legitimacy. The Soviet authorities made a concerted 
effort to transmit this message to residents of Ukraine through the means of agitation 
meetings. In the last week of October, party officials in the localities organised 
special explanatory gatherings about the situation in Poland and Hungary, where 
press articles were read out and discussed. Reports from the agitation meetings 
started flooding into the CPU Central Committee around 25
 
October. The meetings 
were tailored for the broader public, rather than just party members, and the 
authorities paid special care to address industrial workers, collective farmers, 
students and young people, the intelligentsia, and residents of the western oblasts.
31 
In L‟viv alone, they held large meetings at the bus, bicycle, and agricultural 
machinery factories; teachers and students from the medical institute attended a 
special lecture at the opera house; and high school students participated in a 
gathering at the Zan‟kovets‟ka theatre.32 Throughout the first half of November, each 
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obkom produced a few reports about the repercussions of the East European crises, 
informing the CPU Central Committee about the conduct of agitation meetings 
which they held at large industrial enterprises and collective farms, and passing on 
information obtained from the local KGB branches. In Sumy, for instance, the local 
leaders wrote about the moods amongst „workers‟ on 5 November,33 closely 
followed by another report discussing popular reactions to the formation of the new 
pro-Soviet government in Budapest on 6 November.
34
 Kyiv summarised the effects 
of the agitation work in the localities for the CPSU Central Committee on 3 
November, 12 November, and 16 November.
35
  
Before the CPSU Central Committee issued the telegram about Hungary on 3 
November, it seems that agitators had to rely exclusively on the official Soviet media 
in preparation for the meetings.
36
 During this time, obkom officials in Zhytomir 
blamed their superiors in Kyiv and Moscow for providing insufficient information, 
as they requested clearer top-down instructions about how to deal with news and 
agitation on the local level. Some party secretaries and communists even telephoned 
the Zhytomir obkom to enquire whether the CPSU Central Committee had sent any 
letters concerning the crises and, in the absence of clear information in the mass 
media, complained about the appearance of „malicious rumours‟.37 For their part, top 
officials in Moscow and Kyiv reprimanded local party organisations throughout 
Ukraine for their lack of „flexibility‟, charging that they failed to use the Soviet press 
promptly to organise „explanatory work‟ about the East European crises. For 
example, they claimed that despite the supposedly clear coverage in the press, many 
party officials simply „shrugged their shoulders‟ when asked why Gomulka ascended 
to power in Poland.
38
 Meanwhile, obkom bureaucrats were not satisfied with the 
work of their subordinates in charge of organising agitation work on the ground. The 
harshest criticism of all resounded in L‟viv, where senior apparatchiks chastened 
bureaucrats from the Vynnykivs‟kyi raion who had no idea about popular moods in 
the region, and who had failed to prepare for the 39
th
 anniversary of the Great 
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October Revolution.
39
 Party apparatchiks were also very alarmed that debates 
amongst students escaped the confines of the official agitation meetings, which they 
blamed on the incompetence of low-level officials. Party organisations at universities 
did not react to negative opinions promptly enough, the authorities in L‟viv 
complained.
40
 In fact, it seems that similar accusations were grounded in reality. 
Obkom inspectors from Kyiv discovered that halls of residence in the city were 
poorly supplied with newspapers and journals, whilst the „red corner‟ („chervonyi 
kutok‟) in hall number two was cluttered with old furniture, and as such it could not 
possibly host agitation meetings. The authorities were alarmed that members of 
primary party organisations from Kyiv universities, as well as lecturers and deans, 
had failed to visit halls of residence recently.
41
 
By issuing their special telegram on 3 November, the Presidium hoped to 
improve the quality of agitation work about Eastern Europe. They explicitly 
instructed local officials that the „state and party aktiv‟ should be informed about the 
situation in Eastern Europe first; only then should they organise „explanatory work‟ 
at factories, collective farms, and other institutions. At the same time, local agitators 
and lecturers were still encouraged to study official newspapers in preparation for the 
gatherings.
42
 However, it is not entirely clear whether all agitators were in fact 
familiar with the telegram and, in any case, it appears that they failed to control 
popular opinion to the satisfaction of officials in Moscow. In the second half of 
November, the Kremlin adopted more decisive measures to improve agitation work. 
On 21 November, the Presidium of the Central Committee in Moscow began to 
compose „an extremely harsh and impatient letter‟ to all party organizations down to 
the level of primary cells, in which they chastised low-level party officials for failing 
to root out „negative reactions‟ to Khrushchev‟s de-Stalinization and the East 
European crises amongst the creative intelligentsia, academics, Gulag returnees, 
„bourgeois nationalists‟, and others.43 The letter had gone through several drafts 
before being sent out on 19 December, as top officials discussed how to infuse 
Ukraine‟s inhabitants with the „correct‟ understanding of the East European crises, 
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rather than just punishing those individuals who expressed undesirable views. While 
the letter instructed party organisations to pay special attention to Gulag returnees,
44
 
adding that „every communist must fight against provocation‟ and hostile foreign 
propaganda,
45
 it also stressed that the Party should find new sources of legitimacy to 
maintain calm and stability in the USSR. Local officials were to improve safety 
standards at workplaces and combat „bureaucratism‟ to satisfy the Soviet 
trudiashchiesia,
46
 hold meetings with workers and engineers in the spirit of „healthy 
criticism and self-criticism‟,47 and – while making sure that writers accept state 
control over the arts and ascribe to „Leninist principles‟ – avoid the vulgarity of 
Stalinist interventions in literature.
48
 Party officials were explicitly instructed not to 
employ „administrative measures‟ against ideologically immature and „lost‟ 
(zabluzhdaiushchiesia) citizens, who must not be confused with „hostile elements‟.49 
Exactly one month after sending the letter, on 19 January 1957, the CPSU Central 
Committee evaluated how its resolutions were implemented in the regions. They still 
complained about the quality of public lectures in the USSR, claiming that the 
agitators who explained party and state policy to „the masses‟ were often immature, 
unprepared, and sometimes even untrustworthy.
50
 However, local party cells had 
increased their efforts to guide popular opinion in January 1957, mainly through 
introducing stricter discipline amongst rank-and-file members. Feedback from the 
regions suggested that the letter had increased party members‟ „alertness‟, creating 
an „atmosphere of intolerance‟ towards „anti-Soviet, hostile‟ opinions, at least within 
party organisations. Sometimes this happened retrospectively: the director of a 
Zakarpattian lumberjack collective and a party member, comrade Kapusta, had 
previously attacked the Soviet army for killing children in Hungary and claimed that 
the USSR crushed a popular revolt against tyrannical governments. Whereas the 
lumberjacks‟ party organisation had ignored this at the time, they remembered 
Kapusta after reading the Presidium‟s letter in December. Only then did they pass a 
resolution condemning his statements.
51
 Exclusion from the party was one means of 
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keeping discipline after 19 December. The party organisation at the train carriage 
factory in Debal‟tsevo excluded an employee who, apart from „systematically 
listening to the Voice of America and the BBC‟, „praised the capitalist way of life‟ in 
the presence of other rabochie.
52
 Similarly, party organisations in Odesa conducted 
„closed meetings‟ to discuss the letter. At the genetics institute, the party cell 
„sharply condemned‟ the „anti-party‟ behaviour of a third year postgraduate student 
who had criticised Soviet policies in Hungary and he was expelled from the CPSU.
53
 
Thus, public discussion about the East European crises was most lively between 
late October and mid-December 1956, and it became more constrained by early 
1957. Using the press and agitation gatherings to control popular opinion, party 
apparatchiks suggested that the regimes in Eastern Europe and the USSR itself 
would tolerate a limited degree of open discussion about living conditions and 
economic shortages, as well as the excesses of „bureaucratism‟ in the socialist camp. 
By the very act of organising informational gatherings, they encouraged citizens to 
talk about foreign affairs and to demand more information from Party leaders. At the 
same time, top officials made it increasingly clear that the authorities would impose 
stricter controls over public debates, undermining the influence of international 
„counterrevolutionary forces‟ and „correcting‟ the views of anyone who questioned 
the leading role of the CPSU and its sister parties in the socialist camp. This 
amounted to a somewhat confused and paradoxical approach towards the East 
European crises: public discussion was simultaneously encouraged and restricted, 
and the need to reform Soviet-style regimes clashed with calls for re-establishing 
order. Consequently, the Polish and Hungarian events produced contradictory 
responses among the population of Ukraine.  
 
II. Conservative Patriotism 
Some citizens were clearly disturbed by the deficiencies and contradictions in 
public rhetoric. Many members of the Soviet middle class found it difficult to 
understand why Moscow allowed the situation to escalate to the point of violent 
confrontation, a sentiment echoed among other social groups, particularly in western 
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Ukraine, where the „Hungarian putsch‟ opened fresh wounds and inflamed popular 
fears of war. This situation propelled the rise of conservative patriotism. Articulating 
a sense of „imperial‟ pride and expressing support for the idea of a strong 
authoritarian state, sometimes even Stalin nostalgia, numerous people harboured 
seemingly self-contradictory attitudes towards Khrushchev and his leadership. On 
the one hand, they expressed a sense of absolute loyalty towards the Soviet army and 
the CPSU, supporting Khrushchev‟s repressive measures in Eastern Europe and 
calling for the Soviet state to use force to re-establish order at home and abroad. On 
the other hand, they also criticised the Kremlin‟s policies of „liberalisation‟ 
suggesting that the regime‟s legitimacy should be grounded in economic 
paternalism. Citizens who expressed this vision of conservative patriotism were the 
most numerous amongst the participants in organised gatherings whose comments 
were recorded, and KGB reports suggest that many residents of Ukraine articulated 
similar opinions outside the strictly formal context of the meetings, often in very 
emotional terms. 
War veterans in particular recalled the Soviet sacrifices in Eastern Europe, and 
claimed that the USSR must strengthen stability in the socialist camp to protect the 
fruits of victory of the Great Patriotic War. In the Crimea, local residents gathered 
together to listen to Soviet radio and discuss the incoming news. Many of them 
recalled their participation in the battle for Budapest: since „Soviet soldiers‟ „spilt 
blood‟ for Hungary, they were quoted as saying, the country must remain within the 
socialist camp.
54
 At times, war veterans adopted a very aggressive tone. As a 
„surgeon‟ and „participant of the Great Patriotic War‟, a doctor of orthopaedics from 
Kyiv could not but express her outrage at reading the news from Budapest and 
Poznan in Soviet newspapers: nevertheless, she was confident that the „deplorable 
degenerates‟ („zhalki vyrodki‟) and „pitiful animals‟ („zhalugidni tvaryny‟) who 
opposed Soviet-style regimes in Eastern Europe would not „turn back the wheel of 
history‟.55 Official reports that explicitly mentioned the veterans presented them as a 
group which unanimously supported Moscow‟s repressive policies in Hungary. This 
may suggest that foreign affairs provided one forum where the veterans, otherwise 
divided along generational lines and facing various degrees of discrimination and 
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outright repression in the USSR,
56
 began to speak in one voice. Recently united in 
the Soviet Committee of War Veterans, they echoed the authorities‟ attempts to use 
former Red Army soldiers for cold war propaganda when they commented on the 
unfolding crises.
57
 At the same time, even though they did not yet articulate demands 
for privileges as clearly as they would after avenues for formal organisation were 
closed again in the 1970s,
58
 they used public meetings about Poland and Hungary to 
assert that they were a distinguished group in Soviet society. This was in line with 
broader attempts to strengthen veterans‟ collective identity and social standing in the 
USSR through emphasising their importance for Soviet foreign policy. As Mark 
Edele argues, retired career officers began to use the official veterans‟ association, 
established with the aim of strengthening the USSR‟s position in the World Veterans 
Federation, for defending former soldiers‟ interests at home.59   
Whilst war veterans recalled their own sacrifices, some other residents of the 
republic invoked the myth of the Great Patriotic War, too. Amir Weiner shows that 
memories of war served as both a unifying Soviet experience and a means of 
articulating particularistic identities in post-war Ukraine.
60
 At the height of the 
Polish and Hungarian crises, many participants in the public meetings highlighted 
that the Soviet defeat of Nazi Germany obliged East Europeans to remain loyal to the 
USSR. Not only did they implicitly recognise the special position of war veterans in 
Soviet society, but they also identified themselves with a glorious and powerful 
USSR. For example, speaking in the name of his collective, a primary party 
organisation secretary from Kyiv, citing Pravda, argued that the USSR would have 
to „help‟ Poland. „We do not believe that the Polish trudiashchi‟ share the anti-
Soviet attitudes of the Polish press, he claimed: „the Polish robitnyk and villager 
remembers that it was the Soviet army who liberated his country from German 
fascism‟.61 Through invoking memories of the war whilst commenting on the 
Hungarian crisis, these residents of Ukraine often adopted a very personal rhetoric. 
During an agitation meeting at her collective farm, a woman from the Drohobych 
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oblast made an emotional speech about her „friends and relatives‟ who had died 
during the Great Patriotic War. She was appalled that „fascist bandits‟ had become 
active again in Hungary and Egypt and demanded that they be punished in the name 
of the „entire Soviet narod‟.62 With the USSR „as a whole realigned on the basis of 
wartime experience‟,63 and despite the fact that veterans had not yet emerged as a 
„generation‟ as they would in the 1970s,64 many inhabitants of the republic made an 
explicit effort to underline their pride in the Soviet victory and to associate 
themselves with war veterans. 
It appears that many citizens made references to the Polish and Hungarian crises 
to prove that they were loyal to the Soviet state and, more importantly perhaps, to 
claim a special „privileged‟ status in Soviet society. Participants in the „informational 
gatherings‟ suggested that they had contributed towards building „socialism‟ and did 
not want to see Soviet „achievements‟ in Eastern Europe undermined. In early 
November, the local authorities used the same gatherings both to celebrate the 39
th
 
anniversary of the October Revolution and to discuss the Polish and Hungarian 
crises; this juxtaposition helped to bring out the contrast between the reliable 
„socialists‟ in the USSR and the unstable foreigners in Eastern Europe. A.I. 
Kyrychenko from the CPU Central Committee appeared candid when he stated that 
the authorities registered fewer undesirable incidents, even small ones, during the 
anniversary celebrations in 1956 than they had in previous years.
65
 This is not to 
suggest that the holiday took on a greater significance for the republic‟s residents 
during such a tumultuous period, but rather that the citizens who were invited to take 
part in the celebrations were now more carefully selected.
66
 This made the 
commemorative-informational gatherings into an exclusive experience, which 
permitted participants to distinguish themselves from other, less reliable citizens. 
Party activists in the western oblasts were particularly keen to express their pride in 
Soviet „socialist achievements‟. They stressed that they had personally contributed 
towards establishing the Soviet system in the newly incorporated regions after 1944, 
only to see the Poles and Hungarians reverse the very policies that they had 
promoted in Ukraine. A west-Ukraine born pensioner and former deputy of the 
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Ukrainian Supreme Council was clearly disturbed by Warsaw‟s new agricultural 
policy when he described his recent trip to Poland to a group of the local trudiashchi. 
He proudly underlined that west Ukrainian leaders had managed to deal with 
slackers and „bandits‟ who attacked collective farms, and he was convinced that 
Ukraine‟s farmers, having seen the benefits of collectivisation, would never choose 
to move back to private agriculture. With this superior experience, Soviet people 
should travel to Poland more often to guide their Polish brothers along the road to 
socialism. While the Polish leaders failed to punish the harmful „elements‟ who 
hoped to take Poland off the socialist path, the Polish industrial workers and poor 
farmer „welcome us, the Soviet people, very warmly‟, he claimed.67 
Thus, conservative patriotism fused the rhetoric of „imperial‟ pride with a sense 
of elitism. The paternalistic claims of conservative patriotism posed a major 
challenge to the Soviet state. Raising concerns about the spread of „hostile‟ attitudes 
in Ukraine, the dramatic and bloody events in Hungary, coupled with the confusion 
and incompetence of local officials, offered a stimulus and a fresh opportunity for 
some Soviet citizens to criticize the Kremlin‟s reforms and to advance a more 
positive image of Stalin. Stalin nostalgia seems particularly characteristic of those 
individuals who enjoyed a privileged status in Soviet society, such as the technical 
intelligentsia or university lecturers, and were keen to strengthen Soviet stability. In 
referring to their yearning for Stalin‟s iron fist, they portrayed themselves as 
responsible Soviet citizens concerned about the failure of Khrushchev‟s leadership to 
outline a clear Soviet point of view about the foreign crises. In Uzhgorod, for 
example, a university lecturer claimed that the Hungarian events occurred because of 
Khrushchev‟s excessive critique of the cult of personality. At the same time, he 
charged that Soviet newspapers provided very little information from Hungary, thus 
encouraging the growth of all sorts of incredible rumours and creating the impression 
that the Soviet authorities did not care about their narod.
68
 Similarly, many residents 
of Kyiv used public gatherings to complain that Stalin‟s name was only ever invoked 
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in a negative context, even though he had had many „positive sides‟.69  
Stalin nostalgia was common amongst army officers, too.
70
 The KGB informed 
the CPU Central Committee that officers complained about shortages in the military 
budget, as well as Khrushchev‟s lack of „alertness‟ (bditel’nost’), though the reports 
were not always clear about the circumstances in which they voiced such opinions. 
On 3 November, a party member and lieutenant from the Kyiv aviation school stated 
that the Hungarian crisis „would never have happened under Stalin‟, whose authority 
was strong enough to hold Eastern Europe together; „our talk of peace‟ has now led 
to the „weakening of alertness‟, he lamented. Soviet leaders spent copious amounts 
of money on receiving foreign delegations, which gave them a false sense of 
security; this money should be spent on defence instead, the lieutenant stated, 
suggesting thereby that he did not trust diplomats to resolve international conflicts.
71
 
His opinions were echoed by an engineer and army captain who dramatically 
claimed that twelve years of Soviet domination in Hungary had „gone to waste‟ in 
the space of twenty-four hours. „Our leaders have had it coming‟, he asserted, 
because they enjoyed foreign trips and luxurious receptions, instead of strengthening 
foreign intelligence and looking after domestic affairs. There has been „too much 
talk about the personality cult‟, as a result of which „we‟ have become „too 
democratic‟ and lost any semblance of discipline.72 Some of those who had seen 
service in Hungary were particularly alarmed about Khrushchev‟s „liberal‟ foreign 
policy and his reconciliation with Tito. Two officers who visited officials at the 
Khmel‟nyts‟kyi obkom on 16 November claimed that Yugoslavia actively supported 
the Hungarian rebels, which outraged Soviet army personnel. Local party 
apparatchiks tried to calm the officers down, explaining that the USSR should strive 
to maintain good relations with Tito‟s Yugoslavia. As they put it in their report for 
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A.I. Kyrychenko in Kyiv, however, the officers‟ „facial expression‟ showed that they 
did not agree with them.
73
 
To the extent that conservative patriotism was underpinned by fears of instability, 
it filtered through to other social groups in Ukraine. As a report from L‟viv put it, 
workers, bureaucrats, and members of the intelligentsia emphasised that Soviet 
domination in Eastern Europe served the interests of „progressive humanity‟, but first 
of all the „trudiashchiesia of our country‟.74 Public debates about Eastern Europe 
encouraged many inhabitants of Ukraine to demonstrate their loyalty towards a 
hierarchical and imperial Soviet society, because this allowed them to assert that the 
Soviet authorities should represent their interests as „Soviet workers‟. In particular, 
numerous citizens sought more information. For instance, a non-party worker from 
Kyiv bemoaned the fact that the Soviet press provided very little information about 
the East European crises, all the while trying to identify a clear Soviet narrative 
about the disturbances in Hungary. Condemning the rebels across the border, he 
argued that the „capitalist‟ and „fascist‟ unrest in Eastern Europe were directed 
against the USSR. Likewise, a metal worker demanded to know more about comrade 
Rokossowski‟s dismissal from the Polish Politburo and the developments in 
Hungary, while also stating that the „American imperialist plot‟ was doomed to 
failure.
75
  
Some workers and non-party members appeared to believe that the Hungarian 
crisis posed a military threat to the USSR. Fear of change and instability took on a 
special significance in western Ukraine, where the escalating violence in 
neighbouring Hungary brought to life the spectre of war. Having studied the mood 
amongst inhabitants of the L‟viv oblast during agitation meetings, the obkom 
concluded that citizens were afraid that a war might break out soon.
76
 During public 
meetings in the oblast centre, local citizens recalled Soviet sacrifices in the Great 
Patriotic War and declared their readiness to work hard for the „Fatherland‟ to 
preserve peace in the world.
77
 Further south, in the Khmel‟nyts‟kyi oblast, obkom 
leaders admitted that the quality of „mass political work‟ was „poor‟. A party official 
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witnessed panic amongst women collective farmers in the region, who 
misinterpreted radio broadcasts about the bombing of the Suez canal and thought that 
western powers had attacked the „Soviet canal‟. The apparatchik talked to them 
about the Suez crisis, and they laughed at their mistake, but he nonetheless 
reprimanded them, pointing out that there was in fact nothing to laugh about.
78
 The 
authorities took popular fear of war very seriously, seeing it as a potentially 
destabilising influence in western Ukraine.  
Ironically, perhaps, Soviet military intervention in Hungary was widely 
supported in the region, as it made a full-fledged war seem less likely. During an 
informational meeting at the L‟vivsil‟mash plant, workers explicitly condemned the 
„reactionary forces‟ that sought to undermine the socialist system in Hungary and 
supported the Soviet army‟s struggle against counterrevolution. At the same time, 
they also suggested that the Soviet army should have intervened in Hungary earlier, 
which would have helped to prevent such large scale violence.
79
 Thus, fear of war 
reinforced a sense of Soviet patriotism amongst many locals, strengthening support 
for Soviet domination of Eastern Europe, but it also inspired criticism of Moscow‟s 
foreign policy. Many residents of western Ukraine who attended explanatory 
meetings about the Hungarian crisis sounded accusatory as they repeatedly asked 
why the USSR had not intervened in Hungarian affairs earlier.
80
 Some inhabitants of 
the L‟viv oblast were more explicit in their criticism during agitation meetings, 
stating openly that the Hungarian uprising was „our fault‟, because the USSR had not 
been alert when the „fascists‟ in Budapest prepared their revolt. At the fittings 
factory, workers argued that „we‟ should not take the army out of Hungary until 
order is completely restored across the border.
81
 
As rumours spread and doubts about the Soviet future multiplied, west Ukrainian 
responses to the Polish and Hungarian crises were varied and contradictory. 
Inhabitants of the region took a strong interest in foreign affairs precisely because 
they unfolded just across the border. This encouraged people both to debate East 
European affairs outside the official context of agitation meetings and to express 
doubts about the strength of the Soviet army. „Unhealthy rumours' appeared in the 
                                                          
78
 TsDAHO, f.1, op.24, s. 4265, ark. 151-154. 
79
 DALO, f.P3, op.5, s.443, ark. 28-31. 
80
 DALO, f.P3, op.5, s.406, ark. 83-85. 
81
 TsDAHO, f.1, op.24, s.4265, ark. 79-86. 
77 
 
 
town of Khmel‟nyts‟kyi, one official noted, as some locals claimed that the town 
hospital was full of the wounded from Hungary, „which was not in fact true‟.82 When 
a non-party Ukrainian laboratory worker from L‟viv told her colleagues that she and 
her husband condemned Soviet interference in the internal affairs of Hungary, she 
was opposed by another employee who argued that events in the Soviet satellite 
states concerned them directly due to their geographical proximity; the „American 
imperialist border‟ could move right down to our doorstep, she argued. Nevertheless, 
other employees, including a non-party Russian woman, supported the controversial 
opinion, and the laboratory worker boldly resisted her colleague‟s criticism by 
accusing her of simply being afraid to voice her true beliefs.
83
 Thus, a sense of 
instability encouraged residents of western Ukraine to argue about the current crises 
and criticise Soviet policies in Eastern Europe. 
Conservative patriotism was highly paradoxical. In calling for greater top-down 
control in the USSR and the Soviet empire as a whole, its adherents emerged as 
active citizens who criticised their leaders in Moscow. Even though the conservative 
vision of Soviet society put a strong emphasis on hierarchy and thereby appealed to 
members of the Soviet elite, such as war veterans, party activists, and army officers, 
it was also embraced by other residents of Ukraine. Conservative patriotism was 
based on the state‟s power to assure peace and stability at a time when many citizens 
feared the outbreak of war. As such, it turned Soviet citizens into claimants who 
demanded that the state provide safety and assure a decent standard of living in 
return for their political acquiescence. 
 
III. Economic shortages 
Food and fuel shortages created problems for Soviet authorities in Ukraine 
during late 1956 and early 1957, raising doubts about the USSR‟s ability to deal with 
the escalating crisis. Industrial workers and collective farmers took advantage of 
explanatory meetings devoted to the Polish and Hungarian crises to complain about 
the quality of life in the socialist camp and in Soviet Ukraine itself. In demanding 
that local officials pay more attention to their material needs, they described 
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themselves as reliable Soviet citizens who deserved to live better than the unreliable 
foreigners in the people‟s democracies. However, unlike in the early 1980s, when the 
rise and fall of the Solidarity movement in Poland sparked off wider debates about 
the position of workers in Soviet-style regimes,
84
 the Party effectively stifled 
complaints about the economy by improving the supply of certain products during 
the height of the Polish and Hungarian crises in 1956. Only in isolated cases did 
economic complaints escalate into acts of what the party apparatchiks referred to as 
„hooliganism‟; similarly only scattered individuals in western Ukraine discussed the 
advantages of capitalism over socialism when describing the East European revolts. 
Meanwhile, more inhabitants of Ukraine seemed to be satisfied with the modest 
degree of economic stability that the Soviet authorities assured. 
After the news of unrest in Poland and Hungary reached Ukraine, some citizens 
began to panic. They started to take money out of their savings accounts and buy 
basic necessities in preparation for the seemingly impending war: curiously, these 
normally included „soap, salt, and matches‟.85 Panic buying was particularly 
prevalent in the western oblasts. The L‟viv obkom was concerned that it was 
impossible to buy sugar and flour in some parts of the oblast.
86
 They registered 
„unhealthy opinions‟ in shops and in other public places. For instance, an obkom 
employee saw a man who approached people queuing outside a shop and told them 
that stocking-up would help nobody when they drop an atomic bomb on L‟viv.87 At 
the height of the East European crises, the key task that Party officials identified was 
to prevent panic by improving supplies of the products which citizens bought in 
mass quantities. As early as 3 November, the first secretary of the Volhynia obkom 
wrote that the Party was taking measures to supply and deliver such items „on 
time‟.88 Some party officials found this to be a difficult task: on 19 November 1956, 
a secretary of the Bila Tserkva gorkom still registered significant problems in his 
area of jurisdiction.
89
 Nevertheless, the authorities in Ukraine felt confident that they 
brought supply and demand under control by the second week of November. Most 
reports echoed that from Sumy, which claimed that the obkom had reacted to panic 
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buying promptly and efficiently: trading organisations made sure that the products in 
question were restocked, and the party aktiv conducted agitation work amongst the 
trudiashchi to encourage them to denounce collectively any signs of panic-
mongering.
90
 
While Soviet citizens did buy up basic food and fuel products, CPSU officials 
were equally concerned about the way in which they described economic problems 
and shortages. Unlike the more politicised calls for dissolving collective farms or 
introducing workers‟ councils which I discuss below, the majority of economic 
complaints should not be viewed as appeals to change the Soviet system. Rather, 
they represented attempts by ordinary citizens to exact benefits from the state as part 
of the Soviet „social contract‟, bringing to mind those individuals whom Christine 
Varga-Harris describes in her study of housing petitions during the Thaw: citizens 
were now much more assertive in demanding that Soviet officials help them with 
their „individualistic aims‟, often claiming „a right to decent housing simply by 
reason of having been born “Soviet”‟.91 In late 1956, many inhabitants of Ukraine 
articulated economic complaints as Soviet citizens who deserved to live better than, 
or at least as well as, the „foreigners‟ in Eastern Europe.92 It was not uncommon to 
hear complaints to the effect that the USSR helped the satellite states while Soviet 
citizens themselves lived in poverty.
93
 Ignoring his colleagues‟ protests, a party 
member born in the eastern oblasts who worked as head of department at a L‟viv 
factory, complained that the USSR should send fewer products abroad and improve 
material conditions for its own people instead.
94
 Another citizen suggested that the 
Hungarians would perhaps cease to strike if the USSR stopped sending products 
across the border.
95
 In contrasting the USSR to other countries in the Soviet camp, 
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these individuals invoked a Soviet identity to press for the satisfaction of their 
material demands. 
Despite the fact that the Central Committee Presidium mentioned „excesses of 
bureaucratism‟ in their official letters during this period, Soviet officials placed 
much emphasis on increasing conformity and top-down control amongst industrial 
workers and collective farmers. Already before the Hungarian uprising, central 
authorities had grown suspicious of the kind of criticism that Vladimir Dudintsev 
had levelled against managers in his controversial novel Not By Bread Alone, which 
„pitted upright champions of social benefit against corrupt self-seeking bureaucrats‟; 
after late November, the press abandoned the initial „qualified praise‟ of the novel in 
favour of „reserved censure‟ and even „outright rejection‟.96 In line with this, obkom 
officials linked problems of party discipline to economic performance. Time and 
time again, they suggested that shortages encouraged citizens to deviate from the 
official Soviet interpretation of East European events. Conversely, loyalty to the 
USSR and its institutions was manifested through hard work and the fulfilment of 
production norms. S.V. Chervonenko from the CPU Central Committee measured 
the level of Sovietness and party-mindedness by the weight of meat produced in 
different regions of Ukraine for the Hungarian market.
97
 When obkom officials tried 
to prove that the population displayed „correct attitudes‟ in the aftermath of the 
crises, they often emphasised that they fulfilled their production targets. In the 
Khmel‟nyts‟kyi oblast, the obkom thus „mobilised all means‟ to complete the 
autumnal agricultural works.
98
 
Even though, as Donald Filtzer points out, Moscow failed to reform the system 
of work relations to raise labour efficiency in the post-Stalinist period,
99
 it appears 
that Party officials were successful in maintaining the outward manifestations of 
labour discipline and productivity in the aftermath of the Polish and Hungarian 
unrest. During public gatherings called to discuss foreign affairs, most of the workers 
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and collective farmers whose comments were recorded talked about Soviet economic 
progress and made official pledges to over-fulfil their production targets. This is not 
to suggest that they actually worked efficiently, but rather that, despite the many 
economic grievances voiced in late 1956, most of them did not publicly question the 
nature of the Soviet economic system or their role in it. This was particularly 
significant in western Ukraine, where the authorities remained concerned about the 
„wrecking‟ activity of Gulag returnees. In the Nemyrivs‟kyi region of the L‟viv 
oblast, the KGB would make a special effort to protect „communal property‟, and 
collective farmers would finish all agricultural works by 7 November.
100
 They were 
confident that most collective farmers would work as long as they were protected 
against the minority of „wreckers‟. Indeed, collective farmers and workers 
(robitnyki) in the west expressed support for the Soviet system. In L‟viv, they 
publicly supported the resolution passed by „workers‟ in Moscow and Leningrad, 
who agreed to work an extra two hours on top of their working day to help the 
Egyptian narod.
101
 Meanwhile, during a „solemn gathering‟ devoted to the 39th 
anniversary of the October revolution in the Krakovets‟ region, a local woman 
promised to „extract 2100 litres of milk from each cow in 1957‟ in response to the 
imperialist aggression in Egypt and Hungary. She called for all collective farmers to 
follow her example.
102
 
Only at times did economic complaints escalate into what the Soviet authorities 
labelled „acts of hooliganism‟. It is difficult to determine what the term signified: 
Vladimir Kozlov shows that „[i]n the criminal and half-criminal milieu, it was 
common to hear the promise to construct a “second Hungary” or a “second 
Budapest” as well as other widely spread anti-Soviet clichés‟,103 and the KGB 
registered some very violent rhetoric in the aftermath of the crises. In late November 
or early December, a local resident of Bila Tserkva boasted that he, too, would have 
„killed at least a few communists‟ had he been in Hungary during the uprising, 
because „they bring hunger to the people‟.104 In a similar vein, in the village of 
Boiarka in the Kyiv oblast, the villagers threatened to do „what the Hungarians did‟ 
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unless supplies of fuel improved.
105
 However, while ascribing „disruptive behaviour‟ 
to the influence of the Polish, Hungarian, and Egyptian crises, many official reports 
cited examples of „hooliganism‟ which bore no explicit relation to the foreign 
developments; rather, they indicated that the local party authorities were very alert to 
any signs of disturbance during such an unstable period. In Sumy oblast, an obkom 
secretary pointed towards the need to increase party discipline and alertness – some 
disruptive „elements‟ hoped to use the current „economic‟ and „cultural‟ problems to 
harm „leading workers‟ and „collective farms‟. For instance, a former brigade leader 
by the name of Utkin, who worked at a collective farm in Kriasne in the Krasnopil‟ 
region, alienated the local officials at the end of October. The head of his collective 
farm promised to provide a lorry to transport two army recruits to the train station; 
for „technical reasons‟, as Naumenko claimed, the car was not delivered on time. 
Consequently, led by Utkin, a 150-strong crowd, who came to see the soldiers off, 
marched down to the kolkhoz leader‟s house, where they insulted him, calling him a 
„blood-sucker‟ and threatening to beat him up. The report underlined that the 
primary party organisation resolved the situation on its own: they excluded the 
brigade leader from the party for his „anti-Soviet action‟.106 
The unrest in Poland and Hungary resulted in panic buying, inspiring some 
people to criticise the Soviet regime‟s economic performance in the name of a Soviet 
community. Party leaders in the regions and at the very top were painfully aware that 
their citizens‟ acquiescence rested on their ability to assure a modest degree of 
economic stability in the republic. Through improving supplies and conducting mass 
agitation work, they controlled consumer demand and made sure that the great 
majority of citizens voiced loyalty to the Soviet system. Even though economic 
complaints did at times sound very dramatic or threatening from the authorities‟ 
point of view, they did not often lead to questioning the role of workers and 
collective farmers in the USSR, or to articulating grievances in political terms. 
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IV. Reformist Patriotism 
Frustration with the Soviet state did find more politicised forms of expression in 
Ukraine during late 1956. Small numbers of people, including students and members 
of the creative intelligentsia, voiced support for Gomulka‟s policies and hoped that 
they would be emulated in the USSR itself. More broadly, these proponents of 
reformist patriotism wanted to limit the power of the state and encourage citizens to 
comment on Moscow‟s domestic and foreign policy, rather than offering their 
political passivity in return for economic concessions and strong top-down Party 
control. However, in comparison to 1968, reformist patriotism occurred along a 
relatively wide spectrum.
107
 It ranged from mild reformist comments that the state 
was prepared to tolerate, through more challenging calls for better access to 
information (which formed the backbone of future reformist dissent) to very radical 
complaints verging on demands for systemic change.    
Like conservative patriotism, some strands of reformist patriotism were bolstered 
by paternalistic sentiments and a sense of „imperial‟ responsibility for the future of 
Eastern Europe. However, its proponents linked the need to combat anti-Soviet 
moods abroad to speeding up the pace of „democratisation‟. This was especially 
evident in the western oblasts, where a small number of workers (robitnyki) blamed 
the foreign crises on the fact that mistakes of the Stalinist era were being removed 
too slowly, which allowed „hostile forces‟ to turn people against Soviet-style 
regimes.
108
 They thus grounded calls for further „liberalisation‟ by highlighting the 
role of the USSR as the centre of the socialist bloc.  
This had important implications for Soviet domestic politics. In particular, 
debates surrounding Ukrainian cultural autonomy provided an arena where some 
members of the creative intelligentsia justified their reformist agenda by the need to 
strengthen Soviet power in both Eastern Europe and Soviet Ukraine. They 
complained about the suppression of Ukrainian culture in the USSR when they 
discussed the situation in Hungary, describing encounters with their Hungarian 
colleagues who failed to understand why there were so few Ukrainian language 
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schools in the republic.
109
 Inadequate provision of schooling in Ukrainian discredited 
the Soviet nationalities policy in the eyes of the Hungarian comrades, they 
suggested, which was a particularly pressing issue at a time when the USSR should 
guide Hungary away from „counterrevolution‟.  
These demands were voiced openly and, arguably, found some resonance 
amongst Party leaders in the republic. The recently Ukrainianised local cadres in the 
western oblasts recognised that Ukrainian ethnic identities could be mobilised to 
strengthen pro-Soviet loyalties in the region. They had „a personal stake in fighting 
nationalists‟, as well as enforcing the policy of „ethnonational homogenisation of the 
borderlands‟.110 In order to demonstrate that local society was unified during such an 
unstable time, for example, regional party leaders organised a special meeting in the 
Zankovets‟ka theatre. Not only did that gathering celebrate the 39th anniversary of 
the October revolution, but it also commemorated the 700
th
 anniversary of the 
founding of L‟viv. Furthermore, veterans of the „revolutionary struggle‟ from west 
Ukraine spoke during the meeting.
111
 These forms of commemoration pointed 
towards a distinctly Ukrainian contribution to „building socialism‟. The authorities in 
Kyiv also made nods in the direction of a Ukrainian nation, and proved responsive to 
demands voiced by members of the creative intelligentsia in the aftermath of the 
Hungarian crisis. On 12 November, A.I. Kyrychenko suggested that the authorities 
should strengthen the „propaganda of friendship‟ between the Russian and Ukrainian 
narody, thereby propagating the idea of a distinct Ukrainian people. Regional 
administration should work in the language of the local majority.
112
 The state would 
balance between the Russian and Ukrainian population of the republic, recognising 
their rights as separate entities: they would open Russian and Ukrainian schools 
„according to demand‟.113 Thus, some party activists echoed demands of the creative 
intelligentsia, articulating a vision of reformist patriotism that put a strong emphasis 
on increasing Ukrainian cultural autonomy. They portrayed this as a means of 
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neutralising the threat of Ukrainian nationalism. Crucially, however, they also 
invested „Ukrainianness‟ with positive overtones by suggesting that it would help to 
strengthen Soviet influences in Eastern Europe.  
 Reformist patriotism posed a considerably more serious challenge to the CPSU 
when its proponents tackled issues surrounding access to information. Demands for 
more openness in the mass media and during „informational gatherings‟ echoed 
some conservative concerns about inconsistencies in the official coverage of Eastern 
Europe, but they were underpinned by an anti-paternalist belief that a large number 
of people should engage in debates about the future of the socialist camp and the 
USSR itself. Throughout 1956, Soviet citizens revealed a „keen awareness‟ of the 
extent to which they were denied access to information: during the crises in Poland 
and Hungary, workers, avid for news, „clamoured to know why the radio and press 
were so sluggish in reporting fresh details‟ about East European crises.114 
Participants in „informational gatherings‟ devoted to the events likewise demanded 
„more detailed information‟ in the Soviet press and enquired why the USSR blocked 
western short-wave radio broadcasts.
115
 University students were the most articulate 
advocates of glasnost’. Local apparatchiks, who conducted a gathering at Kyiv State 
University, infuriated their superiors at the CPU Central Committee for having failed 
to give a „decisive reproach‟ to a student‟s „provocative question‟. He had apparently 
demanded to know why the Soviet state and the press had not considered it necessary 
to inform the population about Khrushchev‟s talks with Gomulka, which 
(supposedly) took place „in the spirit of friendliness and party openness‟. He had also 
attacked Pravda‟s special correspondent who had written about „anti-Soviet 
statements in the Polish press‟ and condemned them in the name of the Soviet narod. 
The student pointed out that the narod in question could not possibly condemn any 
articles published in Poland, because it was not familiar with them.
116
 The CPU 
Central Committee claimed that the official who conducted the meeting should have 
replied that Soviet journalists had a duty to speak in the name of the narod; in an act 
of circular reasoning, they claimed that the correspondent could not be accused of 
giving an „incorrect‟ assessment of the popular mood, because he clearly „lives 
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amongst the narod‟ and expresses its views „correctly‟.117 The incident represented 
wider concerns about the limits of openness and information control. Taking 
advantage of the local officials‟ confusion and incompetence, the student had used 
the public meeting at his university to criticise central newspapers in the name of a 
„Soviet people‟. He portrayed himself as a loyal citizen who had the right to obtain 
information from the Soviet media, but also posited himself in opposition to the 
official media and party apparatchiks who conducted the meeting.  
Indeed, reformist demands for glasnost’ encouraged numerous students to bypass 
official channels, thus inspiring open criticism of Soviet policy and laying the 
grounds for future dissent. Disillusioned with the domestic mass media and public 
agitation meetings, they turned towards foreign broadcasters to obtain news about 
Eastern Europe. As a L‟viv gorkom official put it, students failed to understand the 
East European developments „correctly‟, because they did not read Soviet 
newspapers and relied instead on western radio stations.
118
 He thus implied that 
students repeated the views that they had heard, portraying the reformist communist 
leaders in Warsaw and Budapest in a favourable light. Likewise, students in Kyiv 
used foreign radio stations to inform debates at home. They „resorted to‟ listening to 
western radio stations, as the officials would have it, which inspired them to analyse 
Gomulka‟s reforms in more detail than the local apparatchiks desired. For example, a 
fourth-year history student from the Kyiv state university openly admitted that he 
listened to the BBC, claiming that this was now officially allowed: apparently, the 
Soviet minister of culture had recently signed a special agreement to that effect 
during his visit to the United Kingdom. A local agitator conducting a students‟ 
meeting at the university asked him what he heard on the foreign radio; in response, 
the student reported that Khrushchev had called Gomulka a „traitor‟ and refused to 
shake his hand during his impromptu visit to Warsaw. He also asked whether the 
BBC could be considered to convey „fifty percent of the truth‟.119 It is notable that 
the student quoted western radio broadcasts during an official meeting – he implied 
thereby that listening to the BBC was not a subversive act, perhaps because he hoped 
that the foreign news could enliven debate at home at a time when Soviet sources of 
information proved inadequate to the task. Fashioning himself as an active citizen, he 
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effectively sought to extend public debate through reporting what he had heard on 
foreign radio stations, thereby compensating for the poor performance of Soviet 
journalists and agitators. Ironically, therefore, the student tried to claim that listening 
to foreign radio stations and spreading information about Eastern Europe obtained in 
this way was as an act of patriotism.  
In fact, the same logic can be applied to the more radical and isolated young 
people who used illegal means to raise public awareness about Gomulka‟s policies 
and to advance the cause of reform in the USSR. In Kyiv, for example, a small group 
held meetings to discuss Gomulka‟s speech, which they planned to translate and 
distribute in the USSR. In the Soviet Union, they claimed, socialist theory had been 
turned into a set of 'unquestionable laws', and it was necessary to follow the example 
of Poland in building socialism and democracy from afresh.
120
 In this way, they 
sought to redefine what it meant to be Soviet, encouraging citizens to participate in 
debates about reform and seeking unofficial sources of information to learn about 
Eastern Europe. Ultimately, however, they still wanted to improve the functioning of 
Soviet media and other Soviet institutions. 
As critical observers of the unfolding events, a small number of advocates of 
reformist patriotism did express very controversial views. Most prominently, they 
protested against Soviet interference in the domestic affairs of Hungary.
121
 
Admittedly, criticism of Soviet policy in the socialist camp was often confined to 
private conversations, but, with its implications of treason, it was inherently political 
and was treated as a criminal act. A student from Kharkiv and a teacher from the 
Donets‟k oblast were both tried in court for condemning the invasion.122 At the same 
time, dissatisfaction with Moscow‟s policy in Hungary found more politicised forms 
of expression during the autumn of 1956. In Odesa, the KGB discovered „counter-
revolutionary‟ leaflets which called for the withdrawal of the Soviet army from 
Hungary.
123
 More prominently, protests broke out at higher educational institutions 
in the USSR both before and after 4 November. Special anti-riot troops disbanded 
protests in Yaroslavl‟ and other cities, as students „organised rallies and carried 
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banners demanding the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary'.
124
 This is not to 
suggest that citizens who expressed alarm at the invasion of Hungary spoke out 
against the Soviet system or agreed with the accusations of disloyalty levelled 
against them; rather, many portrayed the invasion as a violation of „Soviet values‟, 
which suggests that they invoked their Soviet identity to condemn the state‟s foreign 
policy. During explanatory gatherings, individual members of the public asked why 
the Soviet state led its army into Hungary despite promoting the principle of non-
interference during the Suez crisis.
125
 Similarly, at the end of November, the chief 
constructor of the Kyiv Krasnyi Ekskavator plant received an anonymous letter 
which complained about his statements on the radio and during a public meeting 
devoted to international events. The letter despaired that the agitator used the Suez 
Crisis to distract the „Soviet people‟ from what they should really concern 
themselves with: the Hungarian fight for freedom from „Soviet oppression‟.126 Even 
whilst attacking the USSR‟s repressive foreign policy, the author wrote on behalf of 
the Soviet community. In this sense, some of the most controversial views about 
foreign affairs can still be seen as an expression of Soviet patriotism. At the same 
time, by expressing such opinions in anonymous letters and illegal forums, their 
proponents did conceptualise „reformism‟ as an act of dissent. 
Finally, in the confused atmosphere of 1956, a few scattered individuals 
advanced very radical ideas for economic reform. They tread the boundary between 
reformist patriotism and anti-Soviet views, essentially calling for systemic change, 
but also claiming that they wanted to protect Soviet and „socialist‟ interests. Some 
citizens grounded their grievances in Marxist-Leninist ideology. One extreme 
example of social disobedience rooted in the economic situation was an illegal 
workers‟ organisation formed in Donets‟k; according to the historian Anatolyi 
Rusnachenko, its leader was partly inspired by the example of the Poznan riots, 
which he saw as an attempt to defend workers‟ rights in Soviet-style regimes.127 
Calls for purifying the revolutionary cause and defending the proletariat were also 
apparent in the 1300 leaflets that the KGB found across the L‟viv oblast between 8 
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and 19 February 1957. Signed in the name of the Popular Trade Union of Russian 
Solidarists (Narodno-Trudovoi Soiuz Rossiiskikh Solidaristov), the brochures 
described the Polish and Hungarian events and maintained that revolution was 
possible under the communist totalitarian regime – they called for workers‟ councils 
to rule factories.
128
 More often, however, economically driven reformist patriotism 
took the form of ad hoc comments made during private conversations and focused on 
the issue of collective farming, which, as some citizens claimed, weakened the 
Soviet Union. A local farmer from the L‟viv oblast stated that collective farms in the 
USSR should be dissolved like they had been in Poland.
129
 Likewise, an oblast 
inspector from Zhytomir „tried to prove the impracticability of the collective farm 
system in the USSR‟.130 Perplexed by Gomulka‟s drastic departures from the Soviet 
model, and emboldened perhaps by Moscow‟s acceptance of the Polish reforms, 
these individuals implied that radical economic restructuring was compatible with 
preserving a Soviet socialist system and would even help to restore ideological 
purity. Nonetheless, they were probably aware that the authorities would deem their 
views „hostile‟, either because they attacked Soviet institutions or because they 
accused the Soviet leaders of failing to live up to the Marxist-Leninist ideology.  
Most advocates of reformist patriotism did not portray themselves as subversive 
when they criticised Soviet authorities in late 1956, but rather staked a claim to 
participate in debates about the future of their state. In fact, this was partly in line 
with Khrushchev‟s new policies, because, as Amir Weiner shows, „the increased role 
for public organisations and popular participation [was] institutionalised through 
mass mobilisation campaigns and organisations‟.131 This gave rise to a range of 
reformist ideas which gradually morphed into „legitimate‟ Soviet patriotism, patriotic 
dissent, and anti-Soviet opinions. Even though they represented very different 
attitudes towards the economy, foreign policy, the national question, and freedom of 
expression, reformist and conservative patriotism overlapped on the need to 
strengthen the Soviet state; conversely, and somewhat ironically, despite their 
contradictory opinions about the need to involve society at large in public debates, 
proponents of both varieties of Soviet patriotism actively criticised Khrushchev‟s 
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leadership. In fact, officials seemed less concerned about the rise of reformist 
patriotism than they were about economic shortages and conservative patriotism, 
which they believed to pose a more serious challenge to their authority. This is not to 
suggest that they welcomed calls for further „democratisation‟, just that they were 
more preoccupied with other threats during this eventful period. 
 
V. Ethnic minorities 
A potentially more serious challenge to Soviet stability came from 
representatives of minorities in Ukraine as well as ethnic Ukrainians in the western 
oblasts.
132
 The authorities in Kyiv believed that „hostile opinions‟ were most 
widespread amongst Soviet Poles, Hungarians, and Jews, all of whom (with the 
partial exception of the Jews) concentrated heavily in the west.
133
 Their reports 
highlighted the statements and responses of these groups, reflecting perhaps the 
officials‟ own prejudice and giving more „coherence‟ to these groups than they 
actually possessed. However, they also spotlighted specific areas of grievance, 
showing how individuals used the unfolding events in Eastern Europe to articulate 
demands in the name of their national communities. Some Jews made unfavourable 
comparisons between Poland and the Soviet Union to talk about the problem of anti-
Semitism in the USSR. Expressing separatist views, many Poles and Hungarians 
refused to participate in the life of their local Soviet communities, hoping thereby to 
obtain a greater degree of cultural and political autonomy. 
After the anti-Semitic campaigns of late Stalinism, Soviet Jews enjoyed a 
somewhat more relaxed atmosphere under Khrushchev. A few books in Yiddish 
were published in the late 1950s, though not by contemporary authors; the yeshiva in 
Moscow‟s Great Synagogue was established, but it had few students, none of whom 
became rabbis; and in August 1961 the Yiddish periodical Sovietish heimland (Soviet 
Homeland) was started, though it was largely a tool of Kremlin propaganda.
134
 
Despite such achievements, the dramatic events in Eastern Europe brought out the 
problem of anti-Semitism in Ukraine. Many party officials highlighted the opinions 
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of Jewish citizens in their reports on public mood, and in doing so they almost 
exclusively wrote about „misconceived‟ or „hostile‟ views, thereby implying that 
Jews did not fit in well with the bulk of the Soviet community. In part, this was 
because the Polish and Hungarian events coincided with the Suez crisis, which 
inspired the rise of new forms of anti-Jewish rhetoric in the Soviet Union. The state 
of Israel was demonised in official propaganda, as the USSR chose to support Arab 
nationalism to weaken British and American positions in the Middle East.
135
 Thus, 
reports about Jewish reactions may have reflected the officials‟ own anti-Semitic 
prejudice. However, it does also appear that the dramatic events in Egypt and 
Eastern Europe increased Soviet Jews‟ sense of distinctiveness. Indeed, this was 
fuelled by the fact that Jews continued to encounter „official‟ prejudice as well as to 
experience tensions on a day-to-day level, especially since certain party circles in 
Ukraine, Boris Lewytzkyj notes, encouraged anti-Semitism to „regain influence 
among the Ukrainian population‟.136 A number of Soviet citizens employed a 
shockingly anti-Semitic discourse after the official renunciation of the Doctors‟ Plot 
in 1953, claiming that the Jews „will get away scot-free like during the war‟,137 and 
anti-Semitic attitudes persisted in the years to come. During the height of the East 
European crisis, therefore, some Jewish residents of Ukraine, especially those who 
had friends or relatives in Poland, made explicit comments about the development of 
Jewish culture and the problem of anti-Semitism in the socialist camp. Whether this 
contributed towards the authorities‟ decision to allow former Polish citizens of 
Jewish origin to leave the USSR in 1957 is not clear, but approximately 300,000 
Jews did emigrate at this time, most of whom used Poland as a transit point on the 
way to Israel or the West.
138
 
It is difficult to assess the extent to which anti-Semitic attitudes manifested 
themselves during this tumultuous period, but there is some patchy evidence to 
suggest that the foreign crises provoked outbursts of xenophobia in Ukraine. 
Officials in Mykolaiv discovered eight handwritten „anti-Semitic‟ leaflets, posted 
around Lenin Street in the regional centre of Bol‟shaia Bradievka on 6 November, 
which called for the „working narod‟ to „beat up the Jews‟ to avenge the war in 
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Egypt.
139
 Moreover, the Hungarian events invigorated anti-Semitic stereotypes 
amongst the Hungarian minority in Zakarpattia.
140
 The dramatic turn of events on the 
international arena in late 1956 made many Jews in Soviet Ukraine particularly 
sensitive to manifestations of anti-Semitism at home. In Odesa, a party member of 
Jewish origin complained that Soviet authorities persecuted the Jews in the aftermath 
of the Suez crisis, recalling the Doctor‟s Plot in this context.141 The pervading sense 
of instability in the socialist camp likewise encouraged the spread of rumours about 
the rise of anti-Jewish violence. A Jewish engineer from Kyiv and party member 
talked about pogroms in Eastern Europe, alleging (mistakenly) that the „Hungarian 
fascists‟ had killed up to ten thousand Jews during the recent uprising.142  
In private conversations, individual Jewish citizens tried to defend Israel and „the 
Jews‟ from both the accusations voiced against them in official Soviet rhetoric, as 
well as anti-Semitic outbursts which they personally encountered. Interestingly, they 
often expressed support for the Hungarian uprising in this context. For example, a 59 
year old Jewish man from Kyiv, who „received Zionist literature from the Israeli 
embassy‟, stated that while the Soviet army shot at a peaceful population in 
Hungary, the Israelis defended their own lives from a fascist dictator in the war 
against Egypt.
143
 Some citizens used illegal forums to draw links between Soviet 
repressive policies in Eastern Europe and discrimination at home. In February 1957, 
residents of a building in central Odesa discovered 18 anti-Soviet leaflets, which, 
apart from expressing support for the Hungarian revolutionaries and calling for 
improved living conditions at home, also protested against „national‟ and „racial‟ 
oppression in the USSR. Hand-written on pages torn out of exercise books,
144
 the 
pamphlets probably used these terms to refer to anti-Semitism. Some Soviet citizens 
of Jewish origin cited the unfolding developments to argue that they should be 
allowed to emigrate from the USSR. An office worker employed in the barber shop 
at Khreshchatyk 4 (in the very centre of Kyiv) denounced a Jewish hairdresser who 
had recently spent a holiday in Warsaw. Upon returning, he claimed, the hairdresser 
stated that he felt like a foreigner in Kyiv and declared his intention to move to 
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Poland. According to the report, the hairdresser had emphasised how the Jews in 
Warsaw had their own newspapers and a theatre, enjoying complete freedom from 
the anti-Semitism that plagued the USSR. The hairdresser‟s frustration with the 
USSR may also have stemmed from the economic situation. During his stay in 
Poland he had apparently telephoned his sister in Tel-Aviv, who had told him about 
the high quality of life in Israel, and encouraged him to move to Poland so that he 
would then be free to emigrate again. He further complained that the Soviet 
authorities stifled all forms of private initiative through imposing a heavy tax burden 
on hard-working individuals, while living standards in Poland rose because the 
Polish leaders encouraged private enterprise. „The hell with socialism‟, he was 
reported to have exclaimed: the Soviet workers „vegetate‟ and suffer pointlessly in 
the name of „some sort of future communism‟.145 Of course, both Shelest, who 
compiled the official report about the incident, and the man who denounced him may 
have distorted the hairdresser‟s opinions. Nevertheless, not only does the report 
demonstrate that his colleagues treated the hairdresser as an outsider because of his 
background, but it also suggests that anti-Semitic prejudice encouraged him to 
underline his alienation from the Soviet community by invoking his Jewish roots. 
Official reports further suggested that isolationist attitudes flourished amongst 
other ethnic minorities in Ukraine, especially Poles and Hungarians. Even though 
most Poles had been exiled from the newly annexed regions of western Ukraine in 
the 1940s, some 9000 Soviet citizens of Polish ethnicity still lived in the city of 
L‟viv in 1956.146 There was also a Polish community further east, especially around 
Zhytomir, because the regions which had been part of the USSR prior to 1939 were 
not affected by the Polish-Ukrainian programme of population exchange in the 
1940s.
147
 The top brass was so concerned about the Poles in western Ukraine that 
when a member of the CPSU Central Committee visited L‟viv to monitor the 
behaviour of „unstable elements‟, his report concentrated almost exclusively on the 
Polish minority. In the town of L‟viv alone, he wrote, there were 8,877 Poles who 
stayed in the region after the war. They did not socialise with other inhabitants of the 
                                                          
145
 TsDAHO, f.1, op.24, s.4265, ark. 236-245. 
146
 DALO, f.P3, op.5, s.402, ark. 220-222. 
147
 T. Snyder, The Reconstruction of Nations: Poland, Ukraine, Lithuania, Belarus, 1569-1999 (New 
Haven, 2003), 188. 
94 
 
 
oblast and, as the report put it, formed a „closed‟ community.148 It was their 
separation from the rest of Soviet society and their ethnic identity as such that made 
the Poles suspicious in the eyes of the authorities. Despite remaining largely silent 
on the topic of the Polish and Hungarian events, members of ethnic minorities thus 
attracted official attention and criticism. F. Koval‟ from the L‟viv obkom 
complained that many Polish and Magyar lecturers who worked at the city‟s 
universities took no part in their local community‟s social life, remaining „passive‟ 
after hearing the news from Poland, Hungary, and Egypt. For example, the Polish 
deputy head of the agricultural institute kept his opinions to himself, and when a 
secretary of his primary party cell asked him what he thought about recent 
developments, his only response was, „We will see what happens‟.149 This makes it 
difficult to establish how outspoken and „rebellious‟ the Soviet Poles really were, or 
to assess the extent to which they harboured isolationist ideas; rather, official reports 
suggest that party apparatchiks treated them as aliens within the Soviet community 
and expected them to dispel accusations of disloyalty by explicitly denouncing East 
European distortions from the Soviet model. 
It appears that many ethnic Poles in Ukraine added fuel to the flame, distancing 
themselves from the rest of the population and associating themselves with their 
compatriots across the border. For one, they were particularly eager to listen to the 
radio from their „external homeland‟.150 They also talked about developments in 
Eastern Europe with other Soviet citizens of Polish nationality. For example, a 21 
year old Polish student of the forestry institute in L‟viv discussed the news from 
Hungary with a Catholic priest, quoting Warsaw radio when he stated that the Soviet 
policies of „peacemaking‟ had led to bloodshed in Hungary.151 Many party officials 
believed that members of ethnic minorities developed particularly „hostile‟ opinions 
about the events in Eastern Europe, interpreting them as a manifestation of a Polish 
„national‟ opposition to Soviet rule. A „small number‟ of Polish residents of L‟viv, as 
the report would have it, expressed their joy at the recent developments in Poland 
and Hungary, using this opportunity to attack the Soviet system itself. A Polish 
employee of the machine building factory boasted that Soviet flags had been 
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destroyed in Krakow, a sure sign that Poland would soon turn into a new 
Yugoslavia. Similarly, a Polish music teacher supported the Poles‟ opposition to 
Russian interference in their domestic affairs. In Poland and Hungary the youth were 
„decisive‟, she despaired, and „here, that is in Ukraine, they do as they are told‟.152  
In Zakarpattia, where it was clearer that the local Hungarians were causing 
trouble, the local apparatchiks also displayed a degree of ethnic prejudice. There 
were nearly 50,000 Hungarians in the region,
153
 and officials realised that the 
proximity of the border made them very exposed to non-Soviet sources of 
information about the crisis. Party apparatchiks and the KGB were consequently 
very sensitive to any sign suggesting that xenophobic attitudes were on the rise 
amongst the Hungarians in Zakarpattia, and they did indeed register a few unsettling 
incidents. Some Soviet Hungarians, former Gulag prisoners in particular, spread 
illegal pamphlets, voiced „hostile opinions‟ about the Soviet intervention in 
Budapest, and intimidated other Soviet citizens. A Hungarian driver from 
Mukachevo told some non-Hungarians that a time would come when they would 
„crawl at his feet‟.154 According to official reports, Hungarian nationalism was 
closely associated with anti-Semitic prejudice. On 28 October, an unidentified culprit 
distributed 152 „anti-Soviet leaflets‟ in the Russian and Hungarian languages in the 
town of Berehove; similar pamphlets, bulk-produced with the help of rubber stamps, 
appeared in Uzhgorod two days later. They praised the „Hungarian revolution‟, while 
attacking the Jews and communists. Party leaders believed that local Hungarians 
opposed „communism‟ from explicitly nationalist positions, to the extent that they 
expressed their support for the idea of an ethno-national government and despised 
what they saw as a Jewish-dominated communist leadership.
155
  
Furthermore, it appears that other Soviet citizens shared the officials‟ fears of the 
national minorities, and they debated how the authorities in Ukraine dealt with the 
problem. To the extent that the Poles featured prominently in nationalists' view as 
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Ukrainian enemies,
156
 the question of their national rights was bound to inspire 
heated debates amongst the locals in western Ukraine. Rumours to the effect that 
L‟viv would soon be given over to the Polish People‟s Republic did not help to 
bridge the gap between the local Poles and Ukrainians.
157
 Likewise, inhabitants of 
Zakarpattia were deeply disturbed by local Hungarians‟ anti-Soviet outbursts, and 
they enquired why the Hungarians were not expelled to Hungary like the Poles had 
been from other parts of western Ukraine.
158
  
More broadly, the East European crises also inspired many locals to discuss the 
importance of „national‟ politics in the socialist camp. Many residents of the western 
oblasts who expressed support for the Polish reforms explained Gomulka‟s rise to 
power as an expression of the Polish „national‟ spirit. In L‟viv, for example, a senior 
teacher emphasised that the recent events across the border were natural and entirely 
predictable, because the Poles had „always been distinguished by a strong drive for 
autonomy and independence‟, and had grown accustomed to a „different way of life‟ 
during the „thirty years of independence‟ [sic], when even the rabochie were better 
off than now.
159
 Similarly, some people commented on the unrest to suggest that 
Eastern Europeans would go their own „national‟ way, though the political valuation 
of this varied. A woman who travelled from L‟viv to Zhytomir (whom the officials 
described as a grazhdanka, a term imbued with negative connotations) talked about 
the alleged mass exodus of the Soviet Poles to Poland, where „the people‟s 
democratic system‟ and collective farms were dissolved.160 She suggested that 
Warsaw had got out from under Soviet control, and pursued policies in the name of 
the Polish nation. Logically enough, other commentators expected the USSR would 
now crack down on „national‟ dissent in Eastern Europe. The chief accountant of the 
oblast branch of the Gosbank in Zhytomir publicly claimed that Poland would be 
incorporated in the USSR.
161
 
Thus, tensions between different ethnic groups in Ukraine brought the rhetoric of 
„nationality‟ to the fore, especially in the western borderlands. On one level, whilst 
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official reports probably did describe real incidents, they also reflected the 
bureaucrats‟ own fears of ethnic conflict. Reports often underlined that the 
individuals who expressed „problematic‟ opinions were Jews, Poles, or Hungarians, 
but they did not always show how their ethnicity shaped their attitudes. This may 
suggest that Soviet officials believed ethnic minorities to be inherently unstable, 
which encouraged them to blame the existence of unorthodox views on ethnic 
diversity in the western borderlands; in this way, party apparatchiks implicitly 
defined Sovietness in ethnically exclusive terms. On another level, the Polish and 
Hungarian events inspired members of national minorities to mobilise their ethnic 
identities in opposition to the idea of Sovietness: some criticised Soviet foreign 
policy in private conversations with their compatriots, and others, former Gulag 
prisoners in particular, went so far as to articulate xenophobic opinions and to 
threaten Soviet citizens with physical violence. Finally, both these tendencies 
encouraged some other Soviet citizens to imbue ethnic identities with political 
significance, defining minorities as „non-Soviet‟ outsiders. 
 
VI. Ukrainian ‘bourgeois nationalism’ 
Debates about the role of national identities in Eastern Europe took on a special 
significance amongst Gulag returnees in western Ukraine. By 10 October 1956, the 
Ukrainian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) registered over 45,000 „former 
nationalists and affiliates who [had] returned to the western provinces‟.162 Former 
members of Ukrainian nationalist organisations that had waged a civil war against 
Soviet power in the region a mere few years earlier, and supporters of the illegal 
Uniate church that the authorities had outlawed in 1945, often accused Soviet 
authorities of trying to Russify western Ukraine.
163
 This fuelled officials‟ fears that 
they would adopt „hostile‟ attitudes during the height of the East European crises. 
Indeed, their complaints did become especially pronounced in the aftermath of the 
Hungarian revolt.
164
 At the same time, Amir Weiner shows that the Hungarian rebels 
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and the home-grown „bourgeois nationalists‟ alike found little following amongst the 
wider population of western Ukraine, with many inhabitants afraid that „nationalism‟ 
might lead to the rise of violence.
165
 
The Polish and Hungarian events made party leaders particularly sensitive to 
manifestations of nationalism. Top CPU officials looked at western Ukraine with an 
especially strong degree of suspicion. They identified anti-Soviet and „demagogic‟ 
statements amongst Gulag returnees, former members of nationalist organisations 
and „bandits‟ (a term which was often used as shorthand for the UPA). They also 
wrote about members of the illegal churches, such as Uniates and Jehovah‟s 
Witnesses, many of whom were concentrated in the borderlands.
166
 When discussing 
reactions to the unrest in Eastern Europe, therefore, Party bureaucrats focused on 
monitoring those groups which they had already considered unreliable. In that sense, 
official reports did not construct new enemies, but rather pointed to the urgent need 
to resolve an old problem. Making Party leaders even more determined to combat 
„bourgeois nationalism‟ in Ukraine, therefore, the crisis in the outer empire fuelled 
tensions in the CPSU. In December 1956 Moscow accused all party organisations 
(right down to the level of primary party cells) of failing to take adequate measures 
against „bourgeois nationalists‟.167 Still, from the perspective of the CPSU 
leadership, the fault lines dividing Soviet citizens from anti-Soviet nationalists 
remained unchanged. 
Indeed, it seems that the Hungarian and Polish unrest had little discernible 
influence over the claims and reach of Ukrainian „bourgeois nationalism‟. While 
embedded in reports about the popular reactions to the events in Eastern Europe, 
„nationalist‟ outbursts bore little explicit relation to Poland and Hungary. For 
instance, in the Drohobych oblast, a local man (previously convicted for stealing) 
rode his bicycle through town in the evening of 1 November, shouting out anti-
Soviet slogans: he called for the „Ukrainians‟ to „grab their weapons‟ and fight for 
„independent Ukraine‟. He was subsequently arrested and charged with a criminal 
offence.
168
 Similarly, another report about popular reactions to the crises in Eastern 
Europe referred to a former political prisoner from western Ukraine who broke into 
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the house of a local party member, waving an axe and shouting that all communists 
should be killed.
169
 The foreign crises should not be seen as an inspiration for the 
rise of Ukrainian nationalist ideas in the first place, because expressions of 
nationalism were still largely confined to the „usual suspects‟. This partly reflected 
the officials‟ predisposition to monitor the views of Gulag returnees more than other 
citizens, but probably also indicated both their „extremism‟ and alienation from the 
rest of Ukrainian society.   
Because events in Eastern Europe were seen to destabilise the Soviet Empire and 
thus strengthen the Ukrainian cause, „bourgeois nationalists‟ were perhaps more 
willing to speak out. The Hungarian developments provided a „spark‟ which 
transformed the „dormant resentments‟ of the Gulag returnees into action at a time 
when, as Weiner puts it, „the Twentieth Party Congress and the ensuing discussions 
inside and outside the party cells opened the wounds of the occupation and 
sovietisation policies in the western frontier‟.170 Reports about „nationalist‟ leanings 
were not exclusively confined to the western oblasts. Petro Shelest informed the 
CPU Central Committee about a Kyivan who predicted that the „Ukrainian narod‟ 
would follow the Hungarian example and put an end to the Soviet regime.
171
 
However, it was in the borderlands that most „aggressive anti-Russian statements‟ 
were recorded.
172
 Some locals talked about an independent Ukraine. In Volhynia, a 
woman from the village of Boholiuby in the Luts‟k region, who had recently 
returned from imprisonment, discussed the Hungarian developments with a group of 
collective farmers. She predicted that the Ukrainians would follow the Hungarian 
example „in the near future‟ and establish their own „Ukrainian leadership‟. In the 
same vein, a Gulag returnee hoped that a war would break out soon.
173
 
It is difficult to determine how much support or sympathy residents of western 
Ukraine harboured for the active anti-Soviet „nationalists‟. According to Weiner, „by 
and large, Gulag returnees encountered an unwelcoming society that saw them as 
potential trouble-makers and often blocked their reintegration into the social and 
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economic fabric‟.174 It would be very interesting (and all but impossible) to find out 
who denounced the „nationalists‟, in particular whether many denunciations came 
from the migrants from Eastern Ukraine and other parts of the USSR, who were 
often met with a hostile reception in the western oblasts and found Ukrainian 
„bourgeois nationalism‟ threatening. It is likewise possible that personal animosities 
and other factors inspired Soviet citizens to denounce each other, and the reports 
should never be taken at face value. Equally, the denouncers may have represented 
the stable Soviet „majority‟, who acted to prevent the crisis from escalating any 
further.  
For the Soviet Union as a whole, Miriam Dobson demonstrates that many 
citizens were deeply distrustful of Gulag returnees, „and derided the regime‟s claims 
that society itself was sufficiently robust to withstand this return of the banished 
other‟.175 Arguably, even though western Ukraine provided a more welcoming 
ground for the returnees, the same processes were evident in the region. Local 
residents expressed their fear of the Gulag returnees and of „nationalists‟ in general. 
An inhabitant of L‟viv who had migrated from the eastern oblasts, a former KGB 
officer, complained that the Soviet state failed to stop the rise of fascism in Hungary, 
and pointed out that „dangerous individuals‟, such as former OUN members and 
smugglers who traded openly at L'viv markets, could easily destabilise the situation 
in the oblast itself. He suggested that only „honest workers‟ should be allowed to live 
in the city.
176
 Similarly, a lecturer from the Uzhgorod University argued that just as 
the Budapest revolt was supported by reactionary classes in Hungary, some residents 
of Zakarpattia could also provoke unrest at home. His statement reflected a tense 
situation in the oblast – he pointed out that there was „a reason why the Uzhgorod 
furniture factory is dubbed the „bourgeois‟ factory‟, employing as it did people who 
had enjoyed privileged status under Hungarian rule.
177
 These individuals represented 
the Soviet „elites‟, and as such they were almost certain to condemn the 
„nationalists‟. However, as the KGB reported, even the „nationalists‟ themselves 
believed that they had little real influence in western Ukraine. A Volhynian-born 
member of the Komsomol, who had served in the Soviet army since 1953, told a 
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Ukrainian student that everyone in his region wanted an „independent Ukraine‟. 
However, since nobody was willing to „lead the narod‟ (so that everyone could 
„write to the government‟ and say that Ukraine was leaving the USSR), calls for 
independence amounted to nothing more than isolated opinions.
178
  
This suggests a need to modify Weiner‟s statement – it is difficult to determine 
how „welcome‟ the Gulag returnees and „Ukrainian nationalists‟ were in western 
Ukraine. Both the „elites‟ and „Ukrainian nationalists‟ believed that the indigenous 
population harboured some sympathy for „the nationalists‟. However, it is clear that 
they found little public support or actual following in the region. The Ukrainian 
authorities became increasingly strict about keeping Gulag returnees out of western 
Ukraine, and events in Eastern Europe added extra urgency to the issue. On 9 
November 1956, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic issued a 
decree „prohibiting former leaders and active members in the Ukrainian nationalist 
underground, who were tried and completed serving their sentences, to return to the 
western regions of Soviet Ukraine‟.179 
  
VII. Conclusion 
Top party officials in Kyiv and Moscow were determined to contain formal and 
informal discussion. As the crises in Poland and Hungary escalated, they concluded, 
in reference to overly inquisitive citizens, that the events proved that the CPSU 
needed to intensify „ideological struggle‟ at a time of international detente.180 At the 
same time, the authorities were confident that they would manage to restore order 
and control public debate. While „“party-mindedness” [...] remained the fulcrum of 
party policy throughout the period‟,181 most participants in the explanatory 
gatherings voiced support for CPSU policies in Eastern Europe and condemned the 
foreign „rebels‟ in Hungary in the name of a distinct Soviet community. 
Reformist patriotism was crushed under the weight of conservative patriotism in 
public forums. On an emotional level, many Soviet citizens did not like to witness 
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the „foreigners‟ in Hungary and Poland challenge the authority of the Soviet state. 
Demanding that stability be assured at home, they hoped that the Soviet empire in 
Eastern Europe would grow in strength. Indeed, some were explicitly nostalgic about 
the Stalinist period.  
Even as Polish and Hungarian events provoked a predominantly conservative 
reaction, they also encouraged citizens to criticise the authorities, fostering the rise of 
a more „active‟ society in Soviet Ukraine. In response to the confusion and 
incompetence amongst low-level officials who organised explanatory meetings about 
Poland and Hungary, citizens openly attacked Khrushchev and his leadership. By 
articulating both conservative and reformist patriotism, they attempted to hold the 
leaders in Moscow accountable to themselves. Some reform-minded members of the 
public criticised the shortage of information about Poland and Hungary to portray 
themselves as loyal citizens who had the right both to obtain reliable news from the 
Soviet media and to participate in debates surrounding changes in the socialist camp. 
They used the explanatory gatherings about Eastern Europe to promote discussion. 
Equally importantly, however, through outwardly rejecting unorthodox opinions and 
underlining their Soviet and „communist‟ credentials, exponents of conservative 
patriotism pursued their own agenda of reform. They demanded that senior officials 
and journalists provide Soviet audiences with more detailed and reliable news about 
Eastern Europe in order to avoid the spread of malicious rumours. Ironically, while 
engaging in political debate during agitation meetings, they called on the authorities 
to halt „democratic‟ reforms at home. In this sense, the outbreak of violence in 
Hungary and Gomulka‟s reforms in Poland compelled citizens to discuss different 
ways in which the USSR and other Soviet-style regimes could develop. Meanwhile, 
confusion and incompetence of low-level officials created contexts where such 
discussions took place. 
Soviet patriotism was grounded in a sense of belonging – citizens staked a claim 
to participate in discussions about the future of the USSR, which were underpinned 
by various concepts of Sovietness. Whilst conservative patriotism envisaged a 
strongly hierarchical Soviet community in which the „elite‟ would ensure peace and 
stability for the „masses‟, reformist patriotism embodied anti-paternalist attitudes and 
a belief that a large number of citizens should be able to access information and 
debate policy. These views were underpinned by differing visions of the USSR‟s 
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role as the centre of the socialist bloc: most citizens agreed that Moscow should 
preserve its influences in Eastern Europe, but whereas advocates of conservative 
patriotism expected unquestioning loyalty from the satellites and supported military 
measures in Hungary, reformist patriotism generally held that the USSR could best 
boost its international standing by becoming the leader of „democratisation‟. Still, in 
commenting on the Polish and Hungarian events, most implied that it was their duty 
as citizens to support the USSR‟s foreign policy.  
Soviet patriotism also had a much darker side as it implicitly excluded significant 
parts of Ukraine‟s population from the Soviet community. As the very existence of 
numerous reports about conversations between friends and colleagues suggests, 
many „loyal‟ citizens denounced their acquaintances to the authorities; they also 
condemned „hostile‟ attitudes of the Jews, Poles, Hungarians and Ukrainian 
„nationalists‟ during party meetings and agitation gatherings. They thus constructed 
certain groups as inherently unreliable and „non-Soviet‟. Gulag returnees, former 
OUN members, and ethnic minorities were always suspect – in that sense, party 
leaders defined „hostile‟ individuals with reference to who they were rather than 
what they did. 
Social, educational and generational divisions were important factors shaping 
Soviet citizens‟ attitudes towards Poland and Hungary and, by extension, towards 
Khrushchev and his „liberalisation‟. University students were the most vocal 
advocates of reformist patriotism during 1956: many voiced sympathy for Gomulka 
and criticised the invasion of Hungary. In contrast, the Soviet middle class, including 
war veterans, the technical intelligentsia, and army officers, proved the staunchest 
supporters of conservative patriotism. Conservative patriotism also held an appeal 
for low-level party officials who mobilised it to strengthen their position vis-à-vis 
their superiors in Kyiv and Moscow. While the central authorities accused their 
subordinates of failing to control popular opinion in the USSR, low-level 
bureaucrats, the technical intelligentsia, and regular workers blamed Khrushchev for 
letting the situation get out of hand. The position of blue-collar workers and 
collective farmers was more ambiguous, especially in the western oblasts, but it 
would seem that they tended towards conservative positions, too. If nothing else, 
they outwardly rallied behind the state when they commented on the unfolding 
developments during explanatory meetings. Because the fault lines in Soviet society 
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overlapped, citizens maintained complex and contradictory attitudes towards the 
foreign crises. After all, one and the same individual could be a claimant asking for 
more material benefits in response to the leaders‟ emphasis on improving living 
conditions during late 1956, a student criticising the Soviet censorship, and a 
resident of the western oblasts who attacked Khrushchev‟s „lax‟ foreign policy vis-à-
vis the rebellious Eastern Europe. This is why popular responses to the Polish and 
Hungarian events cannot be categorised along a simple axis of support and 
opposition to Khrushchev‟s reforms. 
Moreover, Ukrainian reactions to the Polish and Hungarian crises of 1956 do not 
easily fit into the traditional East-West divide, which portrays western Ukraine as 
more anti-Soviet than other parts of the republic. It is true that most party reports 
about „problematic‟ opinions came from the western oblasts and that the region was 
more exposed to news from Eastern Europe than other parts of Ukraine. Many locals 
expressed support for Gomulka‟s policies and members of ethnic minorities in the 
region, particularly Poles and Hungarians, began to voice „isolationist‟ views. At the 
same time, however, anxieties about a possible war also fuelled conservative 
patriotism in western Ukraine. Most inhabitants of the western oblasts who spoke 
during public meetings welcomed the military invasion of Hungary, at least to the 
extent that they hoped it would bring about peace and stability. However, they also 
criticised Khrushchev‟s supposedly lax foreign policy. While Soviet patriotism ran 
strong in the west, the borderlands witnessed the most heated debates about the 
USSR‟s role as the centre of the socialist camp. 
Repercussions of the 1956 crises in western Ukraine would be felt for a long time 
to come. At times, memories of the Hungarian events had very unexpected 
consequences in the region, and they reflected citizens‟ complex attitudes towards 
the Party leadership. The case of „Tykhyi omut‟ was very radical and untypical. 
Nevertheless, it showed that, at least in west Ukraine, fear of war inspired both a 
longing for „strong rule‟ and a critical approach towards the Party leadership. In 
December 1967, party authorities in L‟viv informed their superiors in Kyiv about the 
discovery of an illegal youth group on their territory. An 18-year-old Ukrainian 
student by the name of Eresko, born and bred in the Ukrainian-speaking west, 
gathered seven young people and set out to form a paramilitary organisation. The 
group rather mysteriously called themselves „Tykhyi omut‟ and printed leaflets 
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calling for the USSR to send tanks against China in order to prevent the repeat of a 
surprise attack from abroad as in 1941. They also wanted to rob shops to obtain 
money to buy weapons, but they were detained by the KGB before they managed to 
put their plans into action. Talking to KGB officers, Eresko explained that his older 
brother, who had served in the Soviet army in Hungary in 1956, had told him 
horrifying stories about the revolt in Budapest. He feared that „nationalist elements‟ 
in L‟viv could follow the Hungarian example and rise up against the authorities 
during the fiftieth anniversary of establishing Soviet power in Ukraine. Believing 
that the leaders in Kyiv and Moscow did not realise the scale of the threat, he had 
resolved to form an organisation that could defend the regime in battle. In other 
words, he formed an illegal group to support the Soviet system in L‟viv, partly 
influenced by his perceptions of the 1956 Hungarian crisis. Unlike his co-defendants, 
Eresko refused to recognise the error of his ways, and was excluded from the 
Komsomol.
182
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Chapter Two 
National Supremacy: Soviet Travels in Eastern Europe 
From the mid-1950s, travel became increasingly important in shaping Soviet 
perceptions of Eastern Europe. As international trips within the socialist camp 
became a possibility and an issue, top CPSU apparatchiks sought to give ideological 
meaning to face-to-face encounters between Soviet citizens and inhabitants of the 
people‟s democracies.1 Just as Soviet officials had long stressed „the productive 
value of touring and travel for intellectual and physical self-improvement‟,2 they 
now likewise insisted that travel in Eastern Europe should be educational and 
instructive. Numerous state and Party institutions consequently promoted three main 
types of international travel.
3
 Firstly, they coordinated the so-called „borderland 
exchanges‟ (prigranichnye obmeny) between towns and regions on either side of the 
Soviet frontier, which normally included local professionals, amateur artists, and 
party activists. Secondly, small delegations of CPSU officials and various cultural, 
scientific, industrial, and agricultural specialists from across Ukraine met their 
colleagues from the satellite states. Thirdly, Soviet foreign tourism resumed in the 
mid-1950s, becoming better organised and more widespread, both geographically 
and numerically, from the early 1960s onwards.
4
 Apart from relaxing and sunbathing 
at „international camps of rest‟ (mezhdunarodnye lageria otdykha), most tourists 
who travelled to Eastern Europe formed part of organised groups which often visited 
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factories, farms, and cultural and educational institutions abroad.
5
 The politics, 
ideology, and practices of travel evolved through the 1960s and took a more or less 
set form by the 1970s, moulding official narratives about Sovietness and the socialist 
camp. 
Travel was a privilege awarded to those who excelled, yet also conformed. In this 
way, it served as both a marker and creator of social privilege and differentation in 
the USSR. Travel had formed an important part of the „Big Deal‟ between Stalin‟s 
regime and an emerging middle class: not only was it a perk bestowed upon party 
activists and professionals, but, as Anne Gorsuch shows, it also set the most 
„reliable‟ citizens apart from the rest of Soviet society and provided a context in 
which people showed that they thought and behaved in the „appropriate‟ manner.6 
After the mid-1950s, the expansion of travel helped to extend the „Big Deal‟ to a 
larger segment of the population. Nevertheless, although trips to Eastern Europe 
were considerably less elitist than travel to the capitalist West,
7
 they still served as a 
means of social distinction, with official narratives of travel highlighting the special 
contribution that Soviet professionals, party activists, artists and „leading workers‟ 
made to strengthening the USSR‟s ties with its satellites. 
Because travel acquired an international dimension, official concepts of status 
became closely intertwined with Soviet and Ukrainian identities. The act of crossing 
the border, both mentally and physically, encouraged Soviet citizens to reflect upon 
their role in the international arena, while strict vetting procedures before departure 
served to determine the personal and social characteristics needed for an individual 
to represent the USSR abroad.
8
 Travel was consequently a crucible in which ideas 
about Sovietness as an „imperial‟ identity were forged, compelling citizens to 
describe the satellite states as junior partners in the process of international 
cooperation and to demonstrate their own contribution to strengthening Soviet 
influences in Eastern Europe. On one level, foreign trips thereby acquired a 
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particular importance for Ukraine, and especially its western oblasts. Pushed 
sometimes to showcase both Soviet and Ukrainian cultural achievements during their 
trips abroad, inhabitants of Ukraine and the western borderlands came into contact 
with residents of the people‟s democracies more often than most other Soviet 
citizens. This granted Ukraine and the borderlands a prominent role in official 
narratives of Sovietness.  
Moreover, the „imperial‟ dimension of travel had important implications for the 
evolution of the concept of middle class. Official accounts suggested that „reliable‟ 
Soviet travellers should demonstrate their professional prowess, as well as 
accentuating „conservative‟ beliefs by condemning foreign deviations from the 
Soviet model of socialism. Fractures emerging during travel further acted to 
reinforce this ideological frame of Sovietness, encouraging journalists and tour 
group leaders to juxtapose the „serious‟ and „responsible‟ Soviet people to 
„frivolous‟ East Europeans. At the same time, at least during the 1960s, official 
portrayals of travel implied that citizens aspiring to the status of middle class had to 
demonstrate an active interest in their western neighbours, thus manifesting that they 
still cared about the „common‟ future of the socialist camp.9 The model middle class 
citizen thus emerged as both a Soviet patriot and a conscious internationalist.  
The sources, ranging from the mid-1950s to the early 1980s, reveal normative 
narratives of travel, which probably did not correspond to people‟s „real‟ interests 
and concerns. This chapter focuses on the period before the end of the Czechoslovak 
crisis in 1969, when official emphasis on travel as a means of strengthening Soviet 
influences in the socialist camp reached its apogee. Correspondence between top 
CPSU apparatchiks and representatives of the Soviet mass media, as well as reports 
about the collaboration between Soviet and East European journalists, demonstrate 
how these groups infused the concept of international travel with various ideological 
undertones. Official narratives were also shaped by travel itself. I thus examine plans 
for borderland exchanges, official delegations, and mass tourism, all of which were 
compiled by state and Party officials in Moscow, Kyiv and the provinces. While not 
unveiling popular responses to the official narratives, these sources expose fractions 
and contradictions within them. Reports from foreign trips further suggest that the 
                                                          
9
 This raised a different image of Eastern Europe than the historical portrayals that evolved under 
Brezhnev, which portrayed the satellite states as inherently „non-Soviet‟. See Chapter 4. 
109 
 
 
evolution of travel, and the meanings given to it, also occurred through the 
experiences of Soviet travellers. Compiled as they were by prominent activists and 
tour group leaders, the reports offer a skewed picture of Soviet travellers‟ 
experiences: after all, as Gorsuch points out, „all trip leaders must have known that 
any possibilities for future trips, as well perhaps as possibilities for advancement at 
home, depended on their own behaviour and that of their charges while abroad‟.10 
Nevertheless, they do reveal that travellers witnessed many „deviations‟ from the 
Soviet model when they visited Eastern Europe, often encountering a cold or even 
hostile reception abroad. This compelled them to comment on „non-Soviet‟ or even 
„anti-Soviet‟ attitudes and behaviours in public, thus redefining official ideas about 
the „socialist camp‟ and international cooperation.  
Although travel as such often had other purposes, a rising number of Soviet 
citizens participated in the reproduction of the formulaic portrayals of a Soviet-led 
socialist camp to „stage consent‟ for the CPSU and the Soviet state, improving 
thereby their own social standing. Some citizens even seemed to be genuinely upset 
when frictions and conflicts that surfaced during travel undermined these ritualised 
narratives, manifesting perhaps an emotional attachment to the idea of Soviet 
superiority in Eastern Europe. 
 
I. Teachers of socialism 
The Soviet mass media created the ideological frame of international travel, 
providing an important resource to citizens who sought to excel at and reap the perks 
of conformity. During the late 1950s and the 1960s, top CPSU apparatchiks 
increased their pressure on press, radio, and television to produce material about the 
socialist camp. Responding to signals from the CPSU, editors and journalists 
suggested that Soviet citizens should celebrate international cooperation in the 
socialist bloc, all the while maintaining a sense of pride or even superiority vis-a-vis 
the satellite states. Such portrayals then put pressure on various Soviet professionals, 
artists, and party activists both to educate themselves about their neighbours and to 
speak in public about their contribution to strengthening the unity of the Soviet-led 
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socialist camp. Reproducing ritualised images of the USSR‟s leading role in the 
region in official reports and newspaper articles about their encounters with foreign 
citizens, members of these groups claimed a special status in Soviet society. 
During the late 1950s, top Party officials made a concerted effort to encourage 
journalists and editors to write more about the people‟s democracies. In a special 
resolution from 6 June 1958, the CPSU Central Committee instructed the Soviet 
press organs to „systematically describe‟ events and developments in Eastern 
Europe, focusing on the cooperation between communist and workers‟ parties, 
ideological questions, the policy of peace, and economic development.
11
 The 
apparatchiks also wanted TASS to refrain from publishing lengthy lists of 
participants of foreign delegations which visited the USSR, and promote more 
„analytical‟ materials instead.12 The number of articles about the European satellite 
states did indeed increase in the following few years, official reports claimed, with 
Pravda and Izvestiia publishing 1500 items about Poland, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, 
Hungary, and Romania in 1961 alone. They included pieces by top party leaders 
from Eastern Europe, diaries of Soviet journalists, accounts by tourists who travelled 
around the region, as well as special reports devoted to important anniversaries in the 
people‟s democracies.13  
Senior apparatchiks were not initially satisfied with the quality of journalism 
about Eastern Europe, reprimanding Soviet editors and journalists for failing to 
educate the public. Throughout the 1960s, top CPSU officials continued to complain 
that the majority of press articles about Eastern Europe were short informational 
notes, which did not explore the „development of the economic base‟ or cultural and 
intellectual processes taking place in the region; journalists often focused on 
foreigners‟ reactions to „Soviet achievements‟, but failed to analyse and learn from 
domestic experiences of the satellite countries.
14
 Similarly, cooperation between 
Soviet and East European television and radio stations was erratic,
15
 with a 
preponderance of formulaic broadcasts which reflected foreigners‟ „admiration‟ for 
the USSR and pride in their own „socialist‟ achievements. Foreign leaders and 
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ambassadors regularly recorded special congratulatory messages for 1 May and 7 
November, as well as speeches devoted to their own national holidays.
16
 
Furthermore, many portrayals of Eastern Europe did not explicitly concern social, 
economic or political questions, with Soviet television showing, for example, East 
German and Czechoslovak children‟s cartoons.17  
However, under pressure from the Central Committee, journalists and editors did 
gradually create more „analytical‟ materials about the Soviet bloc and international 
cooperation. In 1960, television showcased a fascinating range of programmes such 
as The all-state conference of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, Golden 
Prague, and Czech National Drama, along with special reports such as Stalinovaros, 
describing the life of Hungarian metallurgists.
18
 Meanwhile, throughout the 1960s 
and the 1970s, East European radio and television stations exchanged news reports 
and other programmes about „the building of socialism‟, culture, sports, and 
„international cooperation‟ in the camp.19 Not only did editors from the satellite 
countries send programmes to be broadcast on the all-union Soviet radio and 
television, but they also cooperated with the republican media in Kyiv.
20
 Judging by 
the sheer quantity of articles written by East European leaders, contemporary and 
classical East European literature, publications concerning the social, economic, and 
technical progress in the Soviet bloc, and items about the ideological unity of the 
socialist camp, it is safe to conclude that Soviet readers could easily access 
information about Eastern Europe by the early 1970s. The Goskomizdat, the 
Academy of Sciences, and the Central Committee's Academy of Social Sciences 
prepared lists of items to be published in book form once every six months; in 1972, 
they printed 500 different titles about the socialist camp in 17 million copies.
21
  
Political leaders perceived media portrayals of Eastern Europe as a means to 
improve diplomatic relations between the USSR and its satellites, and they 
condemned mistakes or omissions in the Soviet press as potentially offensive. In 
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February 1958, for example, the Soviet Ministry of Culture bemoaned the fact that 
Pravda and Izvestiia, while writing extensively about international sports, contained 
very little information about foreign artists visiting the USSR or Soviet artists 
performing abroad. This surprised „our friends‟ in socialist countries, they argued, 
especially because their newspapers reported on such events on a regular basis.
22
 
Likewise, four years later, CPSU officials were alarmed that a piece about the 
Hungarian party plenum was published four days after it had taken place; they were 
afraid of offending the comrades in Budapest, because newspapers normally reported 
such crucial events on the next day.
23
 Indeed, foreign leaders often „delicately 
hinted‟ at the scarcity of information about their cultural achievements or political 
reforms, which made Soviet state and party apparatchiks keen to sponsor media 
materials about their neighbours. In 1966, for instance, the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs categorically instructed journalists to publish more articles about the 
Hungarian reforms, lest Budapest interpret Soviet silence as a sign of disapproval, as 
well as to take action in response to Hungarian complaints that the Soviet press had 
published few reviews of Hungarian ballet performances in the USSR.
24
 Even 
though journalists and editors frustrated their efforts from time to time, party 
officials continued to mandate that the media must show the USSR‟s commitment to 
„international friendship‟ in Eastern Europe. This was particularly clear in the 
aftermath of the Prague Spring, when the CPSU instructed the press, radio, and 
television to discuss the 1970 Soviet-Czechoslovak Friendship Treaty in much detail, 
thus rebuking „hostile propaganda‟ about the USSR‟s alleged exploitation of its 
satellites.
25
 Pravda would highlight the „objective need‟ for the mutually beneficial 
„proletarian internationalism‟ and „brotherly friendship‟; Izvestiia would focus on 
Soviet-Czechoslovak struggle for peace in Europe; Sovetskaia Rossiia would use 
„concrete examples‟ to show how Prague and Moscow solved technical and 
scientific problems together; and Krasnaia zvezda, targeting the Soviet military, 
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would expose „imperialist plots‟ seeking to break up the „unity of the socialist 
camp‟.26  
While the push to have numerous reports on Eastern Europe was primarily 
intended to strengthen Soviet influence abroad, and even to send more or less covert 
signals to foreign leaders, the strong presence of this theme in Soviet publications 
carried an important message to readers: Soviet citizens were expected to cultivate a 
level of erudition about their western neighbours. Officials in Moscow went so far as 
to specify that Novoe vremia should present a „more or less free view‟ of Soviet 
society, and not the „official position‟ on international affairs,27 thus underlining the 
need for „ordinary citizens‟ to develop articulate views about the Soviet bloc. The 
CPSU Central Committee used the media to motivate readers to develop their own 
roles in establishing „fraternal relations‟ with the people‟s democracies. In particular, 
they encouraged industrial and agricultural specialists to learn from the experiences 
of East Europeans. In April 1966, top Party leaders resolved to facilitate direct 
contacts between newspapers targeting similar audiences in the USSR and Hungary, 
claiming that this would help to educate engineers in both countries about the close 
links between their factories. Because Hungary had recently „gained interesting 
experiences in the field of building socialism‟, Soviet journalists were instructed to 
analyse these developments in an „accessible and interesting way‟, focusing on the 
„national particularities‟ (natsional’nye osobennosti) of Hungarian development and 
common Soviet-Hungarian industrial projects.
28
 Motivated by the need to shape 
popular opinion in Eastern Europe and counteract accusations of Soviet economic 
exploitation, senior apparatchiks even instructed newspapers to discuss the 
performance of particular factories which advanced the process of economic 
cooperation. Foreign journalists would visit Soviet enterprises which exported their 
products to Poland and Czechoslovakia, while Soviet journalists would write about 
Czechoslovak and Polish factories whose production was geared towards the 
USSR.
29
 In this way, managers and engineers were to study the process of 
international cooperation and especially to learn about their colleagues and factories 
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across the border; some even needed to prove that they actively participated in 
common projects with their „socialist brothers‟ by speaking to foreign journalists. 
Moreover, top apparatchiks used the mass media to promote closer collaboration 
between Soviet and East European artists, but only to the extent that they believed it 
would help to further the image of Soviet superiority in the region. They thus called 
for the press to discuss contemporary Hungarian culture, familiarising Soviet readers 
with the „young generation‟, rather than just the same old painters and writers.30 
They also encouraged the radio to exchange musical programmes with the people‟s 
democracies.
31
 For their part, East European bureaucrats were even more forthright 
in promoting artistic cooperation. In 1966, Czechoslovak radio officials insisted that 
Moscow and Prague transmit each other‟s concerts live, as well as encourage direct 
cooperation between Soviet and Czechoslovak composers who could then develop 
„socialist dance‟, instead of simply following Western trends. This was essential for 
making common Soviet-Czechoslovak radio programmes more interesting and less 
pompous.
32
 Interestingly, however, Soviet officials were sometimes apprehensive 
about East European initiatives in the field of cultural cooperation. While they were 
happy to send the composer Arkadii Ostrovskii to the fourth international song 
festival in the Polish seaside resort of Sopot in 1963, safe in the knowledge that he 
would be praised and pampered by the organisers and the mass media having won 
the first prize for his song Pust’ vsegda budet solntse the year before,33 they were 
more divided over the Polish idea to prepare a pan-East European concert of pop 
music under the banner of „Estrada Druzhby‟ (the Stage of Friendship). Afraid that 
the event would not give them a chance to show off „the multinational‟ Soviet pop 
scene, and pointing out that East Europeans placed too much emphasis on such 
„Western‟ genres of entertainment as cabaret songs, the CPSU Central Committee 
advised the Goskoncert not to get involved in the project.
34
 Soviet officials used the 
mass media to show off East European artistic endeavours when they thought it 
would present the USSR as the most advanced state whose culture inspired other 
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nations in the bloc: the festival of Soviet songs held every year in the Polish town of 
Zielona Góra was perfect for this purpose.
35
 
As top officials shaped media portrayals to suggest that citizens had a duty to 
strengthen the USSR‟s links with the people‟s democracies, people who aspired to 
the status of middle class further contributed to the spread of these narratives, 
stressing the need for both cooperation and Soviet leadership in Eastern Europe. 
Reproducing formulaic portrayals of the people‟s democracies in various public 
contexts and in official reports, they sometimes evaluated foreign practices and 
innovations on the constative level. In December 1967, for example, regional 
television in Krakow hosted the director of the Kyiv television studio to share 
experiences and exchange ideas. Reporting to the obkom, the latter described the 
Poles‟ short, dynamic news reports in very positive terms, and suggested that 
Ukrainian journalists could copy the Polish „polemical‟ programmes where two 
speakers represented different views on a given topic and answered questions sent in 
by the viewers.
36
 
At the same time, the aspirational middle class sought to present themselves as 
important social leaders. For one, journalists and editors claimed that they „helped‟ 
their colleagues in Eastern Europe, which allowed them to demand the right to travel 
and improve their working conditions. Editors emphasised that foreign media 
activists should learn from the Soviet experience and thus lobbied the Central 
Committee to increase the number of journalists‟ delegations travelling between the 
USSR and Eastern Europe.
37
 Through invoking the idea of „Soviet guidance‟ and 
„socialist cooperation‟ in official correspondence with senior Party officials, as well 
as in the work that they published, they presented themselves as a key link between 
Soviet and East European popular opinion. As early as 1956, the chief editor of the 
satirical journal Krokodil boasted that his publication was popular throughout 
Eastern Europe, helping thereby to deepen international cooperation and to spread 
Soviet practices across the region: Krokodil and humourous periodicals from the 
socialist countries, such as the Polish Szpilki and the Hungarian Ludas matyi, 
reprinted each other‟s cartoons, and, he stressed, foreign editors carefully listened to 
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„our assessment‟ and advice. At the same time, even though personal contacts with 
foreign journalists would allow Krokodil‟s artists to find out more about „life abroad‟ 
and prepare appropriate materials, the chief editor complained that his employees 
could hardly afford to visit East European countries and were even deprived of the 
opportunity to order international telephone calls. This undermined their position as 
the „senior‟ partners in the process of international cooperation: while their 
colleagues abroad telephoned them on a regular basis, they joked about Soviet 
„formality‟ when Moscow contacted them by post.38 Naturally, the chief editor 
sought to present the situation in such a way as to obtain more funding for his 
journal. Although his plight met with a rather cold reaction at the propaganda and 
agitation department of the CPSU Central Committee,
39
 other editors did have more 
success in lobbying Party apparatchiks to increase the number of foreign 
correspondents in Eastern Europe.
40
 Their justification reveals how they envisaged 
the role of the Soviet press. Invoking the rhetoric of „Sovietness‟ to further their 
professional interests and presenting themselves as leading „Soviet‟ people, editors 
and journalists depicted their work as an example of internationalist cooperation 
within the socialist camp, claiming both to familiarise readers at home with the „life‟ 
of the people‟s democracies and to teach „foreigners‟ about Marxist-Leninist 
principles and the building of socialism.
41
  
Other citizens also participated in reproducing ritualised images of Eastern 
Europe as propagated by the mass media, claiming that they guided Soviet popular 
opinion. Top apparatchiks instructed the Soviet press to depict party activists, state 
officials, and prominent members of various social organisations (such as 
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international friendship societies) as „authoritative observers‟ (avtoritetnye 
obozrevateli) who had a responsibility to inform the rest of the Soviet population 
about the people‟s democracies.42 As the editors of Politicheskoe samoobrazovaniie 
put it after their visit to Hungary in 1973, Soviet „party activists‟ had to study how 
their foreign comrades conducted political work and to write about the USSR‟s 
collaboration with its western neighbours in order to satisfy the thirst for knowledge 
of „rank-and-file party members‟ and „ordinary workers‟.43 Indeed, activists of 
friendship societies and obkom apparatchiks seemed to respond to these pressures, 
drawing on mass media portrayals of the „outer empire‟ to parade their knowledge 
about the socialist camp and thereby to distinguish themselves from the „masses‟. 
They organised „collective viewings‟ of television programmes such as those about 
Brezhnev‟s visit to Czechoslovakia in 1978. Even though these public meetings were 
tailored towards the „mass‟ of workers, the duty to „comment‟ rested on local party 
officials, war veterans, and „leading workers‟ who spoke in the name of their 
„workers‟ collectives‟, employing tired stock phrases or simply repeating what they 
had themselves gathered from the official news reports.
44
 They thus reaffirmed their 
special status in the local communities. 
Moreover, party activists, prominent members of friendship societies and various 
professionals advanced formulaic portrayals of Soviet superiority in Eastern Europe 
when they compiled official reports and produced media accounts of their meetings 
with foreign citizens. Those who described their journeys on „friendship trains‟ 
presented them as a nobilitating experience, emphasising that, as Soviet people, they 
met with a fitting reception abroad: one report celebrated the fact that 3000 people 
turned out to greet one group at the Krakow train station despite adverse weather 
conditions, and the tourists met „important people‟ and stayed in „the nicest hotels‟ 
in Warsaw.
45
 Reports also brought out the expertise of Soviet citizens who met 
foreigners in Soviet Ukraine. In 1959, for example, agricultural specialists from 
L‟viv claimed to have „taught‟ Polish farmers how to grow corn, while engineers 
from the local bus factory stressed that they had impressed the Poles with their new 
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LAZ-695 model and instructed them on how to modernise production technologies.
46
 
Similarly, Soviet academics, CPSU activists, and museum directors received Polish 
delegations in western Ukraine, showing the Poles how to conduct agitation work 
and design exhibitions; the L‟viv obkom underlined that foreign guests took 
„detailed notes‟ about the way in which their Soviet comrades used old and „new‟ 
narodnye traditions in order to strengthen socialism in the region (no matter how 
much of an oxymoron „new traditions‟ may seem to be).47 By participating in these 
international exchanges and, more importantly, producing reports that highlighted 
their senior status in the process of international cooperation, these individuals wrote 
themselves into the ritualised narratives of Sovietness, thus articulating their own 
prestigious social position. Indeed, Soviet travellers also printed many newspaper 
articles, appeared on the local radio, and published books in which they highlighted 
their contribution to establishing friendly relations with twinned towns and regions 
across the border.
48
 They thereby asserted their special status in Soviet society, 
claiming such perks as access to information and the right to travel. In return, they 
had to act in an exemplary „Soviet‟ manner by reproducing formulaic portrayals of 
the socialist bloc and thus „teaching‟ other citizens at home about Soviet guidance 
and socialist cooperation in Eastern Europe. 
Under pressure from top CPSU officials, the Soviet mass media produced 
numerous images of the satellite states. Through highlighting the need to establish 
strong links between the USSR and the people‟s democracies in the economic and 
cultural spheres, and to fortify Soviet authority in Eastern Europe, newspapers, radio, 
and television placed implicit demands on their audiences. They suggested that party 
activists, educated professionals, and artists should speak about their own 
contribution to international cooperation, emphasising that they could enjoy a special 
status in Soviet society. This encouraged numerous members of these groups to 
affirm their middle class status, distinguishing themselves from the „masses‟ and 
claiming privileges such as travel, by reproducing formulaic accounts of their 
                                                          
46
 GARF, f.9576, op.4, d.58, ll. 267-280. 
47
 For instance, on 7 June 1964, Polish visitors participated in the Hammer and Sickle Holiday and a 
wedding ceremony in Drohobych. Meanwhile, Soviet activists visited Poland, where they devoted 
each day to „a different category of youth‟, meeting with activists and learning about the life, work, 
and leisure of young people across the border. TsDAHO, f.1, op.24, s.5987, ark. 7-14. 
48
 TsDAHO, f.1, op.31, s.1458, ark. 43-44; TsDAHO, f.1, op.32, s.46, ark. 15-22; DAKO, f.P5, op.6, 
s.1835, ark. 21-24; GARF, f.9576, op.4, d.58, ll. 89-92. 
119 
 
 
encounters with foreign citizens. This further contributed to the spread of ritualised 
portrayals of Soviet supremacy in the socialist camp. 
 
II. Travel as ritual 
As foreign trips featured so prominently in official portrayals of Eastern Europe, 
narratives of Sovietness were further shaped by the actual practice of travel. Personal 
and national antagonisms which surfaced during face-to-face encounters with 
foreigners, practical difficulties inherent in organising international travel, and 
conflicts between the idea of travel as leisure and travel as ideological act suggested 
new visions of what constituted Soviet identity abroad. Apart from permitting local 
officials in the west to bring out the special role of the borderlands in strengthening 
the USSR‟s links with the outer empire, the practice of travel encouraged party 
activists and professionals to compile reports where they defined „seriousness‟ and 
modesty as crucial characteristics that distinguished Soviet travellers from citizens of 
the satellite states, which further permitted them to differentiate themselves as an 
elite middle class which embodied such attributes. Travel also encouraged these 
groups to speak about Soviet and Ukrainian culture during encounters with 
foreigners, as well as increasing the magnitude of various ritualised celebrations of 
the Great Patriotic War. This reduced the importance of the concept of international 
socialist cooperation in official depictions of the Soviet bloc, turning public attention 
towards themes that set the USSR apart from the rest of Eastern Europe. 
Top state and party officials sought to shape international travel so as to conform 
to the official narratives as outlined in Soviet mass media. They wanted foreign trips 
to emphasise the key role that educated specialists and activists played in „guiding‟ 
their East European colleagues. When travel between the western USSR and eastern 
Poland grew in the mid-1950s, senior CPSU and SSOD apparatchiks demanded that 
borderland exchanges become increasingly „concrete and specialised‟, compelling 
Soviet „experts‟ to impress foreigners with the achievements of the USSR.49 Indeed, 
although borderland exchanges did include a small number of blue-collar workers 
and groups of Pioneers,
50
 most citizens who participated in the programme during 
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the late 1950s and the 1960s were professionals (agricultural specialists, engineers, 
teachers, librarians, doctors, lawyers), Party and Komsomol activists, and groups of 
sportsmen and members of amateur dance ensembles.
51
 When the authorities 
expanded travel to other parts of Ukraine in the early 1960s, they likewise attempted 
to highlight the importance of professional expertise as a crucial part of Soviet 
identities abroad. They took advantage of various new forms of travel, including 
„friendship trains‟, to send Soviet specialists across the border.52 While official 
reports underlined the wide-ranging social composition of the „friendship trains‟, 
they also implied that citizens who enjoyed a high status in the USSR had an 
important role to play in these larger-scale exchanges, thus reaffirming their middle 
class credentials. Every train contained approximately 330 tourists, including blue-
collar workers and collective farmers, but also scientific, artistic, and cultural 
activists, state and party officials, journalists and amateur artists.
53
 To be sure, many 
„workers‟ who visited the people‟s democracies as part of the trains were actually 
prominent members of their local societies who could therefore „swap experiences‟ 
with their comrades abroad: in October 1968, passengers of a train from Kyiv to 
Krakow contained „modernisers of production‟ (novatory vyrobnytstva), „leading 
workers of communist labour‟ (udarnyky komunistychnoi pratsi), and „Heroes of the 
Soviet Union and Socialist Labour‟.54 Professional encounters during which the 
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Soviet partners were supposed to manifest their superior knowledge and expertise 
consequently became part of the routine of travel.
55
  
 However, the authorities encountered numerous difficulties in organising 
international travel, which had important implications for internal Soviet dynamics 
of regional identities during the late 1950s and the early 1960s. In December 1959, 
the CPSU Central Committee passed a special resolution concerning the need to 
improve connections between Soviet republics, towns, and oblasts on the one hand, 
and towns and regions in the satellite states, on the other. The decree criticised 
members of Soviet delegations for failing to propagate Soviet achievements during 
their trips abroad, and sought to facilitate cooperation in the sphere of industry, 
agriculture, science, and culture.
56
 Party activists and professionals from the western 
borderlands were probably not the main target of this criticism, having already 
proven their commitment to strengthening international cooperation. The late 1950s 
witnessed the rise of borderland exchanges in western regions of the USSR, which 
senior state and Party apparatchiks evaluated in very positive terms. At a February 
1959 meeting in Warsaw, officials of the Ukrainian Society for Cultural Relations 
with the Abroad underlined that contacts between neighbouring regions on either 
side of the Soviet border had intensified in the previous years, supposedly enlivening 
the „cultural life‟ in the L‟viv, Drohobych, and Volhynia oblasts, as well as the 
Rzeszów and Lublin voyvodships, allowing their inhabitants to „swap experiences‟ 
and to make „practical use of them‟.57 Meanwhile, however, many Ukrainian oblasts 
were much more reluctant to establish face-to-face contacts with the people‟s 
democracies. Even after Moscow instructed local authorities throughout the USSR to 
strengthen connections with the satellites, major shortcomings persisted in the 
organisation of international travel. For instance, although the Kyiv obkom had made 
very ambitious plans to exchange numerous delegations with Krakow after the two 
cities were twinned in 1958,
58
 the Agricultural Institute in Bila Tserkva did not take 
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advantage of the opportunity to establish permanent contacts with Krakow‟s 
universities, while some raikom officials and managers who had officially agreed to 
cooperate with regions and enterprises in the Krakow voyvodship limited themselves 
to sending them congratulatory letters for important anniversaries.
59
 Problems with 
Kyiv‟s performance in the sphere of international cooperation faded in comparison 
to other regions of the republic. In July 1960, officials of the Polish-Soviet 
Friendship Society in Bydgoszcz stated that plans for mutual cooperation with the 
Cherkasy oblast were not being fulfilled at all: even though a few trips to Ukraine 
had been planned, none of them had taken place.
60
 Around the same time, Society 
officials in Szczecin asked the Polish consul in Kyiv to intervene on their behalf, 
informing her that the Soviet officials in Odesa completely ignored their requests to 
establish friendly relations.
61
 Soviet apparatchiks in the regions were slow to 
promote face-to-face contacts between residents of Ukraine and their „socialist 
brothers‟ across the border. This raised the relative importance of western Ukraine in 
the process of international cooperation during the Khrushchev period, helping to 
counteract the impression that the region was somehow less „Soviet‟ than other parts 
of the USSR 
The gradual expansion of travel during the 1960s increased pressure on 
individuals who aspired to the status of middle class to show that they retained their 
Soviet characteristics even when displaced from the „safe‟ context of their everyday 
lives in the USSR. In order to portray themselves as more sophisticated travellers 
than the „mass‟ of Soviet citizens who came into contact with foreigners, they 
sometimes condemned the „uncultured‟ behaviour of „ordinary‟ tourists. Soon after 
international tourism resumed under Khrushchev, tour group leaders criticised 
tourists for behaving in an „uncultured‟ manner. One report claimed that members of 
a Soviet group travelling around Czechoslovakia created a very bad impression on 
the local waiters after they showed no table manners, with one writer discrediting 
himself as a reliable „exchange partner‟ by getting obscenely drunk and insolently 
trying to seduce a Slovak woman.
62
 Similarly, the leader of a group that visited 
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Poland at the height of the 1956 crisis bemoaned the fact that many „ordinary‟ 
travellers had failed to obey his advice, all the while underlining that he had 
protected them from the aggressive propaganda of Polish reactionaries.
63
 Both report 
writers condemned what they depicted as „undignified‟ and politically immature 
behaviour of other travellers, thus proving their own patriotic credentials and 
suggesting that reliable Soviet citizens were polite, sober and politically alert.  
Furthermore, especially during the Brezhnev era, some social activists produced 
reports in which they complained that many travellers were lazy or even dishonest. 
In 1969, for example, the deputy head of the Soviet-Hungarian friendship society‟s 
youth commission reported on a trip to the third Soviet-Hungarian „international 
friendship camp‟. The Ukrainian branch of the society sent eight young people to 
Hungary, each of whom had been required to attend various lectures in Kyiv prior to 
departure: they learnt about Lenin‟s centenary and youth organisations of the 
socialist countries, and participated in discussions concerning different ideological 
questions and the „moral stance of a Soviet young person‟. Despite such careful 
preparations, the participants failed to represent their country appropriately during 
their stay in Hungary. Having visited the sights of Budapest and laid flowers on the 
Soviet soldiers‟ monument, some of them „treated the trip as a holiday‟.64 In 
denouncing the participants‟ behaviour, the group leader emphasised her own 
commitment to improving international cooperation, and praised SSOD activists in 
Kyiv for their efforts to strengthen Soviet links with Hungary. The distinction 
between the reliable middle class travellers and the masses became even more 
pronounced during the 1970s, when smuggling became very prevalent.
65
 
Consequently, although an increasing number of citizens participated in international 
travel, report writers employed ritualistic images of Sovietness that stressed the 
importance of sophistication, honesty and commitment to deepening international 
cooperation, as well as suggesting that these Soviet characteristics remained 
                                                          
63
 RGANI, f.5, op.28, d.397, ll. 420-423. 
64
 GARF, f.9576, op.4, d. 338a, ll. 43-46. 
65
 Gorsuch, „Time Travellers‟, 217, 222-224; DALO, f.P3, op.44, s. 85, ark. 7-8; TsDAHO, f.1, op.25, 
s. 2608, ark. 18-22; TsDAHO, f.1, op.25, s.2769, ark. 40-42; SWPW, t. 41/225 (Sprawozdanie z 
przebiegu wycieczki nr 7-2247 Warszawa-Moskwa-Kijow-Warszawa organizowanej w dniach 24-31 
marca 1977, Opiekun społeczny grupy Jerzy Piechowicz, 4.4.77). Sowinski claims that smuggling 
was a common practice even on the friendship trains, facilitated by the propagandistic nature of such 
tourist exchanges – customs officials were reluctant to search trains decorated with red flags and the 
hammer and sickle emblems. P. Sowinski, Wakacje w Polsce Ludowej. Polityka wladz i ruch 
turystyczny (1945-1989) (Warsaw, 2005), 166. 
124 
 
 
confined to the privileged few. From the point of view of state and Party officials 
who organised and coordinated international travel, it was only the tried and tested 
activists, group leaders, and professionals who could assure that travel would help to 
spread Soviet influences in Eastern Europe, and it was the lack of their direct 
engagement which was to blame for the rising problems: Party leaders complained 
that activists did not give tourist groups „well defined goals‟ to achieve during their 
trips abroad.
66
 
Apart from the „unworthy‟ behaviour of Soviet tourists, personal conflicts 
between Soviet citizens and inhabitants of the people‟s democracies moulded ideas 
about what formed Soviet identity, further helping to ground in official narratives the 
image of professionals and activists as a middle class that embodied crucial Soviet 
characteristics. Top CPSU apparatchiks expected residents of Ukraine to behave in a 
more „cultured‟ way than citizens of the people‟s democracies, which raised the 
importance of modesty and „seriousness‟ in official depictions of Sovietness. This 
trend had already become evident by the mid-1950s. Patryk Babiracki shows that 
Party bureaucrats often perceived East European students, who had come to study in 
the USSR from the 1940s, as a threat not only to the ideological, but also the „moral‟ 
integrity of the Soviet population.
67
 They consequently expected Soviet citizens to 
distance themselves from the foreigners, praising Soviet students not only for 
rebuking the foreigners‟ provocative political statements, but also for keeping their 
rooms more tidy.
68
 The authorities were happy to report that most Soviet students 
maintained a distance from the Poles and Hungarians who drank heavily, started 
fights with „our‟ students, and insisted on organising dancing evenings which carried 
on until the unholy hour of one in the morning every Saturday and Sunday.
69
 As 
Soviet citizens came into contact with foreign students, Party officials expected them 
to condemn the foreigners‟ trivial pursuits and behave in such a way that would 
highlight their own sombreness.  
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Similarly, when travel created new opportunities for Soviet citizens to meet other 
foreigners, conflicts between the idea of travel as leisure and travel as ideological act 
increased official pressure on citizens to publicly denounce the „frivolity‟ of East 
Europeans, thus further helping to define simplicity and seriousness as positive 
Soviet characteristics. As Anne Gorsuch points out, party and state bureaucrats who 
organised international travel expected the „cultured‟ individual who visited the 
people‟s democracies to avoid both „the “Soviet” dress of the obviously working 
class and the vulgarity of the aspiring elite‟ in order not to bring embarrassment to 
his or her country.
70
 She thus suggests that the authorities compelled citizens to 
portray themselves as modest and refined at the same time. Indeed, as late as 1979, 
when the CPSU Central Committee agreed upon the instructions which they should 
issue to Soviet tourists visiting socialist countries, they still reminded them to „live 
modestly‟, but also to show pride in Soviet achievements and peaceful foreign 
policy.
71
 The authorities praised members of official delegations for behaving 
„simply and proudly‟, like Soviet people should,72 and activists of the SSOD 
reprimanded their Polish colleagues for trying to place too much emphasis on „merry 
light entertainment‟ rather than „ideological tasks‟.73 While ritualised demonstrations 
of modesty and solemnity characterised all forms of travel, they were most evident 
during the borderland exchanges in the late 1950s and the early 1960s. During this 
period, numerous official reports emphasised that the Polish hosts „placed too much 
emphasis‟ on the tourist programme rather than ideological work, and embarrassed 
the Soviet guests from western Ukraine by offering them expensive gifts: even 
though there was no reason to feel indebted to the Poles, top SSOD officials claimed, 
members of Soviet delegations felt guilty about only offering traditional souvenirs in 
return.
74
 Consequently, as the apparatchiks in Moscow put it, many Soviet 
participants in borderland exchanges „tactfully showed‟ the Poles how to work hard 
and avoid unnecessary pomp: they complained that their partners spent too much 
money on fancy dinners, expensive hotels, and personal gifts.
75
 Despite few 
opportunities to meet „ordinary‟ Polish citizens, residents of the western oblasts who 
crossed the western border also claimed that they did their best to address large 
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audiences of Polish workers.
76
 In order to prove their Soviet patriotism, they 
distanced themselves from the Polish hosts and acted as sophisticated „Soviet 
experts‟; at the same time, they demonstrated a commitment to egalitarianism to 
counteract any apparent impression of Soviet economic weakness.  
The perceived need to contrast the USSR with the less reliable people‟s 
democracies also encouraged many travellers from Soviet Ukraine to highlight their 
ideological purity. Upon encountering foreigners, numerous members of official 
delegations manifested their Soviet middle class credentials by repeating 
conservative views on ideology, art, and literature.  For example, a group of Kyiv 
party activists visiting Krakow in 1962 claimed to be astonished at Polish deviations 
from socialism. They asked their PUWP comrades why Polish agriculture had not 
been collectivised, and voiced their outrage at the ever-present „Catholic 
propaganda‟ in Poland. They noticed small shrines decorated with fresh flowers all 
along the road from the Soviet border to Krakow, and were shocked to see two new 
churches being built en route to Lenin‟s former residence in Poronino: as responsible 
Soviet patriots, they alerted their superiors at the CPU Central Committee that the 
Catholic Church made extensive preparations to celebrate the millenium of 
Christianity in Poland.
77
 Numerous academics, writers, and party apparatchiks 
explicitly condemned Polish „cultural distortions‟, too. When a group of university 
lecturers from Kyiv visited Krakow in February 1960, they forced their reluctant 
Polish hosts to explain why „abstractionism‟ had spread amongst students at the 
Academy of Fine Arts. They were not satisfied with the dean‟s explanation: he 
claimed that the students‟ interest in modern art stemmed from the Western style of 
teaching, where the role of university professors was limited to assisting young 
people in their individual creative explorations. The Kyiv academics argued that 
abstractionism was promoted by the lecturers themselves and charged that primary 
party organisations exerted a weak influence over Polish universities.
78
 In fact, Kyiv 
obkom officials staying in Krakow seven years later pointed to the same issues, 
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claiming that „abstractionism‟ and „modernism‟ were widely propagated in Poland, 
with hotels even buying such suspect works to decorate guest rooms.
79
 By citing 
their experiences of travel within Eastern Europe, and speaking to the Polish hosts 
during the actual trips, many members of official delegations suggested that 
conservative beliefs were a defining characteristic of reliable Soviet citizens. This 
permitted party activists and educated professionals to reaffirm their special status by 
presenting themselves as articulate defenders of Soviet ideology abroad.    
Because they encouraged travellers to contrast the USSR with the satellite states, 
conflicts and tensions that emerged during face-to-face encounters with foreigners 
also infused the concept of Sovietness with national undertones. Whilst some 
travellers commented on the „warm welcome‟ which they received abroad,80 many 
others depicted themselves (in public and in official reports) as defending the „Soviet 
people‟ from what they perceived as xenophobia. This was already evident in May 
1956, when a group of Soviet journalists visited Czechoslovakia. The group leader 
was struck by the level of hostility which they encountered on the streets of Prague, 
and offended to see that the people of Czechoslovakia were „proud and convinced of 
their superiority over other Slavic nations‟: he suggested that the USSR should make 
more effort to demonstrate the richness and splendour of „Russian and Soviet‟ 
culture, appealing to the CPSU Central Committee to send the best Soviet 
symphonic orchestras and opera singers to tour Czechoslovakia, and to invite a few 
hundred members of the Czechoslovak intelligentsia to the USSR to show them „our 
cultural and economic achievements‟.81 Similarly, a few years later, the writer I.L. 
Prut clearly stated that the USSR had „few friends‟ amongst the Polish intelligentsia. 
Unlike the „simple people‟, he claimed in his report for the CPSU Central 
Committee, Polish writers forced him to answer for all the evils of Tsarist Russia and 
the brutality of Khmel‟nyts‟kyi‟s uprising, and „crossed all boundaries of elementary 
politeness‟ by blaming the USSR for Katyn and the scale of destruction during the 
Warsaw Uprising. Interestingly, this led Prut to the conclusion that more Soviet 
writers should visit Poland to propagate both „socialist‟ values in the arts and 
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friendship towards the USSR: he specified that they should spend less time 
advertising their own personal achievements, focusing more on exposing progressive 
Soviet literature in general.
82
 He drew an explicit link between preserving 
conservative „socialist‟ values in art and literature on the one hand, and defending 
Soviet honour in the socialist camp on the other.  
The practice of travel helped the aspirational middle class to establish rituals that 
grounded in official rhetoric the image of East European satellite states as „foreign‟. 
From the early 1960s, the authorities used travel to encourage citizens to 
commemorate the rise of socialism in individual people‟s democracies under the 
USSR‟s guidance, and thus to express a sense of Soviet pride. Numerous inhabitants 
of Ukraine and citizens of the satellite states participated together in very formulaic 
anniversary celebrations of the Great Patriotic War and the subsequent Soviet 
„liberation‟ and „modernisation‟ of Eastern Europe. SSOD activists, gorkom 
officials, factory managers, and heads of collective farms organised „evenings of 
friendship‟ with the people‟s democracies, where citizens marked their official 
anniversaries together with foreign visitors to Ukraine. In Kyiv, the locals often 
joined „socialist‟ tourists on 22 July celebrating the Polish communist manifesto, 
while Czechoslovak veterans who had fought in the Crimea met in Yalta with 
representatives of the oblispolkom, gorispolkom, local branches of the friendship 
society and the writers‟ union, as well as correspondents of the local press and 
television.
83
 In fact, it was common for tourists to participate in historical 
commemorations of the war. In 1964 alone, 7,041 foreigners who came to L‟viv 
from socialist countries were treated to various lectures and discussions organised by 
regional bureaucrats. They touched on such joyful topics as „the patriotic 
underground movement in L‟viv‟, the „bestiality of the fascist occupation‟, and „the 
fascist massacre of thirty-six Polish academics‟.84 Meanwhile, local officials in the 
village of Sokolovo in the Kharkiv oblast (the site of a bloody battle where many 
Soviet and Czechoslovak soldiers had been killed in March 1943) had been hosting 
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Czechoslovak veterans since the late 1950s,
85
 and the Ukrainian Council of Ministers 
finally decided to erect a monument on the site in 1964.
86
  
Soviet citizens, mostly party members and professionals, as well as some blue-
collar workers and collective farmers, travelled to Eastern Europe to participate in 
victory anniversary celebrations, too. For instance, when passengers of the Soviet 
„friendship train‟ to Czechoslovakia attended the „liberation‟ anniversary 
celebrations in 1965, the group included 47 blue-collar workers (rabochie), 38 
collective farmers (kolkhozniki), 93 engineers and technicians, 34 university 
lecturers, 23 teachers, 14 doctors and others. Out of 330 people, 253 were members 
of the CPSU and the Komsomol.
87
 Similarly, during a ten-day trip to Poland in 
October 1973, a delegation of Soviet friendship society activists laid fifteen wreaths 
at Soviet and Polish „sites of martyrology‟, as well as places associated with the life 
and work of Lenin.
88
 Indeed, by the early 1970s, most organised tourist groups 
travelling around Eastern Europe followed a trail of „historical-revolutionary 
monuments‟, „Lenin places‟ (leninskie mesta), and sites of battles against „Hitlerite 
occupiers‟.89 Through encouraging tourists to reminisce about the Great Patriotic 
War and the achievements of Soviet socialism, state and party officials established 
sites where many inhabitants of Ukraine could speak about the „revolutionary unity‟ 
of the socialist camp, all the while underlining the idea that the „foreigners‟ were 
indebted to the USSR for their „socialist progress‟ and „liberation from fascism‟.90 
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Residents of the republic who met East Europeans in the 1950s and the 1960s 
could claim to represent both a Soviet and a Ukrainian community during such 
encounters. During the borderland exchanges, amateur artists performed a „Soviet 
and Ukrainian‟ repertoire in Poland, and travellers delivered speeches in the 
Ukrainian language which, reportedly, „created a good impression on the Poles‟.91 
Furthermore, while commemorations of the war were a means of instilling a sense of 
Soviet pride among the population, Roman Serbyn suggests that interactions 
between the Kremlin, CPU leaders in Kyiv, oblast authorities and „ordinary 
Ukrainians‟ led to the emergence of a distinct Ukrainian national rhetoric in 
commemorations of the Great Patriotic War.
92
 For instance, in October 1968, 
officials at the Ukrainian branch of the SSOD reported that the „workers‟ 
(trudiashchiesia) often travelled on „trains of friendship‟ to Hungary. The 
Hungarians were keen to share their experiences of economic reform which they 
conducted with „Soviet assistance‟, and it was the „Hungarian and Soviet 
trudiashchiesia‟ who met to celebrate such socialist occasions as the fiftieth 
anniversary of the Hungarian revolution. This implied that residents of Ukraine were 
expected to portray themselves as Soviet people in relation to the Hungarian 
foreigners. On the other hand, even when celebrating the „achievements of the Soviet 
narod‟, the SSOD encouraged residents of the republic to focus on the fiftieth 
anniversary of Soviet Ukraine rather than the USSR as a whole, and Soviet guests 
helped their hosts popularise „Ukrainian culture‟ in Hungary.93 Moreover, the 
authorities approved when inhabitants of the republic expressed a distinctly 
Ukrainian identity when celebrating the socialist victory in 1945. The Ukrainian 
branch of the SSOD reported that the „trudiashchi of Ukraine‟ hosted foreign 
delegations and visited their western neighbours during the 1967 Soviet-
Czechoslovak peace relay race. The event commemorated the twenty-second 
anniversary of the „liberation‟ of Czechoslovakia. In Chernihiv and other oblasts, the 
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locals welcomed the athletes with bread and salt as „the old Ukrainian custom‟ 
requires.
94
 
The practice of international travel encouraged top CPSU apparatchiks, party 
activists in the regions, members of friendship societies, and educated specialists to 
respond to problems that arose during face-to-face contacts with foreigners. They 
wrote reports and spoke in public in ways that helped to define professional 
expertise, sophistication, modesty and a conservative mindset as crucial attributes of 
a Soviet citizen who travelled in the socialist camp and encountered „unreliable‟ 
foreigners. These narratives suggested that specialists and activists were instrumental 
in strengthening the USSR‟s hold over the outer empire, allowing some citizens, 
particularly in the borderlands, to portray themselves as a Soviet middle class that 
embodied all the characteristics of an international Soviet traveller. Stories of travel 
also implied that this middle class helped to imbue correct attitudes among other 
citizens, defending them against the foreigners‟ „xenophobia‟, inspiring a sense of 
Soviet pride, and eliminating „undignified‟ behaviour among the mass of Soviet 
tourists. Indeed, in order to popularise formulaic depictions of Soviet superiority in 
Eastern Europe and to establish firmly in the public imagination the image of Soviet 
and Ukrainian people as a distinct group within the socialist camp, the authorities 
further shaped practices of travel, encouraging an increasing number of citizens to 
join residents of the satellite states in ritualistic commemorations of the Great 
Patriotic War.  
 
III. Tourism as Diplomacy: 1968 
The ritualisation of travel was especially pronounced during the Prague Spring. 
Tourist exchanges between Soviet Ukraine and Czechoslovakia intensified in 1968: 
as Grey Hodnett and Peter Potichnyj claim, this allowed Ukrainian party authorities 
to gather intelligence about the unfolding situation, and – more broadly – formed 
part of the Ukrainian „quasi-diplomacy‟.95 Because travel served as a means to 
secure Soviet influences in Czechoslovakia, the Ukrainian authorities instituted strict 
vetting procedures to determine who came into face-to-face contact with 
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Czechoslovak citizens; they specified that members of amateur artistic groups, 
sportsmen, and war veterans should be encouraged to travel, while „informal 
contacts‟ between friends and relatives should be limited.96 Consequently, even more 
than the various forms of travel which developed during the 1960s, trips to 
„rebellious‟ Czechoslovakia were clearly a perk awarded to „trustworthy‟ citizens 
prepared to manifest in public their commitment to strengthening Soviet power in 
Eastern Europe. They allowed distinguished members of the republic‟s society to 
affirm their patriotic and middle class credentials. 
Although a number of idealised accounts about face-to-face contacts celebrated 
how Ukraine‟s farmers welcomed Czechoslovak delegations „with bread and salt‟ 
while the latter, „moved to tears‟, laid flowers at monuments to Lenin,97 this buoyant 
style clashed with the more factual tone of other reports. Questions of international 
cooperation became more complicated in 1968 and 1969. Journalists and newspaper 
editors experienced this especially strongly, which encouraged them to condemn the 
foreigners‟ „incompetence‟ and „ignorance‟ in official reports. When Kyiv television 
showed the opening ceremony of the Ukrainian Culture Days in Bratislava, editors 
found their colleagues in Czechoslovakia incompetent and uncooperative. As a 
result, they could only show the picture with no sound during the live transmission in 
May.
98
 Similarly, the head of the Ukrainian radio and television committee 
complained that Czechoslovak journalists were unwilling to work with their 
Ukrainian colleagues. Soviet journalists were shocked that the Czechoslovak media 
failed to report on the Ukrainian Culture Days in Prague: it made their work difficult, 
because they hoped to travel around the city and produce reports in cooperation with 
them.
99
  
Furthermore, Soviet officials complained about the rather chilly reception which 
Soviet citizens encountered in Czechoslovakia, drawing a link between their role as 
„experts‟ and a sense of Soviet pride. While it is not possible to determine whether 
tourists and members of official delegations were indeed as „appalled‟ at their cold 
treatment as the reports claimed, it seems unlikely that they failed to notice that 
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citizens of Czechoslovakia remained aloof or even suspicious of them. Leaders of 
tour groups complained about the rude attitude of waiters and tour guides, and 
emphasised that Soviet citizens were deprived of the usual opportunities to meet 
representatives of Czechoslovak youth, workers (robitnyki), villagers, prominent 
academics and „cultural activists‟.100 As one report put it, Soviet travellers did not 
feel in 1968 the „enthusiasm‟ and „love‟ so characteristic of visits to Czechoslovakia 
in previous years.
101
 Indeed, personal conflicts with foreigners acquired new political 
significance due to their „anti-Soviet‟ or even xenophobic undertones. When a group 
of 61 Czechoslovak miners and engineers from Ostrava came to L‟viv to visit the 
Soviet soldiers whom they had befriended back home during the autumn of 1968, the 
trip took a nasty turn. One guest from across the border came up to a Czech woman 
who was dancing with a Soviet soldier, slapped her in the face and called her a 
„Russian swine‟.102 As the authorities encouraged their citizens to act as „bearers of 
peace‟ when they met residents of Czechoslovakia, they also exposed them to 
attitudes and opinions that challenged the status of the USSR in Eastern Europe. 
This problem was especially difficult because Czechoslovak citizens sometimes 
criticised Moscow‟s excessive interference in their domestic affairs. At the time of 
the military intervention, individual inhabitants and institutions in Ukraine received 
collective letters from Czechoslovakia, which defended Dubcek‟s reforms while also 
reaffirming Czechoslovak loyalty to the USSR. Even school children who 
corresponded with their pen-pals across the border read about the Czechoslovak fight 
for „freedom‟ and „democracy‟ and popular fears of a Soviet invasion.103 Moreover, 
during their trips across the border, Soviet citizens often encountered opinions which 
questioned the USSR‟s leading position in the socialist camp. Many Czechoslovak 
citizens claimed that the USSR did not always provide a good example for other 
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socialist states in Eastern Europe: for instance, a group of Czechoslovak workers 
laughed at the primitive advice they were given by two Soviet industrial specialists 
who lectured them on leather production, pointing out that Czechoslovakia was a 
highly developed industrial country which had adopted modern production 
technologies long before the USSR.
104
  Characteristically, most reports filed around 
this time underlined that trips to and from Czechoslovakia were generally successful, 
barring a few unfortunate incidents.
105
 Still, some Czechoslovak complaints leveled 
against the USSR were very radical: during their stay in Bratislava, a group of Soviet 
students were confronted by a local man who claimed that „Soviet rule here was now 
over‟.106 Unsurprisingly, similar attacks became more frequent after the August 1968 
invasion.
107
 
During such a tumultous time, the authorities demanded increasingly conformist 
forms of behaviour in return for the right to travel. Furthermore, top Soviet officials 
sought to use tourism as a means of influencing the domestic situation in 
Czechoslovakia during 1968. The SSOD made a special effort to intensify 
cooperation with the Czechoslovak-Soviet Friendship Society,
108
 thus strengthening 
„pro-Soviet‟ institutions in Prague. Citizens travelling to Czechoslovakia had a 
mission to fulfil: they needed to explain the Soviet point of view on current affairs 
and counteract the influence of the tendentious Czechoslovak media. They were also 
to popularise Soviet and Ukrainian culture: Kyiv fashion designers presented their 
                                                          
104
 While some „socialist initiatives‟ were worthwhile, one Czechoslovak tourist in the USSR claimed, 
and people supported such projects as the building of nursery schools by volunteer brigades, the 
Czechoslovak robitnyki were „outraged‟ that they were now forced to follow the Soviet practice and 
help farmers „dig out potatoes‟ during harvest time. This created anti-Soviet feelings in 
Czechoslovakia, he concluded. TsDAHO, f.1, op.25, s.30, ark. 139-148. 
105
 When a group of twenty-two Czechoslovak trudiashchiesia, containing only one rabochii and no 
farmers. visited Uzhgorod and Kharkiv at the end of May 1968, they took part in the peace relay race 
celebrating the twenty-third anniversary of liberation, visited the museum of Soviet-Czechoslovak 
friendship in Sokolovo, and met the local trudiashchiesia at a tractor factory, a collective farm, a 
school and a university. At the same time, another member of the delegation Joanna Gotlibova, an 
editor of the journal published by the Czechoslovak-Soviet Friendship Society, „started up 
conversations with Soviet citizens‟, idealising Tomas Masaryk and justifying the current measures 
undertaken by the Prague leadership. As Petro Shelest put it in his report to the CPSU Central 
Committee, she sometimes voiced „openly anti-Soviet views‟: she criticised the Soviet nationalities 
policy by stating that „she could not see Ukraine, its language, culture and way of life‟ during her 
travels, and hoped that the Czechoslovak reforms would be replicated in the USSR itself. She also 
praised Solzhenitsyn and claimed to oppose Stalinist bureaucracy and not the Soviet Union as such. 
Shelest made sure to underline that Soviet citizens and other members of the Czechoslovak delegation 
(including the lone rabochii) opposed Gotlibova. TsDAHO, f.1, op.25, s.30, ark. 15-19. 
106
 TsDAHO, f.1, op.25, s.31, ark. 132-137. 
107
 TsDAHO, f.1, op.25, s.255, ark. 41-44, 126-147. 
108
 GARF, f.9576, op.4, d.330a, ll. 1-23. 
135 
 
 
work in Prague and Karlovy Vary in April, and the SSOD assisted in preparing the 
Ukrainian Culture Days.
109
 When the Ukrainian republican dance ensemble toured 
Czechoslovakia between 7 and 29 May 1968, the group leader emphasised that they 
had an impact on the local population: 40,000 spectators attended the performances, 
and claimed that the artists „socialized with the population of the Czech and Slovak 
parts‟ of the country.110 Their tour was organised in such a way as to reach wide 
audiences, putting pressure on the Soviet artists to exert a „positive influence‟ over 
the foreigners on and off the stage. Indeed, as late as July 1969, party officials 
insisted that tourist exchanges should be promoted to speed up the process of 
recovery in Czechoslovakia. A secretary of the Chernihiv obkom claimed that the 
„presence of our people‟ in Czechoslovakia would help to resolve the ever difficult 
situation there.
111
  
In 1968, travel to Czechoslovakia functioned as a reward for loyalty and 
conformity, but it also conferred certain responsibilities on Soviet citizens who took 
part in ritualistic affirmations of Sovietness. In this way, it came to function as a perk 
and symbol of middle class identity. In order to manifest their patriotic credentials, 
during the trips and in official reports which they compiled upon return, citizens 
needed to distance themselves from „foreign‟ criticisms leveled against their country, 
as well as highlighting their role as senior „Soviet‟ experts who aided foreigners in 
Czechoslovakia.  Various specialists, artists and party activists whom the top 
officials considered to be „reliable‟ were in a privileged position to reaffirm their 
middle class status during the Prague Spring, encouraged as they were to travel 
across the border to help resolve the crisis.  
 
IV. Conclusion 
After the mid-1950s, an increasing number of Soviet citizens spoke about travel 
as a means of strengthening the USSR‟s links with the people‟s democracies. By 
shaping mass media portrayals of the socialist bloc, top CPSU officials suggested 
that educated professionals, party activists, prominent members of friendship 
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societies, and artists had a crucial role to play in advancing international cooperation 
through travel. Drawing on such concepts and taking advantage of the new 
opportunities to encounter foreign citizens, members of these groups produced their 
own accounts of travel in the mass media and official reports, as well as speaking in 
public during their trips abroad. They thereby portrayed themselves as a middle class 
that embodied important Soviet characteristics, guiding both the satellite states and 
the „masses‟ at home on the path of progress. As such, not only did they claim a right 
to travel and enjoy elite status in the USSR, but they also participated in the 
reproduction of formulaic images of Soviet superiority in Eastern Europe. 
Reflecting pressures from top CPSU officials, narratives of travel were 
underpinned by the idea that Soviet people formed a distinct group within a 
nationally diverse Eastern Europe that nonetheless also helped to unify the socialist 
camp. The practice of travel contributed towards establishing firmly the concept of 
Soviet national uniqueness in official representations of the socialist camp. Personal 
and ideological tensions, the clash between the idea of travel for fun and travel as 
duty, and perhaps even genuine shock at the attitudes and practices which travellers 
witnessed in the satellite states encouraged many citizens to condemn foreign 
deviations from the Soviet model, both when speaking to citizens of the people‟s 
democracies during official meetings and when describing their experiences of travel 
to Party officials and the wider public at home. Furthermore, practical difficulties 
inherent in organising international travel and the perceived need to distinguish the 
USSR from Eastern Europe encouraged the growth of various ritualised 
commemorations of the Great Patriotic War, as well as the celebration of Soviet and 
Ukrainian culture. As they became part of the routine of travel, these practices 
essentially compelled residents of Ukraine to portray themselves as superior „Soviet 
people‟ and „Ukrainians‟ who, though committed to preserving the unity of the 
Soviet bloc, were uninspired by foreign ideas and practices. 
Because Sovietness and Ukrainianness were defined against other nations in the 
Soviet bloc, citizens increasingly articulated the idea of middle class in national 
rhetoric. It was the Soviet and Soviet Ukrainian people, and not their „foreign‟ 
neighbours, who promoted the interests of their republic, country and the socialist 
bloc as a whole. This created a context in which some citizens sought to establish 
their status as a Soviet elite: with blue-collar workers or farmers still relatively few 
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amongst the „cultured‟ tourists, they spoke and wrote about travel to suggest that 
education, artistic talent, or specialist knowledge were key attributes that allowed 
them to strengthen the USSR‟s hold over the „outer empire‟.  
Furthermore, in speaking about socialist cooperation in Eastern Europe, Soviet 
citizens also articulated various local identities, claiming that their regions 
contributed to spreading Soviet influences abroad. In the late 1950s, borderland 
exchanges allowed state and party officials in the western oblasts, as well as other 
local specialists and artists, to present themselves as important Soviet citizens whose 
contribution was necessary to improve the USSR‟s relations with the satellite states. 
They proved their allegiance to Moscow by asserting that they taught their socialist 
brothers abroad how to work. As travel then spread during the 1960s, it became an 
important means for local party authorities throughout Ukraine to emphasise their 
role in international cooperation, especially because trips were often organised in the 
framework of twinned towns and regions. 
Official narratives and increasingly ritualised practices of travel consequently 
helped to establish in public rhetoric a clear definition of what constituted a Soviet 
identity. Professional expertise, ideological conservatism, sophistication and 
modesty emerged as key features that Soviet patriots were expected to display, thus 
spreading the USSR‟s influences abroad. This reinforced „imperial‟ attitudes towards 
Eastern Europe: Soviet travellers condemned in public foreign distortions from the 
Soviet model and stated their commitment to preserving the USSR‟s power in the 
region. Top CPSU apparatchiks, journalists, editors, and citizens aspiring to the 
status of middle class participated in and popularised various ritualised forms of 
depicting Soviet hegemony in the socialist bloc. These included writing official 
reports, publishing travel accounts in the mass media, and participating in various 
ritualised practices such as war commemorations during actual travel. Such rituals 
turned into crucial markers of Soviet identity. In sum, international travel became a 
forum for depicting conservative patriotism as the only legitimate attitude or frame 
of mind that citizens should adopt vis-a-vis Eastern Europe.  
Indeed, as debates about the Prague Spring were to demonstrate, many residents 
of Ukraine reproduced fixed portrayals of Soviet domination in Eastern Europe, thus 
presenting themselves as an elite which fortified the USSR‟s hold over the region, as 
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well as grounding conservative patriotism among the Soviet „masses‟. At the same 
time, the foreigners‟ apparent indifference to Soviet citizens‟ proud heritage, which 
became particularly evident during the Prague Spring, made Soviet travellers 
question the extent to which their „brothers‟ accepted the idea of a USSR-led 
socialist camp. When speaking to Soviet tourists, numerous Czechoslovak citizens 
raised a whole set of issues about national roads to socialism and the degree to which 
the USSR should interfere in the domestic affairs of its socialist neighbours. As the 
next chapter shows, this encouraged some Soviet citizens to reflect upon the role of 
the USSR in Eastern Europe, whilst convincing others to stage their patriotic 
commitment to the Soviet Union and its foreign policy all the more intensely. 
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Chapter Three 
A Matter of Soviet Pride: The Prague Spring and the Rupture of Soviet 
Identities in Ukraine 
In October 1968, to mark the fiftieth anniversary of Czechoslovak independence, 
a Soviet citizen by the name of Nekrasov, a resident of the town of Putivl‟ in north-
east Ukraine, posted a letter to his friend in Czechoslovakia. It never reached the 
addressee, Stanislav, whom he had met eight years earlier as they were both 
convalescing in a Kyiv hospital. Writing to Literaturnaia gazeta in early 1969, 
Nekrasov complained that the letter was stopped by Soviet censors and further 
described his shock at the fact that Stanislav‟s package with medicines unavailable in 
the USSR had recently been confiscated by the Soviet customs officials. This proved 
that the Soviet state was only concerned with its citizens‟ welfare on paper, 
Nekrasov exclaimed, underlining that he understood why the Czechs wanted more 
freedom from the economically backward Soviet Union. His anger apparent as he 
protested against Soviet portrayals of Jan Palach as a „fanatic of the Maoist kind‟, he 
argued that Palach‟s self-immolation expressed the plight of the „highly cultured 
Czechoslovak people‟. Nekrasov was ashamed to be Russian.1  
Although more openly critical of the Soviet authorities than the vast majority of 
residents of Ukraine who commented on the Prague Spring in 1968 and 1969, 
Nekrasov‟s letter illustrates wider tendencies in Soviet Ukrainian society. Unlike in 
1956, when reformist and conservative patriotism represented more ambiguous 
opinions about Khrushchev‟s „liberalisation‟, inhabitants of the republic defined their 
attitudes towards Moscow‟s domestic and foreign policy much more sharply in 
1968. Admittedly, top CPSU leaders did maintain complex attitudes towards „reform 
socialism‟, which often inspired both confusion among citizens who tried to define 
and align themselves with Moscow‟s stance and hopes among those who wanted to 
change the system. Nevertheless, because citizens did not see the Kremlin as the 
initiator of reform, but rather as an object of pressures from the outer empire, the 
Prague Spring posed a very direct challenge to Brezhnev and his vision of the Soviet 
future. Moreover, with the emergence of the Soviet dissident movement, boundaries 
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between what was permitted and what was illegal were now less fluid than in 1956.
2
 
During the trial of Andrei Siniavskii and Iulii Daniel in 1966, readers of Soviet 
newspapers had already witnessed a clash between state and party bureaucrats and 
representatives of the creative intelligentsia. While top apparatchiks condemned the 
two writers for „anti-Soviet propaganda‟, some intellectuals refuted the accusations 
of disloyalty levelled against Daniel and Siniavskii, defended the right to free 
speech, and began to publish in the samizdat.
3
 However, it was only the Prague 
Spring which compelled a large number of Soviet citizens to adopt a clear stance on 
such issues as the USSR‟s hegemony in Eastern Europe, the rise of new media and 
access to information, and Soviet nationalities policy. 
An important prelude to the crisis occurred in early 1968. In January, the Polish 
authorities had banned a Warsaw theatre production of Adam Mickiewicz‟s Dziady, 
due to concerns that the nineteenth-century play evoked excessive enthusiasm 
amongst the audiences, who applauded the anti-Tsarist and, arguably, anti-Russian 
dialogue. The ban led to student demonstrations in Warsaw and other Polish 
university towns in early March, which were followed by a large scale anti-Semitic 
campaign. In his infamous speech to the communist active in Warsaw, Wladyslaw 
Gomulka blamed the events on „the Zionists‟ and „fifth columnists‟. Polish Jews 
were expelled from the party, fired from their jobs and effectively forced to 
emigrate.
4
 In sum, the Polish crisis highlighted the problem of censorship, ethno-
national identities, and popular protest in Soviet-style regimes. The Czechoslovak 
events extended debates about the meaning of national sovereignty and ethnic 
diversity, freedom of expression, as well as the possibilities of reforming the 
socialist camp. After Alexander Dubcek replaced Antonin Novotny as the first 
secretary of the Czechoslovak Communist Party in January, the new leaders in 
Prague announced their action programme in April 1968. Whilst they encouraged 
change within a socialist framework, they also outlined a more circumscribed place 
for the Communist Party in society, advocated „freedom of speech‟, and expanded 
rights of personal choice in profession and „lifestyle‟. By mid-1968 the 
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developments had gone further than the Kremlin was prepared to tolerate. Many 
Czechoslovak students and intellectuals began to challenge the „leading role‟ of the 
Communist Party. Their views were embodied in Ludvik Vaculik‟s Two Thousand 
Words, published on 27 June 1968, in which he wrote about „foreign domination‟ of 
Czechoslovakia, the rule of „power-hungry individuals‟, and social inequality.5 The 
Soviet leadership did not accept Dubcek‟s calls for patience, growing increasingly 
convinced that the Czechoslovak party had lost control of the situation. On the night 
of 20–21 August 1968, armies of the Warsaw Pact marched into Czechoslovakia „to 
smother the Prague Spring with direct force and restore power to a reliable set of 
conservative leaders‟.6 Protests against the Soviet domination of Czechoslovakia 
continued until April 1969, when Dubcek was replaced by a more conservative and 
repressive leader, Gustav Husak.
7
  
Residents of Ukraine commented on the unfolding developments very widely.
8
 
Conscious of Volodymyr Dmytruk‟s warning that internal party reports were 
extremely formulaic and unreflective of popular opinion,
9
 I examine scores of 
official reports from the agitation meetings to analyse the ways in which Soviet 
citizens articulated support for Brezhnev‟s foreign policy, conveying different 
visions of what it meant to be a loyal party member, consumer of Soviet mass media, 
and obedient citizen. I also look at a few dozen KGB reports to gauge a range of less 
official reactions to the unfolding events.
10
 The KGB produced especially numerous 
reports in the fortnight after the invasion, which they summarised on 26 August and 
then again on 12 September,
11
 paying special attention to the western oblasts and 
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Odesa.
12
 At the same time, political officers carefully monitored moods in the 
army,
13
 conducting „individual work‟ with soldiers who expressed „apolitical 
views‟.14 These reports focus disproportionately on the attitudes which the 
authorities considered „problematic‟ or even „hostile‟, and they may very well 
construct certain social and ethnic groups as unreliable and anti-Soviet, reflecting in 
many respects the officials‟ own prejudices. Nevertheless, especially when combined 
with samizdat publications, they do offer interesting insights into the emergence of 
unofficial views about the Prague Spring during 1968 and 1969. 
Even more prominently than in 1956, the great majority of citizens articulated a 
vision of conservative patriotism.
15
 Because the regime offered „commitment for 
material improvements in exchange for unchallenged political and ideological 
hegemony‟, and it seemed that the „numbing Soviet order‟ was there to stay,16 
residents „staged‟ their approval of Brezhnev‟s foreign and domestic policy by 
reproducing ritualised portrayals of Czechoslovakia and thus condemning Dubcek‟s 
ideological deviations, or by silently attending agitation gatherings as instructed by 
the authorities. Conservative patriotism was now less challenging to the CPSU 
leadership than twelve years earlier. In order to prove their patriotic credentials, 
citizens contrasted themselves with foreign and domestic „enemies‟ rather than the 
supposedly inefficient apparatchiks in the Kremlin. Even though party activists were 
the bluntest advocates of conservative patriotism, they acted as members of 
collectives which defined their Sovietness in opposition to isolated and „suspect‟ 
individuals, as well as foreigners who diverged from the Soviet model of socialism. 
They thus elevated the silent participants of public meetings to the status of reliable 
citizens, too. The formulaic meetings about Czechoslovakia and the ritual of naming 
and shaming „enemies‟ thus emerged as a means to reconcile the elitist aspirations of 
party activists and professionals with the growing ambitions of the population at 
large, helping to suggest that they could all pursue their goals as Soviet citizens.  
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Partly because exponents of conservative patriotism contrasted themselves with 
some socio-political and ethnic groups, East European events encouraged a small 
number of Ukraine‟s residents to express ideas of reformist patriotism. Its advocates 
believed that it was their patriotic duty to oppose a state which they saw as 
increasingly repressive. Some challenged the regime by expressing sympathy for 
Dubcek‟s reforms in illegal pamphlets and samizdat publications.17 Others voiced 
their opinions in anonymous letters and wall graffiti and, perhaps in less obviously 
illegal ways, in private conversations. Because the KGB considered their views to be 
incriminating, and many exponents of reformist patriotism were tried for „anti-Soviet 
agitation‟, they grew increasingly aware that they opposed Brezhnev‟s leadership 
when they called for an end to censorship, advocated deep economic and political 
reform inspired by Dubcek‟s policies in Czechoslovakia, and defended Ukrainian 
national autonomy in the USSR. Considering Moscow‟s strict attitude towards 
dissent, advocates of reformist patriotism formed a surprisingly vocal section of the 
Ukrainian society at the height of the Czechoslovak crisis. Alarmed though they 
were that the military intervention would spell the end of reform in the Soviet Union 
itself, they still appealed for change „within the system‟. The stilted form of agitation 
meetings and the KGB‟s failure to identify many individuals who expressed 
„problematic‟ opinions make it difficult to determine who the reformist patriots were. 
It seems, however, that reformist patriotism united citizens from various social, 
geographical and ethnic backgrounds, who had different hopes and expectations of 
„reform‟, but all faced the same obstacles vis-à-vis an increasingly oppressive state 
Finally, a small number of anti-Soviet citizens hoped to pursue their interests by 
overthrowing existing institutions and the Soviet state. Anti-Soviet views attracted a 
narrow group of inhabitants, particularly in the western oblasts. They were most 
popular amongst the clergy and the faithful of the underground Uniate church and 
former members of Ukrainian nationalist movements. There was probably some 
overlap between reformist patriots, anti-Soviet citizens and advocates of 
conservative patriotism, to the extent that any one individual could attend agitation 
meetings and voice illegal views in other contexts. Still, the Prague Spring and, to a 
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lesser extent, the Polish crisis evoked radically divergent reactions or attitudes in 
Soviet Ukraine.  
The chapter begins by analysing the ways in which Soviet apparatchiks exploited 
the mass media to shape popular attitudes towards Poland and Czechoslovakia. It 
then proceeds to examine the claims of conservative patriotism, tracing how citizens 
commented on Soviet portrayals of Eastern Europe during agitation meetings 
between March 1968 and April 1969. This is closely followed by an analysis of 
reformist patriotism and ideas forwarded for improving Soviet society. The chapter 
concludes by assessing the significance of anti-Soviet views in Ukraine.  
 
I. A Matter of Soviet Pride 
The Prague Spring was a mass media event in the USSR. Paradoxically, however, 
even though the authorities shifted political discussion away from informational 
gatherings, they were unsure whether the mass media provided an effective means to 
control popular opinion. Consequently, as the official rhetoric underwent a process 
of „progressive normalisation‟,18 public recitation of Soviet slogans about the Prague 
Spring and silent participation in the ritualised agitation meetings became important 
means of „staging consent‟ and manifesting a sense of Soviet pride. 
The growth of mass media and the attempts to embed it into the agitational 
functions of the „propaganda state‟ raised the spectre of the national in the Soviet 
context. In 1968 and 1969, mass media portrayals of Czechoslovakia reinforced the 
idea that residents should refrain from commenting on foreign affairs, to the extent 
that they did not affect them as „Soviet people‟. This emphasis on „passivity‟ can 
partly be attributed to the specific cultural practices associated with the new media: 
as Kristin Roth-Ey points out, because of its location in the home, television 
facilitated „the transformation of an active Soviet person into a passive and childlike 
viewer‟.19 During the Czechoslovak crisis, silent acceptance of the media message 
acquired a special significance. Particularly in the first few months of 1968, the 
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Soviet media was ambiguous about the permissible limits of national sovereignty 
which Czechoslovakia would be allowed to enjoy in the socialist camp.
20
 Even as it 
became increasingly obvious that Dubcek was departing from the Soviet model, and 
both the central and republican press began to depict the reform communists as 
„revisionists‟,21 the Soviet media continued to present Czechoslovak officials as 
sovereign leaders and, as late as 18 July, renounced military invasion as a possible 
solution to the crisis.
22
 Newspapers even offered a platform for Czechoslovak 
journalists, academics, and politicians to defend their right to pursue their own 
„national‟ path of reform,23 thus presenting the crisis as Prague‟s domestic problem. 
Despite the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia on 21 August, which the 
official TASS announcement justified by stating that „further exacerbation of the 
situation in Czechoslovakia affects the vital interests of the Soviet Union and the 
other socialist countries‟, emphasis on the importance of national sovereignty within 
the socialist bloc did not disappear from official Soviet rhetoric.
24
 Between August 
1968 and early 1969, newspapers repeatedly emphasised that „most of the working 
people‟ of Czechoslovakia tried to „normalise the situation in the country‟, though 
their efforts were frustrated by „counterrevolutionary forces‟.25 The Soviet media 
                                                          
20
 In January, central newspapers applauded the election of Dubcek as first secretary, and at the end of 
March Izvestiia continued to emphasise that „relations between our two countries are developing on a 
mutually advantageous basis‟. CDSP 20:1, 24 January 1968: „Plenary Session of the Czechoslovak 
Communist Party Central Committee‟, Pravda, 6 January 1968, Izvestiia, 7 January 1968; CDSP 
20:13, 24 January 1968: M. Volgin, „The USSR and Czechoslovakia on an equal basis‟ by M. Volgin, 
Izvestiia, 29 March 1968. 
21
 B. Lewytzkyj, Politics and Society in Soviet Ukraine, 1953-1980 (Edmonton, 1984), 119. 
22
 The open letter of East European leaders to the Czechoslovak Party stated that „[t]he reactionaries' 
offensive, supported by imperialism‟ threatened not only the interests of socialism in Czechoslovakia, 
but also imperilled „the entire socialist system‟; at the same time, however, the letter assured that the 
Warsaw Pact states had „no intention of interfering in your internal affairs‟'. CDSP 20:29, 7 August 
1968: „To the Czechoslovak Communist Party Central Committee', Pravda and Izvestiia, 18 July 
1968. Similarly, the otherwise alarmist „statement of communist and workers‟ parties of socialist 
countries‟ published on 4 August emphasised that „each fraternal party takes into account national 
characteristics and conditions‟. CDSP 30:31, 21 August 1968:  „Statement of communist and workers' 
parties of socialist countries‟, Pravda and Izvestiia, 4 August 1968. 
23
 CDSP 20:26, 17 July 1968: Jan Prochazka, „To Comrades‟, Literaturnaia gazeta, 26 June 1968. 
24
 In fact, the TASS communiqué itself underlined that „party and state leaders of the Czechoslovak 
Socialist Republic‟ requested military „assistance‟ to defeat „forces hostile to socialism‟, and that the 
armies would be withdrawn as soon as possible. CDSP 20:34, 11 September 1968: „TASS 
announcement‟, Pravda and Izvestiia, 21 August 1968. 
25
 The death of Jan Palach, for example, was described as „political murder‟: newspapers claimed that 
„hostile elements‟ had managed to fool Palach into thinking that the fuel he had used would only 
produce a „cold flame‟ and that he would not die as a result. CDSP 20:35, 18 September 1968: 
„Situation in Czechoslovakia‟, Pravda, 30 August 1968; V. Sevriuk, „Rosy words and black deeds: 
what fate the Counter-revolutionaries were preparing for the Czechoslovak Working Intelligentsia‟, 
Izvestiia, 27 August 1968; CDSP 20:40, 23 October 1968:  V. Beketov, „In the countryside around 
146 
 
 
suggested that the Czechoslovak situation would be resolved on the home front, 
downplaying the importance of the Warsaw Pact invasion and further putting Soviet 
consumers of the media market in the position of passive observers.  
Paradoxically, however, while silence emerged as a model Soviet reaction to the 
foreign upheavals, the media also suggested that citizens had a duty to actively 
defend „Soviet values‟ against the outside threat. Official portrayals of 
Czechoslovakia brought to the fore the tension between national sovereignty and 
unity in the socialist camp. Even though the new media provided some room for the 
celebration of something resembling a Soviet „couch potato‟,26 in the tense 
atmosphere of 1968 top Soviet apparatchiks exerted more pressure on citizens to 
comment on the news which they obtained from the mass media and thus to become 
more critical and discerning audiences.
27
 This was especially because the CPSU 
Central Committee was alarmed by some spectacular blunders in the mass media 
coverage of Eastern Europe. They complained that editors at Soviet central television 
took no account of the current international situation when planning their broadcasts: 
on the 20
th
 of March, soon after the Polish students‟ strikes, they ill-advisedly 
showed The Mendicant Student, an operetta about the struggle of Polish students „for 
their rights‟ in 1704. This led officials to conclude that Soviet television focused too 
much on light entertainment instead of producing „educated‟ viewers.28  
Despite all the talk of „national sovereignty‟, the media increasingly suggested 
that the Prague Spring was in fact „Soviet business‟, encouraging citizens to 
condemn Czechoslovak reforms as dangerous distortions from the Soviet model of 
socialism, and to underline that they got involved in resolving the crisis. By June 
1968, newspapers wrote that Dubcek‟s reforms undermined economic progress in 
Eastern Europe as well as Czechoslovak respect for the USSR and its „great 
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achievements‟. They also claimed that Prague weakened the unity of the socialist 
camp.
29
  
A Soviet version of Slavophilism further acted to blur the boundary between 
national independence and East European unity. The media appealed to the 
audiences‟ Slavic loyalties to highlight that they needed to help to unite the Soviet 
bloc, as well as to fight dissenting views in the USSR itself. Describing the „defence 
of socialism‟ as „the highest international duty‟ on 22 August, for example, Pravda 
wrote about „the centuries old traditions of Slavic community‟.30 This echoed some 
of the statements published in the USSR in the aftermath of the Polish crisis earlier 
in the year, when Pravda and Radians’ka Ukraina printed Gomulka‟s speech about 
Polish-Soviet friendship, and the threat of „German imperialism‟, „Zionism‟ and 
„cosmopolitanism‟. The speech suggested that parents of many students of „Jewish 
extraction‟ who took part in the Polish unrest held „more or less responsible and high 
posts‟ in Poland, and yet were not committed to its national interests. Poles were not 
anti-Semitic, Literaturnaia gazeta qualified in early April 1968, but Bonn and Tel 
Aviv launched an anti-Polish and antisocialist propaganda campaign to discredit 
Gomulka.
31
 The implication was that ethnic Jews undermined the Polish position in 
the Warsaw Pact by allying their interests with Israel (and, bizarrely enough, West 
Germany), who in turn supported them and threatened Poland‟s security. By 
contrast, Polish „non-Jewish‟ patriots strove towards a socialist future and eternal 
friendship with the USSR. Thus, „socialist patriotism‟ was described in ethnically 
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exclusive, Slavic terms. Not only did this suggest that the Slavs in Eastern Europe 
built socialism in alliance with the USSR within their respective homelands, but it 
also had wide-reaching implications for Soviet nationalities policy at home. It built 
into the anti-Semitic rhetoric of the Soviet media, which identified enemies of the 
USSR with Jews in the aftermath of the 1967 Arab-Israeli conflict.
32
 
The media thus encouraged citizens to draw parallels between the situation in 
Czechoslovakia and the USSR, discerning between the „positive‟ and „harmful‟ 
forces in both countries. This was especially important in Ukraine, where Dubcek‟s 
reforms ultimately shaped high politics. With the rise of Ukrainian quasi-diplomacy 
in Czechoslovakia and the official rejection of Romanian territorial claims towards 
„Ukrainian‟ lands,33 Ukrainian national identity appeared to strengthen the Soviet 
state and its interests in Eastern Europe during the late 1960s. Shelest was very vocal 
in condemning developments in Czechoslovakia, thus seeking to demonstrate to 
Moscow that his limited endorsement of Ukrainian culture was different from 
Czechoslovak policies,
34
 despite – or perhaps because of – his genuine fear of a 
potential spill-over of the Prague Spring into Ukraine.
35
 Hence, even as members of 
the Ukrainian creative intelligentsia grew increasingly frustrated with cultural policy 
in Ukraine, citizens could still legitimately seek to defend Ukrainian national 
interests in the USSR.
36
 Meanwhile, however, developments in Czechoslovakia 
helped to discredit Shelest‟s relatively liberal national policy. Volodymyr 
Shcherbyts‟kyi had no scruples about subordinating the republic‟s interests to those 
of the Soviet state. As such, he was seen as more reliable by the Kremlin and his 
position in the CPU was strengthened during 1968.
37
 Interestingly, his evaluation of 
political stability in Czechoslovakia was much less alarmist than that of Shelest, and 
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he was less supportive of military intervention.
38
 Grey Hodnett and Peter Potichnyj 
have partly attributed this apparent paradox to economic considerations,
39
 but it is 
also conceivable that Shcherbyts‟kyi was less threatened by the unfolding 
developments than his CPU rival. Because Dubcek‟s „national road towards 
socialism‟ cast doubts on the extent to which ethno-national interests were 
compatible with existing Soviet-style regimes, the Czechoslovak crisis posed a 
potential challenge to Shelest‟s alliance with the Ukrainian cultural intelligentsia. By 
contrast, like Brezhnev, who initially took a more tolerant position toward Alexander 
Dubcek‟s liberalisation than Shelest, Gomulka or Ulbricht,40 Shcherbyts‟kyi‟s 
political vision combined loyalty to Soviet institutions in return for political stability, 
social benefits, and economic growth. 
In line with the ambiguous status of Ukrainian cultural autonomy, the Soviet 
media variously defined residents of the republic as Soviet and „Ukrainian‟ people 
vis-à-vis the troublesome foreigners in Eastern Europe. For example, when 
Literaturna Ukraina printed an interview with the Czech scholar Vaclav Zidlicky on 
19 April 1968, it wrote about both Ukrainian-Czechoslovak and Soviet-
Czechoslovak international cooperation. Zidlicky discussed „days of Ukrainian 
culture‟ and the broader question of relations between Ukraine and Czechoslovakia, 
but he also identified the differences of approach towards the study of Ukraine which 
arose between Czech and Slovak scholars on the one hand, and their Soviet 
colleagues on the other.
41
 More prominently, however, portrayals of the Prague 
Spring acted as a warning against over-emphasising Ukrainian distinctiveness in the 
USSR. Indeed, the Soviet Ukrainian press drew explicit links between Czechoslovak 
and Ukrainian „bourgeois nationalism‟. As late as 28 October 1969, Radians’ka 
Ukraina cited a Czechoslovak communist official who labeled the enemies of 
socialism in Czechoslovakia as „our Mazepas‟ who unsuccessfully tried to 
„undermine our friendship with the Soviet Union‟.42 Through comparing anti-Soviet 
nationalists to an early 18
th
 century Cossack leader who opposed the Russian Tsar, 
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the article invoked the idea of a Russian-dominated Slavic community, suggesting 
that Ukrainian residents‟ loyalty to the Soviet Union was tantamount to a close 
Ukrainian-Russian political union. In particular, federalism in Czechoslovakia was 
hardly discussed in the Soviet Ukrainian press in 1968 and 1969, and it did not 
figure at all in public anti-Czechoslovak polemics. While Hodnett and Potichnyj 
claim that there may simply not have been much public interest in the issue,
43
 reports 
from agitation meetings show that residents of the republic asked about the 
relationship between Czechs and Slovaks over and over again.
44
 It seems more likely 
that the subject was too sensitive to raise publicly.
45
 With the Slovaks striving 
towards greater autonomy in Czechoslovakia, the authorities wanted to prevent 
inhabitants of Ukraine from questioning the position of their own republic in the 
USSR.  
These tensions underpinned the growing concerns of the authorities in Moscow 
and Kyiv about the exposure of Ukraine‟s population to both the Western radio 
broadcasts and the Czechoslovak, Polish, Hungarian, and Romanian mass media. 
Even as far east as Sumy the obkom officials complained that the local population 
relied on „foreign, hostile‟ broadcasts to find out about current affairs, adding that 
the local press, television and radio should report on recent events before the news 
reached people from abroad in a distorted form.
46
 According to Soviet officials, the 
foreign media encouraged the rise of anti-Soviet opinions and Ukrainian national 
identities defined in non-Soviet terms. On numerous occasions, Petro Shelest 
complained to Brezhnev about the fact that inhabitants of the western oblasts 
received information directly from their neighbours across the border, and tuned in 
to both Czechoslovak and Western radio and television, including the Ukrainian-
language broadcasts produced by the Ukrainian minority in Presov in eastern 
Slovakia.
47
 Indeed, Czechoslovak radio (available throughout the republic) and 
television (whose broadcasts were easily picked up in the western oblasts) tried to 
convince their allies of the legitimacy of Dubcek‟s reforms before August 1968, 
adopting a more aggressive and openly confrontational discourse in the months to 
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follow.
48
 Even though, the „socialist‟ Czechoslovak media could not be labeled 
counter-revolutionary, particularly before the invasion, some of the ideas propagated 
therein would have been considered revisionist in the Soviet context.
49
 By the end of 
July, for example, Ukrainian-language publications posted to the republic from 
Czechoslovakia included Druzhno vpered and Duklia, which had printed Vaculik‟s 
„2000 words‟ and commented extensively on the unfolding events.50 Moreover, 
Czechoslovak media reported on the revival of the Greek Catholic Church in eastern 
Slovakia, „a true red flag for the Soviets‟, and questioned the need for collective 
farming.
51
 Throughout 1968, the Presov newspapers also contained more direct 
references to the situation in Soviet Ukraine, printing letters from Soviet citizens 
who protested against the suppression of Ukrainian culture in the USSR and the 
invasion of Czechoslovakia, publishing an interview with Ivan Dziuba, and giving 
voice to the views of a Kyivan Ukrainian who wrote about the deaths of Ukrainian 
writers in Soviet concentration camps and the loss of ten million lives in the famine 
of 1932-33.
52
 Thus, the Czechoslovak media that was reaching Ukraine‟s residents 
raised the issue of Ukrainian national rights defined in opposition to the Soviet state.  
Because residents of the western oblasts came into contact with these 
„revisionist‟ views more often than other Soviet citizens, the authorities were 
particularly active in combating such influences, and inhabitants often had to go the 
extra length to prove their Soviet patriotic credentials. In the Chernivtsi oblast, for 
example, the authorities condemned the influence of the „ideologically hostile‟ 
Romanian media, which sympathised with Dubcek and condemned Soviet policy in 
Czechoslovakia. According to obkom apparatchiks, this exacerbated national 
conflicts in the region and had a „detrimental effect‟ on Soviet citizens of Romanian 
origin. Consequently, they conducted „individual work‟ with local residents: in order 
to encourage them to publicly manifest their commitment to the Soviet media and its 
message, obkom leaders needed to undermine the isolating and private nature of 
watching television.
53
 In the village of Gorbivs‟k, for example, where there were 
seventy television sets, twenty five families had watched Romanian television in the 
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first half of August. However, after „clarification work‟ was conducted by local 
communist officials, fifteen out of them turned their antennas onto Chernivtsi.
54
 By 
choosing the Soviet media, the villagers displayed their loyalty to the Soviet state 
and its policy to the whole community. Still, tactics adopted by the obkom officials 
here could not assure that the public at large would follow the fifteen families in 
Gorbivs‟k, reflecting the generally ambivalent and somewhat amateurish approach of 
the political elites towards television.
55
 
Indeed, Party leaders found it difficult to make Soviet broadcasts appealing in 
western Ukraine, largely because the standard of Soviet programming did not 
compare well with the East European media. In February 1968, the propaganda and 
agitation department of the CPU Central Committee warned that the Uzhgorod 
television studio (the construction of which was already delayed by two years) 
produced a few trial broadcasts of poor quality, and still failed to come up with 
regular transmissions. The programmes were „long-winded and pompous‟, as a result 
of which inhabitants of the Zakarpattia lowlands tuned in to Czechoslovak, 
Hungarian, and Romanian television.
56
 The need to improve the quality of Soviet 
programmes in western Ukraine fuelled tensions between Petro Shelest in Kyiv, who 
was increasingly frustrated that foreign media affected „moods‟ in the region, and 
state and party officials in Moscow, who did not seem to appreciate the need to 
popularise Soviet broadcasts instead. On 1 July, for example, the CPU first secretary 
alerted his superiors to the fact that broadcasting stations in Chernivtsi, Odesa and 
Zakarpattia oblasts did not assure good quality reception for Soviet programmes, 
which increased the popularity of foreign broadcasts.
57
 However, just over a month 
later, the propaganda department of the CPSU Central Committee concluded that 
„international agreements‟ did not allow for the building of more powerful television 
broadcasting stations in those regions.
58
 Similarly, after party leaders in Kyiv asked 
the propaganda department in Moscow to decrease the amount of Czechoslovak 
publications in Ukraine in May, they were informed that the issue would be 
considered at a later date, after the Czechoslovak Communist Party Central 
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Committee plenum.
59
 Their request fell on deaf ears, or in any case it was never fully 
satisfied. Over two months after the CPU compiled their report, on 30 July 1968, the 
Czechoslovak press was still easily accessible in Ukraine by subscription and in 
Soiuzpechat’ outlets.60 
Because the authorities were concerned that the influence of the Soviet mass 
media was limited, particularly in the western oblasts, they put pressure on citizens 
to actively manifest their „Soviet pride‟. As a result, despite losing their previous 
functions, the ritualised agitation gatherings provided an important setting for 
„staging consent‟. Mass agitation meetings occurred in several waves over 1968. The 
first took place at collective farms, factories and other institutions between 22 March 
and 27 March, where participants expressed support for Gomulka‟s „decisive 
actions‟ in the aftermath of the student strikes in Poland.61 Agitation work was 
particularly intensive in the L‟viv oblast, where one hundred lecturers addressed 
party members and non-party members alike, paying special attention to the creative 
intelligentsia, university students, as well as reserve army officers, educating the last 
in particular about the „patriotic education of youth‟ with the aid of the political 
department of the Prikarpattia military district.
62
 Another wave of mass agitation 
meetings about Czechoslovakia, geared towards party members and non-members 
alike, took place between June and August 1968.
63
 Most of them were organised in 
the first few days after the Warsaw Pact intervention, and reports concerning 
workers‟ reactions to the TASS announcement about the invasion started to flood 
into Kyiv on 21 and 22 August.
64
 In the mining town of Chervonohrad alone, the 
L‟viv obkom organised over 3000 discussions and „political information meetings‟ 
in the aftermath of the invasion on 21 August, where participants were expected to 
„express support‟ for Soviet foreign policy.65 During this period, party officials were 
keen to underline that the meetings attracted non-party members. For example, a 
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raikom apparatchik from the Odesa oblast wrote that out of the 500 people who 
spoke during public meetings about the invasion, 70% did not belong to the Party.
66
  
The meetings were very formulaic,
67
 and, in a stark contrast to 1956, numerous 
reports claimed that the local authorities registered „no undesirable opinions‟ during 
their conduct,
68
 though they did offer an opportunity for workers to ask questions.
69
 
In practice lecturers were unlikely to provide participants with any more information 
than they could gather from the Soviet media, for the agitators‟ role was often 
limited to reading the TASS announcement and other press materials concerning the 
Czechoslovak situation.
70
 Nevertheless, through the very act of organising large 
agitation meetings, the authorities showed that they expected all residents of Ukraine 
to prove their loyalty to the Soviet state and their support for Moscow‟s foreign 
policy. The press publicised examples of the good behaviour of citizens who 
attended mass meetings devoted to the crisis, claiming that workers‟ gatherings have 
been „unanimously approving and warmly supporting the actions of the Soviet 
government and governments of other socialist countries in providing emergency aid 
to the workers of the CSSR‟.71 Between 21 and 31 August, Vilna Ukraina printed 24 
articles about the support of workers‟ collectives and individual readers for the „aid‟ 
given to Czechoslovakia.
72
 The meetings were ritualistic, with attendance itself 
constituting a public manifestation of the „correct‟ Soviet stance, and active 
involvement distinguishing the most reliable citizens from the mass of participants. 
In late June, when the Party organised „meetings of solidarity‟ with the 
Czechoslovak people in response to the pro-Soviet letter of the Czechoslovak 
Militia, 791,747 workers (trudiashchiesia) participated, but only 9,415 actually 
spoke.
73
 Moreover, party apparatchiks now gave the workers an opportunity to 
„display initiative‟ in proving their loyalty to the Soviet state: after meetings at 
factories, a report from Dnipropetrovs‟k claimed, many workers suggested 
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organising „demonstrations of support‟ for the Soviet defence of Czechoslovakia‟s 
socialist achievements.
74
 Hence, during the summer of 1968, and particularly in the 
last ten days of August, residents of Ukraine had a forum where they could speak 
about their pride in Soviet achievements in Eastern Europe. 
 
Party activists and the Soviet middle class, including members and candidate 
members of raikoms, gorkoms, the obkoms, the CPU Central Committee, the CPSU 
Central Committee, as well as revision commissions, had more opportunities to 
voice publicly their „correct‟ views about Czechoslovakia than other members of 
society, thus proving their patriotic credentials and claiming a special elite status for 
themselves. Indeed, even at the ostensibly open gatherings during the summer, it was 
they who predominated. The order in which participants spoke at the meetings was 
likewise telling: during a gathering of an Odesa weavers‟ collective on 21 August, 
two senior managers spoke first, only then followed by two women from the shop 
floor.
75
 Similarly, a report from L‟viv specified that a head of a collective farm made 
a moving speech during a „workers‟ meeting‟.76 Some reports explicitly ascribed the 
workers‟ „correct‟ opinions to the efficient work of the local apparatchiks, 
mentioning specific collective farms and enterprises, as well as the heads of primary 
party organisations who conducted effective agitation work.
77
 In effect, they invoked 
the managerial middle class composed of the most important and reliable citizens. 
Furthermore, between March and June 1968, and then again between September 
1968 and April 1969, non-party members and rank-and-file communists were largely 
excluded from public discussion about Eastern Europe, and closed party meetings 
continued to be organised throughout the summer.
78
 During the whole of May 1968, 
closed party meetings were conducted in all 2,297 primary party organisations of 
Ukraine, and they were attended by 59,814 communists, out of whom 5,849 made a 
public contribution.
79
 From September 1968 to April 1969, the news from 
Czechoslovakia was again discussed during closed party meeting, with „party 
activists‟ expressing outrage at Dubcek‟s indecisiveness, the continuing anti-Soviet 
and „anti-socialist‟ attacks in the Czechoslovak media, and finally expressing relief 
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at the election of Husak as the new first secretary of the Communist Party of 
Czechoslovakia.
80
 Through participating and speaking at closed party meetings, a 
very narrow group of party activists portrayed themselves as the most reliable 
„patriots‟, or active citizens who defended the USSR in the face of the escalating 
crisis in Czechoslovakia. 
The authorities in Kyiv hoped that the Soviet press, radio, and television would 
encourage residents of the republic to distance themselves from the unreliable 
„foreigners‟ in Czechoslovakia and silently support Soviet policy in the region. At 
the same time, they struggled to define a clear Soviet point of view about the Prague 
Spring, failed to restrict access to foreign sources of information, and remained 
unsure about the effectiveness of the mass media in shaping popular opinion. 
Consequently, silent participation in the formulaic agitation meetings emerged as a 
crucial context where citizens distanced themselves from the „foreign‟ unrest and 
identified with a Russian-led Slavic and Soviet community. Moreover, for most of 
the period between March 1968 and April 1969, the opportunity to speak in public 
was confined to party activists and the Soviet middle class, with non-party members 
encouraged to prove their commitment to Soviet goals and values during the 
meetings only for a short period during the summer. This increased the 
„performative‟ dimension of the gatherings: active participation was a marker of 
status, leading to a sharper articulation of social differences than at the height of the 
Polish and Hungarian events in 1956. At the same time, outside the narrow context 
of agitation meetings, debates about the Prague Spring did retain a strong 
„constative‟, as opposed to „performative‟, dimension: this is to say that language 
was used to refer to the world and to state facts about it, as people still voiced 
different opinions about Dubcek‟s reforms and their potential application in the 
USSR, with popular reactions polarised along the axis of conservative and reformist 
patriotism.
81
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II. Conservative Patriotism 
Conservative patriotism was even more widespread in 1968 than it had been 
twelve years earlier. It provided a format for expressing support for the principles 
which governed Moscow‟s policy in Eastern Europe and allowed residents to „stage 
consent‟ during the agitation meetings. Just as in 1956, it was a double-edged sword, 
as citizens who manifested their support for repressive policies in Czechoslovakia 
also felt emboldened to criticise the Soviet mass media and Brezhnev‟s performance 
in foreign affairs. However, conservative patriotism was now less challenging to the 
state, with fear of war and Stalin nostalgia considerably weaker than during the 
Hungarian crisis. Proponents of conservative patriotism increasingly focused on 
identifying „enemies‟ amongst non-party members rather than criticising party 
apparatchiks. Meanwhile, conservative patriotism also acquired strongly paternalistic 
undertones, because it allowed party activists and other members of the middle class 
to act as steadfast patriots who protected the silent „masses‟ from foreign and 
domestic reactionary forces. 
In articulating ideas of conservative patriotism in 1968, citizens condemned 
Czechoslovak reforms and called for the preservation of Soviet-style socialism in 
Eastern Europe. Their statements were underpinned by the assumption that all 
leaders in the socialist camp should maintain a common outlook on reform. Invoking 
„Marxist-Leninist principles‟, some citizens spoke of the need to maintain the „unity‟ 
of the socialist camp and to combat „anti-communist‟ ideologies,82 and others 
enquired why the Czechoslovak leadership remained „divided‟.83 In line with this, 
many participants in public gatherings explicitly condemned Czechoslovak 
departures from the Soviet model. They often spoke about the dangers of Prague‟s 
new media policy, arguing that „hostile‟ elements were allowed to publicise their 
ideas in the mass media.
84
 They also voiced outrage at the fact that some members of 
the Czechoslovak intellgentsia „alienated themselves‟ from the working class.85 Most 
prominently, participants in public gatherings expressed suspicion about the idea of 
„national independence‟ from the USSR, ascribing it to bourgeois influences and 
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Western imperialism. „Independence from what and from whom?‟ – exclaimed a 
participant of a public meeting in Donets‟k – perhaps the Romanian media which 
claimed to defend Czechoslovak sovereignty referred to independence from 
„scientific communism and Marxism-Leninism‟, he charged.86 Well into 1969, when 
the CPC leadership in Prague was brought under control, active participants in public 
meetings continued to talk about „imperialist‟ attempts to sow distrust between 
Prague and Moscow. In the Donets‟k oblast, even as a miner brigade leader rejoiced 
that „imperialist attempts to tear Czechoslovakia out of the socialist community had 
now completely failed‟, he talked about the continuing threat of „rightist‟ and 
„imperialist‟ forces.87  
Conservative patriotism further held that reform resulted in economic 
difficulties. Numerous citizens enquired about short supplies in Poland and 
Czechoslovakia,
88
 in the apparent belief that the crises were caused by the failure of 
Warsaw and Prague to assure a decent standard of living for their citizens. They also 
suggested that Dubcek‟s policies only aggravated the situation further. In May 1968, 
an engineer from Mukachevo stated that his father had died in Czechoslovakia 
fighting for „a life without the rich‟ for the Czechoslovak people. Now his 
achievements were being undermined, he despaired, because the Czechoslovak Party 
was in no hurry to build socialism, and some of its members were even „anti-
communist‟.89 Two months later, а pensioner from the Sumy oblast claimed that 
Dubcek‟s democracy would mirror Masaryk‟s and Benes‟s „bourgeois republic‟, 
with the „working class‟ condemned to „hunger, unemployment, executions, and 
imprisonment‟. It was necessary to increase „revolutionary alertness‟ (pylnist’), he 
concluded.
90
 In this way, with the elite dominating public discussions about 
Czechoslovakia, the link between conservative patriotism and economic populism, 
so evident in 1956, was now broken. From the new conservative perspective, 
economic complaints resulted from ideological dissent and as such they were 
inherently „non-Soviet‟. Members of the middle class suggested that the Soviet 
Union was superior to Eastern European satellites because it had successfully 
eliminated „capitalist‟ and „bourgeois‟ influences.  
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Public criticism of Czechoslovak policy had important implications for the 
making of social identities in Soviet Ukraine. Because the agitation gatherings were 
geared towards reliable citizens, most participants who actually spoke focused their 
energies on correcting the „mistaken‟ and „hostile‟ opinions in their immediate 
surroundings, particularly outside the privileged circle of party activists. They 
denounced those individuals who spoke favourably about Dubcek‟s reforms, and 
thus failed to subscribe to Soviet „socialist‟ ideology. In late August, for example, 
taxi drivers from Luhans‟k held a special meeting to discuss a colleague who had 
spoken to his passengers about the high standard of living abroad and the 
„occupation‟ of Czechoslovakia. They very aggressively branded him ungrateful and 
ignorant, said that they could not „bear even to look at him‟, but finally allowed him 
to remain a member of the collective after his wordy apology.
91
 Similarly, „war 
veterans, veterans of labour, and leading workers‟ condemned a non-party miner 
born in Czechoslovakia: in sympathising with the Prague Spring, they claimed, he 
betrayed „workers‟ honour‟. KGB officials believed that his case had attracted much 
attention in Luhans‟k, with many local citizens claiming that it would act as a 
warning for other „demagogues‟.92 In order to claim the status of „conservative 
patriots‟ for themselves, citizens also named and shamed those residents of Ukraine 
who questioned the legitimacy of the Soviet economic system. For example, the 
obkom authorities in Poltava illustrated the success of their agitation work by citing 
the example of a non-party collective farmer who had complained that all of Eastern 
Europe „feeds off us‟, but then „understood his mistake‟ after the deputy head of a 
local soviet visited the kolkhoz to explain the intricacies of „internationalist help‟.93 
Instances like this allowed party apparatchiks to demonstrate that they were 
instrumental in maintaining the „correct‟ ideological stance amongst the population 
of Ukraine.  
The making of internal enemies was a crucial part of the social hierarchies 
which emerged via ritualised politics and which helped to reconcile the elitist claims 
of party activists and professionals with the rising ambitions of „ordinary‟ Soviet 
citizens. This was possible because party activists invoked the rhetoric of East Slavic 
unity during agitation gatherings, thus implicitly extending the definition of 
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conservative patriotism to most people in the audience. Blaming national conflicts 
between Czechs and Slovaks for the escalation of the crisis across the border,
94
 they 
suggested that national diversity was a destabilising influence in socialist regimes. In 
line with this, they contrasted reliable citizens with „bourgeois nationalists‟ at 
home.
95
 In fact, Soviet dissidents who advocated Ukrainian national rights felt 
alienated from the majority of Ukraine‟s population. They were outraged that 
students and teachers at Kyiv State University laughed at the ironic remarks made (in 
Ukrainian) by the deputy head of the Ukrainian KGB in March 1969 as he talked 
about attempts to defend Ukrainian culture against Russification.
96
 Members of the 
audience did not have to speak to show that they belonged to the East Slavic 
community conjured up by the party apparatchiks, but merely laughed at the right 
moments. 
More frequently, participation in the meetings was a way for citizens to claim 
membership in the „non-Jewish‟ Soviet community. Admittedly, top apparatchiks 
condemned some openly anti-Semitic statements. When an unnamed individual from 
Minsk wrote a letter to Pravda, claiming that „political diversion conducted by 
people of Jewish origin‟ threatened the national (natsional’nye) interests of our 
country and the building of communism, the chief editor branded him an anti-
Semite.
97
 The official censure of anti-Semitism may partly be explained by 
Brezhnev‟s growing suspicion of Russian nationalism and the „Russian party‟ which 
had previously challenged his authority in the Politburo, and still preserved influence 
in journals such as Molodaia gvardiia and Ogonek.
98
 During the second half of the 
1960s, party apparatchiks became suspicious of what Nikolai Mitrokhin calls the 
„red patriots‟ who articulated a sense of Stalin nostalgia and began to join forces with 
young „anti-communist‟ Russian nationalists, adopting some of their anti-Semitic 
views.
99
 However, it appears that residents of Ukraine who attended meetings about 
the East European crises did listen to many speeches which singled out the Jews as a 
potentially unstable group in East European societies, especially in the aftermath of 
the Polish events. As Amir Weiner points out, „Jews seemed to antagonise the party 
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and the KGB, especially in western Ukraine‟: the „visible role of several Jewish 
figures in the Prague Spring‟, demands for restoring relations with Israel, and the 
Polish anti-Semitic events „fuelled the anti-Jewish campaign already under way 
inside the Soviet Union‟.100 In fact, it appears that some residents responded to such 
portrayals, asking many questions concerning the role of Jews in the Polish 
disturbances during agitation gatherings.
101
 The meaning and implications of 
Gomulka‟s speech were unclear, but the Soviet press coverage of the Polish crisis 
allowed party activists who addressed audiences in Ukraine to legitimately single out 
„Zionists‟ (or simply Jews) as a special and potentially disruptive group.  
Some members of ethnic minorities made an explicit effort to defend themselves 
against popular suspicions of disloyalty. In early April, a sewing factory worker by 
the name of Zaltsman tried to distance himself from „Zionism‟, as he stated that 
Gomulka sounded so convinced about the Zionist plot that „it must be true‟, and 
concluded that „the Jews must decide whose side they are on‟. For his part, a local 
rabbi went so far as to deny that the problem of anti-Semitism existed at all, claiming 
that Gomulka‟s speech was not anti-Semitic, because it emphasised that most Jews 
were loyal to the Polish state. Consequently, he claimed, the speech cannot inspire 
anti-Semitic feeling here in the USSR, and „we, the Jews‟, have nothing to fear.102 
Similarly, some Soviet citizens of Polish and Czech origin highlighted their 
alienation from their rebellious external homelands, seeking thereby to downplay the 
importance of ethnicity in the Polish and Czechoslovak crises.
103
 Nonetheless, 
debates surrounding the events in Eastern Europe affected the discourse of ethno-
cultural identities in the republic. They strengthened proponents of the thesis that 
Soviet state and party institutions should represent a unified ethno-cultural 
community. As Geoffrey Hosking argues, both the Hungarian revolt of 1956 and the 
Czechoslovak events twelve years later discredited the idea of world socialism, 
encouraging Moscow leaders to turn towards Great Russian patriotism to legitimise 
their power.
104
 Consequently, most inhabitants of Ukraine could claim to be reliable 
Soviet citizens by simply participating in the agitation meetings, because 
conservative patriotism was defined in sweeping national terms and party activists 
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suggested that „undesirable‟ reactions to the Prague Spring were an anomaly 
confined to social outcasts. At the same time, conservative patriotism was elitist and 
exclusivist, articulated as it was by members of the middle class who barred ethnic 
minorities from the East Slavic, Soviet community. 
The peculiar combination of its elitist claims with the nationalising, nearly all-
embracing appeal turned conservative patriotism into a powerful commentary on the 
Soviet media and the empire. Through underlining their loyalty to the Soviet media 
and its message, the outspoken and self-styled members of the middle class 
demanded more information from official Soviet channels and implicitly criticised 
policy by explicitly denouncing Czechoslovak radio and television. In early May, 
obkom secretaries in Donets‟k and L‟viv underlined that party members were 
outraged that Czechoslovak journalists expressed „anti-Soviet views‟.105 Attacks on 
the Czechoslovak media intensified during July and August, and even though non-
party citizens participated in public meetings at this time, it was mostly party 
apparatchiks who commented on the foreign broadcasts. For instance, in July 1968, 
party members in the Ivano-Frankivs‟k oblast condemned the „liberal attitude‟ of the 
Czechoslovak leadership.
106
 It was only in the immediate aftermath of the Warsaw 
Pact invasion that non-party members expressed their outrage at the „reactionary‟ 
mass media in Czechoslovakia.
107
  Whilst the CPU leaders in Kyiv deemed the mass 
media an inadequate means of controlling popular opinion in the republic, concerned 
as they were by the influence of foreign broadcasts, it was through explicit 
condemnation of the „unorthodox‟ or „counterrevolutionary‟ East European media 
that citizens proved their loyalty to the Soviet state. At the same time, inhabitants 
who sought to underline their indignation at the foreign broadcasts talked about the 
Soviet media as a more ideologically sound institution. Referring to the Pravda 
article which stated that Mlada Fronta Dnes published anti-communist and anti-
Soviet materials, a shoe factory worker and member of the Ivano-Frankivs‟k gorkom 
called on Prague to fight against the „hostile elements‟ in Czechoslovakia. He 
claimed to speak in the name of „the thousands of workers‟ of the west Ukrainian 
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region.
108
 The CPU Central Committee underlined that communists in other parts of 
the republic echoed Pravda‟s condemnation of Mlada Fronta Dnes, too.109 
As loyal consumers of the Soviet information market, citizens refused to be taken 
for fools. In contrasting Soviet media to foreign broadcasts, many residents of 
Ukraine emphasised that they had the right to obtain reliable news through their own 
„national‟ channels. In late April, a Pravda reader from L‟viv stated that the „Soviet 
narod‟ were not idiots and they understood that their authorities did not trust them 
with all the available information, even though people could obtain it from foreign 
radio stations anyway. His comments were echoed by a man from Kyiv, who stated 
that „regular communists‟ were concerned by the course of events, and enquired 
whether Pravda editors considered their readers unworthy of „the truth‟.110 These 
letters were not anonymous, and many of their authors considered themselves to be 
loyal citizens and Party members, who had the right to understand how Soviet 
people and communists should relate to the foreign crises. As avid readers of Soviet 
newspapers, many inhabitants of Ukraine likewise picked up on inconsistencies and 
shortages of information. Obkom reports sent to Kyiv at the end of August revealed 
that residents wanted the local party members to expand on the information which 
had already been made available. For example, when debating the news of invasion, 
residents of the Ivano-Frankivs'k oblast wanted obkom lecturers to name the leaders 
in Prague who asked for military assistance.
111
 Thus, some citizens focused their 
criticism of the Soviet media on the need to establish a clearer narrative about the 
events in Eastern Europe, thus both affirming and reinforcing their status as the 
Soviet middle class: they emphasised the „national‟ dimension of conservative 
patriotism by speaking in the name of the Soviet people, all the while invoking a 
paternalist rhetoric by claiming that Soviet officials had a duty to guide popular 
opinion. Ever since the publication of Gomulka‟s speech, which clearly blamed the 
„Zionists‟ for student unrest in Poland, some citizens demanded that a similarly clear 
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statement should be produced with regards to Czechoslovakia.
112
 They claimed that 
incomplete information about the situation in Czechoslovakia was conducive to the 
appearance of numerous rumours.
113
   
Furthermore, conservative patriotism was underpinned by imperial sentiments, 
which inspired many citizens to express support for the military intervention in 
Czechoslovakia, but also fuelled some criticism of Brezhnev‟s foreign policy. 
Throughout 1968 and 1969, many inhabitants of Ukraine underlined that the USSR 
would not allow its satellites to depart from the Soviet model. Citizens highlighted 
their status as „conservative patriots‟ by showing that they were not afraid to fight 
against the creeping „counterrevolution‟ in the satellite states. In early May, the 
L‟viv obkom reported that most residents of the oblast „understood the need for 
military mobilisation‟.114 Similarly, immediately after 21 August, participants of 
public meetings in the Crimea stated that they were „ready to take part in the defence 
of Czechoslovakia‟.115 The military intervention awoke a form of Soviet national 
fervour in Ukraine, with many expressing passionate support for the army. In 
Chernivtsi alone, 100,000 people, more than half the local population, attended 
cinema screenings of the film Counterrevolution shall not pass (Kontrrevoliutsiia ne 
proidet) and other documentaries devoted to Czechoslovakia. According to official 
reports, they often applauded the heroic acts of the Soviet army and reacted very 
vocally to images of „counterrevolutionary sabotage‟ aimed at „our soldiers‟.116 
When they talked about the „eternal bond‟ between the USSR and its satellites, some 
citizens actually defined Sovietness in a national framework, especially when they 
recalled the „liberation‟ of Eastern Europe during the Great Patriotic War. For 
instance, after the student unrest in Poland, a Pravda reader from Dnipropetrovs‟k 
wrote to the editors, describing his outrage at the abuse of „the great Polish patriot, 
Mickiewicz‟. As „a Soviet person‟, he was shocked that the poet‟s work was 
misinterpreted to inspire „anti-Soviet feelings‟ in Poland and sow hatred between our 
narody, who had fought arm in arm during the Great Patriotic War. Similarly, a letter 
sent from Kharkiv asserted that Poland must stay within the Soviet camp, recalling 
the brotherhood of Soviet and Polish communists in the face of a common Nazi 
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enemy.
117
 Both men aligned themselves with the generation of veterans and thus 
identified with a Soviet narod, more advanced along the path towards communism 
and distinguished in the struggle against the Nazis, but also open to attacks from 
socially backward foreigners whom they were trying to help. Through contrasting 
the Soviet narod with a separate Polish nation, with its own peculiar form of 
patriotism and anti-Soviet national prejudice, they equated the Soviet narod with 
another national community. In that sense, they construed it as a „nation‟ in its own 
right. 
These claims about Soviet superiority in the socialist bloc further reinforced the 
selective nature of conservative patriotism. To prove their commitment to the 
defence of Soviet „national‟ interests in Eastern Europe, some citizens explicitly 
renounced defeatist attitudes. Most prominently, soldiers condemned their colleagues 
who spoke out against the invasion. On 28 August, the political department of the 
Kyiv military district wrote about a group of officers who listened to a Soviet radio 
programme about the brotherly help shown to Czechoslovakia in 1945. One of them 
commented that, unlike the Great Patriotic War, nobody asked the USSR for 
assistance now and yet „we‟ still marched in. His comment provoked lively protests 
among other officers present in the room, and he was later required to report to the 
commander of his unit. He explained that the comment was an ignorant joke.
118
 Not 
only did the man seek to reinstate his „conservative patriotic‟ credentials by 
repudiating his earlier statements, but his case also offered an opportunity for other 
officers to prove that they remained committed to the Soviet cause. Furthermore, 
citizens demonstrated „courage‟ in the face of the impending war, denouncing panic 
and fear as „non-Soviet‟ reactions. Like in 1956, most citizens who were afraid that 
the events would escalate into a full-blown military conflict came from the western 
oblasts. Some residents of Zakarpattia bought up great quantities of „soap, salt, and 
matches‟, whilst others prepared to leave the region and escape further east.119 
However, even though numerous citizens feared the outbreak of a third world war, 
reports suggesting that the population resorted to panic buying were now 
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considerably fewer.
120
 Shelest claimed that most inhabitants of the republic were 
confident that „our government‟ would not allow the situation to escalate into a full-
blown military conflict.
121
 Thus, through remaining calm, many residents distanced 
themselves from the allegedly unstable individuals who spread panic in the USSR. 
As proponents of conservative patriotism identified with a strong and influential 
Soviet Union, they judged Brezhnev by the effectiveness of his policies in Eastern 
Europe. Before the invasion, a non-party worker from Uzhgorod compared the 
Czechoslovak events to Hungary in 1956 and called for an end to „chaos‟,122 and, 
according to KGB reports, many soldiers claimed that it was necessary to take the 
armies into Czechoslovakia.
123
 When expressing support for the idea of intervention, 
some proponents of conservative patriotism displayed a very deep, perhaps even 
cynical understanding of the mechanics of Soviet „imperial‟ policies in the region: as 
early as May, a 48-year old teacher from Zakarpattia argued that it was now 
necessary to install a new leadership in Prague, which could then request Soviet 
military assistance.
124
 Even after 21 August a small number of individuals believed 
that the USSR should adopt a still stricter policy in Eastern Europe, asking why the 
army did not invade Romania, too.
125
 Party officials who organised agitation 
meetings in the immediate aftermath of the invasion were growing increasingly 
frustrated that security services failed to deal with the „counterrevolution‟ in 
Czechoslovakia, and complained that their indoctrination work was constantly 
compromised by the Romanian media.
126
 They may well have been concerned that 
foreign broadcasts would encourage citizens to condemn the Warsaw Pact invasion, 
but it also seems that they perceived the continuation of anti-Soviet programming as 
a factor which discredited the Soviet state as a powerful player in East European 
affairs in the eyes of its own citizens. For instance, collective farmers in Zakarpattia 
displayed „great interest‟ in the recent developments in Czechoslovakia, asking how 
it was possible that the press, radio and television were still controlled by 
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counterrevolutionaries.
127
 Likewise, during agitation meetings in Zaporizhzhia, 
members of the audience asked about the USSR‟s failure to locate and destroy the 
underground radio stations in Czechoslovakia with all the advanced technology at its 
disposal.
128
 Just as the foreign broadcasts grew increasingly radical and explicitly 
anti-Soviet, citizens measured the success of Soviet policy in Eastern Europe by 
Moscow‟s ability to curb the rebellious „socialist‟ mass media. Unlike in 1956, 
however, when residents explicitly blamed Khrushchev‟s Secret Speech for the 
outbreak of violence in Hungary, they now refrained from direct attacks on 
Brezhnev‟s leadership, often dressing up their comments as questions about the 
reasons why the Soviet leaders pursued a certain policy. The non-party engineer 
from Mykolaiv who ascribed the Prague Spring to Moscow‟s excessive critique of 
Stalin‟s cult of personality would have fitted in to the wider group of „conservative 
patriots‟ in 1956,129 but he was now no more than an interesting oddity.  
 Conservative patriotism was a common response to the Polish and Czechoslovak 
crises in Ukraine between early 1968 and 1969. Because party activists had the most 
opportunities to prove their „correct‟ stance vis-à-vis the unfolding developments, 
they were the most well-established „conservative patriots‟. At the same time, 
somewhat paradoxically, the elites who defined the ideas of conservative patriotism 
during public discussions extended the concept to the bulk of Ukraine‟s inhabitants 
by framing it in very broad terms. They contrasted the stable majority who attended 
agitation meetings with members of ethnic minorities and Ukrainian „bourgeois 
nationalists‟. Therefore, conservative patriotism emerged as a means of social 
stratification in Ukraine, allowing party activists and other members of the middle 
class to present themselves as a paternalistic national elite. With the established 
reputation of „reliable Soviet people‟, perhaps even a Soviet nation, they posed some 
challenges to Brezhnev‟s leadership. They criticised the effectiveness of Moscow‟s 
foreign policy and demanded that the Soviet media provide a better access to 
information. However, in contrast to 1956, adherents of conservative patriotism 
voiced few economic complaints and focused not on criticising the Party and the 
state, but rather unmasking the unreliable individuals, particularly Jews and non-
party members, against whom they could establish their own patriotic credentials. In 
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this sense, through differentiating between different groups of citizens, organising 
closed agitation meetings about the threat of capitalism and imperialism, and 
invoking the rhetoric of East Slavic unity, CPSU leaders redirected the critical power 
of conservative patriotism away from themselves. 
 
III.  Reformist patriotism 
Freedom, equality, democracy – this is how a prisoner from the Donets‟k oblast 
described the Prague Spring in a poem he wrote during 1968. The Czechs „voted for 
democrats‟, he suggested, even though they were materially better off than Soviet 
citizens. His appeal to the „peoples of Russia‟ illustrates another trend in Soviet 
reactions to the Czechoslovak events when a small but very vocal group of Soviet 
citizens began to criticise the Soviet state for its betrayal of „socialist ideals‟.130 
Referring to the plural „peoples‟ of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe when they 
demanded a more tolerant nationalities policy in the USSR, they criticised the 
Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia and called for „openness‟ and a „spiritual 
renewal‟ of Soviet society. This was a generation that built on the ideas of the 
reformist patriots who had supported Gomulka‟s policies in 1956, and, starting in the 
mid-1960s, began to insist that many features of Stalinism in the USSR had not been 
eliminated, urging „popular vigilance and protest‟ should the authorities fail to make 
a fundamental break with the past.
131
 Now, with Moscow‟s crackdown on Dubcek‟s 
„reform socialism‟ and the increasing determination to root out dissent at home,132 
their ideas were decidedly pushed outside the boundaries of acceptable Soviet 
discourse. Whilst seeking to reform and improve the Soviet system, the reformist 
patriots of 1968 mostly expressed their ideas in private conversations and 
underground publications, risking prison sentences for „anti-Soviet agitation‟, as well 
as exclusion from the Party, creative unions, universities, or jobs.
133
 They were 
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aware that the authorities condemned their views and, despite divergent interests and 
concerns, they often emphasised the need to protect freedom of speech from an 
increasingly repressive state: in that sense, in contrast to 1956, they formed a 
relatively coherent group of „reformist patriots‟. 
Mark Kramer argues that members of the creative intelligentsia and university 
students were especially prone to voice support for Czechoslovak reforms and to call 
for the implementation of similar policies in the USSR. If KGB reports are to be 
trusted, he writes, the majority of university students in cities such as Odesa 
sympathised with Dubcek‟s ideas.134 Volodymyr Dmytruk further points out that 
some workers and soldiers voiced support for the Prague Spring.
135
 Nevertheless, the 
extent to which the ideas of „reform socialism‟ permeated the Ukrainian society was 
very limited. If we understand reformist patriotism as a critical and reformist frame 
of mind adopted by citizens who expressed their faith in Soviet and „socialist‟ 
values, it was weak even amongst university students. Even the authorities were 
convinced that students‟ complaints against the invasion of Czechoslovakia were 
more an expression of youth rebellion that did not automatically translate into a 
principled effort to change Soviet foreign policy or to copy Czechoslovak reforms in 
the USSR itself. Some KGB reports claimed that students found the very word 
„opposition‟ appealing,136 which suggested that their controversial views about the 
Prague Spring did not have a strong ideological or principled basis. At least in the 
authorities‟ view, young people were not particularly predisposed to support 
Dubcek‟s „liberal‟ ideas. Iurii Andropov‟s report about Soviet university students, 
transmitted after the invasion of Czechoslovakia but completed sometime before 
then, thus highlighted youth‟s alienation from official ideology and their receptivity 
to Western culture, but also pointed towards the „resentment that most students felt 
toward the Soviet Union's "fraternal" allies‟.137 This may go some way towards 
explaining why the Party adopted a conciliatory attitude towards young people in the 
aftermath of the crisis, seeing potential to reintegrate even the more rebellious 
individuals into the Soviet mould. As Amir Weiner points out, after a major purge of 
the Komsomol, the organisation was given a bigger role to play at educational 
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institutions, where it encouraged officials to follow the example of one rector from 
L‟viv who engaged students in discussions on any topic, including Ukrainian 
nationalism.
138
 In sum, students‟ reformist patriotism seemed to be ill-defined and, 
as such, it was partly neutralised by including some of their concerns into formal 
debates organised by the Komsomol.
139
 Thus, Party and Komsomol apparatchiks 
weakened reformist patriotism as an ideology aimed at reforming the Soviet system. 
Although they may have spoken out of frustration with the Soviet state and its 
officials, even a spirit of rebellion, many citizens who outwardly sympathised with 
the Prague Spring did not articulate any reformist ideas, and the Soviet officials did 
not treat them as ideological adversaries. 
What distinguishes many proponents of reformist patriotism from these 
rebellious individuals is that they did articulate several clear ideas about the need to 
reform the Soviet system in the name of „socialist‟ values, in the process developing 
a group consciousness based on the awareness that their activities were illegal. 
Firstly, they suggested that the official Soviet media did not provide reliable 
information about the Prague Spring and more generally. Through publishing 
statements by Soviet intellectuals and translations of Czechoslovak documents, 
Soviet samizdat shed its predominantly literary character and turned into an illegal 
source of news about the unfolding events at home and abroad during 1968.
140
 A 
year later, in an attempt to evaluate the Czechoslovak events, many samizdat 
materials continued to emphasise that „freedom of expression‟ was the only 
guarantee of democracy and economic progress in the Soviet bloc.
141
 Secondly, 
underground publications attacked the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia as 
an expression of „imperialism‟.142 Whereas a month before the invasion „a group of 
honest communists‟ was still convinced that the USSR would not risk discrediting 
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itself „by invading a brotherly country‟,143 numerous samizdat publications at the end 
of August talked about the violation of „Czechoslovak sovereignty‟, underlining that 
„Soviet people‟ did not want to be seen as „occupants‟ in the eyes of the outside 
world.
144
 Thirdly, as the anti-imperialist rhetoric of samizdat was underpinned by a 
sense of Soviet pride, many underground publications appealed to „Soviet people‟ to 
oppose Brezhnev‟s repressive actions both at home and abroad. Like Valentin 
Komarov‟s open letter about the occupation of Czechoslovakia from September 
1968, they warned „all citizens‟ that silence had already once allowed for the rise of 
Stalinism. Not only writers and artists, Komarov specified, but also students, 
workers, and collective farmers should now get involved in the peaceful campaign to 
defend the Soviet constitution, civil rights, and freedom of speech and assembly.
145
 
Thus, reformist patriots emphasised that Soviet citizens had a social and political 
responsibility to criticise the CPSU and to demand that Moscow shape both foreign 
and domestic policy on the basis of Soviet law. Finally, in the years to come, 
samizdat continued to refer to the Prague Spring in an attempt to specify the „true‟ 
values embedded in the Soviet legal system. As self-proclaimed „communists‟,146 
many samizdat authors underlined their commitment to Dubcek‟s „reform 
socialism‟. They reprinted the Czechoslovak Communist Party reform programme 
from 5 April 1968, which specified that the law should clearly outline the functions 
of all state and party organisations, whilst guaranteeing „real freedom‟ of speech, 
gathering, and organisation.
147
 Likewise, they published translations of Czech 
translations of Leszek Kolakowski‟s theses about „what socialism was not‟, 
criticising Soviet-style regimes for imposing their will on the people instead of 
consulting citizens about the policies they introduced.
148
 In other words, through 
commenting on the Prague Spring, reformist patriots suggested that Soviet citizens 
should be active in condemning Moscow‟s repressive policies at home and abroad in 
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order to regenerate Soviet society through creating more representative institutions 
and increasing freedom of expression. 
Most of the underground publications that outlined these ideas originated outside 
Ukraine.
149
 While it is very difficult to trace how samizdat affected popular opinion, 
Party and KGB reports suggested that some individuals in the republic shared the 
beliefs of reformist patriots in other parts of the USSR. For example, a fourth year 
student from L‟viv state university despaired that students in western Ukraine were 
less active than in Moscow, as she added that „something had to happen‟ here, too.150 
Through sending anonymous letters and spreading illegal pamphlets, dozens of 
inhabitants of the republic demonstrated an „active stance‟ in the aftermath of the 
invasion. By 12 September, the KGB in Ukraine had registered twenty-three cases of 
citizens spreading anti-Soviet pamphlets about the invasion of Czechoslovakia, as 
well as ten examples of graffiti criticising Soviet foreign policy.
151
 „Dear comrade, if 
you are a patriot of your country, make and distribute a few copies of this leaflet‟ – 
read the back of one anti-invasion pamphlet found in Odesa in late August.
152
 
Whether its authors read the all-Soviet „reformist patriotic‟ samizdat is not known, 
but they represented the same commitment to „active citizenship‟. The pamphlets 
and graffiti were mostly handwritten and amateurish, like the huge Russian-language 
slogans „hands off Czechoslovakia‟ drawn with charcoal on the kolkhoz market in 
Novovolyns‟k. Still, despite consistent efforts, the KGB did not often manage to 
identify their authors.
153
 
 Most reformist patriots in Ukraine criticised the invasion of Czechoslovakia. In 
the first two and a half weeks after the invasion, the KGB had registered 303 
statements critical of the military intervention, as well as 209 cases where citizens 
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referred to the events as an „occupation‟.154 In attacking the military measures, some 
citizens claimed that Moscow violated „Soviet values‟, which they defined in several 
different ways. Many of them were rather vague when they articulated their support 
for „reform socialism‟, claiming that the USSR did not represent „the type of 
socialism for which I stood‟.155 The Soviet Union should learn how to build 
„socialism‟ from the Czechs – read the four leaflets discovered in Chernihiv on 24 
August – as the struggle in Czechoslovakia was not a fight between communism and 
capitalism, but rather a battle between new and old ideas within socialism.
156
  
At the same time, some other inhabitants of Ukraine were a little more specific 
about the reasons why they condemned the Soviet suppression of Dubcek‟s reforms. 
For one, a large proportion of reformist patriots believed that the military 
intervention would weaken communist parties around the world and blur the division 
between socialist countries and the capitalist West. Their opinions were illegal not 
necessarily because they publicised them in underground publications, but rather 
because the KGB considered such views to be incriminating when expressed at all, 
suggesting perhaps that some of them were not aware that their opinions were 
deemed „harmful‟. Official reports quoted dozens of individuals who despaired that 
the intervention would weaken the communist movement in the whole world.
157
 At 
the same time, it appears that some citizens consciously opposed the official media 
line, all the while invoking ideals propagated in the official rhetoric and complaining 
about the violation of the principle of non-interference. They suggested that the 
Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia weakened the USSR‟s reputation as the 
leader of world socialism. They claimed that Soviet foreign policy would alienate the 
working class in capitalist countries, weaken liberation movements in the Third 
World, and encourage the socialist countries of Eastern Europe to leave „us‟.158 In a 
similar vein, independently of each other, a Jewish doctor from Luhans‟k and a 
student actor from Kyiv despaired that Soviet policies were now no different from 
US actions in Vietnam.
159
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Furthermore, many reformist patriots referred to the Prague Spring to argue that 
Soviet-style systems had to become more representative and fair. Not only did Soviet 
aggression in Czechoslovakia undermine socialism around the world, they 
suggested, but it also weakened „socialist‟ institutions at home and led to the 
militarisation of Soviet society. For instance, local authorities in Chernivtsi found 
many leaflets spread at the university campus, as well as some stairwells around 
town, which claimed that the Komsomol had turned from a youth organisation into 
an instrument of state control, whose role was now limited to dressing children in 
uniform and teaching them military discipline.
160
 The state‟s insensitivity to the 
citizens‟ needs aggravated the population‟s living standards, some reformist patriots 
suggested: „we have built socialism ... and yet living becomes more and more 
difficult‟, despaired an inhabitant of Odesa oblast. A few citizens came up with 
suggestions about how to make the Soviet system more „democratic‟ and equal. In 
Odesa, for example, a lecturer of political economics applauded the Czechs and 
Slovaks for trying to create a multi-party system and free trade unions.
161
 At times, 
complaints against the lack of political representation in the USSR took on the form 
of very concrete attacks against the local bureaucracy and even top CPSU 
apparatchiks. In Uzhgorod, the authorities wrote about a lawyer of Jewish 
background who claimed that party members, inspired by the example of 
Czechoslovakia, would dismiss local factory managers.
162
 The tone of complaints 
against corrupt officials was especially sharp after 21 August. As the anonymous 
residents of Zhdanov in the Donets‟k oblast put it in a letter sent to a Moscow 
newspaper, the „Soviet narod‟ condemned the „bandit‟ invasion of Czechoslovakia. 
The letter ended with a series of griping slogans: „long live freedom of speech and 
press‟, „down with red fascism‟, „down with Brezhnev, long live Kosygin‟.163 Some 
residents went so far as to call for the state to dissolve collective farms and „to give 
land to peasants‟, thus altering the relationship between ordinary farmers and 
representatives of the state. While the authorities characterised similar opinions as 
anti-Soviet, their proponents tried to claim that they would help to restore „Leninist 
principles‟ in the USSR: for instance, a pharmacy accountant from Zakarpattia stated 
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that the USSR would soon follow Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, because things 
should not „stay the way Stalin made them‟.164 
Soviet citizens who called for a more representative system in the USSR linked 
the problem to their ability to access information. Disbelief in the official coverage 
of Czechoslovakia was widespread,
165
 which sometimes encouraged reformist 
patriots to advocate reforming the entire media system. For example, leaflets 
distributed around several stairwells in Chernivtsi accused the Soviet media of 
„lying‟ about Czechoslovakia and concluded that „the cancellation of censorship was 
the most important precondition for democratising the political system of our 
country‟.166 Occasionally, displays of distrust in the official media took on a very 
public form: a resident of a village in the Odesa oblast demonstratively put a radio in 
his window, and played the Voice of America on full volume for all his neighbours 
to hear.
167
 While this was probably an expression of frustration with the authorities, 
it differed from other instances of what the officials called „hooliganism‟. The man‟s 
actions seemed more considered and meaningful than some drunken „anti-Soviet‟ 
outbursts cited in KGB reports, suggesting perhaps that he considered Western radio 
broadcasts to be worthy of public attention, or at least that he perceived access to 
information as a controversial issue which soured relations between the state and 
citizens. Similarly, on 22 August, a student from Uzhgorod who condemned the 
Warsaw Pact invasion decided to express his views by sending a letter to Prague 
radio. At the very height of the crisis, he manifested his faith in the Czechoslovak 
media as a reliable channel through which he could voice his concerns, implying that 
the Soviet media did not represent his interests. The authorities believed that this was 
a very incriminating act: on 23 March 1969, the court in Uzhgorod sentenced the 24 
year old to three years in a hard labour colony.
168
 While many Soviet citizens were 
eager to access Czechoslovak mass media,
169
 and they complained about the quality 
of the Soviet press, radio, and television, it was only in isolated cases that this led 
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them to engage in illegal activities and to demand that the entire Soviet system 
should be made more transparent.  It is not surprising, considering the harsh 
punishments which the state was ready to dispense in return. 
The Prague Spring also encouraged reformist patriots to discuss the national 
question. On the most basic level, some individuals distributed copies of the 
Ukrainian language journals from Czechoslovakia, which discussed national issues. 
In May, for example, the Ivano-Frankivs‟k obkom discovered that an inhabitant of 
Kolomyia received seventy-two copies of Nove zhyttia by post.
170
 Еven though he 
distributed a magazine which could not yet be labelled anti-Soviet, he aroused 
suspicion of the local authorities. This is probably because they associated the 
journal with the samvydav rhetoric of many Ukrainian dissidents. As Dina 
Zisserman-Brodsky demonstrates, throughout the latter half of the 1960s, „ethnic 
minority samizdat championed “genuine socialism” and “the restoration of Lenin's 
norms”‟ as a guarantee of greater national autonomy for republics in the USSR.171 In 
line with this, during the Prague Spring and in its aftermath, some authors who 
published in the samizdat sought to defend „Ukrainian rights‟, but also underlined 
their commitment to the Soviet Union and its official ideology. They thus articulated 
a Ukrainian version of „reformist Soviet patriotism‟. For example, an anonymous 
member of the Ukrainian writers‟ union addressed a letter to Oles‟ Honchar and 
secretaries of the union.
172
 The letter complained that, despite the fact that Soviet 
publications were available in Czechoslovakia, it was virtually impossible to buy 
Ukrainian literature across the border; equally, Soviet citizens found it difficult to 
obtain literature published by Ukrainians living in the satellite states. The author 
suggested that the Soviet authorities were prejudiced against Ukrainian culture, 
creating „artificial bureaucratic barriers‟ which halted its development.173 Even 
though he was critical of Soviet nationalities policy, he still appealed to an official 
Soviet institution, the writers‟ union, to rectify the problem. This was representative 
of wider tendencies in the Ukrainian samvydav. Before Shcherbyts‟kyi‟s crackdown 
on dissent in the republic in 1972, dissidents often linked the question of national 
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rights to the Prague Spring: they acted as „Ukrainians‟ who defended their national 
culture, and „Soviet citizens‟ who criticised the repressive policy of their state. Many 
members of the „national and democratic movement‟, as Khronika tekushchikh 
sobytii described them, were officially tried for speaking out against the Warsaw 
Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia and publishing illegal materials about it.
174
 It seems 
likely, although it is difficult to prove, that the Czechoslovak events affected some of 
their tactics, too. For instance, in the aftermath of Ukrainian student demonstrations 
which followed the death of Jan Palach in January 1969,
175
 a 45 year old teacher 
from Berdians‟k and a father of three, who had been a prisoner of the Stalinist 
Gulag, put out banners protesting Russification in Ukraine and tried to set himself 
alight in front of Kyiv State University.
176
 Reformist patriots portrayed the invasion 
of Czechoslovakia as proof of re-Stalinisation in the USSR, but they still believed 
that a more representative, „democratic‟, and transparent Soviet system would permit 
for the free development of Ukrainian culture. Nonetheless, they were getting 
increasingly desperate in the face of Moscow‟s repressive policies.   
The KGB‟s failures to identify the authors of illegal publications and anonymous 
letters, as well as their generic descriptions of the individuals who voiced „hostile 
views‟, make it difficult to determine who the reformist patriots were. According to 
the KGB statistics, most citizens who expressed „critical‟ views at the height of the 
Czechoslovak crisis were white collar workers, followed by blue collar workers, 
collective farmers, and students. More strikingly, the great majority of KGB reports 
concerned non-party members.
177
 Both before and after 21 August, reports suggested 
that anti-war sentiments spread amongst soldiers stationed in Ukraine, as a few 
privates and officers were reported to have claimed that the USSR should not 
interfere in Czechoslovak „domestic affairs‟.178 Soon after the invasion, the army 
command in Kyiv wrote about an officer who admitted to listening to foreign radio 
stations, and told his colleagues that four army generals and two members of the 
Moscow Central Committee condemned Soviet policies in Czechoslovakia.
179
 It is 
conceivable that soldiers were more predisposed to criticise the invasion, as they 
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were most directly affected by it, afraid perhaps of war and confrontation. In letters 
to their relatives back in Ukraine, soldiers often described their isolation and difficult 
living conditions. One soldier went so far as to write of „putting a bullet through his 
head‟,180 and another wrote to his fiancée stating that there was a 99% chance he 
would not come back alive.
181
 Moreover, according to the CPU Central Committee, 
the army was exposed to „hostile‟ opinions. Soviet soldiers stationed in 
Czechoslovakia were reportedly shocked by the anti-Soviet propaganda in the 
country and the „bourgeois lifestyle‟ of the Czechoslovak youth.182 In their letters 
home, soldiers often included „nationalist‟ and anti-Soviet pamphlets spread in 
Czechoslovakia – in late October, the KGB registered between ten and fifteen such 
instances every day.
183
 However, it is difficult to determine whether this reflected 
any allegiance to the cause of reformist patriotism in the army, or merely showed 
that soldiers took an interest in the Prague Spring. This is especially true because the 
seemingly disproportionate number of reports concerning the military may simply 
reflect special concern about moods in the army around this time.  
Moreover, numerous reports specified the ethnic background of the individuals 
who expressed illegal views, especially when they were Jewish, even though the 
opinions in question did not often concern ethnic or religious issues.
184
 Rather than 
anything else, this shows that KGB officers and party apparatchiks implied that there 
was a link between Jewishness and „anti-Soviet views‟, reflecting perhaps their own 
anti-Semitic prejudice. It is conceivable, of course, that residents of Jewish origin 
were more outspoken reformist patriots than other Soviet citizens. Allegedly, some 
of them linked the Czechoslovak crisis to Soviet relations with Israel, a particularly 
thorny issue in the aftermath of the Six Days War,
185
 as well as commenting on the 
publication of Gomulka‟s speech in the Soviet press. During the late 1960s more 
citizens of Jewish origin became vociferous in demanding a right to emigrate to 
Israel.
186 
Whereas in the 1950s Jewish protest was still quite limited, by the 1960s 
the CPU Central Committee propaganda and agitation department compiled reports 
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about problems caused not only by „separate individuals‟, but „a certain part of the 
Jewish population of the republic‟.187 Therefore, it is not surprising that some 
residents of Jewish origin praised Warsaw‟s decision to allow the Jews to emigrate, 
claiming that the „swine‟ in the Soviet leadership would never agree to that.188 
However, it is striking that most Jewish residents were outraged by the rise of anti-
Semitism in Eastern Europe and wanted the authorities to reinstate a more tolerant 
nationalities policy in Soviet-style regimes. For instance, on 1
 
April 1968, the chief 
of the KGB in Odesa claimed that the majority of the local population had welcomed 
Gomulka‟s speech. Writing to the obkom, he contrasted this „majority‟ with isolated 
individuals who voiced „negative and hostile‟ views after the speech was published. 
Most of the „problematic‟ individuals, the report underlined, were Jews who were 
outraged that the Soviet press published a blatantly anti-Semitic speech.
189
 A few 
months later, in a one-to-one conversation with an undercover KGB agent, a 68-year 
old party member compared the „fascist-leaning‟ Polish and Soviet leadership to 
Tsar Nicholas who used the Jews as a scapegoat for the failure of his policies.
190
 
These individuals underlined their Jewish identity, but also acted as Soviet citizens 
who criticised the performance of „their‟ mass media and the failure of Soviet 
leaders to depart from pre-revolutionary anti-Semitism. As the media increasingly 
identified Sovietness in ethnically exclusive, non-Jewish terms from 1967 onwards, 
citizens of Jewish origin who commented on Soviet policies and demanded that the 
state should represent their rights turned almost by default into reformist patriots. At 
the very least, they were perceived as unreliable by the KGB and party officials in 
Soviet Ukraine.  
In sum, it is very difficult to define the roots of support for reformist patriotism, 
which may well have spread amongst various social groups in Soviet Ukraine. 
Whilst reform-minded patriots in 1956 had various attitudes towards the state, 
ranging from explicit support for Khrushchev‟s new course to protest and dissent, 
reformist patriots in 1968 harboured unambiguously negative feelings towards 
Brezhnev‟s leadership, especially after the military intervention in August. 
Disappointed as they were with the Soviet state‟s apparent reluctance to reform, they 
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did not hope to pursue the interests of any particular social group, but rather focused 
on the need to force the leaders to become more responsive to reformist demands in 
the first place. Consequently, in contrast to the citizens who had openly spoken 
during public meetings in 1956 in the name of their student collectives, writers‟ 
unions, or workers‟ brigades, reformist patriots were now operating clandestinely 
and in the name of the „Soviet people‟, often identifying themselves by such 
pseudonyms as „voice of the narod‟ or „revolutionary worker‟.191  
Whereas Amir Weiner identifies certain groups which were more prone to 
express support for Dubcek‟s reforms than others, including residents of the western 
oblasts, the Jewish minority, and university students,
192
 it seems that reformist 
patriotism as such was not defined by any geographical, ethnic, or social criteria. The 
extent to which university students sympathised with Dubcek‟s policies was limited, 
and while citizens of Jewish origin may have been more willing to criticise Soviet-
style regimes during 1968 than other residents of Ukraine, the official reports 
probably overemphasised the link between illegal views and Jewishness. In fact, 
reformist patriots represented a whole spectrum of interests, defending Ukrainian 
national rights, condemning anti-Semitism, calling for the „liberalisation‟ of the 
Soviet media, and invoking socialist ideas to criticise Soviet repression at home and 
„imperialist‟ foreign policy. Faced with an increasingly „militarised‟ and „imperial‟ 
state, they claimed that the only way to reform the Soviet system was to introduce 
freedom of speech and more representative political institutions. Thus, reformist 
patriots from various social and national backgrounds shared common goals and 
values, to the extent that they faced the same obstacles when they called for 
reforming the Soviet system. Soviet reformist patriotism of 1968 was more openly 
challenging to the state than the reformist patriotism of 1956: neither representatives 
of the state nor the proponents of reformist patriotism had many doubts that they 
were now in opposition to the CPSU leadership. 
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IV. The other side of illegal: Prague Spring and anti-Soviet views 
Some forms of illegal protest were more radically anti-Soviet and as such they 
do not fit the category of reformist patriotism. They did not represent more than a 
small minority of all the illegal statements which the authorities identified in 
underground publications or private conversations, but they do show that some 
citizens did not believe that change could be achieved within the Soviet system. The 
most prominent amongst anti-Soviet citizens were Ukrainian nationalists who 
embraced the cause of independence and concentrated mostly, although not 
exclusively, in western Ukraine. However, the term „nationalist‟ does not accurately 
reflect the range of anti-Soviet opinions in the republic. Whilst commenting on the 
Prague Spring, inhabitants of Ukraine employed a nationalist rhetoric to call for a 
radical restructuring of the economic system, to appeal for religious toleration, or 
simply to express anger and frustration with the Soviet bureaucracy.   
Anti-Soviet opinions represented an explicit renunciation of the Soviet system 
and its institutions. Consequently, not all cases where citizens attacked the Soviet 
state and its institutions should be classified as anti-Soviet. On 23 August, for 
example, the KGB wrote that an unemployed 45 year-old dental hygienist, 
„previously sentenced for mild hooliganism‟, began to shout out slogans „against the 
Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia‟ after he was stopped by the militia for 
„disrupting social order‟.193 Similarly, another report informed Party leaders about a 
worker from Melitopol‟ who, upon being arrested for „hooliganism‟ in the city park 
one August evening, turned towards a group of youth standing nearby and 
encouraged them to „sort [the militia officers] out Czechoslovak style‟.194 Both 
documents suggested that the men‟s drunken outbursts were spontaneous, although it 
is difficult to determine whether the officials were accurate and sincere in ascribing 
them to the „hooligans‟‟ momentary frustration with militia officers. It is, however, 
conceivable that the scope of media coverage surrounding the Prague Spring and the 
Warsaw Pact invasion turned Czechoslovakia into a symbol of „anti-establishment‟ 
attitudes, meaning that positive references to Dubcek‟s reforms did not necessarily 
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reflect support for altering the system, but rather anger with state officials.
195
 This 
influenced the rhetoric of some citizens who threatened to kill communists „if the 
situation in the country becomes more complicated‟.196 
In other more radical cases, it seems likely that acts of „hooliganism‟ reflected a 
broader dissatisfaction with the Soviet order. Between 1967 and 1969, the KGB 
informed Shelest about eighty-eight incidents where citizens damaged state insignia, 
portraits of CPSU officials, and political posters, thus apparently expressing their 
„oppositional‟ stance.197 Although not necessarily inspired by the Prague Spring in 
the first instance, these anti-Soviet citizens were certainly fuelled on by 
developments in Czechoslovakia. When a twenty-three year-old non-party man from 
Uzhgorod was found producing daggers at his work station in the immediate 
aftermath of the Warsaw Pact invasion, he explained that he was planning to use 
them to stab communists „like they did in Czechoslovakia‟.198 His behaviour may 
well have represented a frustration with the economic situation in Soviet Ukraine, 
but it is also conceivable that he saw the Prague Spring as the beginning of an anti-
Soviet war. Some citizens did make plans to resist the Soviet army. For instance, on 
25 September, the Kirovohrad KGB intercepted a letter to the Czechoslovak 
embassy in Moscow, which contained advice on how to fight against the Soviet 
army in Czechoslovakia. They managed to identify the author who soon faced trial: 
he turned out to be a Russian non-party lecturer from the local pedagogical 
institute.
199
 Unfortunately, it is not clear what his motives were or how he justified 
his actions, but his letter could not be more anti-Soviet – it basically amounted to 
treason. 
Official reports about „anti-state‟ outbursts did not concentrate in regions which 
the authorities normally associated with „nationalism‟. They mostly came from 
Sumy, Cherkasy, Chernivtsi, Donets‟k, Luhans'k, Dnipropetrovs‟k, and Volhynia.200 
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Nonetheless, the KGB often equated anti-Soviet views with nationalist influences, 
even when the opinions they cited did not explicitly concern „national‟ questions. 
For instance, they wrote about a „nationalist‟ from Zaporizhzhia who was reported to 
have said that he hoped to see the day when „they will shoot communists down like 
dogs‟.201 Similarly, on 27 August, the L‟viv obkom secretary claimed that 
„nationalist‟ and anti-Soviet elements intensified their hostile activities in the oblast 
after the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia.
202
 No doubt, the link between 
„anti-Sovietness‟ and nationalism was largely constructed by the reports themselves, 
reflecting the officials‟ distrust of Ukrainian nationalism. At the same time, it seems 
that many anti-Soviet citizens employed a national rhetoric to show that they 
opposed the Party and state. For one, CPSU officials often branded their political 
adversaries in Ukraine as „bourgeois nationalists‟ and accused them of having 
cooperated with the Nazi occupiers during the Great Patriotic War.
203
 Thus, they 
inadvertently turned fascist and nationalist symbols into signs of opposition to the 
Soviet regime. For example, standing by a monument to the Soviet army in L‟viv, a 
local engineer claimed that „Ukrainians‟ should follow the Czech example and 
overthrow „communist oppression‟. He added that Soviet soldiers were „bandits‟, 
while „real heroes‟ were buried in the woods.204 In order to manifest his support for 
what he saw to be an anti-Soviet movement, the man rejected official portrayals of 
the Great Patriotic War as represented by the monument and recalled the „nationalist‟ 
heroes of the anti-Soviet underground.  Likewise, on 9 May, „a fascist symbol‟ was 
drawn on the building occupied by a village council in the L‟viv oblast.205 It is 
difficult to determine whether the person or persons had drawn a swastika or perhaps 
the Ukrainian tryzub, which the Soviet authorities also considered „fascist‟, but they 
certainly used an officially condemned symbol to manifest their alienation from the 
Soviet system.  
At the height of the Prague Spring, the national solution was the most 
immediately obvious alternative to Soviet socialism for those who rejected existing 
state structures (as opposed to seeking reform within them). For instance, the KGB 
quoted a Gulag returnee from Stryi who claimed that the only way to solve the 
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Czechoslovak problem was to grant „freedom and independence‟ to all narody in 
Eastern Europe, including Ukraine.
206
 Whereas he implied that it was the Soviet 
authorities who would ultimately grant national independence to Ukraine, other 
„nationalist‟ residents employed a more provocative and violent language, 
particularly before the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia. In a few towns and 
villages in western Ukraine, some locals promised to „hang the Muscovites‟ soon 
and claimed that it was now time „to stock up on rusks and join a different army‟.207 
Meanwhile, in the Sambir region of the L‟viv oblast, the KGB discovered that 
„nationalists‟ had gone so far as to build a bunker in the woods in preparation for the 
seemingly impending civil war.
208
 Even after the swift invasion, when opposition to 
Moscow‟s policy must have appeared more hopeless than before, the authorities 
suggested that some Ukrainian soldiers were reluctant to fight the „Russian‟ war, and 
a resident of L‟viv spread rumours to the effect that some Ukrainian conscripts were 
replaced with professional soldiers after they sang „nationalist songs‟.209 With the 
Prague Spring escalating out of control, some residents of Ukraine hoped that the 
„Ukrainians‟ would now have to confront their „Russian occupants‟. A „famous 
Ukrainian nationalist‟ and Gulag returnee from L‟viv predicted that the socialist 
camp was about to implode, arguing that East European countries would either 
pursue the Yugoslav and Czechoslovak path of reform or they would wage war 
against each other. The former solution, he stated, was undesirable from the 
Ukrainian national point of view, because it would weaken national antagonisms in 
the region and undermine support for the nationalist cause.
210
  
Inhabitants of Ukraine who voiced „nationalist‟ and anti-Russian opinions often 
linked them to economic complaints. Immediately after the invasion, an employee of 
a furniture factory in Chernivtsi stated that the „Moskali‟ prevented the people of 
Czechoslovakia from „living well‟,211 and a local resident claimed that the 
Ukrainians would be richer had it not been for fifty years of „Muscovite 
oppression‟.212 Cloaked in nationalist rhetoric, some material demands represented 
personal interest and ambition. For instance, a metal worker from L‟viv boasted that 
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he had identified a house belonging to a Russian man in order to occupy it during the 
coming war. However, the fact that he had already been under KGB observation 
before this incident may suggest that his „nationalism‟ was not merely an attempt to 
take advantage of the unstable situation in 1968, but rather more deep-rooted.
213
 As 
such, it may conceivably have underpinned his perceptions of the „Russian economic 
exploitation‟ of Ukraine which he then used to justify his plans for dividing the 
spoils. While the desire for personal enrichment may have existed within various 
„nationalist‟ opinions, these citizens who voiced them should not be seen as any less 
anti-Soviet. Like a resident of Drohobych, who, upon refusing to pay his Komsomol 
fees „for the Moskali‟, argued that Ukraine should follow the Polish and 
Czechoslovak example, they rejected Soviet and „Russian‟ institutions which they 
believed not to represent their material interests.
214
 In some cases, „nationalism‟ was 
very explicitly associated with pro-capitalist views. A woman employed at the bread 
factory in Uzhgorod stated that „the Russians take everything away‟. At the 
suggestion that it was still better to live under the Russians than the Germans, she 
retorted that the Germans would „give people their land‟.215 Likewise, a non-party 
manager at a sausage factory in Zakarpattia hoped that the region would now be 
returned to Czechoslovakia and private property would be reinstated: „I will be a 
large entrepreneur and I will show everyone what I am capable of‟.216  
Anti-Soviet Ukrainian nationalism was also closely associated with support for 
the Greek Catholic church which the authorities had de-legalised in the 1940s. 
Dmytruk shows that the legalisation of the church in Czechoslovakia during 1968 
emboldened the faithful in Ukraine to call for similar measures at home.
217
 They 
found the Czechoslovak example both inspiring and instructive. On hearing the 
TASS announcement about the military intervention in August, one cleric criticised 
the clandestine Ukrainian Greek Catholics for focusing too much on the elderly, 
pointing out that Uniates in Czechoslovakia were in a much stronger position for 
having attracted young people to church.
218
 At the same time, Uniate supporters had 
clear nationalist leanings and, according to official reports, they did not harbour 
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many illusions that they would be able to profess their faith in the Soviet state. The 
head of the Council for Religious Affairs of the USSR reported that priests and the 
faithful listened to the Vatican radio broadcasts, which encouraged them to support 
the cause of Ukrainian independence. Furthermore, the suppression of religious 
belief fuelled anti-Soviet and „nationalist‟ attitudes amongst the Greek Catholic 
sympathisers, because they associated religious intolerance with foreign occupation 
and, at times, the supposed Jewish domination of Ukraine. A cleric from L‟viv thus 
encouraged the faithful to listen to the Pope, rather that the „old Yid- the Patriarch of 
Moscow‟.219 The resentment felt against „Russian‟ atheism was not only 
characteristic of the underground Greek Catholic church, but spread to other 
religious citizens in the republic, as the following incident illustrates. In May 1968, a 
non-party worker from Zakarpattia complained that the USSR did not allow 
clergymen to ring church bells on the pretext that they made too much noise, all the 
while allowing military planes to disrupt local residents‟ peace. This was part of the 
reason why „they hate Russians everywhere‟, he suggested, adding that Soviet power 
in Czechoslovakia would be taken down with American aid.
220
 
Not all appeals for religious tolerance took on a Ukrainian nationalist form, of 
course. Some anti-Soviet residents who focused their energies on attacking the 
state‟s religious policy were more broadly „anti-communist‟ and they did not refer to 
the ethnic question. In late August, for example, the KGB wrote about an Orthodox 
priest from Kyiv who hoped that citizens in Ukraine would „oppose communist 
power, too‟.221 Likewise, an inhabitant of Volhynia, „previously sentenced for anti-
Soviet activity‟, claimed that „the communists are prepared to shoot just to stay in 
power‟, for which „God would punish them‟.222 The atheist state alienated those 
citizens who continued to possess religious feelings, including the handful of 
individuals who, during the mass mobilisation preceding the invasion of 
Czechoslovakia, refused to serve in the Soviet army on religious grounds.
223
 
However, though religion was a source of opposition to the Soviet state, most 
official reports identified „Ukrainian nationalism‟ as the major foundation for the rise 
of anti-Soviet feelings in the republic. 
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Whereas reformist patriots invoked „Soviet values‟ and called for democratising 
the USSR, anti-Soviet citizens had much more concrete hopes and expectations. In 
questioning the legitimacy of Soviet rule in Ukraine, they anticipated a war against 
the CPSU officials and the „Russians‟. Some individuals were even preparing to 
fight, hoping to achieve Ukrainian independence. Most „anti-Soviet citizens‟ were 
Ukrainian nationalists who hoped to obtain economic independence for their 
republic, take their vengeance on the detested „foreigners‟ whom they blamed for all 
the evils that befell the country, and rehabilitate religious belief and the Greek 
Catholic church in particular. They never appealed to large audiences in the republic. 
 
V. Conclusion 
Because developments in Czechoslovakia discredited Brezhnev‟s „developed 
socialism‟ as a reformist movement and challenged Moscow‟s leadership in Eastern 
Europe, the authorities expected inhabitants of Ukraine to condemn Dubcek‟s 
policies. They urged residents to condemn unreliable „foreigners‟ in the socialist 
camp and to reject foreign radio and television portrayals of the dramatic events, 
suggesting that people needed to „stage consent‟ during highly ritualised agitation 
meetings or face accusations of disloyalty.  
Agitation meetings devoted to the Prague Spring served two main functions. On 
the one hand, they acquired a new performative role which conjured up the image of 
a Soviet middle class whilst also elevating the silent „masses‟ to the status of reliable 
patriots. On the other hand, the gatherings retained an important constative 
dimension: in repeating formulaic slogans about the USSR‟s guiding role in the 
socialist camp, citizens did not only stage consent without reflecting upon the 
meaning of what they said, as Yurchak suggests, but also distanced themselves from 
„non-Soviet‟ narratives about socialism as propagated by dissidents and, more 
importantly, the Czechoslovak media.
224
 While it is very difficult to assess the extent 
to which Soviet citizens believed in the simplistic slogans concerning 
Czechoslovakia which resounded during agitation meetings, it seems that they did 
identify competing opinions about the way in which Soviet-style regimes should 
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develop, especially because they engaged in ritualised acts of naming domestic and 
foreign „heretics‟ who advanced conflicting interpretations of socialism and 
Sovietness. In the highly politicised atmosphere of 1968, residents who spoke in 
public had to distinguish between „correct‟ and „incorrect‟ views about 
Czechoslovakia, displaying thereby a degree of political erudition, which may partly 
explain why only a small number of citizens who attended the agitation meetings 
actually expressed their opinions. 
Debates about Czechoslovakia ruptured Soviet patriotism in Ukraine, as citizens 
rallied behind explicitly contradictory opinions about Moscow‟s policies at home 
and in Eastern Europe. Inhabitants reflected upon three main aspects of Sovietness: 
attitudes to foreign policy, the role of national identities under socialism, and the 
relationship between citizens and Soviet mass media.  
Unlike in 1956, when reformist patriotism was still underpinned by a sense of 
„imperial‟ responsibility for the „democratisation‟ of the Soviet bloc, reformist 
patriots now perceived Prague and not Moscow as the driving force behind 
„liberalisation‟. They therefore condemned the military crackdown as an expression 
of backward imperialism. Similarly, most citizens who articulated anti-Soviet views 
shared these anti-war sentiments,
225
 although, in condemning „Russian imperialism‟, 
a very small number of radicals in the west went so far as to support the idea of war 
against the Russian occupation of Ukraine. In contrast, in order to distance 
themselves from the „heretics‟ and to prove their loyalty to the Soviet state, 
advocates of conservative patriotism showed support for Moscow‟s foreign policy. 
Conservative patriotism was thus grounded in „imperial‟ sentiments, as participants 
in agitation meetings condemned Dubcek‟s departure from the Soviet model and 
suggested that the USSR was the leading „nation‟ of the socialist camp.  
Likewise, discussions surrounding the national question retained a strong 
constative dimension. Because the Soviet press suggested that ethnic diversity fueled 
conflict in the socialist camp, both party activists and non-party members articulated 
conservative patriotism by describing or silently listening to speeches which defined 
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the Soviet „nation‟ in ethnically exclusive, non-Jewish terms. Consequently, some 
Jewish citizens, motivated by the example of Poland, were now more vocal in 
appealing for the right to emigrate, but many others defended themselves against 
accusations of „disloyalty‟, often turning into reformist patriots who complained 
about the rise of anti-Semitism in the USSR. They did not reject the „legitimate‟ idea 
of a „Soviet people‟, perhaps even a „nation‟, but they did discard the notion that 
Sovietness was grounded in an East Slavic ethnic consciousness.  
Moreover, the East European crises had a particularly ambiguous influence on 
debates concerning the role of „Ukrainianness‟ in the USSR. Some reform-minded 
members of the creative intelligentsia who published in samizdat and spread illegal 
leaflets appealed to Soviet officials to reinstate a more „Leninist‟ nationalities policy, 
thus bringing the problem of ethno-cultural rights to the fore but also largely 
confining it to the illegal sphere. Meanwhile, a small number of citizens who 
sympathised with the illegal Greek Catholic church, as well as former members of 
nationalist movements in the western oblasts, went even further, frustrated as they 
were with state policies of „Russification‟. They saw independence as the only way 
to defend Ukrainian „national‟ rights. Partly in response to these criticisms of Soviet 
policy, and in line with the more general condemnation of „national deviations‟ from 
the Soviet model, articulators of conservative patriotism downplayed the importance 
of „Ukrainian‟ identities and explicitly identified themselves with a Russian-led, East 
Slavic community.  
Debates about access to news and information were likewise complex, 
combining constative arguments with implicit claims grounded in the practices of 
„staging consent‟. Reformist patriots questioned the very mechanisms which 
governed the Soviet information sphere, calling for an end to censorship. Meanwhile, 
since Soviet officials condemned Western radio programmes, as well as 
Czechoslovak, Romanian, and Polish broadcasts, citizens who attended agitation 
meetings outwardly distanced themselves from the „non-Soviet‟ sources of 
information and illegal publications, proving their commitment to conservative 
patriotism by acting as loyal consumers of Soviet media. Through thus establishing 
their patriotic credentials, however, they also implicitly criticised the official media, 
suggesting that they deserved to obtain more reliable and consistent information. 
There was a strong paternalistic undercurrent to these complaints, as active 
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participants in agitation meetings suggested that inconsistent and incomplete 
information fuelled „undesirable‟ attitudes amongst other, less reliable citizens.   
More broadly, by articulating different political views, citizens performed 
various social identities. Participation in agitation meetings and the ability to speak 
in public acted as means of social distinction, separating professionals and party 
activists from the merely reliable „masses‟ on the one hand, and dissident voices on 
the other. Meanwhile, many reformist patriots complained that the USSR was 
politically and socially unrepresentative. Not only did they admire Dubcek‟s 
„democratisation‟ across the border, but they were also aware that they broke the law 
by siding with the Czechoslovak reformers and, as such, risked prison sentences and 
social ostracism. Their illegal actions thus acquired a performative role, turning them 
into social outcasts. This was especially because Soviet apparatchiks and the press 
constructed certain groups, including former „bourgeois nationalists‟ and the „Jews‟, 
as inherently unstable, encouraging some of their members to prove that they were 
after all reliable citizens, whilst pushing others towards reformist patriotism and anti-
Soviet views. 
A very striking aspect of conservative patriotism was that it relied on silence. 
Residents of Ukraine demonstrated their loyalty to the Soviet state by attending 
agitation meetings during the summer of 1968 where, for the most part, they did not 
actually speak. Conservative patriotism allowed the majority of Ukraine‟s residents 
to claim the status of reliable citizens because it was defined against various 
„enemies‟. At the same time, however, most citizens who staged their consent for 
conservative patriotism differed from the elite participants who spoke during public 
meetings, remaining politically and socially impotent. Unlike individual party 
apparatchiks, who emphasised that they were instrumental for maintaining peace and 
stability in the republic, their patriotism was largely defined in an impersonal and 
negative way – workers‟ collectives distanced themselves from unreliable 
individuals. This may partly explain why economic complaints, so prominent in 
1956 and the early 1980s, were all but absent in 1968. The elite comprised of active 
participants in agitation meetings defined economic grievances as inherently „non-
Soviet‟.  
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Social and class identities thus emerged as another potential source of identity 
formation for Soviet citizens. Conversely, variously defined national identities could 
be used to quench social conflict in the republic, transforming some aspects of 
reformist patriotism and anti-Soviet attitudes into an instrument of social control. 
This became apparent during the early 1980s, when residents of Ukraine commented 
on the rise and fall of the Solidarity trade union in Poland. With citizens increasingly 
frustrated with economic shortages, reformist patriotism and, to a lesser extent, anti-
Soviet attitudes crumbled. The great bulk of Soviet citizens articulated a vision of 
conservative patriotism, defining Poland as a „national enemy‟ of the USSR and 
Ukraine. At the same time, they also variously aligned themselves with the „Soviet 
elite‟ or the „masses‟.  
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Chapter Four 
Soviet Patriots and the Cossacks: Poland as a ‘National Enemy’ in Soviet 
Ukraine 
School pupils in the Brezhnev-era USSR spent many a history class learning 
about Russian and Ukrainian conflicts with their neighbours in Eastern Europe. 
Having studied ancient and medieval history in years five and six, they moved on to 
explore how the „peoples (narody) of our country‟ defeated both „foreign enemies‟ 
and „class oppressors‟ to guide the rest of the world on the „path towards 
communism‟. They thus studied the past of Eastern Europe in a national framework, 
reading about Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarusians as the driving force behind 
„socialist progress‟. The „tall, strong, and beautiful‟ Eastern Slavs had inhabited the 
lands of the USSR since times immemorial, facing the destruction of the Galician-
Volhynian kingdom by the Poles and Hungarians, defeating the Polish occupiers in 
Moscow, and fighting for the reunification of Ukraine with Russia during the 
seventeenth-century Cossack uprisings. The year seven history textbook sought to 
help school children develop a notion of Soviet patriotism: with pupils attending 
separate classes on the history of their republics, the introduction reminded them that 
their „national‟ past was „part of the wider history of our multinational homeland – 
the Soviet Union‟.1 
The history of Eastern Europe, and particularly Poland, was a controversial topic 
in post-war Soviet Ukraine. School education, public anniversary commemorations, 
and the mass media ensured that the history of Ukrainian-Polish relations entered the 
public imagination. Historians, local apparatchiks, and top Party officials sponsored 
portrayals of a common „socialist‟ past of the Soviet camp,2 but they also tried to 
differentiate between Soviet citizens, „Ukrainians‟, and residents of the western 
borderlands on the one hand, and their „feudal‟, „pan‟, and „Piłsudskiite‟ Polish 
„oppressors‟ on the other. Although some Polish and Ukrainian émigrés and many 
dissidents in the Soviet bloc tried to reach beyond a narrow national understanding 
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of history,
3
 national conflicts were by far the most dominant theme in official Soviet 
narratives about Eastern Europe. Historians also emphasised the superior role of 
Russia, Ukraine, and the USSR in spreading socialism across the entire region. 
My sources range widely to include officially propagated narratives, as well as 
responses to them on the part of the creative intelligentsia, teachers, lecturers, and 
party activists. Press articles, school textbooks, and survey histories of Ukraine 
expose the changing portrayals of Soviet, Russian and Ukrainian historical relations 
with Poland. On a deeper level, official correspondence between senior academicians 
from the Ukrainian and all-Soviet Academy of Sciences and senior Party 
apparatchiks, as well as reports about international scholarly cooperation in the 
socialist camp, illuminate different ideas about writing history that moulded official 
accounts. Moreover, a bottom-up perspective is provided by reports about the work 
of school history teachers, museum directors, and university lecturers, which 
demonstrate how they contributed to the growth of historical memory about Eastern 
Europe, transforming or even distorting plots as mandated from „the top‟. 
Soviet historical depictions of Poland were relatively diverse during the late 
1950s and the early 1960s, but scholars gradually developed a fixed canon of 
„important‟ historical events. Under pressure from top CPSU officials, historians 
juxtaposed the oppressive Poles to Soviet and East Slavic „masses‟, thereby 
portraying history in a strictly national framework. Paradoxically, as images of East 
European past were becoming ritualised by the 1970s, they also exposed different 
categories within the Soviet community.  Because unified nations and strong 
political leaders emerged as the main protagonists in East European history, CPU 
bureaucrats in Kyiv sponsored representations of Ukraine and Ukrainians as 
important historical actors alongside „Soviet‟ and „Russian‟ people. Despite the 
rising levels of Russification under Brezhnev, they thus promoted a distinct Soviet 
Ukrainian identity.
4
  However, what Roman Szporluk calls „the nationalisation of 
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communism‟, or the adoption of „some of the principles of nationalism‟ in 
communist regimes,
5
 was a process of constant negotiation. Party officials, scholars, 
and writers voiced differing views about how to portray Ukrainian history. Most 
prominently, they advocated differing historical descriptions of the borderlands. 
Afraid that memories of the region‟s „non-Russian‟ past would fuel „undesirable‟ 
opinions, senior Party officials were very reluctant to grant „indigenous‟ residents 
any historical agency. Nonetheless, invoking the story of Ukrainian resistance to 
Polonisation, obkom bureaucrats gradually wrote the western oblasts into the history 
of Ukraine and the Soviet Union as a whole.  
Apart from the national and regional tensions, studying historical memory in the 
USSR also reveals social frictions in Soviet Ukrainian society. While party 
apparatchiks under Brezhnev established very strict control over academicians in the 
republic, some intellectuals, and especially writers, continued to promote 
„unorthodox‟ visions of the past, which were underpinned by a sense of professional 
pride and a striving for more creative autonomy. Moreover, Soviet politics of 
memory exposed and created a more subtle, but potentially explosive division. 
Historians never resolved the tension between the importance of the „simple people‟ 
and „workers‟ in driving „historical progress‟, and the stress which they put on the 
role of strong „national‟ leaders. Top apparatchiks who shaped images of the past 
emphasised the positive function of both the „masses‟ and „elites‟, thus inadvertently 
outlining different ways in which residents of Ukraine could identify themselves.  
 
I. East European Brothers or Socialist Foreigners? 
Soviet history of Eastern Europe was in flux during the late 1950s and the 1960s. 
Some academicians wrote about East European cooperation in the field of culture, 
thus articulating an „international‟ vision of historical development in which the East 
European „masses‟ had fought together against their class oppressors under the 
leadership of the progressive intelligentsia. These narratives functioned side by side 
with more confrontational ones of Ukrainian and Russian conflicts with Poland, in 
which national identities played a more important role than class loyalties. This latter 
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vision of the past became increasingly widespread during the 1960s, as two 
processes encouraged commemoration in a national framework. Firstly, as the CPSU 
Central Committee and the Soviet Council of Ministers grew increasingly 
determined to contain professional debates amongst historians,
6
 and conservative 
establishment figures such as S.P. Trapeznikov and E.M. Zhukov set great store by 
official anniversaries and the publication of collective works,
7
 scholars could no 
longer introduce new themes and topics.
8
 The Party was now firmly in charge of 
commemorating the past, especially after a major crackdown on dissent in the early 
1970s,
9
 which helped to fix in official rhetoric the idea of the USSR, Ukraine and 
Russia as both liberators of other East European „nations‟ and victims of Polish 
nationalism. Secondly, local dynamic often pushed in the same direction as the 
central one. A rising number of citizens with a professional interest in history, 
including school teachers, university lecturers, and Party agitators, participated in 
public debates about Eastern Europe. In order to manifest their „correct‟ views, they 
stayed clear of controversial topics and propagated a simple and internally consistent 
official vision of the past, highlighting the importance of national conflict between 
East Slavs and their western neighbours. 
While the general intellectual climate for historians remained oppressive under 
Khrushchev, as the purging of the editorial board of Voprosy istorii in 1957 
demonstrated,
10
 the Thaw witnessed the rise of a prominent group of historians who 
resisted excessive Party interference in the Academy of Sciences, and complained 
about censorship, restrictions on access to archives, and isolation from international 
scholarship.
11
 Soviet historians hardly abandoned all the canons outlined in the 
Stalinist History of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) – Short Course,12 
but Khrushchev‟s Secret Speech did attack the text, which was replaced in 1959 by a 
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considerably less dogmatic and crude book, The History of the Communist Party of 
the Soviet Union.
13
 These factors encouraged some scholars to promote new ways of 
representing the past, which they used both to reaffirm the importance of 
autonomous scholarship in explaining historical progress and to drive attention away 
from strong national leaders as the main protagonists in history. It was in this spirit 
that they began to highlight the role of „masses as the creators of history‟, departing 
from the view that there was inevitability in the „“lawfulness” of the historical 
process‟.14 The „international‟ history of Eastern Europe, which celebrated class 
solidarity across national and ethnic divides, helped to promote such a „de-
Stalinised‟ vision. On one level, by writing about the complex social and national 
interactions in Ukraine, scholars tried to prove that they needed to investigate the 
details and intricacies of the region‟s complicated history, rather than simply to 
reproduce simplistic dogmas. Moreover, some historians sought to underline the 
importance of an autonomous intelligentsia in history: by writing about the „masses‟ 
in Ukraine, they identified the „common people‟ with „historical progress‟ but also 
portrayed the intelligentsia as leaders of a common Ukrainian-Polish „revolutionary 
struggle‟ against both „class oppression‟ and „foreign rule‟.15  
Cultural landmarks played a crucial part in this „international‟ history of Eastern 
Europe. As the first secretary of the Ukrainian communist party during the 1940s, 
Khrushchev himself insisted that the statue to the poet Adam Mickiewicz, unlike 
other Polish monuments, should not be removed from the streets of L‟viv, stating 
that he was „a writer popular among the Ukrainian people and loved by them‟.16 In 
line with Khrushchev‟s appraisal of Mickiewicz, some Soviet scholars in Ukraine in 
the 1950s pointed to the importance of writers in leading the „masses‟ against their 
exploiters. In June 1959, for example, the Presidium of the Ukrainian Academy of 
Sciences resolved to celebrate the 150
th
 anniversary of the Polish „revolutionary 
poet‟, Juliusz Slowacki, who had been born in the town of Kremenets‟ in modern-
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day Ukraine. They turned to the CPU Central Committee for permission to convene 
a special conference devoted to Slowacki, as well as organise exhibitions and name 
the public library in Kremenets‟ after the poet. The academics presented Slowacki as 
an important social leader, claiming that his poetry „described the Ukrainian narod 
and its struggle for independence‟.17 It seems that the celebration of great, 
„progressive‟ writers was often a means of commemorating Eastern Europe‟s 
„international‟ history. In 1967, literary scholars employed at the Ministry of Culture 
library in Kyiv commemorated another nineteenth century writer, Aleksander 
Fredro, praising him for „ridiculing the szlachta‟ and advancing the revolutionary 
cause in Ukraine.
18
 Not only did members of the Soviet Ukrainian „intelligentsia‟ 
thereby suggest that history and literature played a crucial part in „socialist progress‟, 
but they also presented themselves as active promoters of the Ukrainian „national‟ 
cause and successors to a shared East European revolutionary legacy. 
Polish diplomatic pressures helped further to ground the importance of 
„international‟ history of Eastern Europe in Ukraine during the Brezhnev period. 
Polish scholars, as well as the consuls in Kyiv, attached particular importance to the 
commemoration of prominent cultural figures from Poland and Ukraine. For 
instance, during an official visit to Ukraine in 1968, Polish „Ukrainianologists‟ 
emphasised that they studied Taras Shevchenko‟s creative and personal relations 
with Poles,
19
 thus encouraging their Soviet colleagues to examine international links 
between „progressive‟ Polish and Soviet intellectuals, too. Indeed, this was a 
recurring theme in international scholarly cooperation in the Soviet bloc: as late as 
the 1980s, the Polish mass media and diplomats commented extensively on 
Ukrainian celebrations devoted to Frederic Chopin and the writer Jaroslaw 
Iwaszkiewicz.
20
 The Poles often encouraged Soviet scholars and Party officials to 
celebrate East European „cultural‟ anniversaries, as well as co-producing films, 
including one about the Ukrainian-Polish communist activist, Wanda Wasilewska.
21
 
At the same time, however, historians and party apparatchiks in Ukraine also 
promoted a much bloodier version of history, in which national differences 
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overshadowed international cooperation between Polish, Ukrainian and Soviet 
„progressive forces‟. These narratives differed from „international‟ history, because 
they suggested that progress had occurred in a national framework. In particular, by 
the mid-1950s, public representations of the Cossack uprising against Poland in 1648 
and the 1654 Pereiaslav Council provided a crucial means of outlining the 
connection between the imagined nation and socialist progress. Whereas early Soviet 
historiography presented the hetmans as class oppressors, by the late 1930s Soviet 
scholars began to depict Bohdan Khmel‟nyts‟kyi as a positive hero who had 
furthered both the social and the national liberation of the Ukrainian people.
22
 In 
1954, the CPSU Central Committee issued the „Theses on the Tercentenary of the 
Reunification of Ukraine with Russia (1654-1954)‟, which helped to ground this 
interpretation in public rhetoric for many years. The document instructed academics, 
school teachers and other groups to stress the Ukrainians‟ „progressive role in 
history‟ through their struggle for „social and national‟ liberation from Poland. The 
official historical consensus was based on the assumption that the primary aim of the 
1648-54 revolt was Ukrainians‟ „reunification‟ with the Russian people, which 
removed the threats of Polonisation and annexation by Turkey.
23
 In line with this, 
Soviet historians wrote extensively about the Cossack uprisings against Poland, and 
began to ostracise those colleagues who failed to pay enough attention to national 
conflicts in Ukraine. While O.K. Kasymenko‟s History of the Ukrainian People, 
published by the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences in 1960, evoked positive 
comments amongst the republic‟s historians, some reviewers suggested that he 
should have examined the national conflict of the Cossack period at more length, 
underlining that the „struggle of the Ukrainian narod against Polish pans‟ began 
immediately after the „Polish aggression on Ukrainian lands‟ in the sixteenth 
century.
24
  
Images of the Cossacks, and Ukrainian-Polish national conflict more generally, 
came to dominate historical commemorations in Ukraine. This process was slow and 
gradual, only really becoming evident during the early 1960s, largely because the 
authorities had paid less attention to spreading knowledge of East European history 
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before then. Historians who advanced a „de-Stalinised‟ vision of the past in the late 
1950s concentrated at the Academy of Sciences and, forming the professional elite, 
mostly lived in Moscow, Leningrad, and Kyiv.
25
 Unsurprisingly, perhaps, provincial 
historians were slower to pick up on the theme of the Ukrainian-Polish past. When a 
Russian academic from the Academy of Sciences in Moscow visited L‟viv in early 
1956, she was shocked to discover that the study and popularisation of Ukrainian-
Polish history in the region was largely neglected. The local landscape was still 
scattered with such Polish-sounding place names as Rzęsa, seemingly browsed over 
when the local authorities transformed Gródek Jagielloński into Horodok.26 By no 
means should this suggest that local bureaucrats and historians cultivated the 
memory of a multi-cultural past in L‟viv; rather, it seems that they were generally 
passive and inefficient when it came to popularising historical knowledge.
27
 In early 
1957, the obkom authorities in L‟viv reported that many monuments in the oblast 
were in a state of disarray: in the regional centre of Briukhovychi, for example, the 
monument commemorating NKVD officers killed by Ukrainian „bourgeois 
nationalists‟ stood in the middle of a Polish military cemetery from 1920, with a 
figure of the Virgin Mary to the side and the Polish eagle right in front.
28
 Local 
historians had not even put up a notice by the ruins of Prince Danylo‟s castle in 
L‟viv to explain that it had served to defend the western borderlands of Rus’ against 
foreign invaders, leading tourists to pass by the site on their way to the „Polish‟ 
Vysokyi Zamok (Wysoki Zamek).
29
 
It was only at the beginning of the 1960s that the CPU Central Committee and its 
Institute of Party History made a more concerted effort to encourage residents to 
commemorate the history of Eastern Europe, compelling more teachers, scholars and 
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local party activists to speak and write about it. They resolved to improve the 
Ukrains’kyi istorychnyi zhurnal (Ukrainian Historical Journal), which printed 
articles about such topics as „Soviet patriotism and internationalism‟, the 
development of Russo-Ukrainian friendship, and Ukrainian relations with the 
people‟s democracies.30 Senior party officials planned to make the journal more 
accessible to a wider audience of agitators and university lecturers, rather than just 
senior academics at research institutions who had been reading the journal up until 
then.
31
 Partly because of these top-down pressures from academics in Moscow and 
Kyiv, various individuals with a professional interest in history, as well as local state 
and party apparatchiks, tried to show that they included large audiences in 
anniversary celebrations. Particularly in the second half of the 1960s, teachers 
organised special after-school history clubs and school museums, in which, among 
other issues, they discussed questions associated with the appearance of the „socialist 
camp‟. In Chernihiv, for example, a teacher from school number 18 gained the 
recognition of local party apparatchiks after he encouraged a group of Pioneers to 
collect testimonies from Ulianovsk and Leningrad, as well as Prague and Warsaw, 
after which they published a special pamphlet entitled „I have never seen Lenin, but I 
have not lived a single day without him‟.32  
Paradoxically, while an increasing number of residents of Ukraine discussed the 
past, they contributed towards the establishment of a fixed canon of East European 
history, in which culture played a less important role than socio-political and ethnic 
conflicts. In order to spread historical knowledge, they participated in the creation of 
school textbooks which helped to identify a set of „important‟ historical events. 
Despite the 1958 education reform, school textbooks continued to establish the 
„politically, and therefore professionally acceptable paradigm‟.33 Roger Markwick 
suggests that teachers and lecturers relied on textbooks partly because they lacked 
adequate professional qualifications.
34
 As a matter of fact, however, they were not 
passive recipients of historical dogmas defined in Kyiv and Moscow, but had some 
leeway to shape official narratives. This was evident during the early 1960s, when 
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the Ministry of Education in Kyiv commissioned the first Soviet school textbook 
specifically for teaching Ukrainian history.
35
 School teachers, university lecturers, 
and party activists throughout Ukraine commented on two drafts of the manual 
during special meetings organised by local CPSU officials in March 1960 and July 
1961. They demonstrated their resolve to convey historical knowledge in a manner 
understandable for as many people as possible. For instance, teachers from 
Dnipropetrovs‟k claimed that the authors did not use enough illustrative examples. 
This did not allow school children to imagine how the Ukrainian population lived 
under the Habsburgs, or to understand why they rebelled against foreign rule. The 
textbook only contained a very general statement that the life of the Ukrainian narod 
had become even harder at the end of the eighteenth century, as it was now 
oppressed not only by Polish and Ukrainian feudal lords, but also the Austrian ruling 
classes.
36
 At the same time, many residents of Ukraine who participated in public 
discussions about the new textbook did not want to compromise on accuracy. In 
Mykolaiv, they charged that the textbook was imprecise as far as the history of 
southern Ukraine was concerned.
37
 Similar views were echoed in Zakarpattia, where 
the locals complained about distortions of regional history, and appealed to the 
authors to talk about „tens of thousands‟ rather than „hundreds of thousands‟ when 
discussing the workers who strove for reunification with the USSR during the 
1940s.
38
  
Nonetheless, teachers and lecturers typically did promote a simplistic vision of 
„national‟ history. While they pushed the authors of the textbook to focus less on 
high politics and „princes‟, and more on the „mass of workers‟,39 they also suggested 
that the „masses‟ should be portrayed as unified national communities. In line with 
this, they examined the textbook‟s portrayals of the Cossacks in much detail, with 
historians in Volhynia pointing out that the textbook should describe how the Poles 
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built the Kodak fortress on the Dnipro river to stop peasants from joining the Free 
Cossacks during the seventeenth century, which would help to ground students‟ 
„love and respect for the narodni masy‟ and „hatred for their exploiters‟.40 Moreover, 
„common people‟ were not just „workers‟ but also „Eastern Slavs‟; some teachers 
praised the textbook draft for demonstrating how this ethnic group achieved a high 
level of socio-economic, political, and cultural development, and played „an 
important role in Europe from ancient times‟.41 This amounted to a crude distinction 
between the „good‟ Ukrainians and Russians, and the „evil‟ Poles who exploited East 
Slavic lands.
42
 Indeed, some teachers were worried that students would be left 
confused by any „complicated‟ analysis of the seventeenth century. For example, 
they pointed out that the authors discussed the Khmel‟nyts‟kyi uprising from the 
point of view of successes and failures, which made it difficult for students to 
understand the true „meaning of the national liberation struggle‟.43 Historians in the 
regions of Ukraine consequently suggested that the textbook should emphasise the 
close relationship between Ukraine and Russia, whilst distancing both from the 
„Western Slav‟ Poland and other East European countries. Lecturers from the 
Chernihiv pedagogical institute complained that the first draft failed to explain how 
the position of Ukrainians improved from Polish to Russian rule,
44
 and their 
colleagues from the Uzhgorod university argued that the textbook should talk more 
about the influence of the Russian 1905 revolution in Habsburg-ruled Ukraine.
45
 The 
need to maintain a close relationship with Russia would also be made clear by 
reminding students that the Austrians occupied Northern Bukovyna as soon as the 
Russian army withdrew in the aftermath of the Russo-Turkish wars.
46
 In trying to 
create a more approachable history textbook, therefore, inhabitants of Ukraine with a 
professional interest in history sought to differentiate Ukraine from Poland and to 
bring out the historical role of the western borderlands, as well as putting an 
emphasis on the role of the „masses‟ in historical progress. They thus drew on well-
established historiographical traditions, trying to „strike a balance between the grand 
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narrative of the nation and class analysis‟, in which negative depictions of the Polish 
„pans‟ helped to bring out the progressive role of Ukrainian national leaders.47 
It is very difficult to establish the extent to which the reported opinions reflected 
broader attitudes of Ukraine‟s teachers and university lecturers. They took active part 
in shaping the textbook‟s contents, openly criticising the authors and suggesting very 
specific improvements and additions, but it also seems that they consciously 
operated within the limits of what they considered to be permissible. This was partly 
because they knew that prominent historians and Party apparatchiks expected them 
to discuss the role of the „masses‟ in „socialist progress‟ and to focus on the Cossack 
period and the „reunification‟ of Ukraine with Russia. After all, they were 
commenting on a complete draft of the textbook which outlined a teleological vision 
of history during public meetings organised by local apparatchiks. However, it is 
striking that school teachers and university lecturers in the early 1960s actually tried 
to establish a coherent and „correct‟ vision of the past for students at schools. Even 
though they suggested that teaching should be accurate and inclusive of the 
historically non-Russian parts of Ukraine, they also argued that the past should be 
portrayed in a simple manner in order to ensure that as many residents of Ukraine as 
possible maintained a consistent vision of historical developments. It was partly 
because of this that they turned towards the simplistic „national‟ paradigm. Even 
though Soviet historians still had some room to produce more nuanced 
representations of Khmel‟nyts‟kyi during this period,48 the great bulk of citizens who 
participated in the popularisation of historical knowledge stayed clear of 
controversial topics, employing instead formulaic portrayals of national conflicts 
between the Ukrainian „masses‟ and their Polish „oppressors‟.  
In other words, the majority of citizens who actively contributed to 
commemorative activities increasingly reproduced fixed accounts of national 
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conflicts in order to avoid the ambiguity associated with introducing new tropes into 
official rhetoric.
49
 Indeed, by the late 1970s, depictions of Ukrainian resistance to 
Polonisation became a crucial part of Soviet history, almost an unquestionable 
dogma. With Naukova Dumka finally publishing Istoriia Ukrains’koi RSR: Korotkyi 
narys (History of the Ukrainian SSR: A Short Course) in 1981, the idea that 
Ukrainians defended the common interests of Eastern Slavs and Soviet people 
against the Poles became firmly entrenched in public rhetoric. Aimed at a „wide 
circle of readers‟, as Iu.Iu. Kondufor and other editors stated, it described the „long 
history of the Ukrainian narod, and its struggle for social and national liberation‟. 
Opening by emphasising the common basis from which the Russian, Ukrainian, and 
Belarusian narody sprang up, it outlined their „struggle against feudal and capitalist 
oppression‟. The introduction set out a clear teleological structure of history: it was 
asserted that, through working together against class enemies and foreign tormentors, 
the „brotherly narody‟ developed a new Soviet way of life, shaping a new 
community – the Soviet narod. The editors underlined that internationalism did not 
preclude, but actually encouraged, the love for one‟s nation (natsiia) and country.50 
This authoritative statement summed up the theses outlined in the eight volume 
history of the Ukrainian SSR. The Ukrainian national movement for „reunification‟ 
with Russia thus emerged as a major progressive force.  
Volodymyr Shcherbtyts‟kyi and other Brezhnev-era leaders sought to spread this 
message very widely, with commemoration of the Cossacks turning into an 
institutionalised ritual during the 1970s. This was particularly evident in 1979, when 
the authorities organised the 325
th
 anniversary of the „reunification‟ of Ukraine and 
Russia. While the celebrations were mostly concentrated in Ukraine itself, 
Shcherbyts‟kyi was adamant that the anniversary should be an all-Soviet holiday, 
equating Ukrainian resistance against social and national exploitation by Poles to 
other founding events in Soviet history, including the October Revolution. In a 
report for the CPSU Central Committee, he insisted that the seventeenth century 
„reunification‟ was not only one of „the greatest acts in the history of Russian and 
Ukrainian nations‟, but also „all nations of our country‟.51 By commemorating the 
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anniversary, the CPU Central Committee compelled numerous Soviet scholars and 
state and Party institutions to reproduce the formulaic portrayals of Ukrainian-Polish 
national conflicts in order to prove their commitment to spreading „Soviet 
patriotism‟. Just as the celebrations took on an all-union character in 1954, 
Shcherbyts‟kyi hoped that the 325th anniversary would be used to commemorate the 
„deep historical roots of unity‟ between all narody of „our multi-national homeland‟, 
strengthening Soviet patriotism and proletarian internationalism in the face of 
„bourgeois, bourgeois-nationalist, Maoist, Zionist and other‟ distortions of history.52 
Accordingly, the CPU Central Committee departments of propaganda and agitation, 
obkoms, gorkoms, raikoms and primary party organisations, the ministries of 
education and culture, the writers‟ union, amateur book clubs and many other bodies 
prepared for the celebrations. The unions of artists, architects, journalists, as well as 
the Gosteleradio were given the task of coming up with proposals for a monument to 
mark the reunification.
53
 To celebrate the occasion, state and party organisations also 
held special meetings with Ukrainian and Russian artists, as well as convening 
seminars for workers at factories; in Kyiv alone, half a million people attended 180 
special concerts.
54
 Shcherbyts‟kyi thus involved multiple individuals and 
organisations in commemorating East European history in a national framework. As 
they all underlined Ukraine‟s alienation from Poland and Kyiv‟s special relationship 
with Moscow, Shcherbyts‟kyi could legitimately and publicly describe Ukrainians as 
a separate and distinguished nation in the USSR.  
The authorities further advanced the image of East European satellite states as 
„foreign‟ by including numerous inhabitants of Ukraine in very ritualised anniversary 
celebrations of the Great Patriotic War and the subsequent Soviet „liberation‟ and 
„modernisation‟ of Eastern Europe.55 During the late Brezhnev era, anniversaries of 
the „liberation‟ of the individual satellite states were used to remind the Ukrainian 
(and broader Soviet) public about the glorious Soviet victory in Eastern Europe.
56
 As 
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these forms of commemoration were part of the routine, day-to-day work of the state 
and party bureaucracy, variations from the established script were hard to come by. 
In March 1979, for example, the Kyiv gorkom, the Ukrsovprof, and the Ukrainian 
branch of the Soviet-Hungarian Friendship Society organised meetings to celebrate 
the 34
th
 anniversary of the Soviet liberation of Hungary. They held a very bombastic 
gathering in the building of the Kyiv conservatoire, but also invited representatives 
of the Hungarian embassy in Moscow and the consulate in Kyiv to participate in 
„evenings of friendship‟ in some oblast centres and at factories („collective members‟ 
of the friendship society). The Ukrainian Gosteleradio was responsible for preparing 
special announcements for the media, and the radio and television were put on high 
alert in case the Hungarian consul decided to address inhabitants of Ukraine.
57
 Once 
again, party officials in Kyiv planned very similar measures for the 35
th
 anniversary 
of the Polish communist manifesto in July (they even used the same format for the 
report), although on this occasion they would also hold sport competitions, amateur 
artistic performances, festivals of Polish cinema in Kyiv, Kharkiv, L‟viv, 
Zaporizhzhia, Vinnytsia, Luts‟k, Poltava, Zhytomir, Khmel‟nyts‟kyi, and Cherkasy, 
as well as „mass meetings of friendship‟ in the borderland regions.58 Thus, under 
Brezhnev, the Great Patriotic War and the establishment of the socialist camp 
emerged as the most progressive events in East European history, and the officials 
bombarded citizens with formulaic accounts of „liberation‟. Scholars, state officials, 
and party apparatchiks invoked the myth of the war in order to underline the unity of 
the Soviet bloc, but also to emphasise the superior status of the USSR in it.
59
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Some Khrushchev-era historians wrote about the history of Eastern Europe to tell 
a story about „the masses‟ and „common people‟. They were particularly keen to 
explore Ukrainian-Polish relations, which offered an opportunity to talk about the 
„socialist‟ history of Eastern Europe and the special role of the intelligentsia in 
driving „socialist progress‟. However, most Soviet citizens who participated in 
spreading historical knowledge diverged from this „international‟ vision of history as 
propagated by senior scholars from the Academy of Sciences. From the early 1960s, 
instead of writing about a common East European past, they made an explicit effort 
to differentiate Russian and Ukrainian history from Poland and Eastern Europe. 
While historians identified „common people‟ as the main driving force behind 
„progress‟, they also deprived them of any autonomy by glorifying the idea of 
national unity. Strong national political leaders, such as Khmel‟nyts‟kyi, emerged as 
the positive heroes of Soviet and Ukrainian history. Public debate about the East 
European past grew increasingly constrained under Brezhnev, as top state and Party 
officials established tight control over anniversary commemorations. They 
encouraged residents of Ukraine to celebrate the Soviet „liberation‟ of Eastern 
Europe, thus promoting a sense of Soviet pride in the republic. They likewise made 
historical commemorations of the Cossack uprisings against Poland highly formulaic 
and repetitive, seeking to encourage citizens to discuss history in a national 
framework. 
 
II.  The second Soviet republic60 
Because commemorations of the Ukrainian-Polish conflict played a prominent 
part in distinguishing the Soviet community from Eastern Europe, they provided a 
forum where senior CPU bureaucrats portrayed their republic as the bulwark of 
Sovietness. Not only was Ukraine different from Poland, they suggested, but it also 
played a distinctive role in the wider East Slavic and Soviet community. Party 
officials in Kyiv sponsored various historical images to show that Ukraine had 
remained exemplary in its loyalty to Russia, but also that Ukrainians had developed a 
rich culture and played a prominent part in combatting the Polish threat. The 
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authorities became increasingly keen to outline such a major historical part for 
Ukraine between the late 1960s and the early 1980s. As CPSU bureaucrats and some 
historians sought to criticise the views of Polish scholars who questioned the 
superior status of the USSR in the region, they grew more determined to speak and 
write about Ukrainian glory and bravery. In doing so, however, Party leaders invited 
criticism from some members of the creative intelligentsia who, whilst rarely 
undermining the grand narratives of Ukrainian-Russian „reunification‟, believed that 
citizens should be encouraged to learn more about „Ukrainian‟ history as distinct 
from other nations in Eastern Europe. 
Tensions and conflicts in East European academia encouraged Soviet scholars to 
underline that Ukraine had always remained loyal to the Eastern Slavic community. 
This was closely intertwined with the professional interests of Soviet academicians, 
as they feared that research opportunities for Soviet scholars were undermined by the 
Poles. After the CPSU Central Committee instructed archivists and Slavicists from 
the Soviet Academy of Sciences to choose which books to transfer from the old 
Polish Ossolineum library in L‟viv to Poland in 1967, the scholars stressed that 
approximately 60,000 volumes should be left in Ukraine: the books left in L‟viv 
„exclusively‟ concerned „the history, culture, and economics of the western oblasts 
of Ukraine‟ and „historical connections between the Ukrainian, Russian, and 
Belarusian people‟, and as such they were of most interest to „Soviet historians‟. 
Meanwhile, the CPU Central Committee lobbied for Polish libraries to donate 
materials about the „history of the Russian and Ukrainian narody‟ to Soviet 
institutions.
61
 They advocated the idea that the history of Ukrainians, Russians, and 
Eastern Slavs could be neatly separated from Poland, differentiating Soviet scholars 
who studied „their‟ past from Polish historians who focused on their own heritage.62  
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More importantly, pressures from the outer empire pushed CPU apparatchiks and 
Soviet historians to write about Ukraine‟s special contribution to the Soviet 
community, highlighting that it had resisted Polonisation and thus protected Eastern 
Slavdom as a whole. This tendency was especially pronounced because, from the 
early 1960s, Polish historians implicitly questioned the exclusivity of East Slavic 
history and the supposed unity of Ukrainians and Russians by studying the national 
movement in Tsarist as well as Habsburg Ukraine, as part of the broader European 
phenomenon of nationalism.
63
 Soviet state officials informed Warsaw about their 
anger at such „shortcomings‟, and CPU leaders instructed Ukrainian scholars to 
criticise their Polish colleagues who brought out the „non-Soviet‟ character of 
Ukraine in their work. Accordingly, in February 1974, Volodymyr Shcherbyts‟kyi 
complained about two collections of Ukrainian poetry published in Poland two years 
earlier. They both represented the „anti-scientific ideology of one current‟, which 
underplayed ideological conflicts in Ukrainian literature, grouping „Ukrainian 
classics‟ and „Soviet writers‟ with „nationalist‟ authors from the interwar period and 
even explicitly „anti-Soviet‟ poets. Shcherbyts‟kyi instructed Voprosy literatury 
(Issues of Literature) or Radians’ke literaturoznavstvo (Soviet Literary Studies) to 
publish critical reviews of the Polish publications.
64
 Because the Poles diverged from 
official Soviet scholarship, top Party apparatchiks in Kyiv urged Soviet scholars to 
deny any suggestion that the history of Ukraine could be considered outside the 
context of a wider Russian and Soviet past, but also to discuss Ukrainian defiance in 
the face of the Polish threat.  
The official emphasis on Ukrainian-Polish conflict and the Soviet „liberation‟ of 
Eastern Europe further allowed some historians to promote historical accounts that 
distinguished Ukraine from Russia. Party apparatchiks encouraged Soviet scholars to 
cooperate with their colleagues from around the socialist camp, promoting the cult of 
the Soviet liberation of Eastern Europe,
65
 but also compelling academicians to write 
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about Russia, Ukraine, and Poland as distinct historical actors.
66
 In order to 
counteract Western „bourgeois‟ propaganda, the CPSU Politburo instructed Soviet 
historians to work with the Poles on very delicate issues that highlighted national 
differences between Russians, Ukrainians and Poles. Among other issues, they were 
to deny claims that the NKVD stood behind the Katyn massacre, and to denounce 
publications about the „Soviet occupation‟ of western Ukraine in 1939.67  
As historians discussed national questions when they cooperated with their East 
European colleagues, they paid particular attention to cultural diversity in the region, 
portraying Ukrainian culture as a constituent part of a wider East European heritage. 
Indeed, they defined the very idea of Eastern Europe in a national framework, 
participating in projects about a „transnational‟ history of Slavs.68 By the early 
1970s, the celebration of „Slavdom‟ acquired institutionalised forms. International 
Congresses of Slavic Studies were held in one of the Slavic countries every five 
years.
69
 As scholars from across Eastern Europe worked together to show that the 
Soviet-led socialist camp was firmly united by its predominantly Slavic roots, they 
also suggested that Ukrainian culture prospered under Soviet socialism. During the 
1970s, the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences participated in a Polish-led and 
UNESCO-funded project which aimed to „acquaint the world‟s public opinion with 
the contribution that all Slavic peoples [had] made to global culture‟. Not only were 
they to ensure that Ukrainian materials be included in any collective publications, 
but they would also counteract Austrian attempts to popularise the historical 
paradigm of „East-Central Europe‟, discredit Ukrainian émigré publications, and 
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resist UNESCO attempts to focus the project on „ancient times‟ as opposed to more 
contemporary developments. If publishing an album about old Ukrainian 
architecture, for example, scholars in Kyiv would insist on describing how the 
contemporary socialist state preserved heritage sites.
70
 As East European 
academicians invoked the rhetoric of Slavic unity, therefore, they highlighted the 
importance of Soviet socialism for the development of Ukraine, thereby linking 
Soviet unity to the flourishing of Ukraine‟s unique national culture.  
Inescapably, perhaps, because the history of Ukraine was discussed very widely 
and frequently, some portrayals diverged from the grand narrative of „reunification‟. 
For one, blunders and inconsistencies occurred. From 1978, for example, 
Ukrains’kyi istorychnyi zhurnal devoted a special section to the 325th anniversary of 
the Pereiaslav agreement, but „serious doubts‟ were voiced after a publication by 
M.F. Kotliar. Party apparatchiks alleged that his article effectively publicised the 
views of „hostile‟ authors who denied that 1654 amounted to a „reunification‟ of 
Ukraine and Russia. In arguing against them, it quoted at length the „falsified‟ views 
of such „bourgeois historians‟ as Hrushevs‟kyi, Kostomarov, Antonych, and 
Doroshenko. Meanwhile, Kotliar failed to refer to Lenin or Brezhnev in his 
analysis.
71
 More importantly, fictional literature continued to produce ambiguous 
depictions of Khmel‟nyts‟kyi‟s role in Ukrainian history. Catherine Wanner shows 
that, due to the blatant manipulation of historical accounts in Ukraine, artistic 
renditions of historical events, which could more easily slip by the censors than 
purely scholarly texts, „were often seen as more truthful' than academic studies.72 It 
is difficult to assess how literature shaped popular attitudes towards history, but it 
did evoke some heated debates. This was evident after Pavlo Zahrebelnyi published 
in 1983 his novel Ia, Bohdan (I, Bohdan), which presented a more complex 
psychological portrait of the hetman than inhabitants of Ukraine were accustomed to. 
It called into question Khmel‟nyts‟kyi‟s motivations in staging the uprising against 
Polish rule and signing the Pereiaslav agreement. Public reactions to the novel were 
symptomatic of the status quo in Soviet Ukraine‟s politics of memory during the 
early 1980s. As many reviewers criticised the book for undermining the idea of 
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Russian-Ukrainian unity, even the dissident historian Volodymyr Serhiichuk spoke 
of the work‟s potentially negative influence on Ukrainian youth. This „Ukrainian 
patriot‟, as Frank Sysyn describes him, believed that national myths should not be 
challenged, especially „under foreign occupation‟: however distorted his image, 
Khmel‟nyts‟kyi constituted one of the few official symbols helping to foster a 
separate Ukrainian identity in the USSR.
73
  
Some scholars, writers, and state and party bureaucrats disputed how the history 
of Ukrainian conflicts with Poland should be presented in the official rhetoric under 
Brezhnev, which further introduced ambiguity into official representations of the 
Russo-Ukrainian friendship. It was precisely because apparatchiks and members of 
the creative intelligentsia could refer to a codified set of historical narratives about 
the role of class and nation in history that they began to argue about the desirable 
limits of „orthodoxy‟ in history. Some scholars and party leaders underlined that 
residents of the republic were well enough educated to give the „correct‟ 
interpretation to stories of the Cossacks which undermined the glorious rhetoric of 
„reunification‟. They thus suggested that some controversy could enter the public 
realm, as residents would continue to define the Ukrainian national idea in terms of 
East Slavic unity and social struggle. Meanwhile, others stressed the need for the 
Party and senior academicians to guide the formation of collective memory much 
more tightly.  
These conflicts became apparent in 1984, after the Goskomizdat in Moscow 
decided to publish the first Soviet edition of Henryk Sienkiewicz‟s Ognem i mechom 
(With Fire and Sword).
74
 The nineteenth-century epic forms part of a popular trilogy, 
telling the story of a Polish nobleman who seeks to rescue his beloved from Cossack 
captivity. Written from a very Polonocentric point of view, the novel portrays 
Khmel‟nyts‟kyi and the Cossacks as barbaric bandits who weaken the Polish-
Lithuanian Commonwealth. While Sienkiewicz‟s other works (including two 
segments of the trilogy set against the background of the commonwealth‟s wars 
against Sweden and the Ottoman Empire) had been published in the Soviet Union, 
Ognem i mechom did not come out until 1983. The print run was large: 200,000 
copies. In May 1984, a group of four Ukrainian historians and one literary scholar 
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from L‟viv complained about the publication. Arguing that the book would 
undermine the population‟s „class understanding‟ of the past, they pointed out that as 
early as 1884 the Polish writer Bolesław Prus attacked Sienkiewicz for idealising the 
elites and ignoring the cause of the „oppressed narod‟ which suffered most during 
the wars. The scholars alleged that the Ukrainian masses were represented as „hordes 
of dogs‟, while Sienkiewicz mistook social struggle for national conflict. The novel 
described the Ukrainian war of liberation, the academics continued, from the point of 
view of the Catholic magnates, who sought to enslave the Ukrainians and break their 
ties with the brotherly Russian narod. Even though the report admitted that the 
introduction to the Soviet edition contextualised Ognem i mechom, it also questioned 
how much influence this would have on the readers and lobbied for the large-scale 
publication of Marxist academic studies of the novel. The authors added that while 
the work had been published in Poland regularly since 1955, the Soviet publication 
would weaken its critiques there.
75
  
Ironically, perhaps, the scholars talked of Ukrainian „national‟ liberation and 
reunification with Russia as they attacked the novel for emphasising the national 
rather than the class question. It may well be that they thus sought to advance their 
professional interests. They portrayed themselves as defenders of both the „masses‟ 
and the Ukrainian narod, suggesting that the Ukrainian intelligentsia had a crucial 
role to fulfil in Soviet society. They believed that a wide audience should read their 
analysis of Sienkiewicz‟s work. However, other bureaucrats and scholars in both 
Russia and Ukraine opposed their views. For instance, the chief editor in charge of 
fictional literature at the Goskomizdat defended the publication. He pointed out that 
it received the approval of the Central Committee, the Institutes of World Literature 
and Slavic and Balkan Studies at the USSR Academy of Sciences, as well as the 
chief editor of the Soviet Ukrainian Encyclopaedia, the writer Mykola Bazhan. The 
Goskomizdat editor also emphasised that the exclusion of Ognem i mechom from the 
collected works of Sienkiewicz would evoke an „unpredictable reaction‟ in brotherly 
Poland.
76
 Similarly, the head of the Goskomizdat‟s section for literatures of the 
socialist countries argued that the first full publication of Sienkiewicz‟s prose in the 
USSR could not exclude his „most significant‟ work. He claimed that the novel was 
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a good read, allowing Soviet audiences to „feel the poetry of the Ukrainian 
landscape‟. While the book was set in Ukraine, it was written „from within Polish 
history‟, and as such it should be read as an expression of progressive nineteenth-
century ideas. Even though Sienkiewicz resorted to hyperbole and idealised the Poles 
who had fought against the Cossacks, he did this to create strong characters and 
contrast them with his imperfect contemporaries, praising the ideals of soldiers‟ 
camaraderie, friendship, as well as loyalty and stability in love. To support his views, 
the author of the report cited the „Lenin prize laureate‟, Mykola Bazhan, who voiced 
his views about Sienkiewicz in December 1979: the history of Polish-Ukrainian 
relations was complex and bloody, but while Soviet people could understand the 
class background of the mutual conflicts, they should not expect the same of 
Sienkiewicz. The Goskomizdat official was confident that, with the right 
introduction, Soviet readers would understand Ognem i mechom correctly. He also 
stressed that Sienkiewicz was a very popular writer in people‟s Poland, and the 
publication of his novels would help strengthen Polish-Soviet friendship.
77
  
The exchange of ideas about Ognem i mechom was an expression of conflicts 
between intellectuals and cultural bureaucrats, both on the all-Soviet and Ukrainian-
republican stage. Undoubtedly, their opinions were conditioned by the institutions 
which they represented and the need to defend the decisions which they had taken 
earlier. The scholars from L‟viv were most adamant that academics should guide the 
formation of both national and class approaches towards the novel in the republic. 
By contrast, Goskomizdat officials, members of the Academy of Sciences in 
Moscow, and some representatives of the Ukrainian creative intelligentsia saw less 
cause for alarm and top-down instruction in the aftermath of the publication. This is 
not to suggest that they did not concern themselves with Sienkiewicz‟s influence on 
popular understandings of class and nation in Ukraine‟s history, but they had very 
different ideas about the extent to which inhabitants of the republic could be trusted 
to develop „Soviet‟ attitudes towards the book on their own. As such, all sides 
involved in the debate surrounding the publication of Ognem i mechom wanted the 
Central Committee to recognise their right to influence the politics of identity 
formation in Ukraine, and they all agreed that history should be understood in a 
„national‟ framework. 
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Therefore, while top state and Party officials under Brezhnev established very 
tight control over public portrayals of East European history, they suggested that 
Ukraine played a special part in defending the common Russo-Ukrainian community 
against Polish „pans‟, as well as implying that Ukrainians and Ukrainian culture 
would flourish in the USSR. As both „Sovietness‟ and „Ukrainianness‟ were defined 
against Poland and other countries of the socialist bloc, the national paradigm 
overshadowed the narrative of a common East European „revolutionary‟ past. Rather 
than arguing about the grand themes and messages which history should promote, 
state and Party apparatchiks, as well as historians and other scholars who toed the 
official line, began to dispute an entirely different set of issues. They disagreed about 
the extent to which they should guide inhabitants of the republic in reaching the 
„correct‟ conclusions from the study of history, and were suspicious of any 
„unorthodox‟ ideas which entered public rhetoric. This had a special significance for 
the history of western Ukraine. Although obkom apparatchiks and some historians 
tried to talk about the history of the western borderlands to underline their belonging 
to the wider Ukrainian and Soviet community, they met with the opposition of other 
apparatchiks who feared that memories of a „non-Russian‟ Ukraine would fuel 
„incorrect‟ attitudes amongst residents of the republic.    
 
III. The Borderlands 
While the great majority of Soviet historians turned towards narrow topics of 
regional or local history to keep out of trouble,
78
 the study of the western borderlands 
did not offer such an escape from controversial issues. As Roman Solchanyk argues, 
party leaders were concerned that memories of exclusion from Russian rule could 
encourage residents of the western oblasts to articulate their national identities in 
non-Soviet terms.
79
 Although top apparatchiks in Moscow and Kyiv instructed 
historians to condemn foreign claims to the western borderlands, and to emphasise 
their belonging to the wider Ukrainian and Soviet community, they were more 
suspicious of the obkom bureaucrats who strove to popularise the knowledge of 
regional history. They were afraid that local residents would refer to the „west 
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Ukrainian‟ past to underline the unique status of the western oblasts. Only with 
increasing state control over the intelligentsia did the local bureaucrats begin to 
promote a cult of specifically local historical events and heroes on a mass scale, thus 
claiming for their region an equal status in the USSR.  
The history of the western oblasts was a prominent theme in public discussions of 
the Ukrainian-Polish past throughout the post-war period. The CPU Central 
Committee inspired historians to write about the history of „foreign occupation‟ in 
western Ukraine.
80
 Senior state and party apparatchiks shaped representations of the 
borderlands in such a way as to depict many residents of the region, particularly the 
faithful of the illegal Greek Catholic church, as „collaborators‟. Already during the 
1940s, immediately after the incorporation of the western oblasts into Soviet 
Ukraine, the church union of Brest was depicted as a Polish and subsequently 
Austrian-German tool designed 'to break up the unity and friendship of the Russian 
and Ukrainian peoples'.
81
 Aggressive attacks on the Uniates in western Ukraine 
continued after 1956,
82
 especially because the authorities were determined to deny 
claims made in Ukrainian émigré publications. Concerned that the „Catholics‟ who 
published in the Western press distorted the history of the region, the CPU Central 
Committee instructed Pravoslavnyi visnyk to write that „Ukrainian people‟, 
oppressed by the Greek Catholic clergy, always strove to return to the faith of their 
ancestors.
83
 Campaigns to discredit Greek Catholicism had an especially wide reach 
in the western oblasts.  In order to combat „Uniate propaganda‟, under pressure from 
Kyiv, the L‟viv obkom opened a museum of the history of religion and atheism. 
According to official statistics, it attracted 30,000 visitors between its opening in 
April and December 1970. Housed in the former Dominican monastery in L‟viv, the 
exhibition was designed to educate „workers‟ about the socio-political context in 
which „foreign occupiers‟ created the Uniate church, thus „spiritually enslaving the 
working masses of Ukraine and Belarus‟. The obkom claimed that the museum 
portrayed the Greek Catholic church as subordinated to the Polish „pans‟. In 
designing the exhibition, historians made a special effort to bring out the alleged 
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links between the Uniates, Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists, and German fascists, 
both before and after the imposition of Soviet power in the region.
84
 
In the context of discussing „foreign occupation‟ in western Ukraine, top Party 
apparatchiks also encouraged historians to present the „indigenous‟ inhabitants as 
passive victims, thus implying that other regions of the USSR had played a more 
„progressive‟ historical role. Just as portrayals of the past underlined the evils of 
„foreign occupation‟ in the borderlands, the „reunification‟ of the western oblasts 
with Soviet Ukraine in 1939 emerged as the most celebrated event in the region‟s 
history. On numerous occasions, party leaders and historians emphasised that foreign 
„ruling classes oppressed the hungry and illiterate‟ west Ukrainians, who 
subsequently achieved great progress under Soviet tutelage.
85
 As Kondufor‟s Istoriia 
Ukrainy put it, all narody of the USSR helped western Ukraine defeat illiteracy and 
economic backwardness in the aftermath of 1939.
86
 By celebrating the events of 
1939, Soviet officials highlighted the role of other parts of Ukraine in modernising 
the borderlands. Notably, it was the Kyiv obkom who organised many events 
devoted to the 20
th
 anniversary of the „reunification‟ in 1959,87 suggesting that 
residents of the city contributed to the „liberation‟ of their co-nationals further west. 
As late as 1979, when the CPU Central Committee carefully coordinated the 40
th
 
anniversary of „reunification‟, they instructed party organisations and other 
institutions engaged in planning the celebrations to place emphasis on the socio-
economic and cultural changes which revolutionised western Ukraine „under the 
guidance of the communist party‟. Party and state institutions were expected to take 
extra measures to improve the „material and living conditions‟ of certain 
„honourable‟ groups: „active members of the revolutionary movement‟, individuals 
who helped establish Soviet power in west Ukraine, as well as those whose relatives 
were killed by „bourgeois-nationalist bands‟ in the region.88 Thus, Shcherbyts‟kyi 
suggested that some individuals contributed to the development of western Ukraine 
more than others. While he remained vague about it, they probably included old 
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communists, veterans, and KGB members (as well as their families), many of whom 
were not originally from west Ukraine. 
While the CPU authorities in Kyiv sought to control historical commemorations 
in Soviet Ukraine, oblast party and state leaders showed some initiative in shaping 
historical images of Ukraine‟s relationship with Poland, too. They attempted to 
spread the knowledge of regional history to present the locals as reliable Soviet 
citizens who had achieved the liberation from „foreign occupation‟ through their own 
efforts. In order to distance the local community from the Polish and Hungarian 
unrest, and to highlight the close links between the borderlands and Soviet Ukraine 
and the USSR as a whole,
89
 the Ukrainianised local cadres in L‟viv began to 
propagate the knowledge of regional history in the mid-1950s. The obkom secretary 
lobbied for the CPU Central Committee to award the Order of Lenin to the city of 
L‟viv, claiming that it would act as evidence that the western oblasts had been and 
would always remain Ukrainian. In his appeal, he argued that the people of L‟viv 
had always resisted Polish feudal oppression and the Austro-Hungarian occupation, 
fighting for „national freedom‟ and the „reunification of Ukraine with Russia‟.90 He 
thus portrayed residents of the west as part of both the all-Soviet and Ukrainian 
communities in order to claim a special status for the region over which he presided. 
However, although he explicitly presented Ukrainian nationalism in its anti-Soviet 
guise as alien to the local population, and despite the obkom‟s repeated appeals, his 
request was denied. The central authorities in Kyiv were reluctant to commemorate 
western Ukraine as a discrete, distinguished segment of the Soviet Ukrainian people 
at a time when Khrushchev‟s Secret Speech, Gulag returnees, and the events in 
Poland and Hungary were destabilising the region.
91
 Officials at the propaganda and 
agitation section of the Kyiv Central Committee believed that other industrial centres 
in Ukraine, such as Kharkiv, Odesa, Stalino, or Dnipropetrovs‟k, „had a glorious 
history‟, revolutionary traditions, and had proven their commitment to the Ukrainian 
narod: L‟viv did not stand out amongst other cities, and „elevating it to a higher 
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level‟ would be unjustified.92 They were afraid that representations of local history 
would fuel „undesirable‟ attitudes in the region because, it was implied, the locals 
had not yet shown their commitment to the USSR. 
In order to propagate knowledge of regional history, state and party officials in 
west Ukraine needed to prove that the local population, including the oblast 
bureaucrats themselves, would invoke historical myths with the „correct‟ intentions 
in mind: to underline their belonging to a wider Ukrainian, Soviet, and 
internationalist whole. This was problematic during the 1950s and 1960s: although 
the authorities in L‟viv were careful not to overemphasise their region‟s non-Russian 
and non-Soviet path of development, this was often undermined by lower level 
bureaucrats. Museum directors were a particularly uncooperative group, devoting 
little attention to the region‟s links with other parts of the USSR when they designed 
historical exhibitions. In 1967, the local authorities reprimanded museums for failing 
to propagate the ideas of the friendship of the peoples and proletarian 
internationalism. They displayed few materials relating to western Ukraine‟s 
development during the Soviet period and the spread of Leninist ideas in Polish-
ruled western Ukraine before 1939. Moreover, while the open-air ethnographical 
museum in L‟viv enjoyed the status of a republican institution, the architecture it 
displayed was predominantly representative of west Ukraine, with the left bank 
ignored almost entirely. Its employees paid little attention to contemporary housing 
and provided descriptions of the exhibits in the Ukrainian language only, even 
though over fifty per cent of tourists who visited the museum came from other parts 
of the republic.
93
  
Furthermore, during the 1960s, literary narratives of the village contributed to 
undermining the image of western Ukraine as part of the Soviet whole. In his study 
of Russian village prose, Geoffrey Hosking demonstrates that many writers explored 
folk traditions, thus portraying the village „in the grip of an alien bureaucracy and 
losing its values and culture in the face of the encroachments of urban and industrial 
civilisation‟. This evoked contradictory responses amongst Soviet officials and 
literary critics, some of whom believed that the static village characters provided no 
model for Soviet people who lived in a fast changing world, with others retorting 
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that men in the modern urban environment had the most need for „moral guidance‟.94 
While the village prose movement caused controversy because it fed into wider 
debates about de-Stalinisation and subjectivity in Soviet society,
95
 many Ukrainian 
party officials gave a very negative assessment to literary descriptions of the 
countryside in the western borderlands, in particular asserting that they put into 
question the very status of the western regions as „Soviet‟. This explains why, when 
Roman Andryiashyk sent his novel Zelenyi klyn (The Green Wedge) to be published 
in the journal Dnipro in 1967, the editors refused to publish it, pointing out that the 
Hutsuls were not shown to have strong links with other „Soviet‟ people.96 Charging 
that the Hutsul fight against the colonial politics of Austria-Hungary, Germany, 
Tsarist Russia, and Romania was treated in an artificial manner, as if it bore no 
relation to the revolutionary uprisings in the east and west, they sent the manuscript 
back to the author for corrections. However, Andryiashyk‟s work was eventually 
published in Dnipro in 1969 under the title Dodomu nema vorottia (There Is No 
Return Home), furthering the impression that western Ukraine was „different‟ from 
other parts of the USSR. Party leaders in Kyiv were outraged, because the author had 
made few changes to the original.
97
  
Western obkom officials consequently sought to eliminate depictions of regional 
distinctiveness from public rhetoric, seeking to defend their regions against 
accusations of „non-Sovietness‟. For one, they defended themselves against 
criticisms voiced in Kyiv. When the November 1968 plenum of the CPU Central 
Committee blamed the local authorities in L‟viv of lax control over live shows in the 
city, pointing out that the Zan‟kovets‟ka theatre production of Sestry Richyns’ki (The 
Richyns’ki Sisters) contained a Ukrainian nationalist anthem, the obkom secretary 
explained that the melody in question was not a nationalist hymn, but rather a folk 
song. Nevertheless, considering the „specificity of ideological work in our oblast‟, as 
the obkom secretary put it, and taking into account the „associations and 
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unprecedented reaction‟ which the musical motif could evoke among older members 
of the audience, officials at the obkom‟s propaganda and agitation department 
instructed the artists to replace the song.
98
 In order to prove their resolve to cultivate 
the „correct‟ version of historical memory, local officials sometimes blamed their 
superiors in Moscow and Kyiv for exoticising the borderlands. In October 1960, for 
example, a secretary of the Zakarpattia obkom complained about a tourist guide to 
the region published in Moscow recently. My idem po Karpatam (We Are Walking 
around the Carpathians) was „apolitical‟, he alleged, as it glorified old traditions. 
The author sought out „sensational‟ evidence of the region‟s distinctiveness, which 
forced the obkom onto the defensive. Describing the town of Vynohradovo, he wrote 
about Hungarian language, „typical Hungarian faces‟, and western architecture, 
encouraging the obkom to underline that there were only 2630 Hungarians out of the 
total 15,900 population. The Soviet authorities and workers built two factories, 
schools, nurseries, and libraries in the region after 1945, the obkom report 
emphasised, and there was nothing typically western about the local architecture.
99
 
Indeed, with time, Party officials became more efficient in eliminating historical 
depictions of west Ukraine‟s „otherness‟. On 11 March 1975, the head of the 
Glavlit‟s Ukrainian branch was happy to report that censors had strengthened their 
control over publishing in the republic over the course of the preceding two or three 
years. Under increased pressure from the CPU, editors approached their work more 
carefully and committed fewer mistakes than before. The editorial board of 
Vitchyzna had thus removed Hutsal‟s short story Zustrich z Karpatamy (A Meeting 
with the Carpathians) from the May issue of the journal, due to its focus on old 
architecture, customs and traditions.
100
 
Nevertheless, republican and all-Soviet bureaucrats did promote the use of 
specifically local historical themes and heroes in the west when they believed that 
this would help to strengthen Soviet patriotism in the region. Still, it was only very 
gradually and cautiously that Party leaders in Kyiv allowed scholars and obkom 
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apparatchiks to portray residents of western Ukraine as historical agents who drove 
progress in the borderlands. Stories about „socialist‟ struggle in the region emerged 
first. From the mid-1950s, historians and Party apparatchiks talked about the 
importance of rehabilitating the Communist Party of Western Ukraine (CPWU), 
which had been an autonomous unit in the Communist Party of Poland dissolved by 
Stalin in 1938.
101
 The process was painfully slow, partly because it took until 1966 
before the archivists at the USSR Council of Ministers found many materials relating 
to the CPWU (even then, they would only agree to give photocopies of the 
documents to the archives in Kyiv).
102
 Meanwhile, however, Party officials in L‟viv 
continued to argue that historians should explore the history of the CPWU in more 
depth. As late as 1962, a senior party activist, historian and former member of the 
CPWU still found it necessary to underline that the party should be rehabilitated. He 
appealed to the Institute of History at the CPU Central Committee to publish a 
collection of documents and a history of the Communist Party of Western Ukraine. 
His version of west Ukrainian history was much more favourable to indigenous 
inhabitants of the region than portrayals which emphasised the special role of other 
oblasts and republics in bringing „socialism‟ to the borderlands: he suggested that 
veterans of the CPWU should be given state pensions.
103
 Likewise, three years later, 
the L‟viv obkom stressed that it was the workers of west Ukraine, led by the CPWU, 
who staged street demonstrations in „bourgeois Poland‟, strove for reunification with 
the USSR, and fought against the fascists during the Great Patriotic War.
104
 Indeed, 
the obkom gradually found some recognition for the „brave struggle‟ of „west 
Ukrainian workers‟ against national and social oppression. Kondufor‟s history of 
Ukraine conceded that the accusations leveled against the CPWU in the 1930s were 
fabricated by „provocateurs‟.105 The positive role of local inhabitants during the 
Great Patriotic War was recognised, too. In 1965, the city of L‟viv was awarded the 
Order of the Great Patriotic War for „great courage and heroism shown in the face of 
the German-fascist occupiers‟,106 and Petro Shelest highlighted that 100,000 
residents of L‟viv joined the Red Army in the first few days of the war.107 Even so, 
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when the L‟viv industrial obkom asked to mark the 20th anniversary of liberation 
from fascism alongside Kyiv, Odesa, and Sevastopol, the Central Committees in 
Moscow and Kyiv refused to organise state- or republican-wide celebrations in west 
Ukraine, arguing that the obkom should limit itself to smaller-scale measures, such 
as publishing articles in the local press or holding a special session of the city 
soviet.
108
 
Furthermore, Soviet historians of the western oblasts grounded the legitimacy of 
their research by explicitly rebuking the claims of their „socialist‟ colleagues from 
outside the Soviet border, whom they accused of trying to undermine the Ukrainian, 
East Slavic and Soviet character of the western borderlands. It was the „historian‟s 
duty‟, claimed the Ukrainian press, to expose any such „falsifications‟.109 From the 
mid-1960s, the Romanians were especially provocative, publishing books and atlases 
which claimed that Northern Bukovyna was an ethnically Romanian land.
110
 
Similarly, Polish historical representations of L‟viv increased official pressure on 
Soviet scholars to integrate Galicia into the broader framework of Soviet and 
Ukrainian history. As early as 1956, party apparatchiks noted that the Polish press 
used the 700
th
 anniversary of L‟viv to portray it as a Polish town, underlining that it 
was important for the Soviet side to write about L‟viv as „a city of the friendship of 
the narody‟.111 The need to respond to foreign „distortions‟ inspired Party 
apparatchiks to sponsor more historical images of the borderlands, which permitted 
Soviet historians to introduce west Ukrainians as positive historical protagonists. 
This was evident during the 1962 tercentennial of Stanislaviv – another oblast centre 
in the west. The CPU first secretary, Mykola Pidhornyi (Nikolai Podgornyi), 
emphasised that it was at the initiative of the local state officials and social 
organisations that the city was renamed Ivano-Frankivs‟k. In a report to the Central 
Committee in Moscow, Pidhornyi justified the decision by referring to a distinctly 
regional history. The city was founded in the seventeenth century (on the site of 
ancient Ukrainian settlements, Pidhornyi underlined) by the Polish Count Potocki 
who named it after his son. The Potockis, the report continued, were associated with 
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the darkest period in the history of the Ukrainian narod, although Pidhornyi also 
stressed that the magnates oppressed both the Polish and Ukrainian narody. Workers 
of the Stanislaviv region took an active part in the struggle against foreign exploiters, 
fighting for social and national liberation, and the reunification with Soviet Ukraine: 
the Communist Party of Western Ukraine was founded here in 1919. In changing the 
name of their city and oblast, the „workers of Prykarpattia‟ wanted to pay homage to 
the great writer, revolutionary, and democrat – Ivan Franko, who had lived amongst 
the region‟s „brave and proud people‟ and „fairy-tale landscapes‟.112 Citizens 
commemorated local opposition to foreign oppression to show that this led to the 
„reunification‟ of Soviet Ukraine in 1939, which suggests that west Ukrainian history 
was used to reinforce a sense of Soviet patriotism in the borderlands. 
Party officials and scholars were especially eager to condemn Polish histories of 
L‟viv during the height of the Solidarity crisis in the early 1980s.113 This allowed 
Soviet historians to lobby Party authorities to let them explore west Ukrainian 
history from the „correct‟ positions. For instance, in March 1981, the director of the 
Social Sciences Institute of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences warned the L‟viv 
obkom about the negative influence of Polish history writing in the USSR and the 
shortcomings in the work of the local archives. The autumn 1980 issue of the Polish 
journal Z pola walki…, available to buy in western Ukraine, contained the entire 
„Constitution of the Association of Mutual Credit and Brotherly help in L‟viv, 1881‟ 
as part of its rubric devoted to the 100
th
 anniversary of the „workers‟ movement on 
Polish soil‟. The document had been held at the central state archive in L‟viv and, 
according to the report, its publication implied that L‟viv was a Polish city at the end 
of the nineteenth century, which was an opinion „mistaken from the scientific 
perspective‟, and „unacceptable from the political point of view‟. The academic 
charged the Soviet bureaucracy with incompetence, as he believed that similar 
documents should only be available for Soviet historians. The Soviet law did not 
permit individual researchers to make copies of entire documents, and if a copy was 
presented to Poland as part of an inter-state exchange, Soviet archivists should have 
made sure to publish and interpret the document in Soviet scholarly journals first.
114
 
Even though the CPU Central Committee did not entirely agree with the academic‟s 
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opinion, concluding that no rules were broken when the document was presented to 
the Polish People‟s Republic in 1978, they admitted that contemporary Polish 
historiography gave an „anti-historical assessment to a number of Polish-Ukrainian 
questions‟. This boosted the professional status of scholars at the Academy of 
Sciences: Party bureaucrats specified that the Social Sciences Institute of the 
Ukrainian Academy of Sciences should analyse how Polish academic periodicals 
presented Ukrainian (and especially west Ukrainian) history, and instructed the 
Institute of Social and Economic Problems of Foreign Countries to prepare a 
„scholarly note about the current processes taking place in Poland‟.115  
This may go some way towards explaining why Kyiv agreed to honour the 
memory of Prince Danylo Halyts‟kyi in the early 1980s, though they had rejected 
L‟viv‟s appeal to commemorate his resistance to Polonisation in 1956.116 In June 
1981, the CPU Central Committee and Ukraine‟s Council of Ministers received a 
petition from L‟viv. The obkom secretary, V. Dobrik, and the head of the oblast 
council of people‟s deputies, M. Kirei, asked for permission to erect a new 
monument honouring Prince Danylo as the founder of L‟viv. They wrote that the 
project had received the Academy of Sciences‟ approval, and stressed that Danylo 
Halyts‟kyi had led the popular struggle against Tatar-Mongol, Hungarian, Polish and 
German invasions. They thus suggested that residents of western Ukraine actively 
struggled for the reunification with their East Slavic brothers. After Danylo‟s death, 
when L‟viv fell under Polish feudal rule in 1349, the Ukrainian narod in the region 
strove for social and national liberation for almost 600 years, which culminated in 
the glorious reunification of 1939. Dobrik and Kirei despaired that Polish historians 
deviated from this version of history, portraying L‟viv as a Polish city with only 
coincidental links to Kyivan Rus; they argued that a monument to Prince Danylo 
would strengthen „the patriotic education of the workers‟.117 The Ministry of Culture 
in Kyiv agreed to include the monument in the plan of new constructions for the 
period between 1981 and 1985.
118
 Dobrik and Kirei staked a claim to represent 
inhabitants of western Ukraine whose distinct history acted as proof of their 
proletarian and Soviet credentials. In contrast to many portrayals originating in Kyiv, 
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the way in which they employed historical images of Ukrainian-Polish relations 
suggested a very different interpretation of who the Ukrainian „workers‟ were – by 
virtue of their prolonged struggle against Polish oppression, the indigenous 
population of west Ukraine (and their oblast leaders) could legitimately claim to 
belong to the progressive social forces of the Soviet Union.  
Allusions to regional distinctiveness and Polish domination of west Ukraine 
could be made in public in order to emphasise the local population‟s belonging to a 
larger Soviet and internationalist community, but not their special status within it. In 
this sense, the context in which historical narratives were employed mattered more 
than their actual content. Top CPSU officials encouraged discussion of how the 
CPWU and „brave Ukrainian workers‟ resisted Polish exploitation only to the extent 
that, in the their assessment, it would help strengthen the impression that western 
regions were part of Soviet Ukraine, and even promote the idea of friendship 
between the exploited „masses‟ of Ukraine and Poland. By the late Brezhnev period, 
state and party bureaucrats in the regions invoked the history of west Ukrainians‟ 
opposition to Polish oppression to claim for their oblasts an equal status in the 
USSR. Inhabitants of western Ukraine could speak about their struggle for social and 
national liberation to defend themselves against accusations of being unreliable, 
second-class Soviet citizens. On the other hand, this meant that they could not 
legitimately employ regional history to claim a special status for the western oblasts, 
or to articulate specifically local identities. Public discussion of regional history 
aimed to reinforce both Ukrainian and all-Soviet identities in the western oblasts. 
 
IV. Conclusion 
Inhabitants of Soviet Ukraine participated in a striking number of anniversary 
celebrations, special concerts, lectures, and parades devoted to East European 
history. Senior academics and school history teachers, writers, foreign diplomats and 
historians, as well as state and party bureaucrats in Moscow, Kyiv, and the provinces 
all contributed to the popularisation of a „national‟ vision of East European history, 
in which the USSR emerged as the leading state in the socialist bloc. Especially in 
the late 1950s and the early 1960s, some historians made significant attempts to 
bring out the role of the East European intelligentsia in guiding workers along the 
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path towards communism. However, these images were then overshadowed by 
historical portrayals, ranging from the times of Kyivan Rus‟ to the Great Patriotic 
War. They suggested that „Ukrainians‟, „Russians‟, „Eastern Slavs‟ and „Soviet 
people‟ were the ones who had brought progress to Eastern Europe, resisting the 
„national‟ and „social oppression‟ of other ethnic groups.  
From the early 1960s, under pressure from top CPSU apparatchiks, Soviet 
academicians, university lecturers, teachers, and CPSU activists who disseminated 
knowledge of East European history were increasingly keen to reproduce formulaic, 
ritualised stories about the Cossack uprisings against Poland, as well as Soviet 
„liberation‟ of the people‟s democracies during the Great Patriotic War. 
Paradoxically, the establishment of a canon of important „national‟ heroes and events 
which distinguished the USSR from other socialist states created new possibilities 
for imagining national consciousness in Soviet Ukraine. Underlining that the 
creation of the USSR resulted from centuries of national struggles and social 
progress, state and party officials in Kyiv and the oblasts, as well as members of the 
republic‟s intelligentsia, were safe from accusations of disloyalty and atomism. At 
the same time, they highlighted the role of particular regions, as well as Ukraine and 
Ukrainians, in events that were deemed important for „Soviet‟ history. 
Ukrainian academics and the Central Committee in Kyiv employed 
representations of Polish-Ukrainian historical relations to strengthen the position of 
their republic on the all-Soviet arena, and to legitimise their rule over a distinct 
Ukrainian community. Despite increased levels of Russification and a crackdown on 
„nationalist‟ dissidents under Brezhnev and Shcherbyts‟kyi, Ukraine‟s bureaucrats 
encouraged inhabitants of the republic to identify themselves as both Ukrainian and 
Soviet. Apparatchiks sought to highlight the development of class consciousness and 
Soviet unity, but also identified separate Russian and Ukrainian communities which 
drove historical progress. Especially by the 1970s, history was even used to suggest 
that Ukraine and Ukrainians were particularly distinguished members of the Soviet 
community. In order to reaffirm the unity of Eastern Slavs and the achievements of 
East European socialist cultures, as well as to criticise controversial views of foreign 
historians who questioned the unity of Russia and Ukraine, historians celebrated the 
growth of a distinct Ukrainian culture under Russian and Soviet auspices.  
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Meanwhile, state and party institutions in the oblasts challenged Kyiv‟s monopoly 
over the production of historical images. Once they were able to prove that regional 
history did not reinforce particularistic identities, officials in the western oblasts 
sought to demonstrate that „workers‟ in their part of Ukraine played a progressive 
role in history. Resisting attempts to portray inhabitants of other oblasts or post-war 
arrivals to the region as somehow more reliable Soviet citizens, they spoke about 
resistance to Polish national and class oppression in the west to portray the locals as 
part of a wider Ukrainian, Soviet, and proletarian community. Ironically, perhaps, 
regional history was used to weaken separate regional identities and to show that the 
locals were worlds apart from their „unstable‟ western neighbours who also 
happened to be their former oppressors. 
The question of subjectivity underpinned discussions of the past in Ukraine. On 
one level, the omnipresence of the Cossacks in Soviet Ukrainian historical memory 
was partly counterproductive, leading some individuals to question the extent to 
which 1654 amounted to a „reunification‟. More importantly, state and party 
bureaucrats, writers, and academics disagreed about the extent to which they should 
guide the formation of popular opinion in the republic. Despite the ritualisation of 
public rhetoric, some room still existed to dispute portrayals of the Polish-Ukrainian 
past, and to advance conflicting views about the role which the state and the 
„intelligentsia‟ should play in the formation of collective identities in Ukraine. The 
importance of the past in the Soviet public sphere led many party activists and 
members of the intelligentsia to perceive themselves as an elite responsible for the 
state of historical knowledge in the USSR. Indeed, although Soviet bureaucrats 
spoke of „workers‟ or „working masses‟ to describe the actors behind historical 
progress, they often implied that war veterans and old communists could claim to 
represent these communities and thus claim rewards from the Soviet state to the 
development of which they contributed. This suggests that the historical rhetoric of 
„workers‟ clashed with the implicit idea that there was a Soviet elite which both 
drove historical progress in the past, and shaped historical imagination in the present. 
This made the idea of national unity all the more important in containing potential 
social conflict in the USSR. 
229 
 
 
Chapter Five 
The Elites and the Workers: Polish Solidarity and the Unifying Force of Soviet 
Patriotism in Ukraine 
„There was a Soviet man and a Pole‟, went a popular joke which circulated 
around the USSR at the height of the Solidarity crisis. „Why do you have an eagle in 
your national emblem when surely you need a kangaroo? After all, you jump high, 
but with an empty pouch‟, the Soviet man would ask. „Why then is there no cupid in 
the Soviet emblem?‟, the Pole would retort. „He too is naked, carries weapons, and 
imposes his love on everyone‟.1 As this joke demonstrates, Soviet citizens often 
talked about social tensions and economic problems in Poland and the Soviet bloc as 
a whole as well as about the rising discord between Moscow and Warsaw. Popular 
perceptions of Solidarity fuelled a sense of Soviet pride in Ukraine, as many citizens 
explicitly rejected the Polish trajectory of reform. Criticising the appearance of „anti-
Soviet moods‟ in Poland, they articulated a range of national stereotypes about „lazy 
Poles‟ who jeopardised the socialist camp. Although Soviet leaders found it 
increasingly difficult to deliver on their promises of economic prosperity, with the 
late Brezhnev period witnessing a modest increase in domestic labour unrest, many 
Soviet citizens condemned Solidarity‟s political activism, confining their own 
demands to „bread and butter‟ issues.2  
In August 1980, in the midst of an enormous wave of strikes, the Polish state 
recognised the 21 demands of the newly formed independent trade union, Solidarity. 
In contrast to earlier workers‟ protests, the demands of the union were distinctly 
political: freedom of association, freedom of conscience, freedom of the press, social 
autonomy and self-government, and equality of rights and duties. As such, they 
reflected the alliance among workers, intellectuals, students, and the Catholic Church 
that had been developing since the mid-1970s; they combined a commitment to civic 
activism with the ideas of the democratic opposition and the moral views of the 
church. As Grzegorz Ekiert puts it, the rise of Solidarity „indicated the collapse of a 
definite concept of social and political order‟ in Poland. With some ten million 
members, the movement „presented a mighty political force that was able to threaten 
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not only the domestic order but the entire political stability of the region‟.3 As 
Solidarity continued to grow over the course of 1981, Soviet criticism of the 
independent trade unions became increasingly sharp, and Warsaw adopted a more 
confrontational attitude towards the „opposition‟. This culminated in the imposition 
of martial law on 13 December 1981, which demonstrated the regime‟s ability to 
survive a major challenge from below, but also Solidarity‟s „self-limiting‟ demands 
and non-violent tactics. While the stalemate between the state and society was not 
broken, the regime weakened the „opposition‟ and forced Solidarity underground.4  
Party activists and some dissidents had already discussed the problem of workers‟ 
unrest in Poland in December 1970, following the bloody riots on the Baltic Sea 
coast, and in 1976, after the creation of the Workers‟ Defence Committee.5 However, 
the events of 1980 and 1981 attracted more interest in Soviet Ukraine. The rise and 
fall of Solidarity pushed numerous inhabitants of the republic to blame economic 
shortages on „foreigners‟ across the border. More importantly, citizens commented 
on the rising economic difficulties in Poland as proof that political activism could 
undermine the tenuous balance between a „benevolent‟ regime and „beneficiary‟ 
workers, as well as increase national tensions in Eastern Europe and create the risk 
of war.
6
 Still, despite the scale of changes taking place just across the border, the rise 
and fall of Solidarity evoked considerably fewer comments in Soviet Ukraine than 
the dramatic events of 1956 or the Prague Spring of 1968, though this might partly 
be explained by the fact that the Soviet army did not intervene in Poland, as it had in 
Hungary and Czechoslovakia.  
With a partial exception of the western oblasts, and apart from the first few days 
after the introduction of the martial law in December 1981, primary party meetings 
and public agitation gatherings for industrial workers only touched on the Polish 
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problem „in passing‟. Agitators spoke about the unfolding developments as part of 
their regular talks about the „international situation‟, and participants in public 
meetings asked questions about Solidarity. Top Party apparatchiks also organised 
additional meetings between industrial workers, trade union officials, and factory 
managers, giving residents an opportunity to raise any complaints that they had 
against the „bureaucracy‟, but also allowing them to comment on the Polish 
situation. On an unofficial level, KGB reports document that such comments 
proliferated in the western oblasts. In conversations on public transport, at market 
places, and in queues outside shops, some residents drew a direct link between 
economic shortages at home and the Polish strikes. Unfortunately, records of official 
and unofficial comments are sparse, especially because numerous KGB and Party 
reports focus on the behaviour of Polish tourists in Ukraine rather than Soviet 
citizens themselves. Furthermore, they do not reflect the range of views about 
Solidarity, for some materials about the period are likely still classified. Nonetheless, 
the categories used in describing and asking questions about Solidarity, as well as 
the conflicts that emerged between residents of Ukraine and Polish tourists, reflect 
some popular attitudes towards „opposition‟ and strikes in Soviet-style regimes, and 
views about the role of workers and responsibilities of the state. 
The Solidarity period witnessed a major triumph of conservative patriotism in 
Ukraine. In contrast to 1968, when the various discourses of Soviet and 
Czechoslovak mass media, as well as illegal pamphlets and publications, fuelled 
popular awareness of conflicts over the meaning of Sovietness and socialism, the 
Polish crisis did not evoke constative discussions between proponents of reformist 
and conservative patriotism. Deemed to be inherently „non-Soviet‟ and „non-
socialist‟, Solidarity could not provide an external commentary on socialist values in 
the same way that Gomulka‟s reforms of 1956 and the Prague Spring had. The ritual 
of naming and shaming domestic „enemies‟ was now much less widespread and, 
with the exception of scattered dissidents, more isolated than in the late 1960s; 
reformist patriotism and anti-Soviet views did not manifest themselves in 1980 and 
1981. Rather, afraid of political and economic instability, perhaps even a war, 
citizens whose comments were actually recorded sought to underline their loyalty to 
the Soviet community, which they presented as unified in the face of the Polish 
threat.  
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Although these ritualised affirmations of loyalty prevented the rise of political 
activism,
7
 turning into a means of staging support for conservative patriotism, they 
also exposed social tensions in Ukraine. Members of the Soviet middle class were 
scared by the turn of events across the border and began to look at their own 
„masses‟ with apprehension. Even as they sought to become more responsive to the 
material needs of blue-collar workers, party and Komsomol activists, trade union 
officials, factory managers and other members of the Soviet „elite‟ were becoming 
ever more aware of forming a class apart in the USSR. They used the agitation 
meetings as well as travel and mass shock-work projects to articulate a form of 
„elite‟ conservative patriotism: in commenting on Solidarity, they underlined their 
belonging to a unified Soviet community, all the while emphasising that they were 
more reliable than ordinary Soviet citizens. Most important to them were „labour 
discipline‟ and „unity‟, as well as Soviet „aid‟ for Poland, up to and including a 
military intervention across the border.  
Meanwhile, however, some of the silent supporters of conservative patriotism 
from 1968 gained a voice now, challenging these elite articulators of conservative 
patriotism. In particular, numerous residents of the western oblasts commented on 
the rise of Solidarity much more extensively than other Soviet citizens. Although 
scholars have suggested that the biggest potential for spreading „ideas from Poland‟ 
existed in the Soviet west,
8
 it actually seems that many inhabitants of the region 
spoke about their location in the borderlands to prove their allegiance to conservative 
patriotism. During public meetings, but also in unofficial conversations and upon 
meeting Polish citizens, they suggested that their historical struggle against Polish 
oppression, geographical proximity to the border, and exposure to the „threat‟ of 
Polish tourism turned them into a bulwark of Sovietness. They invoked the ideal of 
unity that members of the middle class were so keen to promote in order to demand 
an improvement in their living standards, and to criticise Soviet economic subsidies 
for Poland. Despite dissident attempts to mobilise Soviet workers against the state, 
these patriots from the western borderlands apparently rejected the Polish trajectory 
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of reform: believing that political activism could upset their material wellbeing, they 
limited their complaints to the economic sphere. 
 
I. Elite concerns 
The Polish crisis posed a challenge to the middle class in Ukraine, further 
reinforcing its sense of distinctiveness. As top CPSU officials instructed the mass 
media to present Solidarity as a „nationalist‟ movement, but also to condemn 
Warsaw‟s neglect of the working class, they put pressure on party activists, trade 
union officials and factory managers in the USSR to highlight their own concern for 
the „masses‟. This allowed numerous members of these groups to portray themselves 
as a responsible Soviet „elite‟, all the while exposing them to criticism, as public 
agitation gatherings shamed the Soviet bureaucrats who remained „insensitive‟ to 
workers‟ needs.9 Paradoxically, therefore, while emphasising the ideal of Soviet 
unity vis-à-vis the „Polish threat‟, CPSU apparatchiks inspired residents of Ukraine 
to talk about the responsibilities of the Soviet „elite‟ and the rights of the „working 
class‟, thereby encouraging them to articulate different social identities. 
Workers‟ protests in Poland had already inspired party activists in Ukraine to 
identify workers as a troublesome group and thereby to distinguish themselves from 
them. Obkom, gorkom, and raikom members and candidate members were very 
disturbed by the bloody events in Gdansk, Gdynia, and Szczecin in December 1970. 
During closed party meetings, they spoke about „workers‟ as a potentially explosive 
force that must be controlled and managed. Activists also participated in special 
gatherings to discuss how Party officials in Soviet-style regimes could prevent the 
rise of discontent amongst the „masses‟.10 Expressing concern that the „Polish 
communists‟ had lost touch with the „working class‟ in their country, they suggested 
that „bureaucrats‟ in Soviet-style regimes should strive to satisfy the needs of the 
„workers‟.11 For example, a party activist from Kyiv stated that the Polish authorities 
were wrong to raise food prices, thus provoking protests among the „working class‟; 
the events demonstrated that „the Party‟ needed to „consult the masses‟ and to 
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maintain „close links with the working class‟ in order to solve difficult problems.12 
The Polish elite and workers should cooperate, he suggested, even though they had 
their own distinct interests and concerns. In his view, „communist leaders‟ had to 
satisfy the needs of the „masses‟ as well as pursuing other, less popular goals. As a 
history professor from Kyiv State University put it, Warsaw concentrated on 
building up heavy industry and producing for export, while failing to improve the 
living standards of the trudiashchiesia in a country so ravaged by the war.
13
 Because 
they were worried that Soviet „workers‟ could challenge their authority, too, the 
Polish crisis of December 1970 encouraged activists in Ukraine to explicitly discuss 
the relationship between „the Party‟ and „the masses‟. Many CPSU members in the 
republic thus inquired whether prices would be raised in the USSR like they had 
been in Poland, concerned as they were about the potentially destabilising 
consequences of such a move.
14
 Local leaders in L‟viv were particularly 
apprehensive about the influence of the Polish events on students and workers 
(rabochie) who lived in halls of residence, intensifying „ideological and educational 
work‟ amongst them.15 
 The overwhelming majority of reports concerning reactions to the Polish 
disturbances in 1970 only refer to discussions amongst the party active. This could 
suggest that there was relatively little public debate about the events among the 
broader population. Indeed, owing perhaps to the short duration of the crisis, it 
appears that even party activists did not publicly discuss the events after December 
1970. By contrast, public debates about Solidarity extended from August 1980 and 
December 1981, slowly raising the spectre of workers‟ unrest as a threat to Soviet-
style regimes. Because they feared that the news from Poland would highlight the 
conflict between Party leaders and workers, top CPSU officials first attempted to 
discredit Solidarity as small and insignificant. In line with this, the immediate 
reaction of the Soviet press, radio, and television to the August events in Poland was 
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silence and a careful evasion of the talk of strikes.
16
 After newspapers began to write 
openly about „Polish strikes‟ in the last days of August 1980,17 abandoning the 
rhetoric of „work stoppages... at certain enterprises along the Gdansk coast‟,18 they 
still portrayed Solidarity as an unpopular movement. This tendency was particularly 
strong after Solidarity was crushed in December 1981, when numerous articles stated 
that „most Polish citizens have welcomed the steps carried out by the army and the 
agencies of law and order‟.19 Even earlier, however, the press often asserted that the 
power of Solidarity was exaggerated by „the bourgeois news media‟,20 suggesting 
that the movement was doomed to failure: the Polish press was quoted to reaffirm 
that the Poles resisted „Western manipulation‟ and remained loyal to „the large 
family of peoples and countries of the socialist commonwealth‟.21 This was largely a 
response to concerns that western radio stations broadcasting to the USSR referred to 
the Polish events to question the leading role of the Party, propagating instead the 
idea of free trade unions, a strong church, and the relaxation of censorship.
22
  
Meanwhile, portrayals of Poland were becoming increasingly alarmist. After 
August 1980, the CPSU leaders further sought to discredit Solidarity by highlighting 
the importance of Soviet unity in the face of the „Polish threat‟ to peace and 
economic stability.
23
 Whilst underlining Soviet citizens‟ right to live well, top Party 
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leaders defined „quality of life‟ in a national framework: they encouraged residents 
of Ukraine to comment on the unfolding events in the name of a „Soviet people‟, 
distinct from Poland with its specific socio-political conditions, and materially better 
off than their Polish „brothers‟. As Gyorgy Peteri argues, East European portrayals of 
the West during the Brezhnev era depicted the „socialist‟ lifestyle as superior not 
necessarily because it offered better access to consumer goods, but rather because it 
made fewer demands of employees in the workplace, fostered good inter-personal 
relations, and allowed ordinary citizens to achieve a rather vaguely defined self-
fulfilment.
24
 During the early 1980s, official Soviet images of the Polish crisis 
suggested that wellbeing was a specifically Soviet achievement, because it was the 
USSR that guaranteed peace and material stability in Eastern Europe. The media 
stressed that the Soviet Union sent economic help to Poland and guaranteed the 
inviolability of Poland‟s western border. 25 Consequently, through remaining loyal to 
the Soviet state and its institutions citizens could assure their own wellbeing and the 
safety of the socialist camp as a whole, especially because „foreigners‟ threatened the 
integrity of the USSR itself. Shortly before the introduction of martial law, Pravda 
wrote that „[c]ertain provocateurs are questioning the existing Soviet-Polish border‟, 
which evoked „legitimate indignation among Soviet people‟.26 Soviet newspapers 
increasingly alleged that the Poles were nationalist and anti-Soviet, hinting at the 
possibility of a Warsaw Pact intervention in Poland.
27
 Although these images 
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clashed with portrayals of Solidarity as small and insignificant, they still presented 
the „Polish disease‟ as inherently alien to the USSR itself. 
Nevertheless, top leaders in Moscow also suggested that Warsaw must satisfy the 
„working class‟ to maintain stability at home and in Eastern Europe as a whole, 
which had far-reaching implications for Soviet domestic policies. During the autumn 
of 1980, they instructed Soviet newspapers to inform the population about all 
measures undertaken by authorities in Poland that served to „strengthen socialism‟, 
paying special attention to the „working class‟ and its „Marxist-Leninist party‟.28 
Accordingly, Soviet mass media charged that Edward Gierek had failed to fulfill his 
obligations towards the Polish „working class‟ and, in the immediate aftermath of the 
strikes in August 1980, they talked about the „improper functioning of a number of 
structures, which in turn gave rise to dissatisfaction among the population in the 
economic and social fields‟.29 At the same time, official media portrayals of Poland 
left no doubt that the PUWP would restore peaceful relations with the „masses‟, with 
censors stopping those issues of Polish periodical publications that criticised the 
achievements of Polish communists in the post-war period.
30
 Thus, the mass media 
suggested that Polish society was divided into the „elite‟ who had to provide, and the 
„masses‟ that received benefits and remained loyal to Party „leadership‟.31 
The Polish crisis therefore brought out tensions between the „rulers‟ and the 
„ruled‟ in a Soviet-style regime, and it consequently spurred top CPSU officials to 
pressurise industrial managers, trade union officials, and party activists in the regions 
of Ukraine to become more responsive to people‟s needs and opinions at home, too. 
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In September 1981, Pravda stated that the events in Poland demonstrated the 
necessity of utilising public opinion as a barometer to provide advance warning of 
„contradictions and conflict situations in socialist society‟.32 Similarly, Konstantin 
Chernenko's article in Voprosy istorii KPSS (Issues of the History of the CPSU) from 
February 1982 emphasised that „the Polish events showed the “vital significance” of 
heeding popular opinion‟.33 Top officials sought to make members of the Soviet 
middle class more attuned to the mood among the population, and especially among 
blue-collar workers, hoping that this would decrease the potential appeal of 
Solidarity. Particularly in late 1980, the CPU Central Committee considered this to 
be a pressing issue, as it strove to intensify the contacts between „workers‟ and 
Soviet bureaucrats. Describing the influence of the Polish crisis in Ukraine, Party 
leaders identified numerous cases where officials at individual enterprises and 
building-sites proved unresponsive to the pressing demands of the republic‟s 
trudiashchiesia.
34
 Similarly, when top apparatchiks in Moscow wrote about work 
conducted „in connection‟ with informing the population about Solidarity, they 
charged that trade union officials were unfriendly and indifferent towards Soviet 
blue-collar workers, rarely visiting them at factories to better their working 
environment.
35
 Consequently, top Party apparatchiks held meetings with the 
republic's trade union council to improve labour conditions and health services at 
large enterprises.
36
 They asserted that local bureaucrats should make a special effort 
to improve the material well-being of the Soviet industrial workers, increasing the 
supply of consumer goods and selling them directly at big factories. In October 
1980, they also resolved to strengthen control over the building of hospitals and 
schools, housing, restaurants and canteens, as well as cultural institutions.
37
  
These pressures from Kyiv and Moscow persuaded obkom officials in Ukraine to 
improve the organisation of agitation meetings for rank-and-file party members and 
many non-party citizens. Regional apparatchiks organised regular meetings under the 
banner of Den lektora, where representatives of the Znanie society instructed 
lecturers and agitators to answer any queries about Solidarity from „class positions‟, 
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using information from the Soviet mass media.
38
 They were thus to reassure 
audience members that the communist parties in Eastern Europe, including the 
CPSU itself, represented the needs of the „working class‟. In the autumn of 1980, the 
Volhynia obkom went so far as to set up a special commission which regularly met 
with secretaries of primary party organisations from large factories, held seminars 
for agitators who addressed workers on the topic of „combating bourgeois 
ideologies‟, and „systematically analysed‟ the locals‟ questions about Solidarity.39 As 
in 1968, when the ritual of naming and shaming „enemies‟ had allowed party 
activists to portray numerous inhabitants of Ukraine as „conservative patriots‟, public 
discussions about Solidarity helped to differentiate the stable majority from isolated, 
unreliable individuals. In L‟viv, for example, the obkom first secretary distinguished 
between the information that lecturers provided for groups of students and workers 
during public gatherings, which allowed them to investigate popular opinion about 
international and domestic problems, and the „individual work‟ that they conducted 
with former prisoners convicted for „nationalist activity‟, citizens who kept in touch 
with relatives in the capitalist West, as well as those „under the influence of Israeli 
Zionist propaganda‟.40 Likewise, while obkom officials in Volhynia were prepared to 
answer students‟ questions and concerns during special agitation meetings, 
considering the „historical past‟ and geographical proximity to Poland, they also 
intensified „individual preventative‟ work amongst former OUN members and their 
supporters, as well as „religious sectarians‟ and Roman Catholics.41 Thus, it was the 
demands of the Soviet „collective‟ which party officials were keen to explore and 
respond to, all the while focusing on more repressive measures amongst the 
„individuals‟ whom they considered less Soviet. 
Consequently, party activists in the regions addressed the public about the 
„unprecedented political events‟ in Poland, outlining the „correct‟ Soviet point of 
view.
42
 For instance, commenting on Brezhnev‟s meeting with Gierek during party-
active meetings in late August 1980, they underlined that Warsaw must restore the 
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„mutual trust between the leadership and society‟.43 Local party activists were also 
keen to monitor popular attitudes towards the Polish crisis, which was particularly 
evident in the western borderlands.
44
 In order to investigate the mood amongst the 
„masses‟ there, lecturers and agitators „answered workers‟ questions‟ during special 
meetings about Poland held in September and October 1980. The bulk of these 
gatherings took place in parts of western Ukraine, Belarus, Lithuania, and Latvia 
with significant Polish minorities.
45
 Moreover, on 4 October 1980 and 25 March 
1981, the authorities organised special „political days‟ for residents of the republic 
where agitators devoted much attention to the Polish crisis,
46
 and in June 1981 
soldiers, party members, and non-party „workers‟ throughout the country 
participated in gatherings about the Polish crisis, discussing the CPSU Central 
Committee‟s letter to the Polish leaders.47  
More importantly, however, top apparatchiks‟ pressure to „reestablish‟ close 
links with the working class pushed lecturers, factory managers, and trade union 
officials to organise public discussion in such a way as to downplay the importance 
of Solidarity and highlight instead the achievements of Soviet power. In contrast to 
1956 and 1968, when the local authorities organised numerous gatherings 
specifically in order to discuss the Hungarian and Czechoslovak crises, most citizens 
talked about Solidarity during meetings which were explicitly called to debate other 
issues. Arguably, this was in line with the wider tendency of downplaying the 
importance of the independent trade unions in Poland. Rank-and-file party members 
discussed the unfolding crisis during electoral meetings in October 1980,
48
 while 
other residents asked many questions about the situation in Poland at gatherings 
devoted to the Warsaw Pact meeting in December 1980,
49
 and again during public 
debates about the 26
th
 Congress of the CPSU Central Committee in April 1981.
50
 
The topic of Poland was also very prominent when residents debated Der Spiegel‟s 
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interview with Brezhnev in November 1981.
51
 Moreover, agitators and lecturers 
regularly addressed people at their factories and collective farms, touching on such 
general topics as „international affairs‟, „economic development‟, and „Marxist-
Leninist ideology‟,52 which gave participants an opportunity to discuss the unfolding 
events in Poland. Quoting his own experience in July 1981, a political commentator 
of the „Novosti‟ press agency noted that „no matter what audience one addresses 
today with a lecture about international affairs, the first question from the floor will 
unavoidably concern Poland‟.53 CPSU officials thus channeled public discussion 
about Solidarity into the relatively safe context of agitation meetings about the great 
achievements of the CPSU, the victory of the Marxist-Leninist ideology, the might 
of the Warsaw Pact, and the international stature of Brezhnev. 
The main purpose of these gatherings was not to shape popular opinion about 
Poland, but rather to examine and respond to workers‟ complaints about socio-
economic problems at home, thus helping to contain any potential unrest. While 
alarming reports about the need to improve workers‟ living conditions were 
especially frequent during the autumn of 1980, with leaders then turning towards „re-
establishing‟ discipline among blue-collar workers,54 party activists, trade union 
officials, and bureaucrats in charge of trade, among others, were again very 
concerned about improving the wellbeing of blue-collar workers and the vaguely 
defined „masses‟ at the end of 1981, that is immediately after General Jaruzelski 
introduced martial law in Poland on 13 December. In Kyiv, the gorkom held a 
special meeting at three o‟clock in the afternoon on the very same day, when the 
city‟s top officials instructed secretaries of the raikoms, heads of the city‟s social 
organisations, and officials of the gorispolkom to address state and party bureaucrats 
in different parts of the city later in the evening. For their part, primary party 
organisations were to conduct appropriate work immediately „among the masses‟, 
focusing on the workers‟ collectives in particular. The gorkom also instructed the 
city‟s bureaucrats to „increase political alertness‟ and act decisively against any 
„negative phenomena‟. No doubt, this implied that the authorities would closely 
monitor popular opinion to crack down on anyone who dared to criticise Jaruzelski‟s 
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actions – the gorkom specified that the city‟s internal security organs should be 
closely involved in the preventative measures, and local officials visited Polish 
students in Kyiv‟s halls of residence to make sure that they expressed support for 
martial law. The local administration further introduced more positive measures to 
assure calm and stability. They made a special effort to monitor public transport and 
other services in the city, while seeking to guarantee reliable food and fuel supplies, 
as well as making sure that the central heating functioned properly. In its conclusion, 
the report emphasised that the local population understood the situation correctly, 
beginning as normal the working day on Monday, 14 December.
55
 Similarly, in the 
Zhytomir oblast, a region with a sizable Polish minority, the obkom issued special 
orders to gorkom and raikom secretaries on 13 December, requesting detailed 
information about popular moods in the oblast, and instructing them to monitor local 
trade, transport and communal services. Officials in all the primary party 
committees, as well as managers at large industrial enterprises, were on a twenty-
four hour call to help control the state of affairs.
56
 Under pressure from Moscow and 
Kyiv, members of these groups strove to prove that they acted as a reliable middle 
class, responsible for maintaining peace and stability among the „masses‟. 
Top Soviet apparatchiks in Moscow and Kyiv observed the developments in 
Poland with a strong sense of apprehension. By putting pressure on party activists, 
factory managers and trade union bureaucrats to investigate popular mood among 
blue-collar workers and other citizens, top CPSU officials made them painfully 
aware of the unresolved conflict between the ideal of harmony and the reality of 
social disunity in Soviet-style regimes. On the one hand, this increased among these 
groups a sense of distinctiveness from the „masses‟, whilst also encouraging them to 
create spaces where citizens could press their demands from Soviet officials in the 
name of their workers‟ collectives. On the other hand, as portrayals of Solidarity 
pointed towards national animosities in Eastern Europe and Soviet superiority in the 
region, they encouraged residents of Ukraine to articulate a sense of Soviet 
patriotism. This evoked two distinct types of reaction to the rise and fall of Solidarity 
in Ukraine. Members of the Soviet middle class took advantage of the various 
official meetings which they organised to present themselves as the vanguard of 
                                                          
55
 TsDAHO, f.1, op.25, s.2295, ark. 12-14. 
56
 TsDAHO, f.1, op.25, s.2295, ark. 10-11. 
243 
 
 
Soviet society and to suggest that they were more reliable patriots than other 
residents of Ukraine. Meanwhile, partly through escaping the confined environment 
of public agitation gatherings, numerous blue-collar workers and residents of 
western Ukraine challenged this elitist vision, seeking to prove that they were equal 
members of the wider Soviet community who had the right to demand more material 
benefits from the state.  
 
II. Conservative Patriotism and Elites 
The Polish crisis fuelled a sense of superiority among many Soviet citizens in 
Ukraine. Numerous party activists, leading workers, war veterans, and factory 
managers portrayed themselves as successful leaders and the most reliable members 
of Soviet society who protected the interests of socialism. More aware of their own 
distinctiveness from the „masses‟ than in 1968, these proponents of conservative 
patriotism spoke about the importance of „social harmony‟ in Soviet-style regimes. 
They thus condemned Poland‟s departure from the Soviet social model, spoke about 
the great Soviet victory over fascism and exploitation in Eastern Europe, and 
recalled the social and national inequalities in pre-war Poland. As they discussed the 
rise of Solidarity, these self-identified members of Soviet elite further expressed 
support for the idea of the USSR‟s „aid‟ to Poland, explicitly stating that they would 
back a military intervention in the „brotherly socialist state‟. 
Participants in the public agitation meetings who spoke between August 1980 
and December 1981 became increasingly keen to underline that they condemned 
developments in Poland. In the autumn of 1980, numerous trudiashchiesia expressed 
concerns that the „free trade unions‟ would be untamed and disengaged from the 
principles of „working class struggle for socialism and communism‟ and the 
„common interests of the state‟,57 and they frequently referred to such stock tropes as 
„proletarian internationalism‟, „Marxism-Leninism‟, and the „strength of the socialist 
commonwealth‟.58 Public statements about Solidarity became still more hostile in the 
course of 1981. In May, for example, „workers of the republic‟ were dismayed at the 
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free reign of „nationalist and chauvinist‟ forces in Poland.59 A month later, increasing 
numbers of citizens who spoke in public denounce „anti-Soviet statements‟ made on 
Polish television, especially upset apparently by claims to the effect that the USSR 
had „robbed Poland‟. This showed that the Poles had forgotten just how much the 
Soviet Union had done for them.
60
 Many residents of Ukraine, including numerous 
party members and soldiers, claimed that the „Soviet people‟ supported the idea of a 
military intervention in Poland.
61
  
Official reports make it difficult to determine who voiced such statements during 
public meetings. They describe participants in very vague terms, such as the 
trudiashchiesia, but it appears that members of the Soviet middle class were by far 
the most outspoken participants in public agitation meetings. War veterans, 
university professors, party activists, and other prominent citizens sought to prove 
that they were personally offended by the rise of Polish nationalism, particularly 
through recalling Soviet feats during the Great Patriotic War.
62
 In June 1981, for 
instance, a lieutenant from Zaporizhzhia and honorary citizen of the Polish town of 
Raciborz called for PUWP leaders to act more decisively, stating that he had fought 
for the liberation of Poland during the Great Patriotic War and knew what a great 
price had been paid for its „honour and freedom‟.63 Similarly, soon after the 
introduction of martial law, a metal worker from Berdychiv claimed that this was the 
only possible solution which guaranteed that the gains of socialism in Poland would 
be preserved. To give credence to his views, he was quick to add that he had fought 
for the „liberation of Warsaw‟.64  
Given that party activists and other members of the middle class grew 
increasingly concerned about social tensions in Soviet-style regimes during this 
period, it is hardly surprising that public attacks on Solidarity acted as a means 
through which they both reaffirmed their special status in Soviet society and 
underscored their links with the „masses‟. An engineer from Volhynia thus spoke in 
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the name of his „borderland kolkhoz‟ in December 1980, pledging support for the 
Soviet army, but also welcoming the „timely announcement‟ by East European 
leaders that warned off all those seeking to „turn back the wheel of history‟ and „sow 
hostility between countries of the socialist camp‟.65 Speaking on behalf of entire 
communities was in fact a common rhetorical device used by advocates of 
conservative patriotism who sought to present themselves as an elite, allowing a 
senior factory worker from Kharkiv to claim that he represented workers who were 
supposedly troubled by the weak position of the Polish leadership; Warsaw 
continued to negotiate with „anti-socialist elements‟ when it was clearly time to „use 
force‟, he stated.66 Whereas these individuals who spoke during public meetings 
portrayed themselves as part of the collectives at their places of work, they also acted 
as self-appointed spokesmen for the „masses‟ and highlighted their readiness to 
defend „socialist achievements‟ in Eastern Europe.  
Furthermore, while explicit expressions of conservative patriotism were most 
frequent amongst members of the middle class who spoke during agitation meetings, 
numerous other inhabitants of Ukraine manifested both their commitment to Soviet 
unity and their „special status‟ in Soviet society by participating in various state-
sponsored shock-work projects and international exchanges of workers‟ collectives. 
Immediately after the introduction of martial law in Poland, over 2,500 thousand 
employees of large industrial enterprises, state and party officials in charge of trade 
and the food industry, lorry drivers, as well as students from technical schools and 
universities spoke about their „class solidarity‟ with Poland as they prepared New 
Year‟s presents for children from Katowice. Despite the widespread participation of 
blue-collar workers in preparing the gifts, the action was a means through which 
party and Komsomol activists, as well as „leading workers‟, both established their 
patriotic credentials and advanced their „elitist‟ claims. Shcherbyts‟kyi thus 
distinguished the Kyiv and Donets‟k obkoms for their contribution to the project: he 
stressed that „the best drivers‟ from Kyiv and Kharkiv, who were Party and 
Komsomol members, delivered the gifts to Poland, where they met prominent state 
and party officials and received flowers from children, while the Polish press and 
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television covered the event.
67
 Top party officials believed that the action 
strengthened citizens‟ sense of „unity‟ and pride vis-à-vis the Poles, and the 
programme continued in the years to come, with thirteen confectionary factories and 
ten oblasts preparing around 560,000 gifts for Poland in December 1983.
68
 Whether 
Soviet citizens who contributed to the project believed that they were in fact more 
hard working or better off than their „socialist brothers‟ remains unclear, but local 
activists manifested an outward commitment to „socialist labour‟ and „Soviet unity‟ 
through not only participating in the scheme, but also organising and coordinating it. 
They thus manifested a link with the „masses‟, all the while distinguishing 
themselves as an elite. 
This peculiar mixture of elitist and inclusive, demotic claims of conservative 
patriotism, already inherent in the ritualised practices of „staging consent‟ in 1968, 
was most palpable during international travel in the early 1980s. Although exchanges 
of „production collectives‟ between Poland and the USSR were severely constrained 
from the end of 1980, not really picking up again until mid-1983,
69
 travel was an 
important way many members of the middle class manifested a commitment to 
„helping‟ Poland and teaching foreigners about the importance of „equality‟ and 
„labour‟. In the first half of 1981, the number of Soviet people travelling to Poland 
was cut by 44 per cent, from 45,400 to 24,500. In some ways, this made travel into a 
more nobilitating experience, as it was mainly war veterans, leading workers, 
friendship society activists, trade union officials, and amateur artists who continued 
to visit Poland to „influence‟ the situation in their country.70 Even when tourism 
picked up in 1983, most Soviet citizens who travelled to Poland were prominent 
members of their local communities: fifty per cent of Soviet citizens preparing to 
visit Poland were party members, the great majority was active in the Komsomol, 
and they included leading students, workers, and sportsmen.
71
 Furthermore, travel 
was now more strictly defined as a means to promote Soviet values abroad. Party 
leaders instructed republican and local newspapers to write more about the Polish 
workers‟ collectives in Ukraine, thus showing how the Poles learnt from Soviet 
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experience.
72
 Because tourist activists were reluctant to send Soviet citizens to „rest‟ 
in Poland, associated as it was with a prolonged stay in the country, they focused on 
promoting „educational tourism‟.73 In other words, in the first half of 1981 alone, a 
large proportion of the carefully vetted 25,000 citizens who travelled to Poland, as 
well as scores of residents who met the Poles visiting Ukraine, portrayed themselves 
as Soviet people who taught foreigners about building socialism.  
Admittedly, blunders did occur, and some members of the Soviet middle class 
failed to prove their patriotic credentials upon encountering the Poles. Top CPSU 
officials reprimanded their subordinates when they failed to adapt to the Poles‟ 
requirements. For instance, the Kharkiv branch of the Znanie society organised a 
series of lectures for Polish building brigades, but their leaders refused to participate 
in them, claiming that the Polish trudiashchiesia „were not used to this form of 
information‟. At the same time, the society‟s lecturers did not respond to the Poles‟ 
request to address groups of workers about history, geography, politics, and 
international relations, because (as the report put it) none of them had prepared 
lectures on these topics. To make matters worse, the Soviet side failed to fulfill their 
part of the work plans or to guarantee reliable supplies, which gave „the foreigners‟ a 
reason to voice „demagogic statements‟.74 More often, however, Party officials 
praised members of Soviet delegations for trying to maintain close contacts with 
Polish workers, despite the latter‟s „negative reactions to the rise of Solidarity‟, 
reluctance to socialise, and preponderance for „anti-socialist‟ and anti-Soviet 
opinions.
75
 Soviet citizens also resisted the Poles‟ „unfounded accusations‟ that they 
stole their personal items as well as building materials from the storage.
76
 Thus, 
residents of Ukraine proved their loyalty to the united Soviet community, and 
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alienation from the Poles, by simply participating in the exchanges. At the same 
time, international travel and exchanges of workers‟ collectives in particular were a 
means for a large section of Ukraine‟s middle class to demonstrate their political 
maturity and to reaffirm their status as the most reliable Soviet citizens during the 
height of the Solidarity crisis. 
Unsurprisingly, perhaps, the uneasy combination of elitism and egalitarianism did 
not always hold, fuelling tensions in Soviet Ukrainian society, particularly in the 
western borderlands. Some „elitist‟ locals tried to prove their conservative patriotism 
by contrasting themselves with what they believed to be unstable citizens. The KGB 
thus investigated an anonymous letter sent to the L‟viv obkom, in which the author 
described food shortages in the region and blamed „hostile, subversive actions‟ by 
enemies of the Soviet power: „after all, you can expect anything in western Ukraine‟. 
The author identified himself as a „good communist‟, but he was worried that the 
Polish events could spill over into the region. „If you only knew, comrade Dobrik‟, 
the letter continued, „what goes on in L‟viv, especially after dark‟. People come out 
on the streets and yell out hostile slogans, Polish tourists engage in illegal trade right 
in front of the opera house and in public toilets, and they all bribe the militia to stay 
away.
77
 Similarly, another letter from „a war veteran‟ failed to accept that there was a 
shortage of flour-based foods in western Ukraine, especially because bread was 
readily available. The author asked the obkom to „check out the pasta factory‟, 
suspecting that its employees were hoarding products to provoke an outbreak of 
Polish-style strikes in western Ukraine.
78
 These elitist advocates of conservative 
patriotism who picked up on social tensions in the borderlands were critical of the 
local authorities, whom they considered too lenient: they should send out more plain-
clothes officers onto the streets of L‟viv, one letter suggested.79 
Under pressure to condemn the Polish social upheaval in the name of a 
harmonious Soviet people, numerous residents of Ukraine explicitly identified with 
unified and peaceful workers‟ communities. They thereby reaffirmed their position 
as important leaders in their local communities, all the while downplaying the idea 
that Soviet society could become as divided as Poland. Many Party and Komsomol 
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activists, war veterans, leading workers and other members of the middle class used 
various official forums, such as public agitation gatherings and organised travel, to 
show that they condemned the strikes in Poland and were ready to „assist‟ the Poles 
in building socialism through defeating „reactionary forces‟ and setting a good 
example for the „lazy‟ foreigners. Thus, conformity, participation in ritual 
representations of Soviet superiority, and outward commitment to „honest labour‟ 
emerged as the main features of elitist conservative patriotism, allowing numerous 
residents of the republic to underline their special commitment to the Soviet 
community. 
 
III. Conservative Patriotism in the Borderlands 
Many inhabitants of the western borderlands challenged elitist visions of Soviet 
conservative patriotism. At a time when Party apparatchiks sought to satisfy the 
needs and demands of workers‟ collectives in the USSR, they downplayed the 
importance of social and regional divisions in the USSR. Contrasting Sovietness to 
„Polishness‟ in explicitly national terms, many self-styled patriots in the borderlands 
argued that they were part of the Soviet collective precisely because they were more 
exposed to Polish influences than other Soviet citizens.  When they discussed the 
Polish „threat‟ to Soviet stability during conversations in shops and on public 
transport, as well as arguing with Polish tourists in western Ukraine, many people 
escaped the confines of official agitation meetings. It was in such public sites that 
they articulated the idea that most residents of the western oblasts were reliable 
Soviet people, more „cultured‟ and hard working than the „lazy Poles‟. This 
emboldened a large proportion of the local population to criticise the authorities for 
failing to provide a decent standard of living at home while offering economic aid to 
Poland. Still, despite dissident attempts to reach out to the disgruntled „masses‟, 
patriotism in the borderlands remained conservative, with popular criticism of the 
authorities largely limited to the economic sphere. 
A few residents of the western oblasts, including former members of nationalist 
groups, the faithful of the illegal Uniate church, and Roman Catholics, expressed 
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sympathy for the Polish opposition.
80
 According to the L‟viv obkom, „individual 
citizens‟ sympathised with the independent trade union movement under the 
influence of western radio stations, the Polish media, and tourist trips to Poland.
81
 By 
March 1981 the authorities had confiscated 55 bibles, 500 copies of a religious 
calendar, and 1100 religious books and brochures in Russian and Ukrainian which 
Polish citizens had posted to private addresses in the USSR, including many in 
western Ukraine.
82
 As members of the Polish clergy transported to Ukraine not only 
Polish religious literature, but also Ukrainian émigré publications such as 
Suchasnist,
83
 the local bureaucrats in L‟viv were concerned that contacts between 
Soviet dissidents and members of Solidarity who distributed „illegal newspapers and 
leaflets‟ in the region would strengthen Ukrainian separatism and religious 
feelings.
84
 Despite such fears, I have found considerably fewer reports about anti-
Soviet reactions to the events in Eastern Europe in the early 1980s than in 1956 and 
1968. While numerous KGB reports relating to the period are still classified, 
available evidence nonetheless indicates that residents of west Ukraine remained 
relatively calm during the rise and fall of Solidarity. For one, the local authorities 
themselves believed that „hostile‟ views were confined to a very small section of 
society.
85
 Just after Jaruzelski introduced martial law, Soviet officials from L‟viv 
surveyed popular opinion in every region and every village, at industrial enterprises 
and collective farms, educational institutions, halls of residence, as well as market 
places, bus and railway stations, and on public transport; even then, they concluded 
that the population voiced „no negative opinions‟ in relation to the Polish crisis.86 
Similarly, in November 1980, obkom leaders in Volhynia appeared surprised that 
even the „usual suspects‟, such as members of ethnic minorities, former OUN 
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activists, Uniates, and Roman Catholics voiced „no negative views‟ about the socio-
political changes in Poland.
87
 
While the Polish crisis generated conflict and frustration in L‟viv society, Party 
officials seemed to give little credence to the anonymous denunciations concerning 
the spread of „anti-social behaviour‟. Trouble-makers included fartsovshchiki,88 
makers of samogon, and „women of questionable reputation‟, but these were hardly a 
specifically west Ukrainian problem, turning up in other parts of the republic that 
hosted Polish tourists.
89
 The local militia also used „administrative measures‟ against 
eighty inhabitants of L‟viv who illegally rented out rooms to foreign tourists.90 
Nonetheless, though the apparatchiks were very alarmed about smuggling, their 
reports placed the blame for such „non-Soviet‟ behaviour almost entirely on the 
Polish tourists visiting the region and hardly mentioned Soviet citizens who engaged 
in illegal trade with the Poles. The proposed solution was to limit the number of 
Polish tourists in the region and thereby to bring back peace and stability.
91
  
In fact, many residents of the western oblasts proved their status as „conservative 
patriots‟ through defining Sovietness in opposition to „Polishness‟ and thus 
downplaying the importance of social and regional divisions in Ukraine. To put it 
differently, numerous inhabitants of western Ukraine articulated a vision of 
patriotism specific to the borderlands, which exposed Soviet-Polish „national‟ 
tensions whilst obscuring conflicts in Ukrainian society. Firstly, in letters to relatives 
across the border, many citizens in the region recalled the horrors of „pans‟ Poland‟ 
and expressed concern about Polish „anti-socialist forces‟ that laid claims to western 
Ukraine.
92
 They made references to the history of Ukrainian-Polish conflicts in the 
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region to show their alienation from the opposition movement across the border. 
While it is difficult to determine whether they knew that the local authorities would 
pick up on their views, other citizens also spoke about the need to protect Ukrainian 
national rights against Poland in public. During agitation meetings, for instance, 
members of workers‟ collectives from Volhynia, a region with a predominantly 
Ukrainian-speaking population, complained that „anti-Soviet attitudes‟ in Poland 
forced them to speak Russian and not Ukrainian when they visited their relatives 
across the border. Others still invoked a manifestly local, borderland identity, 
underlining that the crisis was particularly worrying as it was taking place nearby.
93
 
Thus, they turned their „west Ukrainianness‟ into a positive marker of Soviet 
identity. 
As articulators of conservative patriotism, numerous residents of the borderlands 
claimed that they worked hard for the benefit of „ungrateful‟ Poles. This is not to 
suggest that productivity increased, but rather that Soviet citizens spoke about the 
value of „honest labour‟ and the harmfulness and „foreignness‟ of strikes. In talking 
to other people queuing up in front of a shop, a local man from L‟viv thus claimed 
that the Poles were „idiots‟ who would harm themselves through not working.94 
Many citizens invoked a national rhetoric when they contrasted the „lazy‟ Poles with 
hard-working Soviet people. The reports do not always specify the context in which 
they voiced their opinions, but it seems that at least some of the views were made 
during public meetings. A telephone operator from Luts‟k sounded bitter as she 
stated that the „chaotic‟ situation across the border arose because the Poles were used 
to eating „tasty food‟ and living well, but they did not want to work.95 Similarly, 
another local woman recalled how Soviet workers in different oblasts and republics 
of the USSR were eager to help each other during recent floods, but the Poles were 
not used to honest labour: they enjoyed a jolly life with no worries, expecting Soviet 
people to work for their benefit.
96
 In this way, many inhabitants of western Ukraine 
spoke about the Polish events to highlight their own industriousness as „Soviet 
people‟. This may explain why they often claimed to be deeply offended to hear 
Polish accusations to the effect that the USSR exploited its satellite states 
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economically: individuals who had recently travelled to Poland expressed their shock 
at rumours that Polish meat had been sent to the USSR for the Moscow Olympics, 
while sugar and flour left the country through the eastern border in train carriages 
labeled „cement‟.97 
Encounters with Polish tourists who visited the region provided a context where 
many residents of the western oblasts articulated ideas of conservative patriotism. 
Upon encountering Polish citizens, they often denounced their „incorrect‟ opinions 
about socialism and the USSR. Between January and May 1981, 110,000 Polish 
citizens passed through the Chernivtsi oblast on the way to and from Romania and 
Bulgaria,
98
 and many „transit tourists‟ stopped off to trade and see the sites of L‟viv, 
too. Meanwhile, about 5,000 Poles visited the L‟viv oblast between October and 
December 1980 as part of organised tour groups, although their numbers were 
significantly slashed in 1981.
99
 They talked to „Soviet people‟, giving a „hostile‟ 
assessment to the Polish events, spread rumours about the Polish and Ukrainian 
resistance to Soviet rule, and openly called for the local people to organise Polish-
style strikes in the USSR.
100
 Moreover, some members of Polish tour groups in the 
region voiced views critical not only of the PUWP, but also the USSR. They warned 
their Soviet interlocutors that „blood would flow‟ if the USSR invaded Poland, as 
well as criticising the incorporation of western Ukraine into the USSR in 1939.
101
 
According to official reports, most locals resisted such „provocative statements‟. Not 
only did Intourist guides organise additional meetings between Polish tourists and 
„leading workers‟ of the oblast,102 but „ordinary‟ citizens condemned the Poles‟ anti-
Soviet views, too. They were infuriated by the „shopping trips‟, during which Polish 
tourists got drunk and claimed that „L‟viv is Polish‟. Indeed, throughout the 
Solidarity period, members of the local population appealed to the authorities to limit 
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the number of Poles in the region,
103
 and they continued to complain about the 
behaviour of Polish tourists in western Ukraine even after the imposition of martial 
law.
104
 When a group of Polish citizens addressed a long queue of local residents in a 
shop in L‟viv, encouraging them to protest against poor supplies just as people did in 
Poland, „Soviet citizens‟ retorted that economic problems only arose because they 
had to feed „lazy, speculative‟ Poles. The tourists left the shop in a hurry and did not 
try to speak to anyone else.
105
 Thus, the queue contrasted the „cultured‟ local 
population of western Ukraine with Polish „wreckers and „reactionaries‟. Similarly, a 
party member and a metal worker from L‟viv talked about his colleagues‟ outrage at 
provocative, anti-Soviet statements voiced by Polish tourists who visited the 
region.
106
 Hence, many citizens defined conservative patriotism against Poland, 
which enabled residents of west Ukraine to defend themselves against accusation of 
disloyalty in the full view of Soviet officials during public meetings. Moreover, they 
also acted as Soviet patriots in their everyday lives, which may suggest that their 
sense of national superiority vis-à-vis the Poles was rather deep-seated. It was 
precisely because they lived in the west, so exposed to the „Polish threat‟, that they 
could contrast themselves with the unstable foreigners, highlighting their 
„culturedness‟ and loyalty to the Soviet state.  
Paradoxically, even passivity distinguished some residents of the west as reliable 
patriots. Because Polish tourists visited the region en masse, party leaders recognised 
the locals‟ Sovietness when they suffered at the hands of „unruly‟ foreigners. For 
instance, one report praised Soviet customs officials who suffered at the hands of a 
30 year-old Polish conductor, who attacked them precisely because they were Soviet 
citizens and „Russians‟; he „yelled at them‟, claimed that the train was „Polish 
property‟, and charged that the „Russians treated the Poles badly‟. His attack thus 
reaffirmed their belonging to the Russian-led Soviet community. Similarly, militia 
officers in Chernivtsi faced insults from a drunken Polish couple who compared 
them to Gestapo officers: they arrested the man and the woman after they left their 
train at the Chernivtsi station, walked out onto the high street, and started to shout 
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out „anti-socialist slogans‟ such as „Death to communism‟.107 Obkom officials were 
ultra-sensitive to any signs of conflict between Polish tourists and Soviet citizens at 
this time. It is difficult to determine the extent to which party bureaucrats coloured 
their accounts of similar incidents, or to establish whether Polish „hooliganism‟ did 
indeed become more commonplace during the Solidarity period. What is clear is that 
the officials made a special effort to report the Poles‟ „bad behaviour‟, even when it 
was devoid of explicitly political content. For instance, they wrote about three Polish 
men travelling through western Ukraine by car. They stopped off at the Zelena 
Dubrava hotel in the Glyboks‟kyi region, where, in a state of deep inebriation, they 
poured water all over the walls and the beds in their rooms, destroying the hotel‟s 
paintings and breaking crockery. When the manager asked them to pay for the 
damages, they swore at him and later declined to give their personal details at the 
police station. On the very same day, party apparatchiks wrote, eight drunken Polish 
citizens travelling from Varna to Warsaw refused to show their „undeclared 
currency‟ during the border controls. They started swearing at the Soviet customs 
officer, after which they threw him to the floor and beat him up. One woman, a 
member of the rowdy group, bit the militiaman who arrested them.
108
 Although it is 
not possible to determine how the affected individuals perceived Polish tourists or 
the socio-political developments in Poland, it appears that party apparatchiks 
recognised members of the local population as „Soviet people‟ simply because they 
faced the foreigners‟ rude and unpredictable behaviour as they protected the Soviet 
state and property.  
Indeed, conservative patriotism in the borderlands was a potent force, and even 
the image of „passive victims‟ allowed residents of the western oblasts to articulate 
demands of the Soviet state: although they refrained from voicing explicitly political 
demands and distanced themselves from the Polish socio-political upheaval, they 
expected the authorities to guarantee their personal safety and economic stability in 
the face of the Polish „threat‟. At times, citizens spoke about the need to avoid war at 
all costs, offering their political acquiescence in return for peace. During public 
meetings across Ukraine, residents of the republic openly admitted that they were 
afraid of the Polish crisis escalating into a military conflict and asked lecturers and 
                                                          
107
 TsDAHO, f.1, op.25, s.2287, ark. 8-10. 
108
 TsDAHO, f.1, op.25, s.2287, ark. 6, 8-10. 
256 
 
 
agitators to discuss the possibility of war.
109
 Precisely in the borderlands did the 
spectre of war seem the most threatening, and this inspired residents to voice support 
for the ideal of Soviet unity. Reporting on conversations in public spaces around 
L‟viv, the KGB concluded that „many people‟ supported „our policy of peace‟ and 
were happy to bear the shortages as long as they would help to avoid war.
110
 Even 
the Polish minority in the region reacted „calmly‟ to the introduction of the martial 
law: the officials believed that this was largely because they wanted to „avoid 
bloodshed‟.111  
More prominently, at a time when party activists were becoming increasingly 
determined to increase the living standards of blue-collar workers, proponents of 
conservative patriotism in the borderlands boldly demanded material benefits from 
Soviet bureaucrats. These claims were politicised in that residents criticised the 
performance of the Soviet media and attacked Soviet officials for offering aid to 
Poland whilst neglecting their own citizens. The events in Poland inspired some 
people to express their disbelief in the official portrayals of Eastern Europe which 
suggested that the region was economically successful. Numerous Soviet 
trudiashchiesia asked why „socialist achievements were jeopardised‟ in Poland, 
further probing the reasons for the Polish failure to take more decisive steps to 
collectivise agriculture and combat religious influences.
112
 Agitators found it 
difficult to answer similar questions, because citizens drew explicit links between the 
situation across the border and in the USSR itself. In the autumn of 1980, therefore, 
party members and non-party members alike encouraged party activists to explain 
what conclusions were being drawn from the Polish experience „here‟.113 In the 
spring of 1981, they continued to inquire whether the USSR had foreign debts like 
Poland, demanding to know how it was planning to pay them off in such case.
114
 
Apart from demanding more information from state officials, some individuals were 
more explicit in criticising the inadequacies of the official media when they 
complained about shortages. One local man queuing outside a shop in L'viv pointed 
out that supplies deteriorated from year to year, even though the official press 
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claimed that Soviet factories constantly overfulfilled their production targets, while 
many other residents who talked to each other in public places around the city hoped 
that the media would provide more „objective information‟ about political events and 
the real state of the economy.
115
 However, demands for more information were much 
fewer in 1980 and 1981 than they had been in 1956 and 1968, and inhabitants of 
Ukraine were less keen to present themselves as „active‟ citizens who deserved to 
know about the unfolding developments.  
It was more common for the west Ukrainian advocates of conservative patriotism 
to criticise Soviet subsidies to Poland. Some were very circumspect about it, 
especially when speaking in public: during an agitation meeting in October 1980, a 
driver and party member from west Ukraine agreed that it was necessary to send 
economic help to Poland, but quickly added that „selfless help‟ could harm the 
brotherly country which could not even feed itself thirty years after the war.
116
 With 
the escalation of the crisis, some inhabitants of western Ukraine attacked the Soviet 
state more openly, charging that it neglected the needs of its own hard-working 
citizens whilst helping the „foreigners‟ in Poland. Many residents expressed 
„negative‟ views about the USSR‟s economic aid in anonymous notes passed to 
lecturers during agitation meetings, as well as in letters to party officials and 
newspaper editors.
117
 One anonymous letter demanded that the obkom improve the 
supply of potatoes for the town of L‟viv, asking whether it was true that agricultural 
products were being sent to Poland. After all, the author wrote, transports pick up 
products from collective farms everyday.
118
 Citizens also asked officials to confirm 
the rumours that the USSR paid off Polish debts with its own natural resources.
119
 
They thus confronted Soviet bureaucrats whom they suspected of ignoring the 
population‟s material needs. 
 In isolated cases, economic complaints took on a more confrontational form. The 
authorities in L‟viv wrote about the „hostile‟ views of an unnamed individual who 
stated that the policy of sending everything to Poland was „wrong‟ and could lead to 
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the outbreak of Polish-style strikes „here‟. The same person claimed that Polish 
workers in Solidarity would successfully defend their rights.
120
 Even more daringly, 
a local resident stated that „our‟ narod was „idiotic and scared‟, while the Poles rose 
up for their rights just as they had done „under the Tsar‟.121 In fact, the rise of 
Solidarity emboldened some dissidents to attempt to reach out to the „masses‟ and 
exploit economic discontent to build a more powerful opposition movement. This 
was especially true amongst members of the Helsinki groups, who had previously 
expressed support for the Polish Workers‟ Defence Committee.122  In 1980 and 
1981, activists of the Russian Union of Solidarists (RSU) and the Free 
Interprofessional Union of Workers (SMOT), dissidents such as Andrei Sakharov, 
and even some individual blue-collar workers published articles in samizdat, 
outlining plans to encourage workers to „draw conclusions from the Polish 
experience‟.123 However, a mood of pessimism was quick to set in amongst samizdat 
authors, as they contrasted the activism of the Polish trade unions with the Soviet 
workers‟ apathy and dissidents‟ failure to work with „the masses‟.124 They ascribed 
the scope of the Polish opposition to the strength of Polish patriotism,
125
 thus 
presenting Solidarity as a specifically Polish phenomenon which was unlikely to 
spread into the USSR itself. „Dear Polish comrades, friends, brothers. We cannot 
help you much, we can only hope for you and believe in you‟ – stated the samizdat 
appeal of a group of Soviet „non-conformists‟ to Polish workers on 14 December 
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1981.
126
 The feeling of powerlessness which permeated Soviet underground 
publications about Solidarity was summed up by a Moscow blue-collar worker, 
Nikolai Alekseev, who described how his colleagues called for a crackdown on 
Solidarity even during informal conversations. They criticised the free trade unions 
as they bitterly pointed out that Soviet workers refrained from strikes that weakened 
the Warsaw Pact, despite the fact that they did not enjoy a higher standard of living 
than the Poles.
127
 
Indeed, even though economic discontent was widespread in western Ukraine, 
most residents who complained about their quality of life were far from forming an 
organised political force. For one, they tended to express their views in spontaneous 
outbursts: at the „Okean‟ fishmonger‟s store in L‟viv, „two people around the age of 
forty, probably a husband and wife‟, raised a fuss about the lack of „herring and 
fish‟. The man pointed out that that „we catch more fish now than ever before‟ and 
the woman shouted that „we send it all to our friends abroad‟.128 Secondly, their 
demands were very concrete and thus limited: they mentioned particular products 
which were in short supply and suggested simple, but rather temporary solutions to 
the poor economic situation. Many inhabitants of the borderlands proposed that the 
local officials should introduce a rationing system so that people would not waste 
their time in queues whilst meat and potatoes were sent abroad.
129
 Similarly, during 
public agitation meetings, Party, trade union, and Komsomol members, as well as 
workers at large industrial enterprises raised questions concerning the need to 
improve the supply of food, especially meat and potatoes, and some consumer 
goods, including bed sheets, soap, threads, and washing powder.
130
 Thirdly, as they 
invoked ideals of conservative patriotism, inhabitants of the west focused their 
attacks on local officials rather than top CPSU leaders or the Soviet system itself: 
two elderly men travelling on a tram in L‟viv complained about queues and 
corruption in shops, blaming the municipal authorities for all economic problems.
131
 
                                                          
126
 MS 22/82, 25 June 1982, Document AS4655: „Sovetskie inakomysliashchie: Obrashchenie k 
pol‟skim rabochim‟, no place, 14 December 1981; MS 37/82, 14 November 1982, Document 
AS4752:  „Informatsionnyi Biulleten‟ SMOTa no.29‟, December 1981-January 1982. 
127
 MS 34/81, 11 September 1981, Document AS4413: Nikolai Alekseev, 'Zametki Rabochego', 
September 1981. 
128
 TsDAHO, f.1, op.25, s.2048, ark. 114-117. 
129
 TsDAHO, f.1, op.25, s.2048, ark. 117-121. 
130
 RGANI, f.5, op.77, d.105, ll. 49-53. 
131
 TsDAHO, f.1, op.25, s.2048, ark. 121. 
260 
 
 
They infused their economic complaints with a sense of Soviet pride, reaffirming 
their loyalty to the CPSU and the Soviet state at the same time as criticising 
ineffective officials. When commenting on meat and butter shortages in queues, 
market places and on public transport, some inhabitants of the borderlands 
complained that „their‟ factories worked to satisfy the needs of Poland, where people 
„had no fear anymore‟ and were „fascinated by democracy‟, while they „went 
hungry‟ themselves.132 Likewise, an anonymous letter posted to the L‟viv obkom 
claimed that strikes were alien to any socialist system, which meant that the Poles 
were not worthy of Soviet assistance. The Soviet narod had earned the right to live 
well, it argued, but instead the USSR was „like a dairy cow‟: the authorities sent 
meat, eggs, and butter to the Poles who, even though they were allies, were also 
essentially „useless‟.133 In this way, these people explicitly rejected the Polish 
trajectory of reform, as well as hinting at their dissatisfaction with economic aid for 
Poland. 
The Polish crisis reverberated in the western borderlands much more than in 
other parts of Ukraine. As late as 1986, a Pole from Volhynia reported that the few 
Ukrainian friends with whom he could discuss politics continued to talk about the 
events of 1980.
134
 It was in the west that many residents discussed the Polish „threat‟ 
to Soviet stability and economic wellbeing, not only during public agitation 
meetings, but also in „unofficial‟ conversations outside shops, on public transport, 
and in anonymous letters. It was also here that many inhabitants came into contact 
with Polish tourists, which fuelled national tensions and encouraged „ordinary‟ 
citizens to denounce the Polish path of reform. Many local residents contrasted 
themselves with the „lazy‟ and unreliable foreigners. This allowed them to prove 
their own patriotic beliefs, downplaying the importance of social and regional 
divisions in Ukraine, and challenging the elitist vision of Soviet patriotism. As 
proponents of conservative patriotism, Soviet citizens in west Ukraine were 
emboldened to attack the „bureaucracy‟ for helping ungrateful Poles instead of 
taking care of their own citizens, but they largely limited their complaints to the 
economic sphere and refrained from voicing explicitly political demands. 
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IV. Conclusion 
During the rise and fall of Solidarity, Poland functioned as an important „internal 
elsewhere‟ among members of the Soviet middle class and inhabitants of the western 
borderlands. Numerous citizens spoke about socio-political upheavals across the 
border with a sense of apprehension, contrasting the Polish „opposition‟ with a stable 
and united Soviet community. Apart from some religious individuals and a few 
scattered dissidents who sought to establish independent trade unions in the USSR, 
very few residents of Ukraine supported Solidarity‟s challenge to the Soviet-style 
regime in Poland. However, this is not to suggest that the others defended the 
ideological dogmas about Party leadership of the working class; on the contrary, 
members of the Soviet middle class sought to discourage popular interest in the 
political developments in Poland, and residents of the western oblasts refrained from 
articulating explicitly political views in return for material concessions from the 
state. Many of them distanced themselves from Solidarity precisely because it upset 
the delicate balance between the acquiescent „masses‟ and a benevolent regime: they 
condemned workers‟ activism as a destabilising influence which harmed East 
European economies and inflamed national tensions.  
Whereas comparisons with the West fuelled some dissatisfaction with the Soviet 
economic system, images of Poland reinforced citizens‟ commitment to Soviet 
„unity‟ and political passivity. Contributors to the autumn 2008 issue of Kritika 
suggest that socialist regimes throughout Eastern Europe increasingly sought to 
legitimise their rule by contrasting the quality of life under socialism and capitalism. 
Eastern Europeans compared the extent to which individuals achieved „happiness‟ 
under Soviet-style socialism and in the imagined West. As Gyorgy Peteri 
emphasises, this undermined the Soviet camp‟s „systemic integrity and identity‟ and 
inspired popular dissatisfaction with the „rebellious project of socialism‟, as it „failed 
to provide a workable way toward an alternative modernity‟.135 By contrast, 
memories of Polish rule in west Ukraine, conflicts between Soviet citizens and 
Polish tourists in the region, and the belief that Solidarity‟s strikes led to economic 
chaos in Poland made numerous inhabitants of Ukraine distrustful of the anti-Soviet 
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opposition across the border. Consequently, most citizens who commented on the 
rise and fall of Solidarity spoke in the name of unanimous workers‟ collectives, 
whether as successful community leaders or the passive svoi who suffered at the 
hands of „unruly‟ foreigners. 
During late 1980 and 1981, the great bulk of Soviet citizens articulated a vision of 
conservative patriotism. They agreed about the importance of „hard work‟ and Soviet 
unity vis-à-vis the foreign „threat‟, grounding an idea of patriotism in an outward 
commitment to „honest labour‟ and a sense of national pride as well as on a negative 
image of „lazy‟ Poles. Nevertheless, debates about Solidarity also encouraged 
residents of Ukraine to speak about social divisions in the USSR. Just as the 
ritualisation of historical commemorations allowed inhabitants of western Ukraine to 
emerge as positive protagonists in Soviet historiography, it was precisely the 
formulaic nature of debates about Solidarity which permitted citizens to invest 
conservative patriotism with very different meanings. With accusations of disloyalty 
fewer than in 1956 and 1968, and national unity, equality, and commitment to labour 
defined clearly as Soviet values, inhabitants of Ukraine invoked these official 
slogans to advance varying interpretations of what it meant to be a Soviet person, all 
the while maintaining a semblance of social harmony. 
Anxious about the Polish developments, Party and Komsomol activists, „leading 
workers‟, and war veterans grew ever more conscious of forming a class apart in the 
USSR. In order to keep the „masses‟ under control, they made a special effort to 
monitor popular opinion, improve blue-collar workers‟ living conditions, as well as 
making Soviet bureaucrats and institutions more responsive to the material needs of 
the „masses‟. However, even while they propagated the ideal of Soviet unity, 
members of the middle class used public agitation gatherings and international 
exchanges of workers‟ collectives to prove that they were the most reliable Soviet 
patriots. They identified themselves as the elite of conservative patriotism, 
highlighting their support for Soviet economic aid for Poland and declaring readiness 
to back a military intervention in Eastern Europe, as well as seeking to identify 
unreliable residents of Ukraine who did not live up to the Soviet ideal. 
For their part, many inhabitants of the western borderlands challenged the elitist 
vision of patriotism and the importance of Ukraine‟s social and geographical 
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divisions. I have found little evidence to support Teague‟s view that „[a]lone among 
the Soviet Union‟s national groupings, the populations of the western borderlands- 
Ukraine, Belorussia, and the Baltic states- proved responsive to the example of 
Poland‟s labour unrest‟.136 It would rather appear that many inhabitants of western 
Ukraine spoke during public meetings in an effort to show that their exposure to the 
„Polish threat‟ increased their loyalty towards the USSR. At the same time, they 
escaped the narrow context of public agitation gatherings to suggest that they were a 
crucial part of the wider Soviet community: in anonymous letters and unofficial 
conversations recorded by the KGB, proponents of conservative patriotism from the 
borderlands claimed that they had resisted Polish oppression in the past and 
repudiated Polish tourists‟ unfounded accusations against the USSR in the present, 
as well as working hard to assure a bright „socialist future‟ for Poland and the 
socialist camp as a whole. Having thus established their patriotic credentials, such 
residents of the western oblasts articulated hopes that the Solidarity crisis would not 
escalate into a military conflict. They also criticised Soviet officials and institutions 
for failing to inform them about the unfolding developments. Most prominently, 
however, at a time when Soviet bureaucrats promised to improve the population‟s 
standard of living, numerous inhabitants of the borderlands charged that the officials 
neglected their material needs, all the while sending economic aid to Poland. The 
rhetoric of Soviet supremacy and „socialist‟ solidarity in Eastern Europe was a 
double-edged sword: not only did it drive home the idea that Soviet workers‟ rights 
should be defended more vigorously, but it also suggested that Soviet citizens should 
work more efficiently to give a good example to the Poles. 
The rise and fall of Solidarity encouraged residents of Ukraine to distance 
themselves from Poland and the socialist camp. Indeed, the Polish events 
strengthened Soviet isolationism in the physical sense. The border between the two 
countries was never easy to cross, but a handful of daring individuals used to slip 
across undetected amongst the European bison. The authorities refrained from 
building a fence along a narrow stretch of the frontier in the Belovezha nature 
preserve so as not to disturb the natural habitat of the nearly extinct animals. 
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However, Solidarity had a detrimental effect on the bison‟s wellbeing – the USSR 
finally built a fence in the forest at the height of the Polish crisis.
137
 
                                                          
137
 Conversation with Vera Rich, Ukrainian Institute in Great Britain, 26 November 2009. 
265 
 
 
Conclusion 
Between the 1950s and the 1980s, the signs and expressions of Soviet patriotism 
grew increasingly strong among the population of Ukraine. Describing the people‟s 
democracies in various public forums, illegal publications and informal 
conversations, numerous residents of the republic portrayed themselves as loyal 
citizens concerned about the USSR‟s relationship with foreign states and nations. As 
such, they argued about the desirable direction of Soviet foreign policy and 
evaluated the claims of reformist forces both in the USSR and in the outer empire. 
More prominently, by staging consent for Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe and 
thereby claiming membership in the imagined Soviet community, citizens sought to 
improve their social standing in the USSR. 
Distinct patterns in the evolution of Soviet narratives about the people‟s 
democracies helped to shape official notions of Sovietness. On the one hand, top 
Party leaders were keen to portray Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland as 
„brotherly‟ socialist states, demonstrating thereby that Soviet-style socialism held an 
international appeal. On the other hand, the authorities also promoted tutelary and 
imperial narratives: claiming that the USSR and its residents guided „foreigners‟ on 
the path of progress, they juxtaposed Soviet people to other nations in the Soviet 
bloc. In that sense, top apparatchiks defined Sovietness itself in national terms, 
outlining in official rhetoric the „national‟ characteristics of Soviet people. For one, 
encouraging inhabitants of Ukraine to distance themselves from „unreliable‟ and 
„work-shy‟ foreigners in Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland, the authorities 
suggested that reliable Soviet citizens were serious and hard working. Furthermore, 
especially after the Prague Spring discredited ideas of „reform socialism‟, Soviet 
mass media condemned foreign ideological diversions and departures from the 
Soviet political, economic and social model. This fuelled the notion that Soviet 
citizens were supposed to be conservative, suspicious of any attempt to reform 
Soviet-style regimes. By raising alarm about the spread of „anti-Soviet‟, „anti-
Russian‟, and „anti-Ukrainian‟ attitudes in the outer empire, the authorities also 
increasingly defined Sovietness in ethnically exclusive, East Slavic terms. They 
suggested that reliable Soviet citizens were Russians and Ukrainians who protected 
their homeland from both foreign threats and domestic fifth columnists, including 
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members of ethnic minorities and Ukrainian „bourgeois nationalists‟ who sought to 
break up the union of Ukraine and Russia. 
These narratives evoked different responses among the population of Soviet 
Ukraine. On one level, official portrayals of Eastern Europe exerted a strong 
exlusionary force. Many members of Ukraine‟s ethnic minorities felt that they did 
not belong to the East Slavic community which the officials invoked to differentiate 
Soviet citizens from residents of the satellite states. Some Hungarians and Poles who 
lived in western Ukraine expressed sympathy towards what they perceived as „anti-
Soviet‟ national movements in their external homelands, and, during times of unrest, 
even talked about the possibility of redrawing borders. Meanwhile, some citizens of 
Jewish origin pointed to the rise of anti-Semitism in the USSR and Eastern Europe, 
which helped to reinforce demands for the right to emigrate. One can also trace the 
evolution of particularistic ethnic identities among activists of the Greek Catholic 
Church and former members of Ukrainian nationalist organisations. While they 
accepted official notions that reformist and opposition movements in the outer 
empire constituted a „nationalist threat‟ to Soviet stability, they rejected the idea that 
Ukraine could best defend its national interests in the USSR and in a close union 
with Russia. Consequently, unrest in the outer empire in 1956 and, to a lesser extent, 
in 1968, reinforced such demands for Ukrainian independence, particularly in the 
western borderlands: perceptions of foreign struggle against Soviet occupation 
inspired a small number of residents to believe that Soviet hegemony in the region 
would soon come to an end.  
„Anti-Soviet‟ views attracted a small minority of Ukraine‟s residents. More 
commonly, official narratives provided codes for people to fashion themselves as 
loyal patriotic citizens. Although the formulaic surveillance reports projected a 
distorted image of popular opinion, with bureaucrats imposing official categories on 
what was probably a wider range of opinions, they still reveal that citizens advanced 
conflicting visions of what it meant to be Soviet. In 1956 and in 1968, people‟s 
views and attitudes could be classified along the spectrum between reformist 
patriotism and conservative patriotism. In contrast, after the 1968 Warsaw Pact 
invervention of Czechoslovakia, the authorities registered few expressions of 
reformist ideas. Most reports indicated that citizens invoked what they believed to be 
the „correct‟ ideas of conservative patriotism both in various public forums and 
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during informal conversations. While this undoubtedly exposes the difficulties which 
Soviet officials faced in gauging citizens‟ views, it also seems that people did grow 
reluctant to express reformist ideas, afraid of persecution and disillusioned about the 
prospect of successful reform in the Soviet bloc. By engaging in the practices of 
staging consent, however, they still advanced different ideas about how Soviet 
society should work.  
Reformist patriotism held that the Soviet Union and its citizens must guide other 
states towards „liberalisation‟, as well as monitoring and copying progressive 
reforms pursued by communist parties in the outer empire. It was underpinned by a 
positive image of Ukraine‟s western neighbours, encouraging some citizens to 
believe that developments in the USSR and Ukraine should mirror East European 
„democratic‟ changes. In particular, proponents of reformist patriotism called for the 
Soviet authorities to limit censorship, encourage public debate, and provide more 
reliable and full information in the Soviet mass media. Reformist patriotism was also 
closely intertwined with the development of Ukrainian and Jewish identities. 
Complaining about the rise of anti-Semitism in the USSR and the outer empire, 
many citizens of Jewish origin called on the authorities to promote cultural freedom 
and national tolerance. Moreover, demanding cultural autonomy for Ukraine in the 
USSR, some residents of the republic drew an explicit link between Ukrainian rights 
and reformist ideas in foreign and domestic policy. They urged the authorities to 
tolerate „national‟ roads to socialism in Eastern Europe and in the USSR itself, 
defending thereby East European and Soviet reform movements. They also believed 
that freedom of speech and cultural expression would help to protect Ukrainian 
national rights. 
Meanwhile, conservative patriotism framed the most popular responses to events 
and developments in Soviet satellite states. Many residents of Ukraine asserted that 
Moscow should retain strong control over foreign countries and suppress 
„unorthodox‟ practices and ideas both in the outer empire and in the USSR. Party 
activists, war veterans, leading workers and other members of the aspirational 
middle class were especially vocal in condemning foreign unrest, which they 
believed to fuel anti-Soviet attitudes abroad and extremist nationalism and „hooligan‟ 
behaviour at home. While it is difficult to assess levels of genuine belief, it appears 
that these voices sometimes reflected popular fear of war and instability, which was 
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especially widespread in the borderlands in 1956. Some citizens who condemned 
foreign deviations from the Soviet model of socialism during public meetings and 
informal conversations also appeared to harbour a sense of pride in Soviet „imperial‟ 
power. 
More importantly, perhaps, articulations of conservative patriotism were a means 
of staging consent, which empowered inhabitants of Ukraine to fashion a range of 
social identities and to press demands on the Soviet state. Contrasting themselves 
with „unstable‟, „inferior‟ and „hostile‟ foreigners from the people‟s democracies, 
some residents of Ukraine claimed a privileged status in Soviet society. Apart from 
demanding perks such as international travel, these people often criticised 
inconsistencies and gaps in Soviet mass media, concerned as they were about the 
spread of malicious rumours and unhealthy attitudes among the „masses‟. At the 
same time, other citizens increasingly challenged the elitist claims of the aspirational 
middle class. In order to highlight their status as reliable „Soviet people‟, they 
emphasised that they carried the economic burden of maintaining an outer empire, 
helping thereby to preserve peace and stability in Eastern Europe. This helped to fuel 
economic populism and complaints against poor living standards in Ukraine, as 
people underlined that they deserved to live well in return for their hard work.  
Staging consent also allowed citizens to articulate Ukrainian identities in the 
framework of conservative patriotism. Particularly in the western oblasts, residents 
highlighted the role that Ukrainians played in protecting the wider Soviet and east 
Slavic community against the backward „nationalists‟ from Eastern Europe. In this 
way, people commonly linked notions of Ukrainianness with conservative „Soviet‟ 
goals and values. As „Ukrainians‟, they expressed distrust of their western 
neighbours, especially Poles, all the while supporting in public the idea of a close 
union with Russia. Many residents of the western borderlands who identified 
themselves as Ukrainian sought thereby to pursue their goals in the imagined east 
Slavic community, expecting to enjoy the full benefits of being part of the Soviet 
„socialist‟ state. They demanded that the authorities live up to their promises to 
improve the population‟s material wellbeing, claiming a right to live better than, or 
at least as well as, the „foreigners‟ in the outer empire. As a result, while Ukrainian 
identities ran strong in the western borderlands, western Ukraine turned into a 
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breeding ground for conservative patriotism, as well as reformist patriotism and 
„anti-Soviet‟ Ukrainian nationalism.  
A conservative version of Soviet patriotism triumphed in Ukraine by the end of 
the Brezhnev era. Yet in December 1991 residents of the republic voted 
overwhelmingly in favour of Ukrainian independence.
1
 This raises important 
questions about the relationship between Soviet and Ukrainian identities after the 
mid-1980s: what hopes did people associate with independence, and to what extent 
have Soviet identities survived in contemporary Ukraine?  
Because glasnost’ permitted people to debate what constituted their different 
collective goals and values, ideas inherent in staging consent shaped Ukrainian 
debates about policy during the Gorbachev era. As Alexei Yurchak argues, Mikhail 
Gorbachev‟s reforms allowed people to articulate „in a metadiscourse something that 
had already happened and had been lived by everyone- the mutation and internal 
shift of the system‟s discursive parameters‟.2 In other words, people could identify 
different, potentially contrasting „national‟ aims and loyalties, having earlier 
developed diverse visions of Sovietness: not only by debating the advantages and 
benefits of reform and, in some cases, drawing on rival discourses of populism and 
nationalism, but also, more importantly, by performing various social and national 
identities in the officially approved, formulaic rhetoric. 
In this way, the radical changes of the late 1980s and the 1990s threw into sharp 
relief the different notions of Ukrainianness which Soviet citizens had developed in 
the frameworks of „anti-Soviet‟ resistance, reformist Soviet patriotism, and 
conservative Soviet patriotism. On one level, legacies of „anti-Soviet‟ nationalism 
shaped attitudes among a small number of Ukraine‟s residents. Emboldened by the 
East European revolutions of 1989, these proponents of Ukrainian independence 
believed that the end of Soviet power and Russian domination was fast approaching.
3
 
Interactions with Eastern Europe during the Soviet era had exerted an important 
influence on the claims that „anti-Soviet‟ Ukrainian nationalists made during the late 
1980s and the 1990s. While rejecting Soviet power in Ukraine as „foreign‟, some 
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people continued to voice distrust of Poland as Ukraine‟s „national nemesis‟, but it 
seems that many others now perceived an independent Poland as a precondition and 
guarantee of Ukrainian sovereignty.
4
 Moreover, the legalisation of the Greek 
Catholic Church in Czechoslovakia in 1968, as well as the prominent role that the 
Roman Catholic Church played in fuelling the Polish dissident movement and 
Solidarity, reinforced in the popular imagination the link between nationalism and 
religion. Partly as a result of this, some advocates of Ukrainian independence grew 
to believe that religion could help to mobilise the population behind their cause, as 
well as underlining that religious belief should flourish in post-Soviet Ukraine.
5
 
Since 1991, some of these former anti-Soviet nationalists have also adopted an anti-
Western rhetoric, suggesting that religion must provide a buffer against what they 
perceive as negative features of the West, including violence, pornography, and 
homosexuality.
6
 
More prominently, notions of reformist patriotism re-emerged in public rhetoric 
during the late 1980s, helping to shape popular opinion about national rights, foreign 
policy, and democratisation. Serhii Yekelchyk suggests that an increasing number of 
Ukraine‟s residents believed that deep reform was necessary and, especially after 
1989, began to doubt the legitimacy of communist rule in the republic. Once again, 
Eastern Europe provided an important stimulus for the rise of reformist ideas: as 
Yekelchyk puts it, many „ordinary Ukrainians‟ saw the collapse of communism in 
neighbouring Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia as the writing on the wall for 
the CPU‟.7 Just as „reformist patriotism‟ had earlier advocated change in the USSR, 
proponents of reform during the Gorbachev period did not at first attack the Soviet 
state: even the biggest „opposition movement of the late Soviet era, Rukh, saw 
Ukraine as part of a revamped Soviet federation as late as 1990‟.8 At the same time, 
drawing on aspects of reformist patriotism, some top party apparatchiks in Kyiv 
began to promote the notion that Ukrainians should enjoy cultural autonomy in the 
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USSR, which allowed them to rebrand themselves as „national communists‟. 
Escaping the sinking ship, as Taras Kuzio and Andrew Wilson demonstrate, it was 
they who eventually made the decisive contribution to the cause of independence in 
1991.
9
  
Legacies of reformist patriotism have also exerted an important influence on 
Ukrainian policy and popular opinion since Soviet collapse. The country‟s first 
president, Leonid Kravchuk, formerly in charge of propaganda at the CPU Central 
Committee during the Brezhnev era, stressed the need to protect Ukrainian linguistic 
rights and confined Russian to the status of a minority language, which has ever 
since evoked heated debates among the population.
10
 Furthermore, some Ukrainian 
leaders, intellectuals and ordinary citizens like to recall Ukraine‟s historical links 
with „Central Europe‟, especially the Habsburg Empire,11  and to claim that the 
country should follow the „European‟ path of reform pursued in the former satellite 
states.
12
 Mirroring earlier patterns, these attitudes are especially widespread among 
the creative intelligentsia and residents of the western oblasts, helping to reinforce 
their sense of distinctiveness. In this way, reformist Soviet patriotism has evolved 
into a „liberal‟ version of Ukrainian patriotism, with citizens advocating the cause of 
independence without necessarily adopting the more aggressive and conservative 
rhetoric of the former „anti-Soviet‟ nationalists. 
At the same time, conservative patriotism has also left a lasting legacy in Ukraine. 
In line with the conservative suspicion of „anti-Russian‟ and „anti-Soviet‟ 
nationalism, few inhabitants of Ukraine showed interest in the cause of protecting 
Ukrainian national rights during the Gorbachev era.
13
 Furthermore, as Catherine 
Wanner demonstrates, despite widespread support for independence, many living in 
Ukraine were less supportive of the cultural changes that followed new state 
formation, at least during the 1990s.
14
 Meanwhile, without necessarily undermining 
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people‟s sense of belonging to the Ukranian nation, concepts of conservative 
patriotism have ensured the survival of some Soviet attitudes and ideas in Ukraine. A 
distinct Soviet identity sometimes manifests itself openly in the form of Soviet 
nostalgia and popular calls for a closer union with Russia, as the „masses‟ show more 
interest in Kyiv‟s relationship to Moscow than the West.15  As Iurii Andrukhovych 
suggests, negative perceptions of Ukraine‟s western neighbours also underpin hostile 
attitudes towards the „European‟ path of reform among the Ukrainian population.16 
More importantly, perhaps, elitist claims inherent in the practices of staging consent 
can be seen as an important prelude to the deep social rifts which emerged in 
Ukraine after 1991, helping to shape popular notions of class and status, while 
passive attitudes towards the state which characterised conservative patriotism seem 
to have resulted in a strong degree of political and social apathy. In this sense, it 
could be argued that the former advocates of conservative patriotism have evolved 
into what Mykola Riabchouk describes as the „third Ukraine‟: for „the most part 
invisible, mute, uncertain, undecided, ideologically ambivalent and ambiguous‟ 
majority.
17
  
Still, while retaining some „Soviet‟ ideas and attitudes, the great majority of the 
Ukrainian population does not question the legitimacy of the Ukrainian state. In part, 
this can be explained by the fact that notions of Ukrainianness are not incompatible 
with old conservative ideas of Soviet patriotism. Moreover, widespread support for 
independence which manifested itself in 1991 had arisen as two important pillars of 
conservative patriotism collapsed. Firstly, as Mark Kramer suggests, Gorbachev's 
„loss‟ of Eastern Europe acted to discredit the Soviet state as the leader of world 
socialism, undermining the sense of „imperial‟ pride which had underpinned patriotic 
attitudes throughout the post-war period.
18
 Secondly, whereas citizens had earlier 
offered obedience in return for material rewards and other perks, Gorbachev failed to 
deliver the kind of living conditions which the state promised to loyal citizens. At the 
same time, some people began to claim that the newly independent states of Eastern 
                                                          
15
 S. Shulman, „National Identity and Public Support for Political and Economic Reform in Ukraine‟, 
Slavic Review 64:1 (2005), 85. 
16
 I. Andrukhovych, 'Kraina mrii', Krytyka 9-10 (2004), pp. 2-3. See also Motyl, Dilemmas, 51-52. 
17
 M. Riabchouk, Dvi Ukrainy: real’ni mezhi, virtual’ni viiny (Kyiv, 2003), 304. 
18
 M. Kramer, „The Collapse of East European Communism and the Repercussions within the Soviet 
Union: Part Three‟, Journal of Cold War Studies 7:1 (2005), 67. 
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Europe guaranteed „social justice‟ more effectively than Soviet-style regimes.19 This 
helped to give rise to the notion that a sovereign Ukrainian state would fulfil 
citizens‟ material expectations better than the USSR.20 In other words, citizens hoped 
that Kyiv would now satisfy the kind of demands which they had earlier articulated 
through staging consent for Moscow, creating a notion of Ukrainianness which 
transcended the east-west divide. While the sense of material entitlement which 
underpinned Ukrainian identities resulted in much disappointment during the 1990s, 
it also seems that it encouraged citizens in the different regions to claim that the state 
must represent their rights. Legacies of conservative patriotism may even partly 
explain the growth of civil society which manifested itself during the Orange 
Revolution of 2004: many citizens linked media censorship to economic hardship 
and political corruption, building perhaps on both reformist and conservative 
criticisms of Soviet mass media.
21
 
The „diffusion‟ of ideas across borders was a crucial factor which shaped both the 
expression of particularistic identities but, equally importantly, the rise of Soviet 
patriotism in Ukraine. This tension illuminates the persistence of Soviet-shaped 
identities in contemporary Ukraine, challenging the absolute nature of the East-West 
divide, and tracing the development of various Ukrainian attitudes towards their 
western neighbours, „Europe‟, social welfare, and the role of the state. 
                                                          
19
 M. Kramer, „The Collapse of East European Communism and the Repercussions within the Soviet 
Union: Part One‟, Journal of Cold War Studies 5:4 (2003), 230. 
20
 Wilson, Ukrainian Nationalism, 128. 
21
See A. Wilson, Ukraine's Orange Revolution (New Haven, 2005). 
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Appendix A 
The table below was compiled by the head of the KGB by the Council of 
Ministers of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, V. Nikitchenko, on 12 
September 1968. It sums up the information about critical opinions concerning the 
situation in Czechoslovakia which the KGB had registered between 21 August and 
7 September 1968. Introducing the table, Nikitchenko underlined that the majority 
of the republic‟s population supported the military intervention in Czechoslovakia. 
There are some apparent inaccuracies in the data as outlined below. 
Unfortunately, I have not been able to access the archives to determine whether 
they had crept into the original report, or if they only appeared during the 
publication of the document in 2008. The table was originally published in Russian 
by the SBU archive in Kyiv.
1
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 O. Bazhan (ed.), „”Praz‟ka Vesna” u dokumentakh Galuzevoho derzhavnoho arkivu 
Sluzhby Bezpeky Ukrainy‟, Z arkhiviv VUChK-GPU-NKVD-KGB 1/2 (2008), pp. 111-114. 
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Workers 
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candidate 
members of 
the CPSU 
Komsomol 
Members 
Non-party 
members 
1 Opinions critical of the 
military intervention, 
criticism of interference 
in Czechoslovak affairs 
303 25.
8 
105 25 168 10 13 6 284 
2 Fears of a possible 
outbreak of the Third 
World War 
214 18.
1 
39 55 64 2 3 - 211 
3 Statements to the effect 
that the military 
measures adopted by the 
USSR and other 
socialist countries 
amount to the violation 
of Czechoslovak 
sovereignty, an 
„occupation‟, an 
„intervention‟, 
„gendarme measures‟ 
209 17.
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38 15 115 9 7 2 200 
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  All 
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% Blue Collar 
Workers 
Collective 
Farmers 
White 
Collar 
Workers 
Students Members and 
candidate 
members of 
the CPSU 
Komsomol 
Members 
Non-party 
members 
4 Threats to „deal‟ with 
communists in case the 
situation in the country 
becomes more 
complicated 
89 7.7 34 43 8 2 - - 89 
5 Demands to take the 
army into Romania and 
Yugoslavia 
56 4.8 20 4 32 - 13 - 56 
6 Opinions to the effect 
that the measures 
undertaken in 
Czechoslovakia 
undermine the prestige 
of the USSR in the eyes 
of other socialist 
countries 
41 3.5 11 3 27 1 3 - 38 
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% Blue Collar 
Workers 
Collective 
Farmers 
White 
Collar 
Workers 
Students Members and 
candidate 
members of 
the CPSU 
Komsomol 
Members 
Non-party 
members 
7 Opinions voiced by 
former members of the 
nationalist underground, 
claiming that the events 
in Czechoslovakia will 
strengthen nationalist 
tendencies in the 
republic, and thus fuel 
the fight for so-called 
„independent Ukraine‟ 
32 2.8 46 9 7 - - - 32 
8 Opinions voiced by 
individual 
representatives of the 
intelligentsia, workers, 
the youth, and other 
social groups about the 
need to introduce 
policies analogous to 
Czechoslovak 
„democratisation‟ in our 
country 
33 2.8 16 - 13 9 - - 33 
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% Blue Collar 
Workers 
Collective 
Farmers 
White 
Collar 
Workers 
Students Members and 
candidate 
members of 
the CPSU 
Komsomol 
Members 
Non-party 
members 
9 Information about 
instances of spreading 
anti-Soviet leaflets and 
anonymous documents 
which deal with the 
military intervention in 
Czechoslovakia 
23 2.2 1 - - 2 - 2 1 
10 Spreading provocative 
rumours about the 
events in 
Czechoslovakia 
8 0.8 2 - 4 1 1 - 7 
11 Opinions to the effect 
that the measures 
undertaken in 
Czechoslovakia 
undermine the USSR‟s 
prestige in the eyes of 
communist and workers‟ 
parties of capitalist 
countries 
25 2 2 8 13 2 1 2 22 
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Collective 
Farmers 
White 
Collar 
Workers 
Students Members and 
candidate 
members of 
the CPSU 
Komsomol 
Members 
Non-party 
members 
12 Opinions to the effect 
that the measures 
undertaken in 
Czechoslovakia will 
encourage other 
countries to leave the 
socialist camp 
21 1.9 11 5 8 - - - 21 
13 Opinions to the effect 
that the measures 
undertaken in 
Czechoslovakia 
undermine the USSR‟s 
prestige in the eyes of 
the working class of 
capitalist countries 
14 1.2 4 - 10 - 1 - 13 
14 Information about 
instances of panic 
buying 
14 1.2 3 6 5 - - 1 13 
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15 Opinions to the effect 
that the measures 
undertaken in 
Czechoslovakia 
undermine the USSR‟s 
prestige in the eyes of 
the national liberation 
movements of Latin 
America, Asia, and 
Africa. 
12 1.1 3 - 8 1 1 2 9 
16 Information about 
negative reactions of 
Jewish nationalists to 
the military intervention 
in Czechoslovakia 
13 1.1 2 - 9 - 2 - 11 
17 Information about anti-
Soviet graffiti which 
appeared in response to 
the military intervention 
in Czechoslovakia 
10 0.9 - - - 1 - 1 2 
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White 
Collar 
Workers 
Students Members and 
candidate 
members of 
the CPSU 
Komsomol 
Members 
Non-party 
members 
18 Opinions that the 
measures undertaken in 
Czechoslovakia make it 
more difficult to 
organise the 
international congress of 
communist and workers‟ 
parties 
8 0.8 2 - 4 1 1 - 7 
19 Negative reactions to the 
intervention amongst 
churchmen and 
members of religious 
sects 
8 0.7 2 4 2 - - - 8 
20 Public expressions of 
support for the 
Czechoslovak revolution 
5 0.4 1 1 3 - - - 5 
21 Refusals to serve in the 
army explained with 
reference to the military 
intervention in 
Czechoslovakia 
5 0.4 2 3 - - - - 5 
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candidate 
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Members 
Non-party 
members 
22 Opinions that the 
measures undertaken in 
Czechoslovakia will 
reinforce the military 
measures of American 
imperialists in Vietnam 
4 0.3 1 - 3 - - - 4 
23 Opinions that the 
measures undertaken in 
Czechoslovakia will 
strengthen Israeli 
aggression against Arab 
countries 
5 0.4 1 - - 4 - - 5 
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